**PART I**

**BASICS OF THE SCIENCE OF STRATEGY**

**Chapter One**

**War, Strategy and the Science of Strategy**

The Science of strategy is a military science on rules of war, guiding rules of war, and the evolution rules of strategy. Its main task is to study and show the essence of war and strategy, the influence of various objective factors on strategy, and the operating mechanism and internal rules of strategic thinking activity and the practical activities of war and strategic guidance. The Science of strategy emphasizes closely combining historical experiences and current analysis of strategic environment with a prediction of future war, providing a scientific theoretical foundation for correct strategic decision and strategic guidance. To study the science of strategy in depth, we have to first understand the basic concepts of war, strategy, and the science of strategy, the position of the science of strategy in military academic studies, the basic structure of strategy, and the branch structure of the science of strategy.

**Section One: War, Strategy, and the Science of Strategy**

Strategy is born and developed as war practice develops.

As a social and historical phenomenon, war is the product of human beings developing to a certain stage. In the early clan society of mankind, the productivity was extremely low; people practiced public ownership inside a clan. They worked together, consumed together, closely united together within a clan. There was no internal condition for mutual conflict. The outward relation was mainly the relationship with nature. Rich natural resources could meet the basic demand for survival of all the clans, so there was little communication between clans. There was no external condition for conflict among clan groups. Nevertheless, as the primitive society developed and the population of clan groups expanded the balance between the material demand of clan groups and the total amount of natural living materials in certain regions were broken. People had to migrate to other regions. This kind of migration often invaded the economic interest of other clans, so it led to war of the earliest form of human society. As Marx pointed out, for the primitive commune, “war was to occupy the objective condition for survival”.[[1]](#footnote-0) The war of that time was the group activity of all the members of clan groups to meet the common demand of production and life. Its purpose was to seize natural resources instead of taking control or enslaving other social groups and individuals. After entering class society, the war of the earliest form stepped out of history gradually. The war replacing it was purely predatory. The war of this time had completely “become incessant plundering of livestock, slaves, and treasures, and become a normal business.”[[2]](#footnote-1) The war of class society has lost its direct connection with production procedure. It not only fought for natural resources, but also the material wealth created by other people and the labor force itself. It was the continuation of class politics through violence. It was a higher struggle form for solving the contradiction among nations, peoples, and political groups. It was the politics of bloodshed.

The early war of mankind was brief in combat, sustainable time involved and simple in its combat method. The combat tools were mainly primitive production tools. When the two sides fought, it was mainly a frontal assault and the killing of groups. It was the fight of strength and bravery. The result of war relied on the number, physical strength, and bravery of combatants. There was no planning of the comprehensive situation of war and conscious application of combat method. As war practice developed, and the practical experiences over a long time accumulated, people gradually got to know how to use tactics and planning in war. They gradually sorted out different combat methods and guiding methods of war, and they started to make different operational arrangements and operational plans according to different combat methods and combat needs. There came strategy. From the very beginning, strategy has been closely connected with war. The original meaning of strategy is the strategy of conducting war. The concepts of political strategy and economic strategy that appeared later were only the derivatives of war strategy.

In the 5000 years of Chinese history, war practice is extremely rich. According to incomplete statistics, from the War of Shennongshi against the Fusui Clan in the 26th Century B.C.,[[3]](#footnote-2) to the ending of the Qing Dynasty, there is altogether over 6,000 wars in these 4000 years. This accounts for over one third of the total number of wars in the same period of time in the world. In this long war practice, the commanders and strategists of the ancient Chinese wars not only accumulated rich practical war experience, but also raised this kind of experience to theoretical knowledge, forming a comprehensive combat and combat guidance theory. It is said that as early as in the remote ages, Shennongshi had already had one book on the art of war. Xuanyuanshi, Emperor Huang, had 16 books on the art of war; and Chiyoushi had 2 books on the art of war. There were military theoretic works such as “Military Politics” and the “Military Journal”. According to some scholars’ statistics, currently our country has over 3,380 books on the art of war with 23,503 volumes on catalogue, including 2,308 ancient books on the art of war with 18,567 volumes.[[4]](#footnote-3) “The Art of War by Sunzi” by the great strategist Sun Wu in the late Spring and Autumn Period over 2,400 years ago is the outstanding representative. It is the world’s first famous book of ancient military theory that is currently the earliest and most influential book. It is an important mark of military maturity and great development of ancient Chinese military theory. Today it is still called “The Bible of Military Theory” of the world, as well as “The Ancestor of Military Theory”. There are other important books on military theory: “The Art of War by Wuzi,” “The Art of War by Sunbin,” “The Art of Sima,” “Weiliaoz," “Mastering Amazing Theory,” “Six Strategies,” “Three Strategies of Mr. Huang,” “Q & A with Tang and Li” by Jing Li, “Grand White Negative Theory” by Li Quan, “Illustrated Book of Chouhai” by Ruozeng Zheng, “Zhen Ji” by He Liangchen, “Overview on Military Theory” by Gongliang Zeng, “Huqian Theory” by Xu Dong, “Amazing Tactics of a Hundred Combats” by Xie Fangde, “New Book of Ji Xiao” the “Journal of Training Troops” by Qi Jiguang, the “Book on Military Preparation” by Mao Yuanyi, and the “Illustrated Theory of Sea” by Yuan Wei, etc. These ancient Chinese military works did not separate strategy from the traditional military science clearly. Strategy was usually referred to as “plot,” “plan,” “project,” “policy,” “planning,” “calculation,” “art of war,” “strategy,” and “tactics,” such as “Miao Calculation,” “Miao Policy,” “Miao Combat,” “Planning,” “Strategy,” “Soldier’s Strategy,” “Armed Forces Strategy,” “Strategy of a General,” and “Military Strategy,” etceteras. In theory, they already covered the main aspects of strategy. The strategic thinking characteristic of oriental strategic thinking (such as “defeating the enemy without using force,” “planning before fighting,” “planning and making decisions before action,” “knowing the enemy and knowing yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without defeat,” “attacking and planning,” “making friends with remote states and attacking the neighbors,” “war is about making friends and making plans,” “carefully preparing and cautiously fighting,” “thinking of danger while in peace,” “to win with surprise,” “using force in a unique way,” “enough food makes a strong force,” “food shortage makes our force weaker,” “when the enemy tries to do everything, we should do one thing well,” and “wiping out extremity and falsity,”) are still shining with the glory of wisdom and have profound meaning and infinite charm.

According to the “History of Han,” Hong Ren, an infantry officer of the Western Han Dynasty, divided the ancient military strategists into four categories: military tacticians, military situation controllers, military geomancers, and military craftsmen. This is actually the earliest categorization of military theoretical study in world history. Hong Ren thought that the “situation controller, like wind, moves after the thunder strikes, comes first though moves late, moves around in an unexpected way, and defeats an enemy with minimal loss”. “A geomancer acts in accordance with the situation, carries out the penalty and morality, conducts combat, wins comprehensive victories, and sometimes borrows help from ghosts and angles”. “A craftsman practices with his hands and feet, uses convenient equipment, makes his construction in order to win by successful offensive and defense”. Meanwhile, “a tactician defends the country with righteousness, uses force with surprise, plans before fighting, following the situation and nature and using his skills”. Though Hong Ren did not use the word “strategy,” from the explanation he gave for the military strategists of the four categories, “military strategists” can be categorized into the field of modern “strategist”.[[5]](#footnote-4) The leading position of China in the strategic field in ancient times is well recognized in the world. “The Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union,” published in 1976 through 1980, points out clearly: “as part of the practical activities of the supreme military command institution, military strategy was born in the orient, India, China, and slave countries such as ancient Greece and the ancient Rome.” “The earliest theoretic works involving military strategic issues appeared in ancient times. These works include: “The Art of War by Sunzi” by the Chinese commander in chief and theorist Sun Wu (the 6th Century B.C. to the 5th Century B.C.), as well as the works by Julius Caesar, the Roman Commander in Chief (the First Century B.C.), Flounting Aunorsander, the Roman historian (the First Century), and Weigtewoose (late 4th Century to early 5th Century). There is no doubt that “The Art of War by Sunzi” is the earliest among them.[[6]](#footnote-5) The former Director of the Strategic Institute of the Defense University of the United States, John Collins, has also said in his book “Great Strategy” that Sunzi was “a strategic inventor well recognized” in the world, and “Sunzi was a great man who was the first to form strategic ideas in ancient times.” “The 13 books of Sunzi could match any famous works in history, including the works by Clausaiweitch 2,200 years later. Today, there is no one who can have a more profound understanding of the relationship of strategy, the issues to think, and their limit. Most of his views still have the same significance in today’s environment as they had in ancient times”.[[7]](#footnote-6)

As for the appearance of the word “strategy” as military terminology, it was no later than the late 3rd Century in ancient China. Sima Biao (? A.C.-year 306 A.C.), the historian and military strategist of the Western Jin Dynasty 1,700 years ago, wrote a book called “Strategy”. Though the original copy is lost, part of its content can still be seen here and there in ancient books such as “History of Three States” and the “Taiping Imperial Book.” Huang Shi of Qin Dynasty collected its scattered articles into one volume with 8 sections, about 2,000 words. This is the earliest book on “strategy” we can see today and the word “strategy” used in military context for the first time. Judging from the content of this book, it mainly describes combat strategy and the method of commanding a troop to fight. Though its understanding of strategy does not completely match modern understanding, generally speaking, it is similar. After Sima Biao, Zhao Jiong, a general of the Northern Wei Dynasty and head of Jincheng County (about 532-599) of the 6th Century, also wrote a book called “Strategy” with 26 volumes. “Books of Sui Dynasty, Books and Theories,” and “Tongzhi, Art and Culture” all put it into the category of Military works. In the late Ming Dynasty of the 17th Century, deputy senior officer Mao Yuanyi wrote “A Study of Strategy in the History of 21 States,” collecting strategic historic stories from the Spring and Autumn Period through the Yuan Dynasty into 33 volumes, 613 sections, becoming part of his “Book on Military Preparation.” So we can say that strategy has a long history in China, and it has a relatively complete theoretical form and existing form.

In the west countries, according to research, the word “strategy” comes from the Greek word “strategicon”. According to an historical story of the 6th Century, the Eastern Roman Empire (the Byzantine Empire) divided the country into several military regions with each military region having a military commander whom was also responsible for civil affairs. He was called “strategos,” meaning “general.” In 580, Maurice, the Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire (539-620) edited and wrote a military textbook “Strategicon,” meaning “how to be a general.” It was especially for training the above military officers. Modern scholars tend to think that this is the earliest usage of the word “strategy”. The English word “strategy” is derived out of the root of “strategicon.” Ever since the birth of Maurice’s textbook “Strategicon,” in over 1,000 years, the word “strategy” did not become popular, and it almost fell into oblivion, until it reappeared in the work of the French Meichrouya (1719-1780) in 1771. From the above historical record we can see that China is earlier than the west both in the development of theory and the practice of strategic guidance as well as the birth of the concept of strategy. At least there are parallel trees of strategy grown out of the rich earth of two different civilized systems. Some said that the word “strategy” is a foreign word, and was brought into China in the late 19th Century. This is diminishing ourselves and groundless.

Though the development of theory and practice of strategy and the history of the application of the concept of strategy is very long, it was only after the 18th Century that people separated strategy from tactics and defined them clearly. In his famous book of 1799, “Summary of the Latest Combat Methods,” Hainehili Dietelish Billo (1757-1807), founder of the bourgeois military science of 18th Century Germany, divided military science into two major parts of strategy and tactics for the first time, and he gave definition to them respectively for the first time. He thought “strategy is the science about the military action outside of one’s sight and the range of cannon, while tactics is the science about the military action inside the above limit.” Billo’s contribution is that he distinguished strategy and tactics for the first time. Nevertheless, he only distinguished strategy and tactics according to the radius of operation that obviously did not leave the range of operational tactics and did not catch the essence of strategy. The rich military activities of the French bourgeois revolution in the late 18th Century further pushed forward the development of strategic theory. As Lenin pointed out, “the revolutionary French people of that time not only showed the utmost revolutionary tenacity in France for the first time that had never showed before in the past several hundred years, but also showed the same great revolutionary creativity in the war of the late 18th Century. They reformed all the strategic systems.”[[8]](#footnote-7) Two outstanding strategic theorists, Swiss Normeny and Prussian Clauseweich, grew out of the rich nutrition of the military practice of the French bourgeois revolution, carefully summing up the military practical experiences of the French bourgeois revolution and gave new theoretical generalization to the concept of strategy. Normeny (1779-1869) pointed out in his well-known representative work, “Overview of the Art of War,” that the art of war generally includes strategy, great tactics, war service, engineering art, and basic tactics. The issue involving the whole war zone belongs to strategy. “Strategy is the art of conducting war on a map, and it is the art to study the whole war zone. Tactics is the art of local combat at the place where conflict happens and deploying forces according to local conditions, it is the art of using forces at various places on a battlefield”.[[9]](#footnote-8) Normeny talked about the scope of strategy study in detail, including battlefield, operational base, strategic line, strategic point, decisive point of a battlefield, target point in operation, strategic front, strategic defense line, and reserve troops, etc. Another famous bourgeois military strategist, Clauseweich (1780-1831), who lived in the same time as Normeny, said in his strategic classic work “On War” that “tactics and strategy mix together in space and time, but they are two different activities in nature.” Tactics is “the arrangement and conduction of combat itself,” and “it is the knowledge of using troops in operation,” while strategy is “the application of these operations in order to achieve the goal of war.” Normeny and Clauseweich distinguished strategy and tactics in combat form, combat planning, and application. They not only saw the difference of strategy and tactics in space and time, but also noticed their difference in nature. It moved one step forward from Billo’s foundation definition. Clauseweich especially linked strategy with the goal of war, further showing the essential characteristics of strategy. Though some accused it of trespassing political scope, or invading the scope of the supreme leader of war, it is because of this that Clauseweich appeared one level higher than the others.

From the 19th Century to the Second World War, strategy thinking got more and more active. There were more and more new strategy schools and strategy thinkers coming out, and there were various strategy theories. It was closely related with the rapid development of military science and technology and incessant expansion of war fields. The application of modern weapons such as the airplane, warship, tank and missiles as well as nuclear weaponry greatly changed the look of war. The large-scale conduct in the two world wars created unprecedented wide and broad battlefields, all the political forces are called to this large battlefield to a life-or-death fight, many regions and major countries in the world were involved. It urged people to think about military strategy concept from a higher position and broader background. On this new material foundation people formed a modern concept of military strategy.

Because countries, political groups, and various strategy schools are in different strategic environments, strategic positions, and they have different strategic interests, they have different understandings and explanations of the concept of strategy. In today’s world, you can hardly find two exactly same definitions of strategy. In various modern definitions of strategy, the most representative ones are the following four:

One is the definition of strategy by British military theorist Lider Hart. Lider Hart (1895-1970) experienced two world wars in his life and he was once the consultant to the Army Secretary of Britain. In his representative work, “On Strategy,” he summed up and analyzed the war experiences of 2,500 years. Based on other people’s research, he discussed comprehensively the so-called “indirect line” strategy, and gave his own definition of strategy. He thought that “strategy does not only study the deployment of troops—conventional definitions only focus on this, but it also needs to consider the effect of troop deployment.” “Strategy is an art to assign and apply military means to achieve political goals, and the application of military force in a mass campaign, the operational deployment of these forces, and the command of direct action belong to the scope of tactics”. Lider Hart also put out the concept of “great strategy” above “strategy” for the first time. He pointed out that ‘great strategy,’ or high-grade strategy is to “adjust and guide all the resources of a country or several countries in order to reach the political goal of war.”[[10]](#footnote-9) Lider Hart undoubtedly switched the goal of strategy from a military goal to a political goal. It is obviously a great leap forward in knowledge and sheds a new light on modern strategy. But his definition is still limited on “troop deployment,” and it did not break away from the influence or limitations of classic strategy. In this sense, it plays a role of missing link in the formation of the concept of modern strategy. People usually consider him as the finisher of classic strategy and the first one to start modern strategy.

The second one is the definition of strategy given by Mao Zedong and “The Military Terminologies of the People’s Liberation Army” (1997 edition). Mao Zedong is an outstanding strategist of revolutionary war. In the great struggle of the Chinese revolutionary war and the national liberation war the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people conducted under his leadership, he not only established incomparable glorious achievement, but also established a complete theory of war and strategy. In his 1936, “The Strategic Issues in the Chinese Revolutionary War,” he pointed out: “strategic issue is to study the rules of the overall situation of war.” As for the definition of “overall situation of war,” Mao Zedong thought, “as far as there is war, there is the overall situation of war. The whole world can be the overall situation of war; a country can be the overall situation of war; a dependent guerrilla district and a major and independent operational front can also be the overall situation of war. All the things that have the nature of taking care of all aspects and all phases are the overall situation of war.” Here, “all aspects” are in the sense of space, and we can take it as the overall time situation of war. The conclusion is: “the task of the science of strategy is to study the guiding rules of war that involve the overall situation. The task of this science of campaign and tactics is to study the guiding rules of war that involve local situations.”[[11]](#footnote-10) Mao Zedong not only added the concept of “campaign” in-between strategy and tactics, but also emphasized the overall situation and rules of strategy. For the first time, he pointed out that there was internal objective rules within strategy, they were not the product of subjective will, and strategy focused on the comprehensive planning of the overall situation instead of any concrete answer to any local issue. In this way, he gave a scientific definition on strategy from the height of philosophy, peeling off all the external factors on strategy and opening the most essential core of strategy. It embodies the dialectic thinking of the oriental cultural tradition of strategy. “The Military Terminologies of the People’s Liberation Army,” issued in September 1997, sticks to Mao Zedong’s scientific definition on strategy.

The third one is the definition of strategy by the military of the Soviet Union. “Military Strategy,” edited by Soklovesky, the Soviet marshal and former First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Union in 1962, says that strategy is “the scientific knowledge system of the rules of war, of armed struggle, that serve the interests of certain classes. Based on the study of past war experiences, as well as military and political situations, and the economic and spiritual strength of a country such as new weaponry, the views and strength of the expected enemy, the studies and condition and nature of future wars, ways to prepare and conduct future wars, the application principle of all military branches and their strategy, material and technology safeguarding principles, guidelines of war, and the command principle of the armed forces”.[[12]](#footnote-11) This definition is further supplemented and revised in the “Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union” edited by another Soviet marshal, the First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Union, Alkalkove, in 1976 through 1980 and “The Military Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Soviet Union,” edited also by Alkalkove in 1983. The revised definition thinks that strategy is “part of military academic study and the highest field. It includes the theory and practice of the preparation of war by a country and the armed forces, planning and conducting war, and strategic campaigns.” “As a field of practical activities, military strategy should solve the issues such as deciding the strategic task of the armed forces and the forces and weapons necessary for achieving the strategic task, according to the specific conditions of war; planning and implementing the measures for the armed forces of a country, war zone, economy and residents to prepare for war, and the measures for making war and strategic campaign plans,” etc. The definition also claims that military strategy “comes from politics and serves politics.” It is “the subordinate position of military strategy under politics which decides the class nature of military strategy”.[[13]](#footnote-12) The definition of strategy by the Soviet Union clearly divides strategy into two parts, a scientific knowledge system and the field of practical activities. It stipulates the position of strategy in military academic study, suggests the main entity of strategic action, the main task of strategy, and the foundation of developing strategy, and it also emphasizes the class nature of strategy and emphasizes that “the politics that reflects the interest of progressive classes will certainly produce advanced military strategy. On the contrary, the military strategy that suits the counter-revolutionary politics reflecting the interest of exploitation classes can only produce counter-revolutionary and invasive strategy.”[[14]](#footnote-13) The characteristics of the definition of strategy of the Soviet Union are closely related to the strategic actual combat that, after the Second World War, the two military groups of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the two great ideologies of the east and the west sharply confronted in the Cold War. In a certain sense, it is the reflection of international politics in strategic theory in the Cold War era.

The fourth one is the definition of strategy of the armed forces of the United States. “The Military Terminology Dictionary of the United States” of 1953 reviewed and approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff says: “military strategy is the art and science to use a nation’s armed forces to achieve various goals of national policy through force or threat of force.”[[15]](#footnote-14) “Military Strategy,” published by the United States Army Military Academy in 1983, also uses the above definition approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The characteristic of this definition is to expand the intention and extension of military strategy. This definition promotes the practical application of the armed forces as well as the application of threat of the armed forces; it considers military strategy an art as well as a science with rules. Based on this definition, Maxwell Tyler, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States in 1981, pointed out that strategy includes three factors of goal, method, and means, represented in a formula as: strategy = goal (target to pursue) + way (action plan) + means (tool to achieve goal). The complete content of military strategy consists of deciding the strategic goal, developing strategic guidance for achieving these goals, and using or threatening to use military force to carry out the strategic guidance in order to achieve the strategic goal eventually. The definition of the United States is based on the strength position of the strategic superiority of the United States. Because of the global nature of the national policy goal of the United States, this definition is also connected with the outward nature and global nature of the military strategy of the United States.

The above definitions represent different strategic cultural traditions, different understandings of the concept of strategy by different needs of strategic interest. Although the countries, political interest groups, and schools of strategy in today’s world have expressions of the concept of strategy that are far different from each other both in content and form, they belong to different political entities. In the theory and practice of modern military strategy, we can see that there are roughly the following basic factors in the concept of modern military strategy:

Number one, it is the main player of strategic action. That is to answer the question of who the maker and decision-maker of strategy are. The alliance of nations can be the main player of strategic action, a country can be the main player of strategic action, and an independent political and military group or a strategic region can also be the main player of strategic action. In modern international political life, a country is usually the main player of international action. Therefore, a country often acts as the main player of modern strategic action.

Number two is the scope of strategic action. This is the main mark for distinguishing one strategy from the other strategy. Military strategy is closely related with politics, economy, and culture. But military strategy cannot use politics, economy, or culture as its main field of action. Military strategy makes war as its study and action field. Otherwise, it will not be military strategy. The scope of modern military strategic action is growing, and this trend is not and cannot be separated from the kernel of preparing and conducting war.

Number three; it is a strategic goal. A strategic goal is the expected result that the strategic action is supposed to achieve. It is the concrete embodiment of strategic intention. Different strategic goals often reflect different natures of strategy. Self-defensive strategy is connected with legal interests such as maintaining territorial sovereignty and integrity, while outward offensive strategy usually draws the territory of other countries into one’s own strategic border, taking the interest of other countries into one’s own interest range, and making one’s strategic goal that of getting political and economic interests outside of the border of one’s own country.

Number four is strategic means. That is the material force to actually conduct a combat strategic goal. This force is sometimes shown as a singular military force. But more often, it is a comprehensive force with military strength as the main player and including military, political, economic, and psychological forces. The display form of strategic force can be actual combat as well as potential combat.

To sum up, the complete form of modern strategic concept it is to explain the most fundamental issues such as whom, in what scope, by what means, and to reach what goal, etc.

According to the general rules of defining strategy and the specific situations of today in our country, the intention of the national military strategy of our country in the new era could be summarized as:

The strategy (e.g. military strategy) of our country in the new era is the planning and guidance of war preparation and the overall situation and whole process of war for building up and applying military force in maintaining national sovereignty and security, based on the comprehensive strength of the country and guided with active defensive thinking and winning the local war under hi-tech conditions.

This overall statement emphasizes the following points:

Number one, it clearly points out that in the new era, the main player of national military strategy is the nation instead of certain political and military groups or certain strategic regions. Number two; it defines that the nature of our military strategy is defensive instead of outward and expansive. Its mission is to maintain the national sovereignty and territorial integrity, to defend against foreign invasion and subversion, to protect the peaceful labor of people, and the strategic border of our country is the same as our natural border. Number three emphasizes that the material foundation of the military strategy of our country is the national comprehensive strength (including actual combat strength and potential strength) instead of military force only. Number four comprehensively explains that the whole process of strategy includes the making of strategy as well as the implementation of strategy. The former is the planning process of strategy, while the latter is the guiding process of strategy. The guidance of strategy includes the guidance of war preparation as well as the guidance of application of strategic material force. The application of strategic material force includes the application of actual combat as well as the application of deterrence. Strategic guidance is shown in wartime as well as in peacetime. The function of strategy includes winning a war as well as preventing and limiting a war.

The above description enriches the intention of the concept of strategy of the new era, while sticking to the kernel idea that strategy is the planning and guidance for “the overall situation of war,” instead of taking up the idea of “the overall situation of military struggle.” This is because:

First, strategy has always been connected with war. Without war, strategy itself loses its meaning. In a war, there is always the issue of coordination of war action and non-war action. Non-war action is only part of the overall situation of war, and it only becomes the issue of strategic study as an extension and supplement of war action. The development of military practice has not surpassed or broken through the natural intention of strategy, and Mao Zedong’s classic judgment of strategy is not outdated.

Second, war is a social phenomenon. It is actual combat, lively, and concrete, while military is the social field different from political, economic, and cultural fields. It is an abstract concept. These two cannot simply replace each other. In the concept of “the overall situation of military struggle,” the confrontational, violent, and tactical nature characteristic of war as the bloody politics is unconsciously made indirect. It appears to have expanded the scope of strategy, but actually it weakens, even blurs the core intention of strategy. If strategy makes “overall situation of military struggle” as its subject, then campaign operations related with strategy take “local situations of military strategy” as the subject. This will cause confusion in military academic systems.

Third, the science of strategy is not equal to the science of peace. Peace is a phase result of strategic planning. It is not the process and the content of strategic planning. The science of peace can take peaceful means, peaceful ways, peaceful methods, and peaceful forms as the subjects of study, while the main content of strategic study can only be to limit war, prepare for war, and conduct war. Whether it is wartime, or a relative peaceful time in between two wars, strategy is always conducted around war. It is true in both ancient times and modern times, domestic and abroad. There is no “blind area” and “blank area” of strategic guidance.

Fourth, the task of strategy planning is to limit war, prepare for war, and win in war. Nevertheless, the basic focus is on winning the war. Talking about limiting war without war preparation and war implementation or emphasizing undue and abstractly conducting “pan-military struggles” without war preparation and implementation can hardly realize the goal of limiting war. Because of this, the military strategic guidance in the new era lays its foundation on winning the local war under hi-tech conditions.

Fifth, theory serves reality. As far as the practice of strategic guidance is concerned, the source of modern war still exists, and the danger of war is far from eliminated. Though there will not be any world war in the near future, we are still facing the threat of hegemony; we are still carrying the hard and sacred mission of protecting our national interests and completing the great task of unifying the motherland. To stick to making “the overall situation of war” as the object of our strategic study is good for keeping a sane mind and clearly following the actual combat requirements and combat capabilities and standards to implement the defensive operational preparation of anti-invasion, anti-separatism, and anti-intervention as well.

**Section Two: Division and Structure of Strategy**

Scientific strategic division and establishing reasonable strategic levels and structure is the natural result of the evolution of strategic theory and practice, as well as the objective requirement of further development of strategic theory and practice. In the long history of the development of war and strategy, as the time factor, space factor, social factor, and various objective material conditions that influence strategy change all the time, the display form of strategy also shows more and more the characteristics of variety, while strategic practice and the study of strategic theory develop in two directions, systematic and detailed. It is an important mark for the deeper study of strategic theory and the only way for prosperous strategic theory to correctly reflect the development tendencies of analyzing and studying strategy as a system in order to accurately master the individual characteristics and special nature of different strategies while understanding the common characteristics of strategy. It is also an important part in pushing forward orderly strategic practice, high efficiency, and conducting strategic guidance specifically and flexibly.

According to the nature and form of operational action, we can divide strategy into two categories: offensive strategy and defensive strategy. This is the most basic strategic division, or the most basic strategic category. Every war is a contest of offense and defense of two opposite sides. Offense and defense are the two most basic action models as well as the most basic standard and foundation of strategic division. The superior side or the side that is outside of the strategic line uses usually offensive strategy. During the process of implementing this strategy, people usually use military superiority to launch surprise attacks in order to have a fast fight and fast victory to achieve a strategic goal. Defensive strategy is a strategy that is overall defensive. Usually, the side that is inferior in military strength or in the inner line of strategy takes this position. This strategy shows more the nature of self-defense. Offensive strategy is in the offensive posture in the overall situation, and offensive action is its main model. But in operation and combat, it is sometimes forced to take defensive action in its inner line. In the overall situation, defensive strategy is in the inner line a defensive posture, but it does not necessarily exclude offensive action in the outer line of combat. The actual combat defensive strategy is always closely combined with the strategic defensive and operational and combat offensive strategies. Besides, only by active outer line operational and combat offensives can we change gradually the balance of force and strategic postures, turning strategic defense into strategic counterattack and eventually achieve the defensive strategic goal. To divide strategy into offensive strategy and defensive strategy can let us understand the basic nature of strategy and the basic posture of strategy more accurately. This division is the foundation and precondition of other divisions. We can say that the other divisions are all extensions of this division with different significance and different aspects, and they are closely related with this division.

Based on the above basic division of strategy, we can also make different divisions of strategy from different angles.

By the time characteristic of combat operation, we can divide strategy into the two types of fast winning strategy and protracted strategy. Fast winning strategy is often connected with offensive strategy. It tries to use flashing offensive action to achieve strategic goals in the shortest possible time. The relatively stronger side usually takes this strategy. Protracted strategy is often connected with a defensive strategy. It tries to turn a war or military struggle into a protracted one, using time for space, blunting the enemy’s edge in a protracted contest, gradually accumulating strength, adding small victories into big victories. Usually, the side that is politically just but militarily inferior takes this strategy. The protracted strategy implemented in the great Chinese war against the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 1940s of the 20th Century is the most outstanding example of protracted strategy in the military history of the world. In this life and death struggle between glory and darkness, justice and evil, and progress and counterrevolutionary decline, facing the strong military offensive of the Japanese military that had first-class military strength, economic power, and political organizational power in the east, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people calmly analyzed and concluded that the Japanese were in military superiority, but it had a smaller territory, it was backwards, and it had less help. While China was in an inferior position, China had a larger territory, China was progressive, and China had more help. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people stuck to a protracted strategy, through a hard struggle of 8 long years, not only smashing the crazy calling of “conquering China in three months” of the Japanese fascists, but also driving the Japanese invaders totally out of the Chinese territory. For the first time we won the comprehensive and total victory against foreign invasion in the modern history of China and wrote down a glorious page in the war history of mankind.

By the space characteristics of operational action, we can divide strategy into ground strategy, air strategy, sea strategy, and outer space strategy, etc. Ground strategy is the strategy with land as the main space for operational activities. Ground space is the most basic foothold or the first dimension of space for human survival and military activities. The activities of other spaces all take ground space as the starting and destination point. Therefore, ground strategy is not only the earliest strategy of the history of war, but also the most used basic strategic model in the history of war. Sea strategy and air strategy as the second and third dimensions of space strategy are developed gradually after warship and airplane and other new combat means came out and were massively used in war. The sea strategy represented by Marham’s theory of sea power served the competition over the sea and overseas colonial expansion of bourgeois and colonialism in early times. The air strategy represented by Duhai’s theory of air control came into being in the 20th Century. In the two world wars and the half-century Cold War between the east and the west, it was mainly used in the contest for air superiority between imperialism and hegemonism. In the late 20th Century, as the development of air weapons and the conduct of independent air campaigns increased, air strategy became more and more important in modern war. Outer space strategy was proposed in the latter part of the 20th Century first by the United States and then the Soviet Union, the two space technology powers, for the purpose of getting military superiority in outer space. Currently, outer space strategy is still further developing and in its growing period.

According to the main means of operational action, we can divide strategy into nuclear strategy, conventional war strategy, and hi-tech conventional war strategy. In the 1940s of the 20th Century, the first mushroom cloud over the Los Alamos Desert of the State of New Mexico of the United States brought mankind into nuclear times. The huge destructive power and strategic effect has changed the nature of the material force of war. Nuclear strategy was born. Nuclear strategy is the strategy for building up nuclear forces and using nuclear force to achieve strategic goals. In the half-century Cold War between the east and the west after the Second World War, relying on their super satiated, super destructive and huge nuclear arsenals, both the United States and the Soviet Union made nuclear strategy the important pillar of their national military strategy. Today, though world nuclear disarmament has made some progress, the quality race of nuclear arms is still going on. The proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear weaponry is hard to stop. And nuclear strategy is far from finishing its historic mission. To distinguish it from nuclear weapon and nuclear strategy, non-nuclear weaponry is usually called conventional weaponry, and the military strategy of conventional war with conventional weaponry is usually called conventional war strategy. The functional mechanism of nuclear weapons includes the application of nuclear weapons in actual combat. Nevertheless, it is more about its non-combat usage and, rather, the use of threat. Related with this, conventional war strategy can also be divided into the conventional war strategy under nuclear threat and the traditional conventional war strategy under no nuclear threat. In fact, ever since the appearance of nuclear weapons, apart from the two atom bombs dropped by the United States over Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan, there is no other case of using nuclear weapon in actual combat in the world. The conventional war strategy under the threat of nuclear weaponry is the most popular strategic choice after the Second World War. Hi-tech conventional war strategy is born out of the development of a series of non-nuclear hi-tech and new military technologies such as electronic computer technology, precise guiding technology, laser technology, remote attack technology, and space technology in the new revolution of military development after the 1970s of the 20th Century. The application of these non-nuclear high and new technologies has the strategic effect similar to nuclear weapons while avoiding the huge political risk of stepping over the nuclear threshold. Therefore, its importance and position rises day by day, becoming a new and more and more popular strategic model for countries. Especially when Internet information time is here, informational war and informational war strategy is getting wide attention. The core of informational war strategy is to seize and maintain strategic information superiority and information superiority on the battlefield. One seeks to achieve strategic goals through information control and information attack, including conducting soft sabotage or hard destruction of the infrastructure, basic information sources or battlefield information systems, the armed forces of a country relies on for survival through information network in order to achieve its strategic goals. This is an all-new strategic concept and strategic model.

According to the application method of operational means, we can divide strategy into two types of actual combat strategy and deterrent strategy. Actual combat strategy is to put military force onto the battlefield to fight directly, while deterrent strategy is the strategy for achieving strategic goals through the threat of force. The latter does not really use force directly. Instead, it openly shows the resolve of using force and shows that it can bring unbearable consequences upon the opponent, forcing the opponent to give up. The basic factors for real deterrence are one, you have proper military strength; two, you have the resolve and will to use force; and, three, you make your opponent believe this strength and resolve. These three factors function together, no one is dispensable. Otherwise, deterrence will fail. According to the purpose of threat and the nature of deterrent force, deterrent strategy can also further be divided into offensive deterrence and defensive deterrence. According to the extension of deterrence, it can be divided into superior deterrence, balance deterrence, limited deterrence, and minimum deterrence. According to the scope of deterrence, it can be divided into comprehensive deterrence and local deterrence. According to the composition of deterrent forces, it can be divided into conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence, and biological and chemical weapon deterrence.

According to the size of war and the range involved, we can divide strategy into comprehensive war strategy and local war strategy. Comprehensive war strategy is the war strategy for conducting comprehensive mobilization and conducting an all-out confrontation. This kind of war involves a wide range with a huge scale, firm war goal, high intensity of war engagement, and a prolonged time. Local war strategy is in contrast to comprehensive war strategy. It is the war strategy of conducting a war in a local region and in a relatively limited range. Usually, the war it guides is relatively limited in its goal, means, and scale. Some countries call this limited war strategy. Though limited war does not completely equal local war, the two are similar in their intention, and they are all in contrast to comprehensive war. Comprehensive war strategy involves two kinds of war, generally speaking. One is worldwide, such as the two world wars which involved 33 countries and 80 countries respectively, and 80% of the world population, and the fighting was scattered over several continents. The other is of a country. That is to mobilize the whole country to join the war. Sometimes, for one country, it is a comprehensive war. But for the world, it is still a local war. For example, the Korean War and Vietnam War after the Second World War were comprehensive wars as far as the two Koreas and two Vietnams were concerned, but the wars did not spill out of the Korean Peninsula and the Indochina Peninsula. So they were still within the range of world local war. Some wars involved many countries, though, for example, the so-called “United Nations Army” in the Korean War consisted of troops from 16 countries, and the multi-nation troops in the Gulf War involved 39 countries. But the war was still limited in a certain region of the world and it did not expand to other regions. So it was still a local war, and the strategy guiding this kind of war is also local war strategy.

This is to divide strategy vertically according to the different characteristics of strategy. Apart from this vertical division, we can also divide strategy horizontally, and establish the level structure of strategy based on this.

The level structure of strategy does not have a fixed common model. The national situation and military situation of countries are different, and the division of strategic levels and the level structure of strategy based on it are also different.

The level division of strategy of the United States not only has the typical characteristics of a superpower; it has great influence over the other countries in the world. The strategic level structure of the United States generally consists of national strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and war-zone strategy, etc. The highest level is national strategy. The definition of national strategy given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States is: “it is the science and art for developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military resources of the nation in peacetime and wartime in order to achieve the national goal.” The national strategy of the United States is the general strategy of the United States. It defines “the national interests” of the United States all over the world and the general goal of maintaining and expanding the national interest of the United States within the whole world using its comprehensive national strength. The U.S. president and the Congress make the U.S. national strategy together. Up to today, there is no fixed title for the national strategy of the United States. The annual State of the Union Address by the American president and the non-periodical policy reports generally touch the main content of the national strategy of the United States. Connected with the national strategy of the United States is the national security strategy of the United States, and it is part of the national strategy of the United States. It directly reflects the strategic planning of the national security interests of the United States. The U.S. President is responsible for the national security strategy of the United States, and it is shown in the national security strategic report issued by the president every year. Under the national security strategy of the United States is the national military strategy of the United States. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff according to the national security strategy issues the national military strategy. It mainly includes the development strategy of the military force and the application strategy of the military force. The Department of Defense is mainly responsible for the former, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually responsible for the latter. The development strategy mainly involves the size of the armed forces, troop structure, the development of military science and technology, and the development of weapons, etc., and the application strategy mainly involves war guidance, troop deployment, strategic command, strategic intelligence, joint operation with allied forces, and battlefield construction, etc. The lowest level in the strategic structure of the United States is the war-zone strategy of the United States. Connected with the nature of the world of the American strategy, the war-zone strategy of the United States is not divided within its territory. Instead, it is divided in the whole world, such as the European war-zone, the Pacific war-zone, etc. Matching this, the United States has the European war-zone strategy and the Pacific war-zone strategy respectively. The war-zone strategy of the United States is part of the national military strategy of the United States, as well as part of the allied strategy of the United States.

The Soviet Union has its unique strategic structure. In the works on strategy of the Soviet Union, there is no terminology such as “national strategy,” “great strategy,” and “defense strategy,” etc. “The Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union” with Aukalkov, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces as the editor-in-chief says: “the concept such as “great strategy” is a universal concept in some capitalist countries.” The Soviet Union generally uses “military theory,” “military strategy,” and “combat method” to describe its strategic level structure. The so-called “military theory” is, according to the explanation of “The Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union,” a set of views of a country in a certain period of time on the essence, goal, and nature of future war, the war preparation of the country and armed forces, and the way of conducting war”.[[16]](#footnote-15) It is on the highest level of the strategic structure of the Soviet Union, equal to the national strategy of the United States and the “great strategy” of some western countries. On the middle level of the strategic structure of the Soviet Union is military strategy (sometimes it is also called the science of strategy. The Soviet Union does not have a strict definition). “Military Strategy” with Socroffsky as the editor-in-chief says, “the science of strategy belongs to military theory.” But it is not the relationship as the relationship of the overall situation and local situation such as a “national strategy” and “national security strategy” of the United States. It is a relationship between theoretical principle and concrete practice. The explanation of “Military Strategy” is “military theory decides general principles, while science of strategy studies the concrete issues such as the nature of future war, the war preparation of the country, the organization and formation of the armed forces, and the combat methods, according to these general principles.” Under military strategy is “combat method.” The Soviet armed forces believe that “combat method is the grand total of the forms and methods of military action,” so it does not belong to tactics, but to strategy. It is the grand total of the forms and methods of using various weapons, various troops of services and branches, corps and army corps, and the whole armed forces.”[[17]](#footnote-16) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the main successor to the Soviet Union, Russia generally takes over this legacy of strategic level structure.

Leder Hart is the founder of the modern strategic structure of Britain. In his representative book “On Strategy,” he said, “national policy” decides “great strategy” (or “high strategy”) “Great strategy” decides military strategy. Therefore, the British strategic structure can roughly be divided into three levels, national policy, great strategy (or high strategy), and military strategy. The “national policy” of Leder Hart refers to the guidance of war mainly by the head of government. It decides strategic goals and tasks. It is actually the national military policy. The task of “great strategy” is to “coordinate and guide the whole forces of the country to reach the political goal of war, namely the goal decided by national policy.” Leder Hart believed that strategy not only needs to fully assess the economic resources, human resources, and mobilize these resources effectively, but also needs to fully assess the spiritual force of the country. It not only needs to pay attention to the issues related with war, but also needs to pay attention to the peace issue after war, ensuring peace and its progress. Meanwhile, military strategy is the leadership art to allocate and use military forces to achieve political goals. “It only studies the issues related with.” It is not hard to see that the relationship between national policy and great strategy divided by Leder Hart is generally the relationship between decision-making and implementation, and the relationship between great strategies and military is the relationship between goal and means. The military strategy he mentioned refers to the application of forces. When implementing, strategy and tactics “do not have clear borders,” and there is no more level under military strategy.

The French modern strategic thinker Andrea Boffer divided strategy into three levels of general strategy, comprehensive strategy, and operational strategy. Boffer believed that the level division of strategy is like a pyramid. “On top of the pyramid and under the direct control of government (e.g. the highest political authority) is the general strategy. Its task is to decide how the general war should be conducted. Moreover, it should define the goal for every special strategy, and decide how to coordinate political, economic, diplomatic, and military aspects together.” “Under the general strategy, every field (military, political, economic, and diplomatic) should have a comprehensive strategy. Its function is to assign tasks and coordinate various activities in a special field.” Under it is “operational strategy,” and “its purpose is not only to let the goal be decided by the comprehensive strategy and the tactics and techniques of related branches to cooperate in its application, but also let those tactics and techniques develop in the planned direction in order to best suit the future strategic needs.”[[18]](#footnote-17) The “general strategy” on the top of Boffer’s strategic pyramid is similar to Leder Hart’s “great strategy” or the American “national strategy,” but Boffer believed that his concept of “general strategy” is clearer than the latter two.

The Japanese strategic level structure generally consists of three levels of national strategy (or national policy): comprehensive security, safeguarding strategy, and military strategy. The Japanese officials and strategic scholars believe that national strategy is the general strategy for mobilizing all the forces of the country, including political strategy, economic strategy, science and technology strategy, psychological strategy, and military strategy, etc. It is on the top level of the strategic structure. Comprehensive security safeguarding strategy is sometimes also called “defense policy” or “defense strategy.” It is that part of national security in the national strategy, similar to the national security strategy of the United States. It is in the second level. Under the comprehensive security safeguarding strategy is military strategy (or military policy). Tengjingzhifu said in “War Plan of Self Defense Forces” of 1978 that “as part of the national policy, there is defense policy. As part of defense policy, there is military policy.” “The Procedure of Making Defense Policy and Terminology System,” by the Defense Institute of Japan believes that “military strategy is about the application and planning of military forces.” Military strategy is made according to national strategy and defense policy.

The situation of our country is somewhat different from the other countries of the world. In the days of war, because of the restriction of historic conditions and strategic environments, we did not make division of a strategic level. Over a half-century has passed since the foundation of the new China. As strategic guidance practice and the study of strategic theory develop continuously, it is not only necessary for us to make a division of a strategic level, but it is also possible to divide it, in order to establish the strategic level structure suitable for the reality of the armed forces of our country and having the characteristics of the armed forces of our country. In the most important position of the strategic structure of our country is the national strategy of our country. Though our country has not issued the national strategy officially up to today, it has been embodied in a series of general guidance and general policy statements made by our party and our country. For example, the three great strategic tasks proposed by Comrade Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s of the 20th Century and the basic line of the party in the time of socialist construction. They are all-important contents of the national strategy of our country. The national strategy of our country is the general planning for the overall situation of the survival and development strategy of our country. It defines the most fundamental interests of our country, and the general strategic guidance, strategic arrangement, strategic measures, and strategic means, etc. that should be taken in order to maintain national security, push the country forward, and revitalize the Chinese nation’s development quickly. It is the basic foundation of the military strategy of our country. In the middle level of the strategic structure of our country is the military strategy of our country. It is limited and guided by the national strategy, and it obeys and serves the national strategy. Apart from the common characteristics of general military strategy, the military strategy of our country also has its own characteristics. First of all, it is the military strategy of the party, as well as the military strategy of the country. As the supreme military strategic decision-making and command institution, the Central Military Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Military Committee of the country are in one body. Secondly, the military strategy is responsible for the defense construction and armed force construction of our country, and it is responsible for the preparation and application of the armed forces. Third, the military strategy of our country is pretty stable. Our country has always followed the military strategy of active defense. Apart from making timely adjustment of the main strategic direction, strategic key point, and strategic arrangement according to the change of strategic environment, the military strategy of our country has always been defensive in nature, and it is always active in its requirements. Under the military strategy of our country is the service strategy of our country. This comes up as required by the fact that our armed forces developed from a singular force into a joint armed force with all-modern services and branches for modern war. The Navy and Air forces of our country bear the important mission of defending the security of the territory and air space of our country and maintaining the ocean interests of our country. In modern war, especially in hi-tech local war, the strategic position and function of navy and air force are rising day by day. The opportunity of accomplishing strategic tasks by navy and air force independently is growing. And there is an objective need for strategically planning sea and air operations and the construction of the navy and air force. **Therefore, under the unified guidance of the active defensive military strategy of our country, it is necessary for the navy and air force of our country to decide the military service strategy of navy and air force of offshore defense and offensive air defense. (page 26)**  Our country is recognized in the world as one of the five nuclear powers, and nuclear force is an important strategic element of our country. The huge destructiveness of nuclear weaponry lets nuclear weapons serve not only the realization of military strategic goals directly, but also the national strategic goal. This puts the effective deterrent of our nuclear strategy into an independent position in the strategic structure of our country. At the same time, it also has the characteristics of national strategy, military strategy, and military service strategy of our country. It is a kind of special strategy with three parts in one body. The nuclear strategy of our country has the following basic characteristics: number one, it is defensive. From the first day of possessing nuclear weapons, our government solemnly stated that in any time, under any circumstance, we would not use nuclear weapons first. Our country has nuclear weaponry purely for the purpose of self-defense and breaking the nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail of hegomonism. Number two, it is limited. The size of our nuclear force is limited. We do not involve ourselves in the nuclear arms race of other nations. The development of our nuclear force is completely in accordance with the active defensive military strategic guidance. Number three, it is effective. The fundamental purpose of developing nuclear weapons by our country is to stop a nuclear attack against our country. Once being attacked of this kind, we will firmly and effectively conduct destructive nuclear retaliation. Number four, it is safe. Our nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Committee. And we have taken strict management measures, so nuclear security has reliable safeguarding. All the strategic regions of our country are the strategic operational units under the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Military Committee. The main tasks of all the strategic regions in their strategic operational directions are to consider the reality of all the strategic directions according to the unified arrangement of the Central Military Committee to carry out the strategic intention of the Central Military Committee creatively and implement all the requirements of the military strategy.

**Section Three: Position of Science of Strategy in Military Theory**

Though strategic study has been there since ancient times, strictly speaking, as a military science in the modern sense, the science of strategy does not have a long history as an independent branch of study in the military field.

As far as we know now, the herald of Chinese modern science of strategy is the textbook “Science of Strategy” of the Reserve University of the Army in the 34th year of Guang Xu of the Qing Dynasty. It explains the definition of strategy, strategic withdrawal, strategic offense, strategic pursuit, and strategic safeguarding, etc. It is a special work on science of strategy taking strategy as a scientific branch to study systematically in early modern times. In the years of the Chinese revolutionary wars, in his days of fighting, Mao Zedong wrote a series of works on the strategic issues of the Chinese revolutionary war and the Anti-Japanese Invasion and National Liberation War during his busy life of fighting. These works focus on solving the important practical issues in the Chinese revolution and anti-invasion war. Though it is not the science of strategy in a complete form, it clearly raises the concept of the science of strategy, and systematically describes the study object of science of strategy and the strategic guiding principle of the Chinese revolutionary war and the Anti-Japanese Invasion and National Liberation War. Therefore, we can surely take it as the science of strategy in the period of the Chinese revolutionary war. In the 1980s of the 20th Century, as the situation of the international strategic environment changed, the ideological line of being practical and realistic by the party was carried out and the new campaign of liberating ideas developed broadly. The strategic study in the military academic field of our country was unprecedentedly active. Along with the establishment of a group of strategic research institutions and academic organizations, a group of strategic works was also born, creating an unprecedented prosperous situation in the study of the science of strategy of our country.

In the world, the Second World War was the catalyst for the science of strategy getting into the halls of military academics. After the fighting of the Second World War died out, it was not only necessary to strategically summarize this great fighting that was unprecedented in the history of mankind, but also possible. Meanwhile, the Cold War confrontation appeared soon after between the two great military groups of east and west, the complicated international relationship of the three worlds, and the development of modern combat means such as missile nuclear weaponry urgently needed new strategic answers. By the urging of multiple strategic demands, worldwide strategic study entered the golden time of prosperous research. Strategic study was no longer the monopoly field of professional soldiers and military leaders. Many scholars got into this field. Apart from the strategic research institutions established by governments, many colleges, businesses, and civil organizations also established the think tanks of strategic study and strategic consultation. Among them are the well-known Rand Corporation of the United States, the International Strategic Institute of London in Britain, the Stockholm International Peace Institute of Sweden, the Brookings Institute of the United States, the Strategic and International Institute of Georgetown University, and the Atlantic Council, etc. Many senior officials from the government and the armed forces came here to continue their study after they retired, providing suggestions for the government, and many well-known strategic scholars got into military and government decision-making institutions to manage the government directly. These think tanks are only the processing plants of many new strategic theories and strategic ideas, but also the storage facilities for strategic talented people and the important “outside mind” influencing of decision-making. It is one of the important marks of modern science that strategy develops to a new stage.

The science of strategy takes the overall situation of war as its object of study. It is an important part and the highest field of the whole military academic study, and it is in the leading position of military academic study. Science of strategy studies the issue of guidance of the highest level of the overall situation of war. It has a close connection with the operational study and tactical study that study the local issue of war, but it is different from them. The science of strategy guides operational study and tactical study. The science of strategy restricts and controls operational study and tactical study, and it decides the main tasks and developing direction of the latter. This is the relationship of the overall situation and local situation, upper position and lower position, the guiding and the guided, no restriction and the restricted. Operational study and tactical study have to follow the requirement of the science of strategy, decide the theoretical principle that matches it to make a strategic requirement specific, and at the same time make the required influence over the science of strategy. The science of strategy also has a guiding role to play for the science branches related with the construction of military forces, such as that of military systems, military management, military legal study, military mobilization, military training, and weapons management. These science branches should decide their research task and development direction according to the general requirement of the science of strategy. Because modern science has a greater tendency toward mutual influence, mutual infiltration, and mutual crossing and mixing, especially because military science is not limited within one military field, it is widely involved in political, economic, science and technology, and cultural fields, during its development. The science of strategy should constantly absorb and borrow the research results of natural science and other social sciences such as the science of systems, of decision-making, of prediction, of international relations, political geology, of religion, ethnology, and international law, etc.

The science of strategy is a military science that has clear characteristics that are practical, political, confrontational, tactical, and predicable, etc. First of all, is its practicality. Though strategy belongs to the scope of idea and it is beyond just thinking, it is not purely a science of thinking and debate. It is the essential fruit of thinking out of war practice. It is from practice, serves practice, and takes its test in practice. It relies on practice and practical applicability very much. The science of strategy is closer to practice than any other science. Without war practice, science of strategy loses its life, becoming water without source and a tree without root. Without practice, strategy could bring about catastrophic consequence in practice. In ancient times, Zhao Kuo studied military science on papers only, and, later on, 400,000 troops were destroyed because of it. This is a tragic example. Strategy concerns the well being of nation, armed forces, and people, so there should not be any subjective assumption. The scientific nature of strategy must rely on its practicality. Secondly, is its political nature. Crosewitz once said, a war is not only a political action, but also an actual combat political work. It is the extension of political contact, and it is the realization of political contact through another means.[[19]](#footnote-18) Mao Zedong said, “politics is bloodless war, and war is bloody politics.”[[20]](#footnote-19) In essence, strategy is the choice of politics. Every strategy has its deep political background and reflects certain national and people’s security interests and their fundamental attitude towards war. There has never been any strategy that is outside of a national interest and political goal, and there has never been any war that is outside of politics. Ideological background and national political relationships decide the content of national military strategy to a great extent. Different world outlooks and methodologies of different political interest groups and strategic guides have profound influence on strategic direction. The theory of “blitzkrieg,” from its first day, served Nazi Germany in its crazy and expanding fascist politics directly. “Mutual guarantee of destruction” can only be connected with the Cold War politics of the nuclear superpowers. And the strategy of protracted war was the reflection of just and progressive anti-war politics of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War. Politics and strategy have natural flesh and blood connection with the science of strategy. Thirdly, is its nature of overall situation. As the guidance of the overall situation of war, strategy is a large system consisting of the factors that are mutually connected and mutually restricted according to unified strategic goals. This system includes strategic decision-making systems, as well as strategic implementation systems, strategic operation systems, strategic command systems, strategic safeguarding systems, and strategic mobilization systems. As far as space is concerned, it is dimensional, from land to sea, air, and outer space. As far as time is concerned, from the preparation of war, to its implementation, and its end, it is throughout the process. As far as level structure is concerned, it is organic unification from strategic guidance, operational adjustment and control, to the unfolding of tactics. As far as related factors are concerned, it involves all the aspects of politics, economy, psychology, geology, culture, science and technology, etc. In modern war, the more it is hi-tech, the more it is systematic. In a large strategic operation, usually there are dozens of services and branches, several hundred kinds of weapons and equipment, and thousands of military professional technologies involved, and they are unfolded in multiple levels of battlefields with thousands of kilometers of front and depth, and many combat models are applied at the same time or alternatively. The science of strategy is the macroscopic and comprehensive thinking of this large system. Fourthly, it is the nature of confrontation. Strategy is about the interest conflict of opposite classes, countries, nations, and political groups. The process of strategic guidance is the process of two-way movement of opposite parties, and it is the movement of mutual action and confrontation of rival parties. In strategic planning and implementation, there is always an opponent who raises the question from the opposite side. Correct strategy and tactics are born from the sharp comparison of the contradiction of two sides. This requires the planning and guidance of strategy to have clear aim and wide applicability. It requires to pay attention to the increase and decrease of the forces of a strategic opponent, the true strategic intention of the opponent, the nature and size of the interest conflict of the two sides, the main threatened direction, and the nature and seriousness of threat, and to construct a response accordingly. For example, from 1917 to 1945, in the military confrontation between the Soviet Union and Japan in the Far East, there were 7 times of mutual change and adjustment of strategy of the two sides. Both sides tried to change according to the enemy’s move and change before the enemy’s changing, in order to get a strategic initiative. This is an important characteristic that makes the science of strategy different from the other scientific branches. Fifthly, it is planning nature. Sun Zi once said, “the superior force fights with planning.” In ancient times, there was also a saying that “the best application is all in the planning in your heart.” In a certain sense, strategic guidance is the competition of strategic wisdom and planning level based on certain material force. The art of strategic guidance is in its planning. Sagacious and resolute, circumspect and far-sighted, flexible and adaptable, and defeating one’s opponent by a surprise move, these are the embodiments of the subjective initiative of strategic guidance in strategic confrontation. Superior planning ability can make current material force produce abnormal energy, make passiveness into aggressiveness, inferior situations into superior situations, in order to achieve the goal of defeating the more with the less and defeating the strong by the weak. On the broad stage of the Chinese revolutionary war, Mao Zedong thought about ourselves and the enemy, planned before moving, and used the forces like a god, directing one and another as in gallant and bravery live dramas. Up to today, it is still highly praised. In a certain sense, we can say that science of strategy is a science of wisdom for summarizing the rules of application of plans in war. Sixthly, is its prediction. It is to predict for the time, model, size, direction, process, and result. Prediction is not unique for the science of strategy. Nevertheless, strategic prediction has special significance in the science of strategy. Without strategic prediction, there will be no practical guiding value. To evaluate whether a military strategist has strategic quality, one of the important standards is to see whether he has strategic far-sight. That is to say, whether he has the keen insight and predicting capability for strategy. A wise man after what has happened can never become an actual combat strategist. Strategic prediction is not simple analogy, reasoning, induction, guiding infinite with definite, guiding future with past, and guiding moving situation with still situation. Instead, it is deeply and comprehensively analyzing the strategic environment, the strategic intention of both sides, the increase and decrease of enemy and our forces, and all the related factors restricting strategy by way of one to another, from outside to inside, to get the scientific conclusion. Otherwise, it will only become blind assumption and become the laughing-stock such as “conquering China in three months,” of the Japanese militarists and “ending the Korean War before Christmas” of McArthur.

# **Section Four: Theoretic System of the Science of Strategy**

As the military science in the primary position of the military field, the science of strategy has formed a pretty complete strategic theoretic system on the rich soil of strategic practice of our country, after the hard cultivation of strategic theoretic scholars. Considering the actual situation of our country, the theoretic system of the strategy of our country is generally consisting of two major parts; strategic basic theory and strategic applied theory. Strategic basic theory is the most common theory to study the intention of strategic concept, the evolution rule of strategic theory, strategic thinking rule, and research methodology of the science of strategy. It is the knowledge system of the science of strategy.

For strategic concept and its intention, we focus on studying the relationship between war and strategy, the research object and scope of the science of strategy, the scientific intention of a strategy, the position of strategy in military academics, important factors of strategy, the category and level structure of strategy, and other basic theoretic issues. As war and strategic practice develop, strategic concept also changes and develops incessantly. Therefore, one of the basic projects of science of strategy is to enrich the intention of strategy and define it scientifically incessantly according to the development of strategic practice.

For the related factors of strategy, strategy takes some material condition as the objective foundation, and it is restricted by objective conditions. Wise strategic guides can only make scientific decisions and direct live war drama through scientific analysis on objective conditioning and understanding of its rules. Among all the factors that influence strategy, the most important and more often functional ones are mainly political factors, economic factors, science and technology factors, geological factors, cultural and traditional factors, military forces, and national interest factors, etc. Of these, first, national interest is the essential starting point and destination of military strategy: it is the decisive factor for the value direction of military strategy. National interest includes the interest of existence and interest of development. Interest of existence is usually shown in territorial and sovereignty integrity and sea interests are not violated, core values and social systems are not changed because of foreign pressure, and the peaceful work of people is guaranteed with surety. Development interest is usually shown in that the normal order of national construction and the fair and mutually beneficial diplomacy are not interfered with, national resources are not plundered, and as a sovereign country, the legal position, development space, and national dignity are duly respected. Military strategy has to make national interest its own interest, and the national goal its own goal. Second, political factors decide the nature of strategy. No matter how developed the military technology is, even under nuclear circumstance, war cannot change its political nature. One of the tasks of the science of strategy is to understand the political nature of strategy and the political motive behind strategic guidance and political relationships. Third, economic factor is the deepest cause of military activity and the material foundation of all military activities. The dependence of strategy on the economy is not only in the development and change of strategic thinking; it is totally controlled by economic conditions and the development level of productivity of the time. In that the choice of strategic direction, the decision on strategic key points, the freedom of strategic actions, and the realization of strategic goals are also controlled by economic factors to a great extent. Therefore, the science of strategy has to make economic study of strategic issues its important task. Fourth, the progress of science and technology and their application in military has always been the powerful energy to push forward the development of operational methods and strategic thinking. As the world technology revolution moves forward, space technology, micro-electronic technology, information technology, computer technology, biological engineering technology, new material technology, and laser technology, and other new hi-tech developments grow up and are widely applied in the military field, they first bring about revolutionary change in strategy, instead of in tactics. The development of military technology has reached to such a step that limited application of hi-tech weapons can directly achieve strategic goals. The science and technology take a greater percentage in modern war, and science and technology take higher and higher percentages in the factors that constitute combat capability, so strategic research has to pay special attention to it. Fifth, geological factors has always been one of the important strategic factors. No military activity can go without certain geographical space. National strategic territory, geographical position, bordering situations, and the geopolitical relations based on these are themselves strategically significant. In the world history of strategic thinking, different explanations on geological relations produced different geological strategic schools. One of the important benchmarks of the strategic capability of a country has always been the size of a country, the population, and its resources. The establishment of its military bases, the control of strategic key points, and the maintenance of sea-lane and communication routes, are all the considerations of strategic geography. Only by fully studying the influence of geological factors can we implement correct and effective strategic guidance. Sixth, military force is the tangible form of military strategy. The relationship between military force and military strategy is mainly shown in that the size and structure of military force should fit the nature of military strategy, and the planning and implementation of military strategy has to match the support capability of military force. The capacity of military force and its support to military strategy is a concept of numbers though; it is more a concept of quality. It includes tangible forces such as weapons and equipment and military personnel, as well as invisible forces such as military theory, force structure, command art, and psychological morale, etc. This is an issue strategic research has to study deeply. Seventh, cultural tradition is different from the other factors. It is not directly perceived through the senses, shallow, and temporary. Instead, it is the factor in a deeper level that has long-term influence on strategy. It is the base and root of strategy. Culture in a broad sense is the grand sum of spiritual accumulation and material accumulation of a country or a people influenced by long-time natural environments, social formations, and economic levels, etc. Its main content is man’s attitude towards nature and other people, the way of man’s life, and significance of life. Strategic thinking is always born based on some historic and national cultural tradition. When strategists make and implement strategies, they are always controlled and motivated by certain cultural idea and historic cultural feelings. The 5,000 years of Chinese cultural tradition of “combination of man and heaven,” “harmony is the most valuable,” and “making friends with neighbors” is in accordance with the active defensive strategy of modern China; while the crazy and expansionist “continental strategy” of the Japanese militarist during the Second World War could find its gene in the Japanese bushido culture and imperial philosophy. To dig into the cultural and philosophical background of strategy and show its future developmental tendency, is an important way to lead strategic research to a deeper level.

For the development history and the evolution of strategic theory, it is by way of studying the historic track of the development of strategic theory to find the source and stream of strategic theory, understand the basic tendency of the evolution of strategic theory, and predict the future direction of strategic theory. In the development history of world strategic thinking, the east and west cultures have made their own parallel contribution to the development of strategic culture. The development of strategic thinking had its glorious days of hundreds of schools of thought in ancient times as well as “the time without any harvest” in the Middle Ages. The new productivity from the industrial revolution not only turned a new leaf in world history, but also put new life into the development of strategic theory. The bourgeois strategic theories such as “sea right theory,” “air right theory,” and “general operational theory,” etc. appeared in this period of time. Crosewitz, the Prussian, climbed to the top of bourgeois strategic theory, becoming the outstanding modern bourgeois strategic theoretician. The birth of Marxist strategic theory marked an epoch-making revolution of strategic theory. Marxist military philosophy became a sharp weapon for the oppressed nations, oppressed people, and oppressed classes to seek liberation on the battlefield. The set of comprehensive revolutionary war strategies produced by Mao Zedong in the practice of the Chinese revolutionary war is the concrete application and development in China of Marxist strategic theory. It is the strategic bloom of Marxist military philosophy blossomed on the oriental ground, and the crystallization of thinking out of the combination of Marxist military philosophy and the oriental strategic culture. In the evolution of the world strategic structure at the turning of a new century, the vitality of strategic research is in how to stand in China and view the world. In the strategic chain of past, present and future of strategy, one must understand the evolution rule of strategic theory, the macro tendency of strategic theory development, and the order to serve reality.

For the essence and rule of strategic thinking, it is the highest form of thinking science in the art of military thinking, and it is the idea movement in the mind of the main body that decides strategy. The essence of strategic evolution is the development and movement of strategic thinking. The quality of thinking reflects and generalizes direct experience and indirect experience and the depth and width they influence the objective world. Mankind has experienced naïve dialectic thinking models in ancient times, theology thinking models in the Middle Ages, and modern dialectic materialist thinking models. They all left their marks in strategic thinking. The depth and quality of strategic thinking directly influences the result of strategic competition. It is the objective demand for the science of strategy research to go deeper to study the essence and rule of strategic thinking and establish the theoretical system of strategic thinking.

As for the research methodology of the science of strategy, strategic research is the knowledge activity in the field, and the methodology of strategic research is the methodology of understanding strategic issues. In nature, the methodology of strategic research belongs to the scope of strategic thinking, and it is the scientific epistemology and methodology in the strategic field. The methodology of strategic research has a guiding function, processing function, and testing function. Firstly, strategic research has to take Marxist philosophy as guidance and get help from this “political and military telescope and microscope.” This is because “the closer the military research approaches the highest level of strategy, the closer it is to military philosophy.”[[21]](#footnote-20) As a general scientific principle, Marxist philosophy provides the basic methodology for strategic research and makes people’s knowledge touch the essence of war and war issues most profoundly. Secondly, we should comprehensively use general methods of scientific research, such as scientific abstraction (logical thinking, thinking in images, and intuition thinking, etc.), logical reasoning (comparison and categorization, synthesis and analysis, induction and deduction), and systematic scientific method, etc. Moreover, the research of the science of strategy also has some specific methods characteristic of this branch of science, such as the method of combat case study, the method of combat simulation, the method of live troop tests, and the method of strategic evaluation, etc. The research methodology of strategy is a system of epistemology, and it is the tool of knowledge to study strategic guiding rules. It is decisively significant for getting scientific research results to correctly use these methods.

Strategic applied theory is to study strategic guiding rules, including the essential theory of the guiding rule for strategy making and strategy implementation. It is the practical system of science of strategy.

The guiding rule for strategy making is the strategic planning rule. As far as its operational process is concerned, it mainly includes the guiding rules for studying the basic links of strategic judgment, strategic decision-making, and strategic planning, etc.

----Strategic judgment. It is the precondition for making strategic decisions. It is the conclusive knowledge based on comprehensive knowledge of the situation of the enemy, ourselves, friends, weather, geography, and people, etc., after comprehensive analysis of the strategic environment, the increase and decrease of all the strategic factors and strategic forces, strategic situations, and strategic intentions. In strategic judgment, the most important is to make accurate judgment on the direction of threat (where the threat is from and what is the main threat), the nature of threat (potential threat or combat threat), the seriousness of threat (comprehensive threat or local threat) the nation faces. Strategic judgment concerns the safety and dignity of the country and nation, so in the judgment of threat, it should not be overestimated or underestimated. In judging the time of threat, it should not be too late or too early. Strategic judgment is a continuous process. As strategic situations change and develop, we have to make timely adjustment and revision to the old judgments.

----Strategic decision-making, it is the strategic decision made according to strategic judgment. The main issues it needs to understand are number one, strategic goal, that is the final intention the war wants to realize. The national military strategic goal has to obey the national political goal, has to match the possible strategic means, and it should not exceed the maximum support capacity of strategic means. Number two, strategic task: that is the requirement for the overall situation in order to achieve strategic goal, including the general task of national strategic overall situation, the tasks in all strategic directions, long-term strategic tasks of the whole process of war, and periodical tasks. Number three is strategic guidance. It is the principle and guiding rule to guide the overall situation of war. Usually, we have to know clearly the main strategic opponent, the main strategic direction, strategic key point, the basic model of strategic action, and the division of strategic phase and strategic steps, etc. Number four is strategic arrangement, it is the strategic formation, deployment, and task assignment according to strategic need.

----Strategic plan. It is the unified arrangement prepared for the overall situation of war according to strategic decisions, and it is the concrete form of enacting a strategic decision. Strategic plans usually include war and war preparation plans, construction plans of armed forces, and the development plans of military science and technology and weapons and equipment, etc. Once made, the strategic plan has legal effect, and becomes the foundation of all military operations. Therefore, it is the core secret of the country and the armed forces. We must strictly control it and keep it a secret.

For the guiding rule of strategy implementation, it is the guiding rule for strategic operation, including the strategic guidance for the construction of military force and the strategic guidance for military force application.

The construction of military force is the precondition and material foundation of military force application. In relative peacetime, the competition of the construction of military force is relatively obvious. The construction of military force not only serves actual fighting, but also is an application itself, and the process of construction is the process of showing actual combat strength and applying deterrent functions. Therefore, the guidance for strategy implementation has to combine the construction of military force and its application organically, and take the guidance for the construction of military force into the viewfinder of strategic research. The construction of military force includes not only quantitative construction. More importantly, it is quality construction. It includes the construction of standing forces as well as the construction of reserve forces. It includes the construction of actual combat strength as well as the construction of potential forces. It includes the construction of material force as well as the construction of spiritual force. To study the guiding rule of the construction of military force is a natural part of the science of strategy, and it is also the fundamental requirement for the science of strategy by strategic practice.

The application of military force includes the use of military force in actual combat and non-combat. Actual combat application is the real war action. It is the actual contest and real force confrontation of military force on a battlefield. This is the traditional field of classic science of strategy as well as the kernel content of the modern science of strategy. Undoubtedly, the most challenging task of the science of strategy is to conduct profound study into this highest form of struggle of a strategic guiding rule, the most fierce, most sharp, and most costly strategic guiding rule of military confrontation, including the guiding rules of a series of operations such as strategic command, strategic offense, strategic defense, strategic mobility, strategic air-raid and anti-air raid, strategic information warfare, strategic psychological warfare, and strategic safeguarding, etc. Today, hi-tech local war has become the main format of modern war, so to study the special rules of hi-tech local war should become the new main battlefield of the study of strategic guiding rule of war. The science of strategy has to answer the new characteristics of hi-tech local wars and the special rule of strategic guidance, especially to answer, as a developing country like our country and under the condition that our military technology is relatively backward, the strategic guiding rule of how to conduct the people’s war under modern conditions and how to defeat the enemy equipped with hi-tech equipment, defeating the superior with the inferior. When studying the guiding rule for actual combat, we have to pay enough attention to this strategic guiding rule for the non-actual combat application of military force. The non-actual combat application of military force is the extension and necessary supplement for actual combat. For example, military deterrence, military diplomacy, arms control and disarmament, low-intensity military conflict and the border and sea border struggles of peacetime, etc. Though their intensity of confrontation is relatively low, usually they will not endanger the survival of the country, they can still endanger the dignity of a country and people, endanger the country’s legitimate position in international political life, and endanger favorable military strategic situations. Therefore, we have to carefully study the strategic guiding rule for non-actual combat of military forces. It is the important task of the science of strategy.

The theoretic system of the science of strategy of our country is as the following illustration suggests:

The theoretic system of the science of strategy of our country

|---Strategic concept

|---related factors of strategy

----Essential theory of strategy---|---development history of strategic | | theory and evolution rule

| |---nature of strategic thinking and rule

| |---research method of science of strategy

|

Science of strategy |---strategic judgment

| |---strategy making---|---strategy decision-making

| | |---strategy plan

| |

Applied theory of strategy |----strategic guidance for the construction of

| | military force

|---strategy |

implementation

|----strategic guidance for the application of

military force

# **Chapter Two**

# **Factors of Determining Strategy**

The objective material condition of war determines the rule of war as well as the guiding rule of war. Though strategy is shown in the subjective guiding activity of the guider of war, it is absolutely not the improvising of personal will of the guider of war. Instead, it is based on certain objective material conditions, and it is strictly limited by certain social production methods and certain social historical conditions. The important task of the research of the science of strategy is to specifically analyze the objective factors that influence the strategy of war and study the internal connection between them and the strategy of war.

# **Section One: National Interests**

National interest is the total sum of the objective material demand and spiritual demand that a country relies on to survive and develop. National interest is the basic foundation deciding the military strategic direction of a country, and it is the starting point and destination of the military strategic guidance of a country.

# **One: the Component Factors of National Interest**

As the subject of interest, a country has various demands, and it decides that the component factors and forms of national interest are diversified. We can define and categorize national interests from different angles. For example, as far as its importance for a country, we can divide national interest into fundamental interest and non-fundamental interest. As far as time span is concerned, we can divide it into long-term interest and current interest. As far as the range involved is concerned, we can divide it into general interest and special interest, or domestic interest and overseas interest. According to the activity area of a country, we can divide it into national political interest, national economic interest, and national military interest, etc. As far as the basic functions of national interest are concerned, we can also divide national interest into two large categories: survival interest and developmental interest. Though countries of different natures often have different definitions on their interests in different times, generally speaking, the just interests of a country are usually consistent with the following aspects:

(One) National Territory

National territory refers to the living space of a country and all the natural resources in this space. It is the material foundation and condition for a country’s survival and development, one of the most important factors in national interest, and the basic mark of the existence of a country. In history, the establishment of a country did not rely on the difference of people and religion; it relied on the territory it occupied. In this sense, apart from the interest value of “material foundation and condition” for ensuring a country’s survival and development, national territory is also a symbol with “a body” to show national independence and integrity. We cannot take national territory only as a flat plane. It includes all the special parts under the surface of the earth under a country’s rule. It is up to the sky, down to the underground. Usually, it has three parts, territorial land, territorial water, and territorial air space. Among them, territorial land is the most important part, while territorial water belongs to territorial land, and territorial air space and underground belong to territorial land and territorial water. We cannot take national territory only as space. It also includes the natural resources contained in territory that the country relies on for survival and development. All the countries in the world believe that territory is divine and cannot be invaded. Because loss of territory is the loss of living space of a country, it directly influences the life and death of a country. Because of many reasons, many countries have disputed regions in territorial border divisions. Moreover, some countries, driven by the aspiration of territorial expansion, make border disputes all the time, causing many wars and disturbances, seriously influencing national security. So, national territorial integrity is the material component of a country’s survival, and it is part of the core of national interest.

(Two) National Security

National security is a situation when a country is not threatened subjectively and not invaded and damaged objectively. National security is not only shown in the living situation of a country, but also in the development situation of a country. The National security situation is the combination of political, economic, military, cultural, information, energy, and biological environment situations. In the traditional sense, security is first of all to eliminate all threats on the country’s survival. In these threats, the threat of war (the early understanding of this kind of threat in history was the violent fight over living material) is the main threat, and national security pays most attention to it. Nevertheless, today, while traditional security still exists, we cannot neglect the threat of economic, political, and cultural fields. The security in non-traditional fields such as “economic security,” “political security,” and culture, etc. are also important factors of national security.

(Three) National Sovereignty

National sovereignty is the intrinsic right of a country that is paramount domestically and maintains independence and initiative. It is an “invisible” mark showing the existence of a country. Domestically, sovereignty is shown in that country’s right to decide its own political system and social economic system according to its own will, without foreign interference. Internationally, sovereignty is shown in an equity relationship between a country and another country. The sovereignty and independence of every country should be respected by other countries. This is a fundamental norm that is to be followed by all the countries in modern international relationships. Sovereignty and territory have a close connection. A country exercises its jurisdiction over all its territory, according to sovereignty. On the other hand, sovereignty can only be established when it has territory. Actually, the key to the realization of national sovereignty lays in an acknowledgment of territory. It is mainly an acknowledgement of the other side on all the subordinate relations of one’s own definitions and respect and obedience of the ruling will of one’s own dealing with its subordinates. The realization of national sovereignty symbolizes that a country can control all under its rule according to its own will, and show its equal international position in international communication. National sovereignty usually is confirmed in legal form, and it is often shown in the relationships of international communications. As a national interest, national sovereignty is often related with national survival and development as well as national dignity. Once a country loses its sovereignty, it means that it loses the right to control all its survival materials and the minimum qualification for receiving respect from other countries. This kind of country cannot be taken as a country in a complete sense. It is only an auxiliary of another country. The so-called national interest of this kind of country (that only exists in name) is subordinate to the interest of its controller country. The realization of its interest is to get a “left-over soup” after its controller country’s interest is satisfied. The maintenance of its interest does not depend on it, but depends on foreign force.

(Four) National Development

National development is a dynamic component of national interest. Usually, it refers to the economic prosperity, the continuous progress of science and technology, and the incessant improvement of a people’s living standard of a country, or the incessant rising of social productivity level in general. Besides, it also includes a country’s influence in political, cultural, and other fields as increasing constantly. Under modern circumstances, when trying to operate under “national development,” we need to stress first the ruling scale or parameter as in the sense of comparing ourselves with the advanced level of the development of the world. Whether a country has developed, apart from comparing it with its past, we also want to see whether the distance between it and the advanced level of the contemporary world has shortened, and whether it has got close to or surpassed the advanced level of the world. Second, under modern circumstances, national development not only refers to the economic prosperity, but also refers to the has the country increased its comprehensive national strength based on its economic prosperity, and the comparison and competition of the comprehensive national strength with the developed countries of the world. Third, national development is a changing real strength of a country, a real national strength that is accumulating and increasing all the time. In this sense, to maintain and safeguard national development is to maintain and safeguard that the national real strength increases all the time. National development is related with the survival and security of a country. “Sailing against the current: either you keep forging ahead or you keep falling behind.” In the rapid development of the world, if a country stops and moves forward slowly, it will fall behind the other countries. It will change from strong to weak, from big to small; eventually, it will be eliminated by the trend of world development. On the other hand, if a country does not develop, it cannot maintain a strong economic position, a powerful defensive strength, and a powerful national cohesive force. If comprehensive national strength is not powerful, national security will lack powerful backing, while this backing is indispensable for maintaining national security. National development concerns national sovereignty. A country with a higher development level or a powerful development tendency will be able to maintain its sovereignty more effectively. As an increasing strength, national development is a reliable force to maintain the effectiveness of national sovereignty.

(Five) National Stability

National stability refers to the situation present when a country maintains normal and orderly situations. If one is looking deeper into the normal national, political, economic, and legal orders, the essence of national stability is the cohesive effect of a country and its spiritual aspect (political idea, national tradition, and religious belief, etc.). We can say it is the maintenance of a national order based on the psychological stability of citizens. It is shown that based on the active and initiative spirit of the whole nation, the whole national institution and social life move in an orderly and coordinated way. That is to say, national stability is the structural situation of “tending to balance.” It has a strong “ability of self-organization.” It can adjust its social relationships well and control social contradictions from intensifying. It is a necessary condition to guarantee the realization of all national interests. When a country is not stable, cannot maintain normal economic and life order, it is impossible to develop and to gather powerful combined forces to participate in international competition. If we say national development is mainly an economic material force, national stability is a spiritual potential force of “the same mind of the leaders and the followers,” and “the unified resolve of the whole nation.” This force can also make the enemy scared who tries to sabotage another nation’s security and covet national sovereignty. Historical experiences show that when a country wins its sovereignty and develops, national stability is of particular importance.

(Six) National Dignity

National dignity refers to the due position and prestige of a country in the international community. The realization of national dignity is like the realization of national sovereignty: it needs the confirmation of the international community. This confirmation is a confirmation of the country’s international position, international influence, and international image. The forming of this confirmation is not only decided by rational thinking. It is mainly decided by a country’s real strength and the action model it adopts within the international community, as well as its influence in international affairs. As an “invisible” national interest, national dignity is usually reflected by an equal position in international communications. National dignity concerns national glory or national disgrace. In a certain sense, it also symbolizes a soft right of a country in the world. From the surface, damage to national dignity is a loss of “feelings” instead of a material loss. But this loss can seriously affect national security and development. For many countries, a disgrace related to national dignity can have a worse influence and consequence than material loss. Because the belief of a country on national self-reliance and becoming strong by one’s own strength, should be shown through national dignity. The human dignity of every citizen should also be reflected through national prestige. In history, there were many wars over maintaining national dignity. “Wuzi”, the well-known military work of the early Warring States period of our country, points out the motivation of war: “A war could be caused by five reasons: one is to fight for name; two is to fight for money; three is to fight accumulated evil; four is to have a domestic disturbance; and five is to suffer having a famine.”[[22]](#footnote-21) Here, “fighting for name” mainly refers to today’s maintaining national sovereignty and national dignity. The ancient people of our country listed it as first place in the motivation of war. On the other hand, a country that loses its dignity in the international community has to be a weak country, and there is no sovereignty, security, and development for such a country.

The above six factors cover the basic part of national interest. But it does not cover all of it. As the society develops and civilization progresses, the needs of mankind increase and the needs of a country increase. Likewise, the component factors of national interest also increase. Meanwhile, the component factors of national interest appear before us so often that we have a very close connection to them. For example, security influences development, and sovereignty includes dignity. Particularly in reality, we can hardly make clear a borderline between these factors. This is probably one of the reasons why national interest, as an overall concept, is felt and accepted by all the people.

In practice, the key point and position of national interest changes all the time, and we should get to know it in its dynamic state. This is because different countries have different needs and the arrangement and order of their interests and goals are also different. In different historical periods, a country’s need is not completely the same, either. So in different times, the interest arrangement and order of a country is also different. For example, when a country faces the threat of life and death, its security interest is outstanding. When a country has a certain sense of security and safety, its development interests become obvious.

**Two: the Position and Function of National Interests in Strategic Guidance**

National interest has a decisive function on national military strategy. It is shown mainly in the following aspects:

(One) National Interest Is the Starting Point of Strategic Guidance

National interest, as the supreme expression of the interest of the whole nation, is comprised of the common interest of all the separate groups within a country. Most clearly and directly this answers the questions what are the goals of national military action – what is it we want to maintain or get, and why should we maintain or get them?

People put national interest in the decisive position instead of other interests (such as international interest or the interest of a certain group of a country). This is because, compared with other interest groups, a country reflects the common characteristics and common nature of all the interest groups within a country in a most concentrated way. All the interest groups take themselves consciously or unconsciously as part of a whole: under a country and living in a country. It is because national interest has this kind of “common nature” and “superiority” that one can “concentrate” and “represent” the interest of all the groups in a country, and it can get the recognition of all the interest groups of a country. It provides a wide social foundation for the decisive function of national interests in the making and implementation of a national strategy. When analyzing and judging strategic environments and potential threats, strategic decision-makers should take national interest as the basic foundation of strategic guidance. Strategic decision-makers should, in the changes of interest relationships and interest patterns among countries, judge the extension and model of the challenge a country faces, decide the nature and level of threat, and make suitable strategic decisions and take suitable strategic actions.

(Two) National Interest Is the Highest Standard in Considering the Strategic Relations among Countries

The interest relationship among countries decides the strategic relationship among countries. The international strategic pattern of a certain period is formed out of it. The interest relationship among countries has a “common nature” or “conflicting nature.” It decides that the strategic relationship among countries and has the nature of unity or confrontation. The “long-term nature” or “temporary nature” of interest relationships among countries decides the firmness of strategic relationships among countries.

National interest becomes the basic standard for deciding the strategic relationship among countries. It is because the interest among countries is like a large interwoven net with many “interest intersections.” On these “intersections,” the interests among countries “attract” or “bump into” each other, forming “common interest” or “conflict of interest.” Common interest is usually established upon the foundation of complementation of the exchange of national interests; that is, “my gain is your gain, and my loss is your loss.” Conflict of interest is usually established upon the foundation of exclusion of the exchange of national interests; that is, “my gain is your loss, and my loss is your gain.”

The countries with common interests often become allies while the countries with a conflict of interests often become rivals or enemies. Nevertheless, in reality, it is not so simple to divide enemy from friend. It is because the interest contact among countries is a comprehensive contact. Among allies, one cannot exclude the existence of a conflict of interests; while among enemy countries, one cannot exclude the existence of common interests. Therefore, to make friends or become enemies is decided by whether the common interest is larger than the conflict of interests. Or is it the smaller conflict of interest in the content of greater national interest. To put it in another way, it is decided by whether there is “common nature” or confrontation in “fundamental interests” and “long-term interests.” In international political life, sometimes the relationship between enemy versus friend is defined by values and ideology. Ideology and values are only surface phenomenons. Their background is still rooted in national interests. Countries with the same ideology can be rivals sometimes because of a conflict of interest; while countries with different ideologies can get into alliances sometimes because of common interests.

The interest relationship among countries changes all the time. So the relationship of enemy or friend among countries and its intensity or extension changes all the time, too. When the interest contradiction among countries in certain aspects is eliminated, their confrontation in this aspect will decrease or disappear. When the common interest connecting some countries decreases or desalinates by the new conflict of interest, the alliance among these countries will become loose, perhaps exist in name only. Therefore, the interest connection among countries decides their connection in political, economic, military, and diplomatic fields. There is no permanent alliance among countries. Their relationship splits up and recombines all the time. The dynamic nature of national interest decides that the alliance relationship or confrontational relationship among countries may not be stable.

(Three) National Interest Is the Main Factor to Decide the Happening of War and Its Development

Marx pointed out that all people strive to achieve is related to their interest. Croseweitz also pointed out, when discussing his famous view of “war is the extension of politics,” that “politics concentrate and coordinate all the interests within it, and concentrate and coordinate all the personal interests and all the other interests that philosophic thinking can provide. Because politics is nothing else but the representative of all these interests.”[[23]](#footnote-22) War is the extension of politics, it can also be seen as the extension of national interest. When the interest contradiction between a country and another country, a nation and another nation, a political interest group and another interest group, reaches an uncompromising stage, war breaks out. War is the highest and the final way to adjust an interest relationship.

The conflict of national interest not only leads to war, but also controls the whole process of war development. The war guider has to control the process of war according to the interest gain and loss of his side, either escalating war, or lowering war intensity, or ending a war at the proper time. The starting, development of war, the scale of war, the intensity of war, and the duration of war, are all controlled by the consideration of interest. Usually, when one party in a war has not achieved its expected interest goal, its interest need is not satisfied, and it still has the ability to continue the war, it will not end the war readily.

**Three: the Principles to Be Mastered to Implement Strategic Guidance according to National Interest**

(One) Based on the Common Interest of the Majority People

A country consists of many different social groups (e.g. different ethnic groups, classes, or interest groups, etc.). These social groups have mutually common interests as well as different interests. Different social groups have different value standards. Therefore, the interests confirmed by them are also different. The dividing line of different political natures of strategic guidance is whether to deal with strategic issues based on the interests of the minority of people or the interests of the majority of the people.

The essential nature of the national interest of our country is its nature of people. This is decided by the nature of a socialist country like our country. In a socialist country, the mass of people become the masters of the country, including all ethnic groups and all social fields, and they control the national government through their own representative, the proletarian political party. Reasonable enough, this kind of national interest embodies the interest of the mass of people. Or we can say the common interest of the mass of people is embodied through our common national interest. From this point of view, we can clearly understand the unanimity between the national interest of our country and the interest of the proletarian, all ethnic groups, and all social interest groups. This is the most fundamental difference in nature between the national interest of our country and the national interest of capitalist countries. When some capitalist countries consider their national interest, they also consider the need, the feelings, and the public opinions of people more or less, but their starting point is the ruling class and related interest groups instead of the mass of the people as a whole. What they consider is not how to realize people’s interest, but how to let the need, the feelings, and the public opinions of people not influence the realization of their own interest. Their national interest does not have the full nature of the people. In history, some rulers used people as their cannon fodder to invade other countries year after year, wantonly engaging in military ventures and launching large-scale wars, totally against the people’s interest. It was totally in opposition to the position of the mass of people, and it certainly met with people’s resistance. Eventually, it ended in failure.

(Two) Taking National Interest as the Highest Standard

National interest is the basic standard for deciding national strategy and the starting point of implementing strategic guidance. Therefore, the strategic guide has to take national interest as the highest standard to decide the position and attitude on strategy. Deng Xiaoping, when meeting with the former U.S. President, Richard Nixon, said, “When considering the relationship between two countries, we should mainly think of the strategic interest of one’s own country. We should not think of historical friendship or hatred and we should not think of the difference in social systems and ideologies.” Instead, we should “take the national interest of one’s own country as the highest standard to talk about the issues and deal with them”.[[24]](#footnote-23) Here, Deng Xiaoping compared national interest with social systems and ideologies, very clearly pointing out the position and function of our national interest in the decision-making of our national strategy, using the three words, “the highest standard.” Our country is a socialist country. When making friendly contact with other countries with the same social system and ideology, we cannot do it at the cost of our own national interest. Meanwhile, as for the countries with different social systems and ideologies, while maintaining necessary alert, we should also maintain normal relationships among these countries. We cannot simply draw a dividing line because of ideology.

(Three) To Combine National Interest of One’s Own Country with the Interests of the People of All Nations in the World

To pay attention to the common interest of the people of all nations in the world is actually an issue of correctly dealing with the connection among national interests of all nations. The so-called connection refers to the connection when one nation’s national interest contacts the national interests of other nations. The change of one nation’s national interest might influence the national interests of other countries, having favorable or unfavorable influences on the interests of these countries. This connection is mainly shown in today’s world as, first, when the world economy is moving toward globalization, the economic interests of many countries mutually infiltrate and rely upon each other. The national interests of the countries show this connection more clearly. Secondly, the countries in the world are facing more and more world problems such as biological crisis, environmental pollution, transnational crimes, drug trafficking and smuggling, proliferation of massive destructive weapons, etc. These problems make many countries in the world feel a common threat, forming a common interest, so as to make a common connection among the national interests of all the countries more obvious. Thirdly, today’s world is moving towards multi-polarized strategic patterns, and all the countries are adjusting their strategies according to the changes of international situations and their own national interests. The connection of national interests among countries becomes more complicated and diversified. According to the demand of this connection of national interests among countries, we should deal with the following two issues well when dealing with strategic issues. Number one: we should try to maintain a relative balance among the national interests of countries, correctly understand the overall interest of the world and the interests of individual countries, and correctly evaluate the favorable and unfavorable aspects, reach a common understanding, and eliminate contradictions. Number two: under the precondition of maintaining our fundamental interests, we should connect our national interest with the interests of the world’s people, be good at managing our national interest from the angle of a greater world perspective and actively seek new ways and new means to resolve disputes, and produce “win-win” results for the just interests of all sides, or even “multiple wins.”

(Four) To Place National Sovereignty and Security on Top Position

Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out: “We should always place national sovereignty and national security in the top position.”[[25]](#footnote-24) Sovereignty is the supreme and inviolable right of a country. It is the fundamental symbol for a country to be an independent interest body in international relations. Security is the interest a country has to consider first for its survival. No matter which country, it will always put security on top of all the other interests. The words of Deng Xiaoping clearly illustrated the “powerfulness” of national sovereignty and national security in the structure of national interest and the superiority of national sovereignty and security interests. Here, the “top position” of national sovereignty and national security mentioned by Deng Xiaoping refers to the order of intensity of all the concrete interests within a national interest. While Deng Xiaoping’s saying about taking national interest as the highest standard refers to the position relationship of national interest and other strategically related factors (e.g. ideology and social system, etc.) it is inclusive of all lesser interests.

Deng Xiaoping also pointed out that “Sovereignty is not an issue to be discussed.”[[26]](#footnote-25) No strategic guider can trade national sovereignty and security interest under any circumstance. People will not agree with anyone who sells out national sovereignty and security interests. Some in western academic circles promote the theory of “sovereignty being outdated” such as “civil war is not an internal affair,” or “human rights is over sovereignty,” etc., justifying strategic expansion. It is totally wrong.

(Five) To Consider the Long-term National Interest

When the long-term national interest conflicts with the current local interest, we should consider the long-term development interest. We should not look at the current interest only. We should sacrifice some things, sacrifice some local interest in return for the important long-term interest.

To consider the long-term national interest and implement strategic guidance requires us to use a dynamic view regarding national interest. That is to say, we should see national interest as a system that changes all the time, instead of a still object. This is because as the country develops and its fundamental needs change, the structure and content of national interest also changes accordingly. Some interests that do not seem so important today may be the important interests concerning national survival tomorrow. Sometimes, though we sacrifice current local interest, in the long run, from the point of view of the development and change of national interests, the realization of overall interest will make up these local interests to a higher extent.

# **Section Two: International Politics and Domestic Politics**

Marxism believes that war is the extension of politics though violent means. No matter how the war means and war models develop, it cannot change the essence that war is the extension of politics. Croseweitz clearly pointed out, when discussing the relation between war and politics that “politics is the mother of war, and the frame of war is formed invisibly in politics, just like the gender of life is formed in embryo.”[[27]](#footnote-26) “War is induced by politics. Politics is the head, while war is only a tool. It is impossible to be vice versa”.[[28]](#footnote-27) Mao Zedong pointed out: “War is the supreme form of the struggle between nations, countries, classes, and political groups.” Politics decides the final goal of war, decides the nature of war, controls and influences the making and implementation of war policy, controls the whole process of the birth, development, and the closing of war. When a strategic guider forms and implements a strategy, he has to consider the political situation in the world and in his country. He should go with the political need and try his best to achieve the war task assigned by politics.

**One: the Influence and Control of International Politics on Strategy**

International politics is a historical scope. It is the product of human society in the stage of capitalism, and the grand total of the mutual relationships that the subject of international action in the political field has formed. International political situations are one of the preconditions and objective foundations for making strategy. Among them, the characteristics of the times, international political patterns, international alliances and organizations, and the strategic intentions and balance of forces of the main powers in international politics have important influence over the making and implementation of strategy.

(One) the Characteristics of the Times

The characteristics of the times is the general landmark of the whole world in a certain historical developmental stage. Its special worldliness and phases decide that its influence on strategy is not a one-time event, but a fundamental influence. The characteristics of different times are displayed in differing forms and contents in its influence on strategy. In the evolution of human society, the characteristic of the times represented by productivity and science and technology, such as an agricultural civilization or an industrial civilization, etc., reflect the changes between mankind and nature. This change certainly brings about the changes in military technology, weapons and equipment, military structure, systems, formation, war models, combat methods, etc., and it influences the making and development of strategy in a revolutionary way. In the evolution of human society, the characteristics of the times marked by production relationships and the forms of society it reflects forms the basic rules. Phases change in different development stages of human society. In this long historical process, the change of social ideas, ideology, and social and political systems definitely influence people’s fundamental attitude toward war and peace. In the historical development stage of human society, the characteristics of the times, often marked with the focus of contradiction, as well as the struggle themes of the international community, reflect the main aspect of the world political contradiction. In certain periods of time, the main trend of political struggles, can certainly have profound influence on the object, goal, main struggle model, basic policy, and strategy of the military struggle of a country or a political group.

In today’s world, as far as the progress of science and technology is concerned, a new technological revolution is going on and it is vigorously marked by information technology. As far as social development is concerned, it is the time when capitalism is transforming to socialism. The systems of socialism and capitalism co-exist, and the single-polarized political pattern and multi-polarized political pattern are fiercely competing. As far as world contradiction and struggle themes are concerned, peace and development are the two major world strategic issues influencing the process of international political situations. It is an important precondition for making and implementing strategy to correctly understand and control these characteristics. In today’s world, to control from a macro point of view the political situation and the general tendency of development in order to make correct judgments on the international strategic environment is critical.

(Two) International Political Patterns

International political patterns are the situations and structures formed under mutual functions of the world political forces in certain historical periods of time. It is the most basic characteristic in the world political situation, and it is the basic point of view to understanding the international situation. As a special display model of political struggle, the happening and development of war is more and more influenced by international political patterns. Therefore, the development and change of international political patterns is the main foundation of forming strategy, and it is the important factor influencing the implementation and change of strategy. For example, in late 19th Century and the early 20th Century, there came many capitalist powers, forming a political pattern in which old imperialism and new powers lived side by side. The imperialist powers followed the ocean strategy that was mainly the theory of “huge guns and warships” under the guidance of Markham’s “Theory of Sea Power,” which ignited the war of re-dividing world hegemony, adjusting and establishing new international political patterns. After World War II, the international political pattern of confrontation of the east and the west in the Cold War had obvious influence on the military strategies of the major countries in the world, especially the military strategies of the superpowers. In the 1960s, because of the change of the international triangular relationship brought about by the deterioration of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union while attaining a normalization of the relationship between China and the United States, a major change of military strategy for the Soviet Union occurred. That changed from getting prepared for fighting on one front in Europe to getting ready to fight on two fronts at the same time in Europe and in the Far East. One of the important reasons for this change of military strategy of the United States was a change from “two and a half” wars to “one and a half” wars. During the Cold War, the pattern of confrontation of the two poles decided the basic directions for the strategic decision and strategic interaction of the two big military camps of the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great change in Eastern Europe led to a serious unbalance of international political forces. This is also an important background element for the United States to seize the opportunity to adjust its strategic arrangements, to comprehensively carry out its world strategy, and to seek the leading position in the world.

(Three) International Alliance and International Organization

In certain times and environments, among some countries or political and military groups in the world, they could form certain groups of international alliances or organizations in order to achieve their respective political goals and seek common political interests. In order to realize the goal of the whole group, these groups and organizations usually use the forces of all the countries in the group comprehensively, and adjust and apply all the resources of one country or many countries. Under the guidance of the common interest of the group or alliance, when the countries with alliance policies make and implement strategy, they not only need to consider their own strategic interests, but also the common interest of the alliance or group. They are limited by the alliance or group and they also carry out group responsibilities. They not only need to consider the limitation of their own alliance or group, they are also limited by the strategic force, strategic intention, and strategic situation of an enemy’s alliance or group. Even for the countries that do not join in an alliance, when they make strategy, they have to consider the possible influence of foreign alliances, apply the strategic thinking of the alliance to the issues, and consider the factors of alliance strategy when carrying out their own strategy.

In practice, there have been alliances of countries in ancient times. For example, in the Spring and Autumn Period of our country, Qi Henggong, the King of Qi Kingdom, “respected all the kings to fight against foreigners,” and “united the kingdoms nine times to fight together” and eventually “unified the country.” In the Period of Warring States, Su Qin promoted the strategy of “united all kingdoms” and it coordinated six kingdoms in the east to resist the Qin Kingdom. During the time of Three Kingdoms, Liu Bei united the Wu Kingdom to resist the Cao Kingdom. In recent history, in the Napoleon War of the early 19th Century, there was the anti-France “Sacred Alliance” of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. In the First World War, there was the confrontation between the Central Powers and the Entente countries. In the Second World War, there was the confrontation between the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the anti-fascist allies. During the Cold War, the two large military camps, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, had unprecedented influence on the strategies of many nations then. After the Cold War ended the international alliances and organizations remain far from disappearing, they are still holding very important influence over the trend of strategies of the nations in today’s world.

(Four) the Strategic Intention and Balance of Forces of the Major Powers

The world is a collective body consisting of countries with different social systems and different economic forms. Because all countries follow the strategy of achieving the goal of satisfying the need of their own interests, it affects the strategic choices of other countries. Therefore, the strategic intentions of countries are mutual conditions for each other, to co-exist with each other, and influence each other and restrict each other. Among them, the strategies of the big countries that have some influence over the world or the regions, especially those of the superpowers, their strategic intentions and strategic forces often have a particularly huge influence on regional and international situations. The strategic adjustment of superpowers or world power often brings about some changes in strategy of other major powers, especially the rivals. Sometimes, this chain reaction may repeat itself many times. For example, in the 1960s the “nuclear missile strategy” was mainly a reaction to the “massive retaliation strategy” of the United States. In the 1970s, when the Soviet Union made and perfected its strategy of “dimensional strike in great depth,” the United States formed “equal reaction” by “integral operation of air and ground.” Moreover, during the Cold War, every strategic adjustment of the United States and the Soviet Union affected the making and implementation of the strategies of all the major countries in the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and other non-alliance countries.

Military force is the general name of the armed forces a country (or group) that can directly be used in war or used in war after mobilization. It is the main material foundation for conducting war. Its strength has decisive influence over the scale of war, sustained time, the turning of a war situation, and the result of war. Therefore, as the main player of war, military force balance is not only the main material factor for making strategy, but also, in war practice, the increase and decrease of military force balance has a very important influence over the changes of strategy. This influence is often shown in different times, different wars, or different stages of war and on the changes of operational objectives, main strategic directions and operational models, and operational types. For example, during the domestic revolutionary war of our country, as the force balance between us and the enemy changed in the war process, our armed forces took a series of strategies of “defense,” “stalemate,” and “counterattack,” etc. accordingly. During the Cold War, the reason why the United States carried out the nuclear strategy of “assurance of mutual annihilation” is because the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union,” had a relative balance of nuclear forces at the time.

**Two: the Influence and Restriction of Domestic Politics on Strategy**

Domestic political situations refers to the political system, the structure of political forces, and the leading ideology and political situation of a country. It has decisive influence over the strategy that guides the overall situation of war. No military strategy of any country can go against the political system and basic policy of that country, and exist independently from the political situation of the country. The nature of strategy has to match the political nature of the country, and strategy has to act within the overall political situation of the country. As Lenin pointed out, “No war can be separated from the political system that gives birth to it. The politics that some country, some class of this country promotes for a long time before the war, has to be promoted by this class unavoidably. Only the action model changes.”[[29]](#footnote-28)

(One) the Political Nature of Country

A country, as the main subject of a strategic action, shows its political nature mainly through its political system, leading thinking, and basic policy formation. The political system of a country and its leading thinking are the essence and core of the political nature of a country, and it has decisive influence over the planning and making of global strategy. The political system and leading thinking of a country has to be made through the legislation of the supreme right institution of the country, and it is the fundamental legal system and basic national policy carried out and embodied in the political life of the country. It defines the goal, nature, task, and basic policy of strategy, and it confirms the foundation of the strategic guiding principle. It is the highest political standard that the strategy has to obey and serve. Meanwhile, it is also the political foundation for ensuring that strategy is carried out and implemented. Military strategy relies on the political system of a country. This is shown in the political nature deciding the nature of military strategy, and military strategic goals obeying political goals. Advanced political systems can motivate people to be firm in their ideals, beliefs, and spirit, and will enhance the cohesion and combat capability of the armed forces to fully apply military strategy. On the other hand, counter-revolutionary political systems will limit this function, and the strategy serving this political system is often boycotted and fails badly.

The basic policy of a country highly reflects the economic and political interest of the country and the will of the ruling group. The basic policy of a country includes domestic policy and foreign policy. Foreign policy includes the general foreign policy and the specific policy towards individual countries (groups). Countries with different natures have different foreign policies. They can maintain the sovereignty of their countries and seek international equal rights; they can also seek the leading rights in international affairs, even hegemony. The country dedicates promoting power politics and seeking regional or world hegemony often carries out the outward expansive offensive strategy; while the country that dedicates itself to peace and development and seeking establishing of a fair and reasonable international order often follows self-defensive and defensive strategy.

(Two) Class (Stratum), Ethnic Group, Religion (Sect), and Interest Groups of a Country

Strategy is born as society divides classes and gives birth to armed forces and class war. As a national act rooted in class contradiction and interest conflict, in the planning and implementing of a war, it has to be influenced by all the political relations of certain classes, certain governments. Therefore, in a certain period of time, the relations of all the classes (stratums), ethnic groups, religions (sects), and interest groups of a country and their influence on the national political situation and national security can make the strategy show its class nature more clearly. Certain strategy always represents the interest of certain classes, stratum, ethnic groups, and interest groups. The choice of strategic direction and operational direction and the judgment of enemy or friend are all influenced and restricted by the interest judgment of the leading political force and interest group. The religious wars in history were mostly launched by the ruling church forces. They were attempted to consolidate and expand the rule of religious authority and increase church assets. The Civil War of the United States was the natural result of the interest conflict between the group of industrial owners in the north and the slave owner group in the south. After the Second World War, the surging national liberation movement and national independence wars were the expression of resistance that oppressed nations and oppressed people in colonies fought for their legitimate rights.

(Three) Political Situation of a Country

The Political situation of a country mainly includes the stability of the political system of that country and its ideological situation.

The stability of the political situation of a country shows the controllability of the national political situation in a certain period of time. It is the important factor to influence the change of national military strategy. If all the social stratums recognize the current political system and recognize the legitimacy of the existence of the current social and political system, it will provide the strategy with a relatively stable political foundation and service goal. If the current political system is not recognized in society, that is to say, the political attitudes of the social stratums are not the same, even against each other, causing instability in the political situation of the country, then the strategy loses its political foundation and service object. Therefore, the foundation of existence and development of strategy, in a very important aspect, relies on the conformity of values, political beliefs, political attitudes, and political actions within the country.

The ideology of the ruling political force and interest group has decisive influence on the making and implementation of strategy. For example, during the Cold War, the difference of two ideologies, socialism and capitalism, was the root for the formation and confrontation of the east and the west military camps. After the Cold War ended, as the confrontational situation of the two camps disappeared, though the influence of “ideology” decreased compared with the time of the Cold War, ideology still plays a huge role in the making and implementation of strategy.

All in all, military strategy is closely connected with politics. It is from politics, and serves politics. As Lenin said, “strategy obeys politics. The two are closely related.” The guiding function of politics on strategy lies in politics deciding the goals of strategy, deciding the way of conducting war, setting up strategic tasks, mobilizing human resources, material resources, and resources to ensure the needs of war. Without political guidance, strategy becomes the water without source and the tree without root. Meanwhile, what strategy shows is not only the confrontation of military forces, but also the confrontation of political forces in the first place. In the process of politics guiding strategic decision, strategy also has counteraction on politics. The “right” strategy can accelerate the resolution of political contradiction, the appearance of new political relations, and the turning a new leaf of politics; while the “wrong” strategy can further intensify the contradiction and nurture and lead to more serious political conflict, even war.

# **Section Three: War Strength and War Potential**

War strength is the grand total of military, political, economic, and spiritual forces that can be used in war immediately. War potential is the capability of the above factors that are in potential status during peacetime and can be mobilized or developed before the war breaks out or during the war to increase war strength. War strength and war potential constitute the general war force of a country or a political and military group (alliance). Its influence on war strategy is fundamental throughout the whole process, and decisive.

One, War Strength and Potential Are the Objective Material Foundation for Military Strategic Planning

The capacity of war strength and war potential of a country is decided by many factors, among them natural conditions, science, technology, economic conditions, political conditions, and military conditions, etc. These construct the action stage for a military strategist. Mao Zedong particularly emphasized that a “military strategist cannot override the permissible range of material conditions to hope for the victory of war. Nevertheless, a military strategist can and must try to win the war within the permissible range of material conditions.”[[30]](#footnote-29)

First, geographic condition. It mainly refers to the size of territory and sea, the quality of geographic location and climate condition, and the amount of mineral resources, hydro resources, and other resources. that can be developed. It is not only the foundation for a country, a nation to survive and develop, but also the precondition for any military strategist to implement strategic planning. Under normal situations, the subjective will of the people cannot change these natural conditions. Some countries use invasive means to occupy other countries’ territory and resources. But that is only a factor that functions temporarily. Under normal circumstances, the capacity of war strength and potential of a country is first restricted by natural geographic conditions. Of course, through scientific knowledge of the natural geographic conditions, improvement, and application, people can increase war strength and potential to certain limits.

Second, population situation. The amount of population and labor force, the density of the population, the reasonableness of population distribution, the speed of population mobilization, and the structure of ethnic groups, gender, and age, etc. are all important factors of the human resources of war. Among them, the number of population has a decisive significance for reserve forces. Lenin once pointed out that “whoever has more reserves and whoever has more sources of force, he can sustain more in war, and he can win the victory of war.”[[31]](#footnote-30) Apart from the number of population, the more important thing is the quality of the population. The quality of the population directly influences the quality of soldiers. The more advanced the science and technology and national education are, the more important this factor seems to be.

Third, the development level of science, technology, and the economy. The advancement of science, technology, and the economy decides the development and application of all the resources, and decides the size of material resources and financial resources that can be mobilized. This is the important material foundation that decides the capacity of war potential and war capability. In particular, the level of the defense science and technology industry directly controls the number and quality of the research of weapons and equipment, and directly influences the choice of military strategic guidance and the combat capability of the armed forces.

Fourth, the situation of military forces. This mainly refers to the level of the armed forces, including the structure, size, the number and quality of weapons and equipment of the armed forces, the capacity of expansion of the armed forces, the capability of rapid response, and the number of the defense reserve force and its quality. The backbone force in war strength and potential is a highly modernized and formalized regular army backed up by the massive people, plus a large, strong, and carefully organized reserve force, and it is in the leading position when a military strategist implements military strategic planning.

Fifth, the social system and national spirit of a country. The countries with different social systems follow different policies, producing different meanings of war strength and potential. In capitalist countries, because of their born class contradiction and ethnic contradiction, especially the invasive and expansive policy of hegemonism, leads strong dissatisfaction and resistance from their citizens and forms anti-war and war-weary sentiment. They seriously block the application of war potential. But in socialist countries, the high political consciousness and patriotic sentiment can fully apply the counteraction of superstructure on economic foundation and spirit on material, to turn out a powerful material force. Meanwhile, national spirit is also an important factor of war strength and potential. In war times, Mao Zedong highly complimented that “we Chinese people have the spirit of fighting against our enemy to the bloody end, the resolve to recover the old glory based on self-reliance, and the capability of standing in the nations of the world.” The function of this national spirit and cohesive force in war should never be underestimated.

The components of war strength and war potential do not exist independently. They are in an inter-related, inter-promoting, inter-influencing organic body, shown as a comprehensive war force and becoming the big stage for a strategic guide to sit within a command tent and devise strategies that will assure victory a thousand miles away.

**Two: War Strength and Potential is the Basic Means of Winning a War and Achieving a Military Strategic Goal**

Mao Zedong pointed out: “The result of war mainly lies in the military, economic, and natural conditions of the two sides of war. There is no question about that.”[[32]](#footnote-31) He also pointed out, “War is the competition of subjective abilities between the commanders of two armies to fight for superiority and initiative, based on the material foundation of military strength and financial strength as its stage.”[[33]](#footnote-32) The feasibility and reliability of the conditions of war strength and war potential are the footholds for achieving all military strategic goals, adjusting the internal organization and inter-relations within the armed forces, and implementing military action.

The making of a military strategic goal is influenced by the strength of science, technology, economy, politics, and military force. It not only has the characteristics of strong comprehensiveness, strategy, and policy, but also involves many variables, complicated activity rules, and interactive influences that cannot be surmised subjectively. Every judgment, plan, selection, and important decision of a military strategy should be evaluated and planned in the aspect of war strength and war potential. One should make detailed analysis and demonstrate in strategy and tactics, in a macro way and a micro way, comprehensively and locally, and for military effect and economic support capability, assure the feasibility of conditions and the scientific theoretic guidance needed. All uncertainty, careless thinking, hasty decision making, and overweening will be punished by war. The ultimate reason of the failures of Germany in the two world wars, of course, lay in its injustice. Nevertheless, the limitation of war strength and potential was also one the decisive factors. In the First World War, though Germany had full preparation and its military forces were in a temporarily superior position, the fields of human resource, food, raw materials, and other economic factors were inferior to the opponents’ and long-time consumption rendered its national economy into chaos. In the winter of 1916, the production indexes of all industrial sections went down continuously. There were serious shortages of all materials, especially food. People lived on tulips. So it was called “the winter of tulips” in history. In 1918, the German economy was on the brink of collapse and the war had to end in its failure. In the Second World War, the stake put on the so-called “blitzkrieg” by Germany was obviously risky, because its invasion goal greatly exceeded its war potential. So Germany was totally defeated. On the contrary, in the Homeland Defense War of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945, the reason why the Soviet Union could change from defense to counteroffensive quickly (and win the final victory) was, apart from the fundamental reasoning of the justice of war, because of the strong economic potential of the Soviet Union. After the Civil War and the recovery of its economy, the Soviet Union immediately threw in full force to develop heavy industry. After two five-year plans, one year before the Homeland Defense War, the industrial output of the Soviet Union was 12 times that of Russia before the revolution, with an annual output of 18,300,000 tons of steel, 15,000,000 tons of iron, 166,000,000 tons of coal, and 31,000,000 tons of crude oil. This was the economic foundation for the Soviet Union to conduct the Homeland Defense War. Of course, because of the problem of distribution, in the first year of the war, the Soviet economy had serious damage, too, and over 1,500 factories had to move eastward. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union successfully reorganized the whole industry quickly according to the needs of the war, greatly strengthening its defense industry. To the last year before the end of the war, the Soviet Union armed forces had 4 times more in divisions than in peacetime, 5 times of artillery pieces, and 5 times of planes, greatly changing the balance of military forces between the Soviet Union and Germany. This made the victory of the Soviet armed forces and the failure of the German armed forces unavoidable. Here, the importance of the evaluation and comparison of war strength and potential in strategic decision-making are obvious.

A brilliant strategic commander has to make clear evaluation of war strength and potential and analyze the foundation of war, as the first step of deciding military strategic guidelines. In the great anti-Japanese Invasion War, Mao Zedong made a comprehensive analysis of the war strength of China and Japan and pointed out: “Though Japan was strong in military force, economic strength, and political organization, its war was unjust, barbarian, and backward”. Moreover, Japan was a small country with a shortage of human and material resources, and it did not have much support in the world because it was unjust. Meanwhile, the advantage of China was that its war was just, progressive; China had a large population, large territory, and bumper natural resources, and China had much support in the world because it was just. The shortcomings of China were that it was weak in military force, economic strength, and political organization. Comparing the two, the war strength and potential of China was larger than that of Japan. The result of war was that Japan would lose for sure, and China would win. But China could not win the victory quickly. China had to conduct a protracted war. In this way, Mao Zedong correctly understood the characteristics and the general rules of the Anti-Japanese Invasion War of China. Mao Zedong also specifically analyzed the change of war strength and potential of China and Japan during the war and accurately predicted the process of war. He demonstrated the three phases the protracted war had to experience in the process, namely enemy strategic offensive, our strategic defense; enemy strategic conservation, our preparation for counteroffensive (e.g. stalemate phase); and the enemy’s strategic retreat and our strategic counteroffensive. These three phases show the change of the strength of enemy and us. According to this, Mao Zedong made a series of strategies and tactics for guiding the Anti-Japanese Invasion War that dynamically led to the final victory of the war.

**Three: War Strength and Potential Are Important Foundations for Stopping and Controlling War**

To stop and control war is an important function of strategy. In order to achieve the goal of stopping and controlling war, apart from “war is planning,” and “war is relationship,” one has to have a strong war strength and potential as backup to threaten the enemy, making the enemy dare not act rashly. Otherwise, stopping and controlling war will become empty talk. There are about four ways for threatening the enemy and controlling war with strength. Number one is to possess superior war strength and potential and let the opponent realize that to launch a war can only result in self-destruction. This is the most reliable way to control war. Number two, to reach a balance of force with the opponent with advantages and disadvantages on both sides and no assurance of either side to win, so no one can launch a war rashly. Number three, to possess limited but effective war strength that can inflict unbearable damage and strike on the opponent, so to stop war with deterrence. Number four, to possess minimum deterrence. Though the opponent has larger superiority, because we have the means of making some damage on the war launcher, it has some controlling function on war.

Among war strength and war potential, war strength is the most direct factor to stop war. Only war strength can make the enemy afraid and dare not launch a war out of fear of having too much loss. After the end of the Napoleon War, Europe maintained almost a hundred years of peace. This has something to do with the balance of forces based on the military strength formed after the Vienna Conference. After the Second World War, in the Cold War of near half a century between the east and the west, though the two sides faced each other with heavy forces, with swords drawn and bows bent, they had never had any direct war. Its reason also lay in both sides having developed strong war strength, in particular, in the 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed the strategic nuclear forces that could destroy the other side, therefore, no one dared to launch a war hastily.

Of course, war potential is also an important factor to controlling war. Huge war potential can be turned into war strength in wartime and can be applied directly in combat, becoming an important factor nobody can ignore or not consider when launching a war. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, our country was in a bad international environment for a long time, with two superpowers threatening our country at the same period of time. But there was no massive invasion of any superpower. One of the important reasons was that our country has a wide and large territory, bumper natural resources, a large population, great room for strategic maneuver, and the people were bound by a common hatred for the enemy. Any massive invasion on our country would have been buried in the great ocean of the people’s war. This huge war potential certainly made the enemy afraid. In the Korean War, the reason why the United States dared not expand the war onto the Chinese territory was that it was threatened by the huge war potential of the people’s war of China. It certainly was one of the important reasons. To expand the war could only put the United States into a protracted war, which was against the fundamental interest of the United States. Therefore, it was reasonable for Truman to fire McArthur who clamored to expand the war.

During the Second World War, though Nazi Germany launched the blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union, it put the Soviet Union into a very passive position, yet, as time moved on, the huge war potential of the Soviet Union was released gradually and in less than four years, the Soviet Union won the great victory of the anti-fascist war. On the contrary, without enough war strength and potential, even though one is justified, one can hardly control an unfavorable war. In history, there are so many cases that the small and weak countries cannot control their own destiny and allow one to be trampled upon. In the Second World War, some countries became the victims of the fascist forces. There was no doubt that one of the important reasons was that they were small and weak.

**Four: War Strength and Potential Are the Most Active Factors for Military Strategy Changing All the Time**

The development history of military strategy shows that the development of war strength and potential has to push forward the change of the size and structure of the armed forces and the operational models, and has to bring about profound revolution in military strategy. In the latter half of the 19th Century, in the second science and technology revolution, the productivity of capitalist countries developed rapidly and there appeared a series of unprecedented new industrial sections. The war potential of the advanced industrial countries increased rapidly, and the armed forces had high-performance rapid-shooting guns and artillery pieces, tanks, planes, new warships, and they had the transportation means of high mobility. The increase of military strength and the change of combat means further pushed forward the development of military strategic theory. The action plan of the armed forces was in more detail in time and space; the scale and intensity of strategic action increased greatly; the safeguarding for military command and military action was more complicated; and there was new development in the concepts of offensive and defense strategies. Strategic offense stressed implementing several strategic campaigns at the same time or in sequence, and the suddenness and mobility of the offense increased greatly. Strategic defense evolved the firm defense with a powerful second echelon and great depth. The intention of the strategic task also expanded into multiple layers, putting more and more emphasis on the strategic coordination of land, sea, and air, and considering the relationship between the strategic potential of the country and current strategic reserve forces. In the new technology revolution starting in the 1970s, the high and new technologies represented by information technology, space technology, new material technology, and micro electronic technology developed rapidly. The leading countries in the new technology revolution wave greatly enhanced their national strength and military strength though informational renovation of their national industry and armed forces. The enhancement of strength and the progress of technology have brought and are bringing major influence to the combat model of modern war. The combined operation of various services and branches, the integration of strategic forces, remote precision attacks, and global information control has forecast the new trend of the development of modern military strategic theories.

The development of war strength and potential not only pushed forward the renovation and revolution in military strategic thinking, but also directly influenced and controlled the choice of military strategies of the countries. In the near half-century tense confrontation between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, their adjustment of military strategies was directly connected with the change of their war strength and war potential.

As the new military revolution develops, the decisive function of the war strength and potential in the selection and making of military strategy, with the basic factors of the strength of science and technology, economy, politics, and military, is more and more strengthened. One of the outstanding expressions of this strengthened trend is more emphasis on military strategy obeying national strategy, more emphasis on maintaining national development interest, more emphasis on the influence of military revolution and on seeking the overall enhancement of the factors such as the structure of the armed forces, their weapons and equipment.

# **Section Four: Geographical Strategic Relation**

Geographical relation often refers to the “social-geographical” space relation formed by the social activities of residency, life, and production of human beings in certain common geographic areas, based on natural geographic environments.

The geographical strategic relation among countries refers to all the interest-related strategic relations among countries based on natural geographic and geological environments, such as geographical political relations, geographical economic relations, geographical cultural relations, and geographical military relations, etc. These relations have foundational functions on the security and development of a country, and are important factors influencing and controlling war and strategy.

One, Component Factors of Geographical Strategic Relation

There are many aspects that constitute the geographic factors of the geographic strategic relations of a country. Generally, the basic factors can be divided into natural geographic factors and human geographic factors. Natural geographic factors include the geographic location of a country, the size of its territory, the shape of its territory, its natural resources, its national capital, and its borders, etc. Human geographic factors include the comprehensive strength of the economy, science and technology, culture, and military of a country. Its organic structure of its human resources and distribution, its structure of ethnic groups, religion, and social forces, the role and position of this country in the international community, and the characteristics of its foreign policy, etc. are factors.

Geographic location. The geographic location in geographic strategic relationships refers to the natural location of a country on the earth. The geographic location of the countries in the world can be roughly divided into inland countries, mainland ocean countries, peninsula countries, large ocean island countries, island countries, and islands of countries, etc. The natural location of the geographic location of a country has the most fundamental influence on geographic strategic relations. Generally speaking, inland countries are limited by the surrounding countries in their transportation, their development room, and their room for maneuverability are relatively small, and their geographic strategic relationships are relatively simple. Mainland ocean countries have to deal with the issue of national relations in two directions, land and sea, at the same time. Their geographic strategic relations are complicated. For example, for a long time, France has faced a hard choice of whether to put her strategic emphasis on developing “land power” or developing “sea power.” Peninsula countries have the convenient condition of land and sea on one hand, and are easily influenced by mainland countries and invaded by ocean countries. Generally speaking, their geographic strategic relations are often in passive positions. For example, the Balkan Peninsula had been the wrestling ring of the land-right countries and sea-right countries to fight for the hegemony of the Mediterranean and the hegemony of the Euro-Asia Continent. Large ocean island countries refer to the countries consisting of large islands that are arranged in order and connected with each other. Generally, they pay attention to developing sea force and try to control the strategic passages. Generally speaking, in the geographic strategic relationships, they are in an advantageous position. Generally speaking, the weak and small island countries and islands of countries refer to the weak and small countries scattered on the oceans. Though these countries have convenient sea transportation conditions, they can be easily divided, invaded, and controlled by large ocean countries, because the size of their territories are too small, or their territories can hardly form a geographic whole, so in geographic strategic relations, they are often in an inferior position.

The size of territory. Territory is not only a geographic concept of land territory. It is all the space and area belonging to a country on a geographic location of the earth. It not only includes land territory, but also “sea territory.” The geographically large countries that people often refer to are usually the countries with land and sea. Russia, China, the United States, Brazil, and Australia, all these six countries with the largest territories in the world are large countries of land; meanwhile, they are all large ocean countries. Generally speaking, the geographic strategic relations of these large countries have major influence in their regions. Because of their strong political, economic, scientific and technologic, and military strength, their influence on the geographic strategic relations of some countries far exceed their own regions, becoming the world powers with important influence over the strategic patterns of the world. Some become the powers that have leading functions and decisive functions for the world strategic pattern. Those countries with very small and narrow territories, especially some inland countries in between large countries, have geographic strategic relations that are usually in “inner” and passive positions, and they can hardly have any major function in the region and the world. Some of them even become the victims of the major powers for their hegemony and major influence. Meanwhile, those weak and small island countries and islands of countries scattered on oceans even become the “footrests” of the large ocean countries for their hegemony in the world.

Territory shape refers to the outside shape of a country on the surface of the earth. The categorizing method of the outside shape is a projecting analysis method of plane geometry. Generally speaking, the shapes of territory can be divided into the shape of plate (relatively regular) and irregular shape. The shape of plate is generally divided into balanced plate or unbalanced shape. Balanced shape is divided into ordinary balanced shape and huge unbalanced shape. Unbalanced shape generally is a long and narrow shape. The territory with irregular shape has an intriguing and complicated geographic relationship with its neighboring countries. The most special is the scattered shape. The territory shapes that are typically significant for analyzing geographic strategic relations are mainly huge balanced plate shape, long and narrow shape, and scattered shape. Huge balanced shape refers to the plate shape that has a broad territory with one body and relatively regular shape. In this kind of country, the territorial resource is scattered in a balanced way, the strategic depth is deep, and there is large room for strategic maneuver. Long and narrow shape is an extreme changed shape of plate with a long and narrow shape of territory. The strategic center of this kind of country is often the “shape of the dumbbell,” and its “waist of bee” part is very vulnerable during wartime. Scattered shape is a special case of irregular shape. Its shape of territory is fragmented and hard to consolidate. Countries of this kind are usually scattered in oceans. Because their land territories lack complete unification and their strategic forces are scattered they are vulnerable to being dismembered.

Natural resource. Natural resource is the resource of living material and production material of human society, and it is the objective condition a country has to rely on for survival and development. The categories of natural resource include recyclable resources (land resource, water resource, and biological resource, etc.) and non-recyclable resources (mineral resource and fuel resource, etc.). The distribution of natural resources includes land resources and sea and ocean resources. In history, seizing and controlling natural resources was often the economic root of war. Under modern circumstances, the fight over resources is not only shown in the fight and control over land resources, but also more and more in the fight and control over sea and ocean resources. Under modern scientific and technological circumstances, “developing the ocean” is not only “for the fish and salt” and “the convenience of ship transportation.” More importantly, it is to use modern sea and ocean development technology to open up the world’s sea and ocean, the inexhaustible treasury resource. There are many sea and ocean disputes among modern countries, such as the dispute over the bordering sea and ocean regions, island disputes, seabed disputes, and ocean environmental disputes, etc. They are all the fights over sea and ocean resources. Therefore, according to the Convention of Sea and Ocean Laws of the United Nations, it has become a key issue of national geographic strategy to maintain national sea and ocean interests.

National capital refers to the political, economic, cultural, and military center of a country. The capitals of all the countries in the world were all formed in history. Nevertheless, the choices of the capitals by all the countries were all decided to a great extent by their geographic strategic values. For example, in the late 9th Century, Russia established a national country “Kiev Russia” (?), and its capital was established in Kiev near the Black Sea. In the early 13th Century, Moscow Dukedom decided to make Moscow its capital, far from the Black Sea. In the late 15th Century, Moscow became the capital of Russia. In 1712, Emperor Peter moved the capital to Saint Petersburg on the Baltic Sea, opening a door towards the world’s oceans and marking that Russia was on the road to a world naval power. In 1918, Russia moved its capital back to Moscow. Another example, because of the influence of the geographic concept of “round sky and square land,” in the ancient times of China, people made the capital city as the center of the national territory at first. The first slavery nation, Xia Dynasty, in Chinese history originated in the middle and lower region of the Yellow River, and its central region of activities was the area of Luoyang. The people of Xia Dynasty decided its ruling center of territory according to the model of “the same center of round.” After Emperor Qin Shihuang unified China, he constructed a fan-shaped communication network that reached as far as the old lands of all six eastern kingdoms, and he chose Xianyang as the center of the country according to the model of “eccentric circle.” In Chinese history, the ruling groups rising in the northwest and northeast established provisional capitals in their birthplaces after they made their capitals in eastern or central regions, in order to control relatively advanced east and central regions, and took the model of “dumbbell” to maintain the strategic balance between their birthplaces and the national ruling centers. In the times of Han Dynasty and Tang Dynasty, to defend against the Huns from the north was the focus of the political affairs of the country. People took the model of “resisting foreign invasion,” ruling with stability in Changan, the center, to achieve the strategic goal of controlling the whole country. In the time of North Song Dynasty, the center of the country moved eastward. Kaifeng, “the city that reached four directions,” became the capital. In the early 70s of the 13th Century, Yuan Dynasty that rose from the northern prairie combined the strategic functions of the comprehensive model of the capitals in history, made Dadu (today’s Beijing) as its capital. That was at the juncture of agricultural culture and nomadic culture, and Dadu became the political, military, and cultural center of China, a multi-nationality country. Because the capital of a country is the symbol of its national will and national dignity, China as well as the world, saw the foreign invasion usually taking the occupying of the capital as its goal, in order to conquer the resistance will of an invaded nation and control the sovereignty of the invaded country. Therefore, the capital of a country is the core issue of the geographic strategic relation of a country.

Border area and national border. Border area is the territory on the border of a country. It is the outer shell or extension of the geographic structure of a country. The national border is the territorial dividing line between neighboring countries. It is the real mark line to separate the territory of one country from its neighboring country on the surface of the earth or the map mark line to separate the territorial sea from the international waters. The national border is the important symbol and mark of the sovereignty of a country, while border area is an important part of the territory of a country. The invasion on the national border of a country is the invasion on its sovereignty, while occupying a border area is to occupy the territory of a country. Therefore, border area and national territory are in the same comprehensive concept. The change of border area means the change of national territory. It is very important for the stability and balance of the geographic strategic relation among neighboring countries to correctly deal with and apply the functions of border area in resisting foreign invasion and opening to the outside world.

The relative distance among countries. The relative distance among countries can be divided into neighboring relations (bordering and neighboring), observing relations (close but not bordering), connecting relations (far but easy to reach), separating relations (close but hard to reach), and far relation (far but accessible), etc. Generally speaking, the relative distance among countries follows the diminishing rule of distance of geography. That is to say, the mutual acting force and influence among countries decreases as the distance increases. It also means that the closer the distance is, the greater the mutual acting force and influence is; the further the distance is, the smaller the mutual acting force and influence will be. The relative distance among countries holds major influence over the geographic strategic relation among countries. The geographic strategic choices of all the countries in the world means dealing well with the geographic strategic relationships with surrounding countries in important positions.

Strategic large space. The strategic large space refers to the world’s ocean space, atmospheric space, and outer space (or called near earth space, or called near earth outer space). The world ocean space mainly refers to all the “international waters” (including international seas and oceans) outside of inner water, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zones under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the countries, all the “international seabed area” of the seabed and bed earth that is usually 3,000 to 3,500 meters deep and outside of the rule of the jurisdiction of countries, and the “international navigation straits” that are outside of the range of the territorial sea of the countries on banks. Atmospheric space usually refers to the space between the surface of the earth and up to the height of 100 kilometers, including troposphere, stratosphere, and ionosphere, etc. Outer space refers to the near earth outer space outside of earth atmospheric space. The world ocean space is the traditional space for the sea powers to fight for world hegemony. Today, as “the era of the ocean” has arrived, many sea countries and coastal countries in the world have made strategies regarding ocean powers. They are actively developing the comprehensive strength on sea and moving forward into the sea. The idea of “sea power is to use and control the sea” by Markham has become and is becoming the important theoretic foundation for the world ocean countries and coastal countries in expanding their strategic deep area into the oceans. Atmospheric space, apart from ordinary civil usage, is widely used for military purposes. It is the main activity field for air force, air defense force, and air-born force. Compared with territory and territorial sea, the territorial air space of a country is more vulnerable to foreign violation. Especially when missile weapons have the characteristics of remote attack and “electromagnetic weapons” have the characteristics of getting in by every opening, the defense of territorial air space is weaker, making the military struggle in atmospheric space a more sensitive area of the geographic strategic relation of countries. Outer space is the fourth space for the activities of human beings. As space technology develops, human beings are getting into the space era. Though international laws say that outer space can only be used for peaceful purposes, some space powers are speeding up the dangerous process of militarizing the outer space and trying very hard to occupy the new strategic commanding height. The outer space has become the most sensitive field of national geographic strategic relations.

**Two: Influence and Restriction of Geographic Strategic Relations on Making and Implementation of Military Strategy**

(One) To Evaluate Security Environment and Decide Strategic Role according to Geographic Strategic Pattern Formed by Relations among Large Powers

The development of modern and contemporary world history shows that the formation and development of world geographic strategic patterns and international order are often led by large countries that have privileged geographic locations, national territorial natural forms, and comprehensive strength, and have important influential roles on the international stage. In the late 15th Century and early 16th Century, for the first time, there was a pattern of two powers in the world, Portugal and Spain on the Iberian Peninsula which controlled the world colonies. In the second half of the 17th Century and the first half of the 18th Century, there was the confrontation of sea power, England, and land power, France. The “Vienna System,” established in 1815, turned into the co-existence of the five powers of England, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, after the failure of the Napoleon War. Later it turned into the co-existence of the new imperialist countries and the old imperialist countries on the eve of the First World War. The “Versailles-Washington System” established after the First World War split into two large camps of the Axis and the Allies in the 30s of the 20th Century. The “Yalta System” established at the end of the Second World War set up the pattern of the confrontation between the two poles, the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, the two poles were gone. The United States became the only superpower. China and Russia stick to their respective independent positions. The European Union has increased its self-determination a little and the world is beginning to transfer to a pattern of multi-poles.

When a country wants to make right strategic decisions, it has to have clear knowledge and judgment on the geographic strategic pattern and international order it is in first, and decide its role in international relations clearly. In this way it can adroitly guide action according to circumstances and promote the favorable and avoid the unfavorable to optimally realize national strategic interest. Under the historical circumstance where power politics and strength policy occupy the leading position, if the poor and weak geographically large countries and middle-sized and small countries want to survive and develop, it is especially important for them to understand the characteristics of geographic strategic patterns, understand clearly the strategic security environment, and define clearly their own strategic roles and positions.

Though China is a geographically large country, since modern times, China had always been a victim of carved-up and plundering by the imperialist powers and had always been a poor and weak country. Mao Zedong summed up China’s bitter lesson of being bullied, being split, and being carved up in the past 100 years or so. He studied “geographic international relations,” and made a series of major strategic decisions for the liberation of the Chinese people and national independence. During the Anti-Japanese Invasion War, Mao Zedong proposed to establish domestic national liberation alliances and international anti-fascist alliances, making outstanding contributions for the victory of the Chinese anti-Japanese Invasion War and the victory of the world anti-fascist war. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted the conflict between the two poles. Mao Zedong laid his eyes on the very wide and broad “middle area” in between the United States and the Soviet Union, stuck on the diplomatic policy of independence and self-determination and the military strategic guideline of active defense, vigorously maintaining the sovereignty and security of the New China. In his late years, Mao Zedong created the famous theory of “three worlds,” advocating the combination of the struggle between “oppressed and oppressing” of the Third World countries and the superpowers and the struggle between “the controlling and the anti-controlling” of the Second World and the superpowers, maintaining world peace, working against hegemonism, and seeking to change the international order based on unfair, control, and exploitation, and winning the strategic initiative position for China.

(Two) Judging Main Strategic Threatening Direction and Defining Clearly Key Points of Strategic Offensive and Defense according to Geographic Distribution of Real or Potential Threat

To judge the main threat, one should first judge the possible threat on the national strategic security from the point of view of geographic strategy. Secondly, one should judge whether the nature of these threats is potential or current. Then one should judge the intensity of the threat. These should be the foundation of making strategic decisions.

From the point of view of the pattern of geographic strategy, the debate over “sea defense” and “fort defense” in modern China reflected the wavering of Sing government on the strategic judgment of the main threat. Starting from the early 19th Century, Russia expanded eastward on the Euro-Asia continent, while Britain came around Africa to expand onto South Asia and the Far East, and “the whole Euro-Asia continent is encircled by a pair of huge pincers. One of the hands was Russia. Russia came around Siberia on land, moved towards the Pacific Ocean. The other hand was the expanding West Europe. The West Europe came around Africa to expand to India, Southeast Asia, and China.”[[34]](#footnote-33) In the geographic strategic pattern of “the pincer attack from the south and north” made by the land power, Russia, and sea power, Britain, the Sing government had a fierce debate on how to judge the main strategic threat China was facing. One side believed that the main strategic threat came from the Czar’s Russia from the northern land; the other side believed that the main strategic threat came from Britain from the sea on the south; and the third side believed that the main threat came from Japan on the sea on the east. This debate brought about the huge debate on whether “sea defense” or “fort defense” should be the focus of the Chinese strategic deployment against the invasion of the powers. It had always been a hard issue in modern China to choose the direction of strategic defense. After the foundation of the New China, China “does not pose any threat to any country, but is threatened by foreign countries. China is a poor and weak country. But China is an independent and self-determination country. Where comes the main threat on China? From the first day of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, we have been facing this issue”.[[35]](#footnote-34) In the 50s of the 20th Century, the United States moved its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, militarily occupied Taiwan, signed a “Mutual Defense Treaty” with Taiwan authority, and constructed a new-moon circle around Mainland China, suppressing, encircling, and blocking China comprehensively. At that time, the main threat facing China came from the east. After the 60s, the Soviet Union deployed one million troops on Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. The main threat facing China came from the north. Because the Chinese government observed calmly, judged correctly, and made timely strategic adjustments, China has always maintained a strategic initiative position.

(Three) To Construct and Deploy Strategic Force according to Different Characteristics of Geographic Strategic Space

Different strategic geographic characteristics decide different focus of the construction of strategic forces. For example, the security index of an inland country relies greatly on the strength of the neighboring countries and the direction of their foreign policies. And its development potential and perspective is much related with the development level and economic complement relationships. The strategic force mainly consists of the army, and it is generally used to defend the central pivots of the country and its border. Usually a large island country has narrow land space. Its national security and development relies greatly on ocean and sea communication routes. Continental coastal countries generally have broad land, rich resources, deep strategic areas, long coastal lines, good natural ports and gulfs, and convenient sea outlets. Its need of national security and development is comprehensive and there is much room to choose.

Different strategic geographic characteristics also have different development directions of strategic forces. Though Russia is on the edges of many marginal seas, it is not able to face the three oceans directly. To its north, the sea is shallow and connected with the cold North Pole world. To its east, the seas lead to the Pacific Ocean, but the Bering Sea is surrounded by the Aleutian Islands, the Sea of Knots is surrounded by Kuris Islands, and Sea of Japan is controlled by the Islands of Japan. To its south, it can only enter the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Zoospores, the Strait of Dardanelle’s, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Strait of Gibraltar. To its west, the Baltic Sea is a key ocean route. But it has to pass narrow Large Belt Strait (?) and Small Belt Strait (?), and pass the Strait of Kartercarter (?) and the Strait of Scalgrag (?) to enter the North Sea eventually. Its route towards the Atlantic Ocean is greatly controlled by the powerful sea power, Great Britain. Therefore, in order to break through this geographic restriction, Russia has long been trying to solve the problem of a sea outlet. So, to search for a sea outlet, especially a warm water port, becomes the most important geographic idea and strategic choice of Russia to move towards the world seas and oceans.

As the only superpower in the world, the United States has two oceans on its east and its west, and there is no strong neighbor to its north or its south. “In the international community, it takes the position of the main role on the world stage in future”.[[36]](#footnote-35) Therefore, there are the following characteristics in the deployment of strategic forces of the United States: number one, to eliminate all threat on its homeland, to maintain the absolute superior position in military technology in order to keep its homeland absolutely safe. Number two, “to eliminate the existence of hostile forces outside of the western hemisphere that hurts its interest. Number three, to control the world ocean strategic space through controlling the main sea strategic pivots and strategic routes of the world and to impose influence over the other continents of the world by the absolute superiority on sea. Number four, to focus on controlling the leading position of the Euro-Asia Continent all the time. Number five, to implement “global military intervention” strategies and to establish flexible response capability for the crisis focuses around the world, “to frequently take troops and resources from one war-zone to support another war-zone, in order to deal with major problems appearing in another war-zone”.[[37]](#footnote-36)

(Four) To Decide Nature of Mutual Strategic Relation according to Geographic Strategic Interest among Countries

Because the geographic strategic interests of countries are different, in the process of mutual action and influence among countries there are often mutual advantage-taking and contradiction struggles that show constant alliances and splitting. Or there are groups of nations with similar interests, or they choose to be neutral, non-allied, or anti-alliance. When we analyze the formation and development of the geographic strategic relation from the angle of geography, especially the formation and development of the relation of alliances, we found out the following characteristics:

First, the interest relation formed by geographic security threat is the important foundation to decide the strategic relations among countries. The anti-fascist alliance established in the Second World War is most typical. The Axis strategic alliance constituted by the fascist countries, Germany, Japan, and Italy imposed a common strategic security threat on Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. No strategic force of a single country of these countries could contend with the force of the Axis strategic alliance. Even the combined forces of Britain, France, and the United States could not stop the expansion of invasion. So considering the fundamental interest of life or death Britain faced, Winston Churchill had to put away his long-time anti-Soviet and anti-communist position, formally started to promote the strategic alliance of the three powers, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in order to eliminate the serious threat of fascist Germany on Europe and the Atlantic region. As early as in 1936, Mao Zedong had already suggested that China, Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union formed “the Pacific United Front.” On the eve of a massive invasion against China by the Japanese fascists, Mao Zedong sharply pointed out: “Japan’s continental policy and ocean policy are not targeted at China, but are also targeted at (Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union) these countries,” and exposed the scheme of the “eastern Munich policy” of Britain, the United States, and France that attempted to sacrifice more Chinese territory and sovereignty in exchange for not attacking the Pacific region. Mao Zedong also suggested that, to establish “the Pacific United Front,” they had to take China as a strategic unit, and the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain etc. all as the strategic units to form the strategic force system of anti-fascist war in which they could support each other and cooperate with each other on land and sea battlefields strategically. But because the United States followed the so-called “neutral policy” of watching a fire from the other side of the river, the United States joined the war only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in the end of 1941, and the strategic alliance of anti-fascist Germany, Japan, and Italy was finally established.

Second, national and religious interest can sometimes produce different strategic fronts among countries and regions. When national and religious interest conforms to national interest, the strategic alliance usually is established by the strategic cooperative partnership among countries, such as the strategic alliances among the Arab countries in the three Middle East Wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973 respectively. When national and religious interest is not enough to form a strategic cooperative partnership among countries, it can still form a national religious front among countries and regions. For example, “the Crusades Expedition in East” in late 11th Century to late 13th Century was the invasive expedition of the Catholics from the western European countries organized by the Roman Church.

Third, the difference based on social system and ideology often forms different strategic alliances. During the Cold War, the confrontation of the two big political and military camps of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization focused on the struggle of ideology, formed two big camps based on geographic strategic relations and confronted each other for nearly half a century. It ended in the drastic change in East Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union finally.

Fourth, the geographic economic relations of regional economic integration or economic integration has double influences on security environments. On one hand, regional economic integration or economic integration is good for improving the political and security relations among countries, as well as easing up armed conflict and war. On the other hand, as the development of regional economic integration or economic integration occurs, the member countries within the organization, considering their own economic and security interests, may move on to political and military groupings, posing threat to the countries outside of the region and the non-member countries within the region.

# **Section Five: Strategic Cultural Traditions**

Strategic cultural tradition is protracted and relatively stable cultural characteristics shown by a country in its strategic action. It is the concentrated reflection of historical experiences, national characteristics, values, and cultural psychology in strategic fields of a nation and civilization. The strategic action of a country reflects its current need at the moment. At the same time, it is also rooted deeply in the historical and old strategic cultural tradition. As a modern European thinker said, “the process of politics is the product of two forces, motivation and navigation. The force of motivation comes from the past, and it is rooted in the special and traditional history of a nation.”

One, Basic Characteristics of Strategic Cultural Tradition

The continuity of history is the most basic characteristic of strategic cultural tradition. The accidental or transient cultural phenomenon in history does not necessarily become components of tradition. The cultural creation of a time can only become a part of the cultural tradition of a nation and a civilization after it is passed and continued and gradually becomes the “regular” culture. In other words, though the culture formed by history enriches and expands its content constantly as the environment changes, while there are those changes, people can always see those unchanged things that constitute what we call civilization character and national character. Therefore, the understanding of the strategic cultural tradition of a nation and a civilization has to be established on the foundation of long-time examination of its historical experiences and understanding its continuous and relatively stable characteristics maintained after many historical changes. Take the strategic cultural traditions of China and the west as examples. The breaking-up and expansion of the west dated back to the days of Greece and Roman. The west was still breaking-up the world in the 19th Century, and it was still expanding with the same method, and changed the rest of the world into its colonies and semi-colonies in a very short time. On the contrary, China’s tradition of a united domain and its subsequent tradition that focused more on domestic order instead of focusing on outward expansion had established its basic model after Qin Dynasty and Han Dynasty at the latest. These two traditions are still influencing the reality even though there have been several thousand years of history changes, and they are shown in reality repeatedly.

The relativity of culture is the second characteristic of strategic cultural tradition. As all ideas, strategic cultural tradition is not a priori, either. Any strategic cultural tradition of a civilization form is the reflection of the characteristics of this culture in a strategic field. Judging from the range of world history, nomadic civilization and navigation civilization usually showed the strategic cultural tendency of expansion, aggressive, and martial spirit; while agricultural civilization usually showed inward and peaceful strategic cultural tradition. The basic characteristics of nomadic civilization were its fragility and instability of economic structure. The periodic invasion and plundering on agricultural civilization became the need for nomadic people to maintain its survival and to satisfy the desire of upper aristocrats. This was the inner motivation for nomadic people to launch frequent war on foreign countries, and the cultural tradition of martial spirit and the expansion of nomadic civilization was formed out of it. For navigation civilization, expansion and war was also indispensable. Navigation civilization was itself an outward civilization. The regions the navigation people lived were mostly peninsulas which are barren lands and not much room for the development of an agricultural civilization, and the development and prosperity of civilization could not be mainly established on the foundation of agricultural development on their own lands. So the wide ocean replaced the land, becoming the main development direction of civilization. And overseas expansion became the main way to get wealth. Therefore, to explore overseas markets and colonize became the natural mission of the navigation civilization, and war became the basic means to fight for trade hegemony. For agricultural civilization, everything is on the contrary. In agricultural civilization, the creation of wealth was mainly realized through the combination of man and land. This was a kind of civilization that could be self-sufficient and did not need to rely on the outside world. So it was hard to produce the motivation of foreign expansion. Moreover, for agricultural nations, war could only mean the damage on productivity, the ill balance of civilization focus that led to the collapse of the whole social order. Therefore, for agricultural civilization, war usually did not bring wealth, but disaster. Because of this, the strategic cultural tradition of agricultural civilization usually showed non-violent and non-expansive value tendency.

The leading character of values is the third characteristic of strategic cultural tradition. The core of culture is values. As part of cultural tradition, the basic characteristic of strategic cultural tradition has to be infiltrated and influenced by the leading values of the cultural tradition environment. The core of the values of strategic cultural tradition is constituted with the leading value ideas of the cultural tradition. One of the important characteristics of the Chinese strategic cultural tradition is that it emphasizes the strength of morality and justice, has strong views on right and wrong. When it is reflected in the view of war, it emphasizes “moral forces,” “moral war,” and convincing people with virtues. This is inseparable with the influence of the value system established by the ideas of the Confucian school that focuses on morality. The peaceful pursuit and “world” thinking in the Chinese strategic cultural tradition is directly related with the whole cosmic ideas and world outlook of “one body of sky and man” in the Chinese culture. Contrary to it, the pragmatist tradition in the western tradition makes realism that focuses on seeking power and interest occupied the leading position in the western strategic cultural tradition from the very beginning. The conflict idea and struggle sense in the western culture produced the tradition of martial spirit and praising war that has been continuing ever since the days of the ancient Greeks and ancient Romans.

**Two: The Influence of Strategic Cultural Tradition on Strategic Action in Reality**

Culture is not action, and tradition is not reality. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that cultural tradition can influence the action choice in reality. A culture becomes the main culture of a civilization and a value becomes the leading value of a culture because it reflects the deepest need for the survival and development of this culture. This is the foundation of cultural influence action. The relation between strategic cultural tradition and strategic action in reality is the same. No strategic action of any country or nation can be without the nurturing of strategic cultural tradition. The only difference is the amount of influence of cultural tradition.

(One) the Influence of Strategic Cultural Tradition on Strategic Action in Reality Is First Shown in Knowledge and Judgment of Strategic Environment

Human beings have always tried to understand the world through certain cultural models. There is only one world, but different cultures have different understandings of the same world. The significance of strategic culture is firstly in that it provides a basic model for a decision maker to understand and judge strategic environments. Different strategic cultures provide different understanding models, making people have different judgments on strategic environments. Using the world outlook of integration, the Chinese strategic cultural tradition tends to recognize the integration of the world, its mutual reliability, and the peaceful co-existence of the players of international action and their friendly interaction. This is the deep cultural foundation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence followed by today’s China. In the mainstream strategic culture of the modern western world, the basic model to understand the world is social Darwinist “survival competition” and “the law of the jungle.” Endless competition and conflict are considered the nature of human beings; the law of the jungle is considered the basic rule of international community; and the equal relation of the countries no matter how large or small and how strong or weak they are is considered a romantic utopia. So the only rule of survival is the rule of the strong. So power politics gets its cultural legitimacy. As Peamarce (?) said, “If the strong overpowers the weak, it is only an irreproachable rule of survival competition.” Starting from the precondition of understanding conflict and ending at the preferred power action, this becomes the basic logic of the mainstream strategic culture in modern western world. In contemporary western strategic culture, this strategic understanding of conflict still has an important position. It is from this understanding of conflict that some people show an inner motivation of loving to have conflict and loving to seek and even make enemy. This is clearly shown in the “Cold War” mentality of some countries and in various “theories of China threat.” The strategy of “containing China” promoted by some people is a natural product of this strategic culture. To pass judgment on strategic environment is the basic starting point for all strategic decisions. Today, in the world that is in the process of globalization, the strategic understanding that stubbornly is biased on the conflict in the world can only lead the world into the pit of confrontation and distrust.

(Two) the Influence of Strategic Cultural Tradition on Strategic Action in Reality Is also Shown in Deciding on Strategic Goal

Different countries have different strategic goals. Generally, these strategic goals are in two categories: expansive strategic goal and non-expansive goal. The difference in the strategic cultural tradition of different nations, different countries, and different civilizations is shown very clearly in deciding strategic goals. The former President of the United States James Buchanan said, “The survival rule of our country is to expand. It is impossible to go against it, even if we wanted to.” So, one of the basic beliefs in the western strategic theory is that, as far as there are resources and opportunity, countries have to expand their forces, though foreign expansion will certainly bring disaster and misfortune to the expanders. When this strategic cultural value is shown in the strategic action in reality, it is to make the expansion of interest and getting hegemony as the supreme strategic goal. Different from the west, in the survival and development of the Chinese civilization, expansion has never had fundamental importance. The Chinese civilization takes a road of internal development. Matching with this, in the Chinese strategic cultural tradition, “planning for the future all the time without considering morality” has never had cultural legitimacy. For this reason, the Chinese strategic goal has always been to defend homeland, to defend peace, to seek for unification, and to stop invasion. For China, the strength increases like those in the west will certainly lead to the rule of foreign expansion, losing its generality. China does not have the internal motivation to plunder the wealth, land, and resources of other countries. In the early 15th Century, before the big geographic discovery of the western world, Zheng He of China had already led the most powerful fleet in the world then sailing down to the south seven times. But their goals were not oversea expansion. Instead, they were to make economic and cultural exchanges with the countries in Asia and Africa. Today’s China follows the military strategy of active defense. The solemn promise by today’s China about “not participating in the arms race, not forming military alliances, not making military expansion, and never seek hegemony” has best reflected the all-time pursuit after peace, stability, prosperity, and development in the Chinese strategic cultural tradition.

(Three) the Influence of Strategic Cultural Tradition on Strategic Action in Reality Is also Shown in Choice of Strategic Means and War Format

In the mainstream western strategic cultural tradition, the function of strength and violence is fully emphasized. Croseweitz had a famous saying: “Force has huge function. Only under the condition that the strength of countries is equal when laws and justice can play their roles. Otherwise, the strong can do whatever he wants, and the weak will have to swallow insults and humiliations.” When force is considered the most effective strategic means, war is considered as the process of the limitless application of violence. As Croseweitz said, “war is a violent act, and the application of violence is limitless.” It is on this background that the material form of violence and the way of applying violence have got great development in the modern western world, laying a foundation for the west to expand to the whole world and establish global hegemony. Even today, some large country still believes in policy of force, and the thinking characteristics in its strategic action that established its security upon the insecurity of other countries are still very obvious. Contrary to this, the Chinese strategic cultural tradition, in its strategic means, chooses the cultural mentality of emphasizing war and careful about war. Sunzi, the representative of the Chinese military strategists, believed that “war is a big issue of a country. It concerns the life and death of the country, so we have to study it.” He also believed that “to fight a hundred fights and win them all is not the best of the best. The best of the best is to defeat the enemy without fighting.” Wuzi also believed that, “In all the warring states in the world, the one that won five fights has disaster; the one that won four fights is wrong; the one that won three fights has hegemony; the one that won two fights is the king; and the one that won one fight is the emperor.” So, “there are few that win the world by winning many fights, most of states are conquered”. Laozi, the representative of Daoist School also believed that “war is a way of misfortune, and it is not a means of gentleman.” Armed force is violent and war is dangerous, this is the fundamental foundation for the Chinese strategic cultural tradition to think of the nature of war and the significance of violence. Up to Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, when the Chinese military strategists talked about war, they were still concerned about the possible damage war could make first. In modern history, China got into wars mostly under passive circumstances. Even when China had to conduct a war, China often tried to keep the war within certain limits. In all the self-defense wars since the founding of the New China, before the war, during the war, and after the war, the Chinese government always expressed great tolerance and restriction. China has always stuck to the principle of self-defensive retaliation, and reasonable, favorable, and restricted war guidance. In the means applied, China showed highly clear mind, great carefulness, and great restriction. This is the basic character of the Chinese strategic cultural tradition.

# **Section Six: International Law**

International law is the rule of act recognized by all the countries and having legal restriction over the countries in international relations.

The relation among countries does not only include a peaceful state, but also hostile war states under particular circumstances. International law not only adjusts the relations among countries during peacetime, but also the mutual relations among countries in war time. The former is called peacetime international law; the latter is called wartime international law, it is also called law of war or law of armed conflict. International law is the important legal foundation for mediating armed conflict. It is the important factor to influence strategic decision and war strategic guidance.

**One: International Law System and Basic Principles**

An International law system can be divided into various categories. According to wartime and peacetime, it can be divided into two categories, peacetime law and wartime law (war law). According to various political, economic, social, and cultural relations among modern countries that international law is to cover, it can be divided into: international law issues on national territory and residents, international law of sea, international law of human rights, international law of space, diplomatic and consular relation law, international law of environment protection, international law of treaty, international law of organization, international economic law, and law of armed conflict and law of war, etc.

The basic principles of international law are the important principles that all the countries recognize, can be generalized, applicable in all the fields of international law, and that constitute the foundation of international law. As the international law of modern times appeared, there came the principles such as national sovereignty principle, the principle of equality of countries, and the principle of not interfering in internal affairs, etc. The basic principles of contemporary international law were decided by a series of international legal documents after the Second World War. The making of the United Nations Charter in 1945 was the first concrete expression of the basic principles of international law on international law documents. “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” “the Bandung 10 Principles,” “Declaration of Principles of International Law,” and “the Charter of Economic Rights and Responsibilities of Nations,” etc. further enriched the principles of modern international law.

Comprehensively, the basic principles of international law mainly include the following 10 principles: 1. The principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2. The principle of mutual non-aggression; 3. The principle of mutual interference on each other’s internal affairs; 4. The principle of equality and mutual benefits; 5. The principle of peaceful coexistence; 6. The principle of non-application of force or threat of force; 7. The principle of national self-determination; 8. The principle of respect for human rights and basic freedom; 9. The principle of international cooperation and carrying out international responsibilities honestly; 10. The principle of peacefully resolving international dispute.

In the rules of modern international law, because the act of war has been considered in principle an illegal act, so the law of war is also called the law of armed conflict. The law of war is consisted of a large amount of international customs and treaties, traditionally forming two systems, the system of Hague and the system of Geneva. The system of Hague are mainly the rules on how a war is started, conducted, and ended, stressing on limiting the ways and methods of war; while the system of Geneva are the rules on protection of war victims, stressing the protection of human beings.

The basic principles of the law of war confirmed by the international community are: 1. The principle of illegal act of war. According to the rule of UN Charter in 1945, apart from “self-defense,” “national independence,” and “the peace-keeping operations taken by the United Nations,” all acts of war are considered illegal. 2. The principle of the responsibilities of international law. Apart from the situation when there is “military necessity” and when there is no clear written rule of international treaty, people cannot relieve the responsibility of the country concerned to obey international law. “Military necessity” mainly refers to the necessary force used in armed conflict to overpower an enemy. But it cannot become the pretext for any non-humanitarian act. 3. The principle of limiting combat means and methods. It is mainly to ban or restrict the application of improper combat method, means, and massive destructive weapons, such as barbarian and extreme cruel weapons, ban toxic, chemical, and germ (biological) weapons, ban the use of nuclear weapons and indiscriminate attacks, and ban the attack on the engineering project or facility that has dangerous forces. 4. The principle of differentiation. It is to differentiate combatant and non-combatant and protect the non-combatant. It mainly includes: protecting peaceful residents, the people who do not belong to armed forces and do not join the fighting; protecting women and children; protecting the victims of armed conflict, the injured, sick, and POWs on the battlefield; and civilians and civilian materials cannot be attacked as the objects of military attack. 5. The principle of protecting relics and cultural inheritance. 6. The principle of respect for neutral countries. 7. The principle of punishing war criminals. According to modern international law, not only the invasive countries and organizations should bear the international responsibilities, but also the main responsible people for launching invasion war and conducting invasion war have to take criminal responsibilities. In 1968, the United Nations Congress passed the resolution that says “legal time effectiveness” does not apply to war crimes and anti-peace crimes.

**Two: the Influence and Restriction of International Law on Strategic Guidance in Modern War**

In modern war, the function of international law is mainly shown in:

(One) International law is a powerful weapon to expose enemy, getting sympathy and support from international community, and getting strategic initiative position

War is not only military struggle, but also a political, economic, diplomatic, and legal contest comprehensively. Promoting one’s legitimacy of fighting and exposing the enemy’s illegitimacy of using force; promoting one’s own humanity and exposing enemy war crimes against law; and trying to get broad sympathy and support from the international community and people, these are the important ways to force an enemy into isolation and passiveness and to get one’s own strategic initiative.

(Two) International Law Is Important Standard to Evaluate and Differentiate Justice and Injustice of War

While modern international law abolishes the right of war of a country, bans the use of force or threat of force in national relations, it also rules that when a country is attacked by force or threatened by force, it has “the natural right to make individual or collective self-defense,” giving just war the legitimate position. Only under three situations when war is a legitimate act. 1. A country acts its right of self-defense. 2. The act of force taken by the UN Security Council or authorized by the UN Security Council. 3. The national independence or national liberation movement against colonialism or foreign rule for getting national self-determination. International law is an important standard to evaluate if a war is just or not. The war that violates the above principles of international law is an unjust war. Meanwhile, it is also unjust to violate the rules of law of war in war and to use combat method and means that are banned by international law, and such acts should be condemned and opposed by the international community.

(Three) International Law Is Main Legal Foundation for Determining and Punishing War Criminals

International law has the nature of forced law. Its nature of force is that we should impose international sanctions against the violators. In traditional international law, a country has “the right to resort to war,” and a war crime only refers to the specific conduct that violates the rule of war or convention during war. In modern international law, the right of war of a country has been abolished, and war crime is the total name of various criminal acts that violates the basic principle of international law, plots and launches invasion wars, damages peace, violates the rule of war and convention, and violates the standards of humanity. According to the Charter of International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, there are three war crimes: crime of damaging peace, war crime, and anti-humanity crime. Any individual who commits a war crime, no matter whether he is the head of state or not, has to be prosecuted for criminal responsibilities according to international law. After the Second World War, the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo tried the fascist criminals of Germany and Japan according to international law. This was the major development of international law, especially the law of war.

The restriction of international law on modern war is mainly shown in:

1. On the use of right of war. A war in the sense of international law refers to a violent situation among countries. Because modern international law has clearly banned countries to use force or threat of force in international relations and said that “one cannot use force if it is not for public interest,” so when choosing to use force, a country should follow the rules of international law on using force under several special circumstances. Mainly, it is to use the right of self-defense reasonably and legitimately. Item 51 of the United Nations Charter defines the individual or collective natural right of self-defense by any UN member. At the same time, it has three restrictions on implementing the right of self-defense. Number one, the precondition is being attacked by force; number two, the time limit is before the Security Council takes necessary measures; number three, the self-defense measure taken should be reported to the Security Council, and it should not affect the action the Security Council believes it may take. In the international community, there has always been debate over what is being attacked by force, how to define self-defense, and if one can conduct preventive war when it is not threatened by attack. Hegemony countries often use the pretext that their security is threatened to use force against other countries willfully. The Resolution about the Definition of Invasion passed by the United Nations Congress in 1974 says that it should be determined by the Security Council whether there is an act of invasion. When using force in the relation of countries, there has to be sound foundation of international law. The measures taken by a country to suppress domestic armed rebellion in order to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be restricted by the principles on international relations in the United Nations Charter, because this is the sovereign right of a country.

2. The choice of war method. The size, model, range, and duration of a war has to consider the factor and related rules of international law. In a legitimate self-defense war, a country has the right to choose all the water routes, air space, and land as war-zone, except the effective controlled area of neutral countries and special international navigation routes. But when a neutral country cannot effectively carry out its neutral responsibilities, the other side of war can take this area as war-zone. In concrete combat, there can be sea and air blockade, capturing, and sea and air combat, setting up no-fly zone, no-navigation zone, and there can be ground counterattack, integral firepower attack, and island blockade and island attack, etc. In the combat of these models, the related rules of international law and the law of war will be involved avoidably.

Besides, in sea, air, and ground combat, people should follow proper rules. They are mainly: ground combat, sea combat (submarine and surface warships), and air combat rules; water mine, torpedo, and land mine restriction; sea blockade, inspection, capturing, trial; and air bombing and capturing, etc.

3. The use of war means and method. The main purpose and function of the guiding principle and the restriction on combat means and method are to try to get a balance between “military necessity” and avoiding “unnecessary pain.” Geneva Four Conventions of 1977 (the first additional protocols) says that “in any armed conflict, the right of the parties involved to choose combat method and means is not unlimited.” In principle, the choice of combat method and means by all the countries and parties involved should be restricted by law. For example, it is banned to use the combat method and means of massively killing human beings; it is banned to use the combat method and means of killing and injuring randomly and making extreme pains; it is banned to use toxic, chemical, and germ (biological) weapons; and it is banned to use the combat method and means of perfidy, indiscrimination, and changing environment. Currently, the international community has passed a series of conventions on restricting and banning the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and landmines, and they have had a positive influence on further limiting the huge pains and destruction of war on mankind.

4. The choice of target of attack. The law of war regulates “differentiation principle” for the target of military attack. It strictly distinguishes military facility and civilian object, civilian and the combatant in armed forces, the combatant with combat capability and the war victim who loses combat capability. It is banned to kill and injure randomly. The attack and bombing are legitimate only when they are on the target that obviously constitutes military interest for one belligerent. It is banned to bomb civilian and defenseless cities, including cultural relics, but the precondition is that these targets are not used for military purposes at the time. It is banned to bomb the projects and facilities that have dangerous forces and can release huge energy such as dams and nuclear power stations. It is also banned to bomb the journalists of the other belligerent and the hospitals that have the signs of the Red Cross or the Red Crescent.

Geneva Four Conventions of 1949 extended all the protection principles for the war victims from the injured and sick on land, the injured, sick, and people in shipwrecks and prisoner of war in sea combat to all the civilians. All acts in war that violate the rule of war and conventions, such as using toxic or other banned weapons, killing or abusing captives and civilians, and attacking or bombing defenseless cities and towns, villages, residences and buildings are the crimes against international law.

5. The starting and ending of war. In traditional international law, the start of war has to declare the war. The 10th article of the Convention on the Start of War of 1907 clearly says “there should not be any hostile act with each other without advance and clear warning. The form of warning should be the declaration of war that explains the reason, or the ultimatum for the conditional declaration of war.” Nevertheless, some countries often launched the war without declaration in order to avoid the rules of domestic laws or to get military privilege and strategic initiative from the beginning of war. For example, the war Israel launched against the Arabic countries in 1967 and the Iraqis invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were all the wars without declaration.

A war is usually ended by signing a peace treaty. Before signing a formal peace treaty, people can also sign a truce, cease-fire, or temporary peace treaty. There are also surrounding and compensation and other forms. The two sides or the victory country can also declare ending war status.

6. Neutrality in war. A neutral country is the country that does not join the current war. A neutral country can be a permanent neutral country as well as wartime neutral country. When there is a war between two countries or the anti-government organization in a civil war is recognized as a belligerent, the third country only has two choices: participating in war or keeping neutral. The country that declares neutrality should be restricted by the rules of neutrality. When a country is involved in war or armed conflict, it should try to get more countries to stand with it, at least to let them keep neutral in order to increase its own strength. The third country often uses the means of declaring itself neutral to avoid getting involved in the conflict. According to the United Nations the Resolution on the Definition of Invasion, if a country provides its territory for the other country to use in its invasive act on the third country, it constitutes an act of invasion, and it should be held responsible in international law. Therefore, for those countries that violate the principles of neutrality, people should timely expose its action of violating international law and conduct firm diplomatic struggle. When it is necessary, people can conduct armed self-defense against this act of invasion according to the principles of international law.

We should take all possible means to monitor enemy operational action comprehensively, collect the evidence of the other side violating the rules of law of war, including the object of enemy attack, the means used, and the damage we have suffered, etc. to expose enemy illegitimate acts with large amounts of true and reliable witness and material evidence. We can also use various media to expose enemy crime, pushing enemy into passiveness.

Three, Relativity and Limitation of Effect of International Law

In strategic guidance, we should see the important influence and function of international law, as well as its limitation, avoiding subjectivity and one-sidedness in strategic guidance.

(One) Judging from Enforcing Mechanism of International Law, Enforcing Force of International Law Has Its Limitation

Number one, the compromising nature of regulations of international law decides that it is weak. The essence of international law is the coordinated will among countries. Actually, it is the coordinated will reached after struggle and consultation by the ruling class of many countries, including the countries with different social systems. Therefore, when countries reach international treaties, they have their own right to choose, and they have relatively free will in carrying them out. Number two, because there is no legislature over all the countries in the international community to make the laws for all the countries to enforce, modern international law is born by the agreements in the contacts of countries. Only when a country agrees, international law has legal jurisdiction over it. The United Nations does not have the right to make law. The legal resolutions passed by the United Nations Congress can only have enforcing effect only after the international diplomatic meetings sign treaties. Number three, the international community does not have a judicial institute that has real jurisdiction and can enforce resolution over international dispute. Though an international court is the judicial institute of the United Nations, its condition is voluntary acceptance of jurisdiction, not enforced jurisdiction. Any country that does not want to press charges in the international court, or goes to the international court, but does not obey its decision, the international court can do nothing about it. Number four, the international community does not have a centralized and powerful administrative institute, such as government, police, and armed forces, etc. to take forceful measures to carry out international law. The implementation of international law can only rely on the country involved to take unilateral or collective action to implement. This is the so-called self-help system.

(Two) Judging from Rapid Development of Modern High Technology, Rules of Law of War Have Their Obtuseness and Limitation

Number one, the appearance of modern high technology makes some rules of current law of war lose necessary effect and binding force. For example, the principle of “banning the use of combat means and method that will bring about unnecessary pains” confirmed by the law of war seems quite helpless for the hi-tech weapons that have enormous destruction. Number two, the creation of new rules of the law of war is behind the need of reality. As the other rules, the law of war is also restricted by a certain level of social development and reflects the extent of the scientific and technological progress of society. When brand new hi-tech weaponry comes out, it will certainly make the old rules lose their restriction. For example, there still lacks necessary and specific regulation on laser blinding weapons, sub-sound weapons, and graphite bombs that have high intensity and wide destructive capacity, and the current standards cannot judge accurately whether it violates the rules of the law of war. Number three, under hi-tech circumstances, it is harder to understand and restrict scientifically the form, size, and model of war. Hi-tech war breaks through the principles of the law of war that “differentiates military facilities and civilian objects” and bans “random” attack, etc. The non-linear remote combat model that combines land, sea, air, outer space, and electromagnet into one, further blurs the difference between traditional front and rear area, and military use and civilian use. Especially the appearance of information warfare increases soft destruction, making it harder to define the difference between wartime, war and peace. Therefore, we have to actively enhance the making of international law and the law of war by the international community, in order to restrict and stop war and optimally decrease the destruction of hi-tech war on human society.

(Three) Judging from War Practice, Binding Force of International Law Is Relative

Number one, some countries often use “self-defense” as the pretext to launch war against other countries in their own interest. Though modern international law takes off the right of war of a country, the root of war and the fundamental contradiction causing war have not gone. Number two, some countries, on the pretext of “humanity,” interfere into the internal affairs with force at will, causing serious consequences. In 1970, the United Nations Congress unanimously passed “the Declaration of Friendly Relations Among Countries,” and it said: “countries or country groups do not have the right to interfere into the internal affairs or external affairs of any other country directly or indirectly and under any reason. Therefore, any armed interference and the interference of any other forms or trying to threaten the dignity of a country or other political, economic, and cultural factors violate international law. The so-called “humanitarian interference” seriously damages the authority and solemnity of international law. Number three, the collective security mechanism of the United Nations faces challenge. “The United Nations Charter” says that the Security Council of the United Nations is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. But some countries and regional organizations bypassed the United Nations on purpose and launched armed attacks on sovereign countries at will. It not only seriously trampled the principles of international law set up by the United Nations Charter, but also seriously attacked and challenged the collective security mechanism of the United Nations.

**Chapter 3**

**The Evolution and Rule of Strategic Theories**

Engels indicated, “The thought process began when the history began. The advancement of thought process is the reflection of the consistency of the abstract and theoretical form of the historical development.” (1[[38]](#footnote-37)) It is absolutely necessary and significant to study in depth the strategies by studying the beginning of the history in order to understand the thought process of strategic theories, to search for the path of changes of strategic theories, and to understand the trend of its development and the principles of its development.

**Section One: The Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories**

The ancient Chinese strategic theories were great, profound, and have a long history. They guided the thousands of years of military applications and were further expanded and enriched from practical applications. The historical Chinese strategic theories included two big dimensions, the ancient and modern strategic theories. The two are closely intertwined as a whole. They are the basics for the modern Chinese strategic theories; they have also greatly impacted the development of world strategic theories.

**Subsection One,** **The Birth and Development of Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories**

The ancient Chinese strategic theories went through several big developmental steps, the slow developmental phase, formal establishment phase, expansion and fulfillment phase, and the integration of the Chinese and western theories phase.

The slow developmental phase – This phase was from ancient past to late Western Chow Dynasty. In the Sun Bin’s Military Strategy, (See King Wei.) it had recorded the “Shen-nong’s battle ax flint,” some scholars dated it back to about 7000 years ago. The earliest battle in Chinese history that we talked about is the Battle of Ban Chuan between the Yellow Emperor and Emperor Yen and the Zhu-lu battle between Yellow Emperor and Chi Yu. After defeating these two enemies, the three big tribes were incorporated into the main body of China(Hua-xia Tribe). Thereafter, there were “fifty two battles to win over the populace” (2) and he successfully unified a definite region. In ruling the various tribes, Yellow Emperor established right and left guardians to supervise various tribes. “If there were people who did not follow his edicts, the Yellow Emperor would conquer them and annihilate them.” (3), etc. It already displayed the ability to control the entire region. From the old war fares of the Xia, Sang, Western Chow dynasties, in order to gain victories, people then used “the will of god” and “protect the people” as campaign slogans to gain the support of the publics. Under these slogans, people use strategies to win victories, such as the defeat of Xia by Sang dynasty; King Wu’s victory over King Zou; they all used strategies, such as using political mobilization, hiding and preserving their forces, gaining cooperation from other countries, annihilating the supporters of the enemies, using the spies, grasping the timely moments, and attacking the core of the enemies.

In the military books (Jun Zhi) and (Jun Zheng) which were produced about the Western Chow era, they discussed many tactics “when just and proper, one should reach the goals”, “if you see a possibility, you advance, but withdraw if you encounter difficulty ahead,” and “the earlier people will win the heart of the people, the latter people will wait for the moment of weakness,” and “the jewel is to take the advantage of the topography.” These tactics were already equipped with the significance and functions of strategic guidance. However, it had not yet developed into systematic strategic theories.

Formal Establishment phase- This was the period of Chun-Qiu Warring States period, it was about 8th century B.C. to 3rd century B.C. with about five to six hundred years in between. During this period, reputed to be the first ever book on military strategies (Sun Zhi, The Art of War) came to being, which symbolized the formal establishment of the Chinese ancient strategic theories. Thereafter, the six military books, (Wu Zi Military Strategies), (Qi Sun Zi Military Strategies),(Sun Bin Military Strategies), (Wei Liao Zi), (Shi Ma Fa), (Liu Tao), etc., made the Chinese ancient strategic theories even better.

Many scholars not in the military field also actively discussed military strategies, which made the theories even more complete. The military scholars had a better understanding of the relationships between warfare and politics, warfare and economy, warfare and diplomacy; the principles of strategic guidance, how to manage the country and the military. They had contributed more systematic strategic theories and approaches to deal with these important issues. During this period the framework of the Chinese ancient strategic theories was established. The philosophical principles of ancient strategies emerged in a more systematic manner.

The Expansion and Fulfillment Phase –It is from the 3rd century B.C. to the mid-19th century. It was a long period in which the society was in a feudal system; the productivity and development were slow. The period was a non-firearms period. In the latter part, it entered into both non-firearms and a firearms period. Although it did not offer a systematic breakthrough in the area of strategic theories, it did expand and fulfill the practical substance of the content. In basic theories, they did provide some creative interpretations on some military matters. They provided better understanding than the ancient people on, for example, protracted vs. speedy, direct vs. indirect, false vs. real, appearance vs. substance, attack vs. defense, honesty vs. deceit, They also provided better methods of using non-firearms and firearms in protecting the city and applied them in the theories of field battles; they also provided some new ideas to coastal defense. They elevated the qualities of strategic policies. For example, they unified the formation and implementation of national strategies; the application of cavalry battle command principles; the implementation and conclusion of national defense strategies against attacks, and the multi-dimensional strategic research and applications. These were better than our early ancestors were. They made the ancient Chinese strategic theories more systematic and complete. But some war guidance principles began to show clear backwardness in the Qing dynasty.

The integration of Chinese and Western Theories Phase - Due to the Opium War, many foreign countries invaded China, which fostered the integration of the western strategic theories and ancient Chinese strategic theories. It smashed the traditional strategic thinking and developed a new framework. It absorbed the western military thinking into the content, for example, it abolished the long held Qing dynasty fundamental but restrictive policies of “horse riding and shooting,” and proposed “to study the fine foreign techniques to defeat the foreigners.” The new perspective and policies in coastal defense strategies, protracted strategies, national defense developmental strategies, were quite different from the ancient strategies. The qualities had made great leap forward. But during this period, there is a tendency on total acceptance of the western military thinking and a willingness to ignore the good old military Chinese traditions.

There was also a tendency to stick to the old ways and refuse to accept the advanced military theories and technologies, which could have negatively impacted on the formation of the modern strategic development of China. Not until Mao Tse-dong, whom led the Chinese communists in the liberation war and the war against the foreign invaders, created the progressive proletariat military science, thus, the Chinese strategic theories had finally reached its new height.

## Subsection Two. Major Content Of Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The main content of the ancient Chinese strategic theories could generally be divided into three parts: the early victory theory, total victory theory, and war victory theory.

The early victory means prior to the war, one has equipped itself with the conditions to win victory. This is more related to the strategic theory of preparing for war. Its content includes “knowing” and “accumulating into shape” two parts. The “knowing” talks about understanding of the war, which includes “early knowing” and “thorough knowing.” The “early knowing” is a matter of timing in “knowing.” “ Thorough knowing” is to do with the space of “knowing.” These two are intertwined, they require the war decision-makers to be all knowing and knowing at all times, when it has to do with the vital problem, i.e., the victory of the war. They have to make good prediction and decide on correct war strategies. The “accumulating into shape” mainly talks about the preparation of military forces. It includes the preparation of politics, the economy, the commanders, rules and regulations, soldiers, arms and equipment, the nature, territory, and battlefields. The efforts will assure that there is a superior force against the enemy. The total victory theory is to talk about the strategic theory to win total war victory by using the most thorough efforts with minimum cost. It requires the decision-makers to form a total destructive dialectic relationship with the maximum effort to defeat the enemy but still minimizes the damages inflicted on both sides. The tactics are to combine attack with strategies, attack with diplomacy, attack with military and applied psychological warfare (by using literary offense and intimidation), economic warfare, and allying other forces at war. The war victory theory is to win victory through warfare. It is the best part of the ancient Chinese strategic theory. It includes the rich dialectic content, which emphasizes that you ruled the enemy but not be ruled by them. So, there must be talk of kindness and treachery, distinguishing the advantages and disadvantages, knowing what is constant, what is change, good at being flexible and imperative, understanding what is true and false, knowing when to be regular and irregular, good at specializing or diversified, understanding the protracted and speedy, understanding the straight and shift, and recognizing the need of attack and defense.

The early victory, total victory and war victory are an inter-related organic whole. From the operations, we can see that early victory is the basis and prerequisite of total victory and war victory; the total victory stands in between early victory and war victory. It is the most effective application of war preparation and it could provide the right condition for war victory. If the total victory failed, it could be relegated to war victory. If the war is won, it can turn around and become the chips of implementing total victory strategies. It can also increase the early victory power of the country and political group, which means, “defeat the enemies and getting stronger.” (5) These three could become the methods and objectives, each side will accept the function of the other side, and they interact in such a way to form the theoretical system of victory over enemies, getting stronger and final victory.

In recent years, the conflict between the ancient Chinese and western strategic theories created some new development. The modern people have included areas such as, the war problems, war guidance, strategic tactics, the science of troop management, the science of military philosophy, in their systematic discussions, which caused the formation of a new frame work of strategic theories. It has also made some breakthrough in practical content, which made further development on the ancient Chinese strategic theories. For example, in the national defense concept, it has changed from the strong emphasis on fortified defense and neglecting the coastal defense to equal emphasis on both; in coastal defense strategy, it proposes the development of the navy, expanding deeper defense, forming a blue water navy, learning the good things from the foreigners. It also serves to develop further the ancient theory of making the country rich and cultivating a strong army. It not only emphasizes agriculture warfare but also commercial warfare. In the war guidance, it changed from the ancient way of valuing winning with quick battles and frowning on the protracted war to consider both ways according to the circumstances.

It brought the protracted war to a new height in the fight against the imperial forces. In troop management, it proposed a series of policies of troop formation and troop management, and training method, which could cope with the modern warfare. The traditional view to emphasize politics and belittle the importance of equipment also received serious impact. People gradually began to value the importance of weapon equipment and facilities in the strategic domain.

Looking at the major content of the ancient and modern Chinese strategic theories,

It can be briefly said that, value the politics; be careful in war, use just army to

Win; use war to end war; combine the interests and mobilize; make the country rich and cultivate a strong military; equal emphasis on fortified and coastal defense; stay in peace but be alert for troubles; try to win early victory; plan first before fighting; win total victory; to attack with strategies; attack with diplomacy; use both civilians and military personnel; avoid the frontal assault and attack where it is vulnerable; deploy troops for sudden attacks; eliminate enemies one by one; know how to use the circumstance and surrounding; attack when people are not ready; use the right moment for action; be flexible; use protracted or slow war based on the circumstances; know your enemies thoroughly; be changeable; achieve victory by better control; set the rules and regulations ahead of time; unify the military authority; strictly enforce the rules; emphasize the characters of the people; be clear in applying award and punishment; motivate the senior and low level people equally; and make sure the weapons are good and the soldiers are able.

## Subsection Three. The Major Traits Of The Ancient Chinese Strategic Theories

The ancient Chinese strategic theories possess the following main traits:

It was formed early. The ancient Chinese strategic theories were formed as early as at the end of Chun-qiu to the warring period, which was about the 7th century B.C. to the 3rd century B.C.The typical strategy books were represented by (Sun Zi, The Art of War.) During this long period and long after this period, the westerners did not have any book which specialized on strategic theories. Therefore, the ancient Chinese strategic theories were the leader in the world. But after the 16th century, the western military theories had made quicker development. For a long period, the Chinese had become stagnant in the systems of strategic theories and there was no new development.

Philosophical reasoning was emphasized. The ancient Chinese Strategic theories involved rich dialectic thoughts, which had strong philosophical traits and were measurable. They were rich in proverbial wisdom. The words were simple and meaning was profound. They could give people deep insights and broad association. They could be applied to military matters but they could also lend support to politics, economy, medicine, and sports. However, they are weak in operations. Though good at the holistic thinking, the ancient Chinese strategic theories value the wholeness and look things at full range and in long term, which demonstrated the holistic and systematic nature of the thinking. This approach was being compared to the western emphasis on quantitative analysis and verification; it is apparent that there are advantages as well as shortcomings on each side.

To reason from observing the nature. The ancient Chinese were good at reasoning from observing nature and these thought processes were applied to strategic theories and strategic policies. For example, from observing nature, they figured that a country should establish a centralized administrative organization. >From the changes in nature, they also came to the realization of war guidance theories and strategic policies.

.

### Section 2: The Changes of World Strategic Theories

This section talks about the world, which refers to the other parts of the world and does not include China. The changes of the world strategic theories can be divided into three stages: the ancient, modern, and current stages.

**Subsection 1. The Ancient World Strategic Theories**

The world strategic theories experienced a long period, which started from the 8th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D. It passed two historical periods, the slavery society and feudal society. The ancient western society, which used the slavery system, was keen on expanding their territories, robbing the wealthy, and increasing their range of control. They frequently invaded and robbed the wealth of other countries. The ancient western strategic theories originated from the Mediterranean coastal areas where politics, economy and culture were far better developed, through their frequent warfare. The early trait of the world ancient strategic theories is the combination of the military science and historical studies. There are many strategic thoughts buried in the voluminous military and historical books. For example, in the 5th century B.C. the Greek historian Herodotus (about 484 B.C. to about 430 or 420 B.C.) wrote the book on the “Persian Wars, Thucydides (about 460 B.C. and 396 B.C) wrote the book on (Polynesian Wars), the historian of Athens Xenophon (about 431 B.C. to 352 B.C.) wrote a book on “Anabasis”, “**The Long Conquering**(phonetic)?” , the Roman commander and military expert Caesar (about 100 B.C. to 44 B.C.) wrote books on Gallic War and Civil War, etc. In the first century A.D., Frontinus (about 35 A.D. to 103A.D) edited the “ Strategy,” which broke the traditional historical mode of writing. It demonstrated the shift from the traditional military history to military theories. In 4 centuries A.D., ancient Roman military expert, **Sugativus**(phonetic) (the date of birth and death were not clear) discussed military affairs in a book, which ended the mixing of the ancient Greek and Roman military strategic writings with the discussion of history. **Sugativus** (phonetic) became well known in Europe for his being the only writing on the theories of military affairs prior to the Renaissance period.

From the above books, it appears that the military specialists of the ancient Greek and Roman periods, had already paid attention to the true nature of the war, the relationship between war and economy, and troop management. They also valued the importance of applying strategies in the war. The ancient Greek historian Xenophon was the one who first brought out the concept of “The way of commanders and soldiers. (Phonetic)” It was close to the original meaning of “strategies.” The ancient Roman commander and politician Julius Caesar believed that, in the war, the strategies were more important that the weapons; in order to win victory at war, it was needed to defeat the enemies through the combined use of politics, diplomacy and military. At the same time, it is essential to be careful in using the military. He emphasized that the use of military should be used through active political campaigns, with firm grasping of the enemies’ situations, the awareness of advantageous circumstances of the topography and other relevant conditions. The latter Roman military expert Sugativus (phonetic) discussed the specific subject on the issues of military guidance in his book “Discussing Military Affairs (phonetic)” The commanders should have full grasp of the knowledge about their own and their enemies’ affairs, decide on the correct direction of the war, attack when the timing was right, with strong emphasis on the importance of the suddenness of the war, prepare a strong reserve, and use a quick offensive, etc. Due to the conditions of the time and restrictive nature of the strategic environment, the military theorists of the “slavery period did not have deep understanding of the military science and they were in a budding stage.”(5) Fatalism and Idealism in those days were also quite rampant.

From the 5th century, Europe went into the Middle Ages for 1000 years, which was the period of feudalism. The development of European military theories was greatly hampered due to the problems of grabbing others’ territories, the restrictions of Christianity and the philosophy of theologians. Engels said, “The military development of the entire Middle Ages were like other sciences, there was no accomplishment what so ever.”(6) However, due to the development of productivity, the advancement of military technologies, and the practical experiences gained during many wars, there developed strategic thoughts, which were typical of the feudalism era. The most typical work of the early Middle Ages was the work on “Strategies” by the Byzantium emperor Maurius (539-620). In the late Middle Ages there was an Italian philosopher and military theorist, Machiavelli (1469-1527) on “The Art of War” and the “Supremacy.” The book by Maurius, “Strategicon,” was one of the textbooks used in training high level military commanders. The word “Strategicon” actually became the origin of the word used as strategy. The latter part of the Middle Ages, the Western military strategic thoughts were revived due to the impact of the Renaissance. The most typical military theorist of this ear was Machiavelli, who was touted by Engels as “The first mentionable modern military writer.” (7) He believed that politics and war had a very close relationship. They have mutually coordinated and supported each other, so they are required to become one. The military is the major branch of a nation, if the head of the nation does not have his own troop, he would not be able to hold on to his power. He promoted the idea of using militia rather than mercenaries. His influence to the world was immense and the westerners regarded him as the father of modern strategies.

Compared to the ancient Chinese military books, which emphasized abstract generalization and were rich with philosophical reasoning traits, the ancient western theories appeared to be confusing and not systematic. Because the western military specialists often paid more attention to the realistic matter, they tried to apply their great military talents in the real battles, thus, even with thousands of years of ancient war history, there was no specific strategic theories in writing with complete meaning on strategies. As indicated by John Collins (phonetic), “There were very few creative military experts, who had written books on military strategies prior to the 19th century.These historians were to write long after the fact.So even they wrote lengthy works on organizations, weapons, wars, battles, and fighting tactics, they only wrote some tidbits on strategic matters. **”** (8)

**Subsection 2. The World Modern Strategic Theories**

This period of the world modern strategic theories covered the historical period from the Capitalistic Revolution of the 17th century to the end of World War II. The Capitalistic Revolution of England in 1640 suggested the end of the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the western Capitalistic society. The rise of the capitalistic society and the fall of the feudal society changed the distribution of world power. The development of production methods, the improvement of science and technologies, transportation, and communication, all had increased the connections between different parts of the world. The formation of modern nationalism gradually pushed the traditional monarch’s interests and religious moral principles off the world stage. During the development of Capitalism, all kinds of hegemonies, colonialism, and superpower political theories also came into being. The western capitalistic countries, which led industrialization, relied on the superiority of their agricultural culture; they started to seriously expand their power with blood and fire. Under the attacks of Capitalism, areas such as the American continent, African continent, Asian continent, western Pacific islands and the Oceania became the commercial markets and the sources of materials for the world of Capitalistic countries. During this period, there was frequent fighting over the years because of the conflicting needs amongst the capitalistic countries, the imperial powers and their colonies, the capitalists and proletariats, which led to the two unparalleled and fierce World Wars. The modern western strategic theories were born during these continuous wars and conflicts.

After the 18th century, the first group of capitalistic military thinkers appeared. The famous representatives are: Piro (phonetic) of Prussia (1757-1808, his representative book “The Essence of New Fighting Method”(phonetic), Suvalov(phonetic) of Russia (1730-1800) his representative book “The science of winning**”**(phonetic) etc. They objected to the ignorance and neglect in their understanding of war issues and studied the general rules of war. Piro(phonetic) was the first one who had clearly distinguished and defined the strategies and tactics. He pointed out, “The strategy is related to the military actions, which was beyond the sight and battle field of gun fires, while the tactic is to do with the military actions within the sight and battle field of gun fires mentioned above.” (9) Tactic is mere supplement to strategy and belongs to part of the strategy. Piro(phonetic) even distinguished the strategy into political and military strategy: the political strategy is focused on the diplomatic relationships between countries and on the establishment of allies; the military strategy is the study of war issues; compared to military strategy, the “political strategy is at the highest level”. Suvalov (phonetic) made specific in-depth discussions on strategic offenses and troop concentrations in his book. He advocated speedy maneuvers, concentration of main forces, attack when enemies were not prepared, fierce attacks, and establishing and deploying the reserve units. In terms of the relationship between men and weapons, he put the men first and considered them as the major factor in the winning or losing in the fighting. These thoughts broke the reserved and stagnant atmosphere of the military theories of the Middle Ages.

The Napoleon wars about the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century greatly promoted the development of the western military strategic theories. From the perspective of the history of military strategic thoughts, the Napoleon war had the significance of a milestone. It established a strong foundation of the system of the western capitalistic military theories, which included the strategic thinking. Napoleon had created; a whole set of strategic guidance principles and fighting methods in leading the French capitalistic military to fight against the European feudal system. He had, therefore, created many miracles in the history of the capitalistic military. In strategic guidance, he abolished the then popular passive cordon strategy and emphasized the positive offenses with initiatives. He emphasized that the objective of the offense was to annihilate the enemy troops; it was not just to occupy the enemy territories, cities, and strategic locations. He emphasized concentrating superior forces in establishing the offensive military groups and the direction of the offenses, he also emphasized the fast maneuvering, establishing and maintaining strong reserve units. Engels commented, “Napoleon’s immortal accomplishment lied in his discovery of the only method of correctly using a large armed group of people in his strategy and tactic. This deployment of a large armed group of people could only be possible in a revolution.” (10) But, just like what Collins said, “Strangely, though reputed to be one of the greatest strategists in history, Napoleon Bonaparte(1769-1821), if strictly speaking, could not be considered as a pioneer of strategic theories.” ….Therefore, people in the world came to appraise his strategic contributions through the eyes of other people. The two most important persons were Anthony Henry Romney(phonetic) (1779-1869) and Karl Von Clausewitz(1780-1831). (11)

Romney’s (phonetic) “The Concept of the Art of War”**(**phonetic) was the first western book on the war and strategic theories. He indicated that the science of strategy is a major component of the art of war. “It was the art of war which proceeded on a map, it is the art of war on the entire theater of war.” (12) He believed that offense is better than defense, the only way to defeat the enemy is to fight and not to threaten the enemy’s route of maneuvers. In order to defeat the enemy, one should adopt a very strong strategy and pour the largest forces at the most decisive point. To defeat the enemy with a superior force was the fundamental content of the four strategic principles. He criticized the French Marshal Saks’(phonetic)viewpoint that war is a shadowy science, which has no rules. He indicated, “There are indeed principles in the strategy,“ and made some valuable explorations. Engels praised Romney (phonetic) as “the best writer” to describe the wars of Napoleon and considered him as the “most recognized authority” on military strategic theories.” (13)

Clausewitz’s book (The Theory of War) (phonetic) was the bible of the capitalists’ military strategic theories. The book had thoroughly discussed in depth the true nature of war, the rules of war, the principles of war and the philosophy of war. He made many brilliant interpretations, it was considered as the “Bible” of the western science of strategy. Even now, it still has a large influence on the current military of capitalistic countries. Clausewitz believed that war came from politics, and politics was the mother of war. He got high praise from Lenin on his famous judgment that, “War was merely a continuation through a different means of politics.” Lenin believed that “Marx’s doctrine looked at this principle and fairly accepted it as the theoretical foundation in studying every war.” (14) Clausewitz emphasized “The attempts to annihilate the enemy troops and maintain one’s own troops are mutually assisting each other, because they have mutual impact. It is the same idea which is supported by both sides.”(15) He proposed, “The most important but simple principle in the strategy is to concentrate the armed forces.” The two fighting methods of offense and defense are mutually related, impacted, and transferable. The defense cannot be just a pure defense, “It is a shield, which is formed by clever offenses.” (16) Clausewitz offered his own interpretation on the distinction of strategy and tactic.” He believed that the strategy is “For the purpose of obtaining the objectives of war that it uses fighting.”(17) He classified the elements of strategy into spiritual, material, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements. He also emphasized that in the strategic theories, principles, and methods, one should take all the special characteristics of the time period into consideration.

Clausewitz’s military strategic thoughts reflected the progressive trend and innovative spirit during the rise of capitalism. His discussions made creative explorations into the relationships of war and politics, material elements and spiritual elements, annihilate the enemies and preserve oneself, and the offense and defense.

From the middle part of 19th century to the end of World War II, was the period that capitalism gained great development and entered into imperialism. During this period, many new military strategic theories and schools came to being, which were brought on by the deepening in industrialization following a series of breakthroughs and the need of carrying out wars. This brought unprecedented western countries’ studies of military theories. The American, Alfred Thayers Mahan (1840-1914) promoted the “Naval Supremacy” and believed that “the naval supremacy, especially the right to control the main transportation lines, which are relevant to the national interests and trades, was the major factor in pure materialistic elements of making the nation strong and prosperous.”(18) He advocated the building of a large navy and a net of naval bases to capture naval supremacy, by controlling the oceans, they could move on to realize the national strategic objectives. This proposal by Mahan impacted greatly to the building of navy and naval strategies by the British and the U.S. The German, Alfred Von Sullivan (phonetic) (1833-1913) proposed the idea of quick solution and annihilation strategy and believed that, ”The war started in the Spring, should be concluded with total victory over the enemy by the Fall when leaves are falling.”(19) He asserted that people should learn from Hannibal in his battle of the Cannae**.** Byaudaciousflankingmaneuversand surrounding the enemies, it would bring the destruction of the main forces of the enemy.The strategic thinking of Sullivan (phonetic) had deeply branded the German strategic guidance during the two World Wars. The Italian, Guilio Douhet (1869-1930) proposed the theory of “the aerial supremacy”. He believed that using the airplane as aerial weapons in fighting would thoroughly changed the face of war, which was a turning point of war history. To obtain the air supremacy is to inhibit the flying of the enemy but still can maintain one’s own flying. **It is absolutely necessary to build an air force, which parallel the army and navy. The destruction of the air force bases, the air force material reserves, and the centers of the air force industries, are much more effective than the aerial combats.** Douhet’s (phonetic)air supremacy theory was promoted in many nations in the building and using of an air force during the two World Wars. The British, Fuller(phonetic) (1878-1966) proposed “the theory of mechanized war**”**(phonetic)**,** hebelieved that, after the appearance of tanks, it was a natural tendency for the army to become mechanized, war has become purely mechanized activities. He believed that victory in war “ninety nine per cent relies on the weapons,” and “the strategy, command, bravery, disciplines, supply, organization, and all the elements of spiritual and physical prowess, will not be able to compete with the supremacy of weapons. These other factors are at the most good for 1 percent of the victory.” (20)

Someheld similar views as Fuller (phonetic) or the likes of the military theories by the German, Jacot (phonetic), who advocated “smaller” troops and the French, De Gaulle, who advocated a “professional” military. They all believed in using small but sharp professional troops, relying heavily on such new weapons as tanks and airplanes, to achieve victories in the wars. The German, Erich Ruddendolf (phonetic) advocated the theory of “An all out war,” he believed the modern war was an “all out war” or “The war of a whole nation.” The battlefield would involve the entire national territory. It was not only the troops that got involved in war; the people of the entire nation would join the war effort. He advocated sudden attack without declaring war, using blitzkrieg to achieve a quick end of the war. The “all out war” reflected the desire for revenge and conquered the whole world by the Germans after World War I. It became the German Fascists’ theoretical basis of the “blitzkrieg” strategy. The strategic theories discussed above had made varying degrees of impact on the military strategies of the capitalistic countries, which fought in the two World Wars.

It could be said that during more than three hundred years of development, the western strategic theories had gradually molded into more complete systems of military theories. The science of strategy had thus become a relatively independent science of military affairs. Compared to the ancient strategic theories, the modern western strategic theories have their own characteristics. It is based on the materialistic foundation of the advancement of technologies of the industrialized era. It accepted the existence of “military science.” It paid great attention to exploring the rules of war and the rules of guidance of the wars in the early and middle part of the industrialized periods. It covered up the true nature of the war, especially the invasion wars, which were class based. It emphasized the use of military technologies and the improvement of military hardware. However, it often exaggerated the functions of weapons, especially those new weapons. It also emphasized the function of the spiritual element and people, but often unfairly exaggerated the functions of the individual top commander. It was aware of the influence of the nature and geography on war but to a certain degree, the tendency of “the theory of decision based on environment”(phonetic) emerged.

# **Subsection 3. The World’s Modern Strategic Theories**

The world’s modern strategic theories refer to those of the period from the end of World War II to just before the end of the cold war. During this nearly half a century of cold war confrontation between the east and west, the societies also experienced a new technological revolution. The quick development of new technologies and wide application of these technologies in the military, which were well represented by the nuclear, microelectronics, and aerospace developments, promoted creative dimensions of war concepts, war models, and strategic theories.

The most profound impact on the military strategic theories after the World War II was nuclear strategic theory. After the emergence of nuclear weapons toward the end of the World War II, a great number of books related to nuclear strategies have been published. The early nuclear strategic theories talked about using nuclear weapons as a method of “deterrence.” Using the fear of mass destructive power of the nuclear weapons and the nuclear equipped countries’ monopoly on nuclear weapons, the threat of using these weapons could lead to the submission of the opponents. In the middle of the 1950s the American nuclear monopoly was broken. Moreover, the small equivalent tactical nuclear weapons were developed, thus emerged a new nuclear “actual combat” theory, replacing the nuclear “deterrence” theories. This theory believes that the use of strategic nuclear weapons can directly and quickly achieve the strategic objectives. It calls for nuclear war to replace the regular war and nuclear weapons to replace regular weapons. Dulles clearly indicated in his book “The development of American Foreign Policies”(phonetic), “The current fundamental policy is relying on a strong retaliatory power, using the weapons of our choice, and selecting the location of our choice for immediate retaliation.”(21) The Soviet Union also proposed the “nuclear missiles theory,” which aimed at the objective of a “total victory through a nuclear war.” Sokolovskyedited “Military Strategies”(phonetic) and he believed “In the future world wars, from the standpoint of weapons, the first would be nuclear missiles.” The basics of implementing this kind of war by all branches of the military forces, the troop of strategic missiles and the nuclear submarines forces will be the first, large amount of nuclear missiles to be used. (22)

In late 1960s, the members of nuclear power nations gradually increased, which further developed the theory of nuclear threat. The American, Herman Kahn (phonetic) proposed “Gradual progression theory”(phonetic). He believed that when the nuclear forces of each nuclear opponent have reached the degree of “definite mutual destruction,” the reliance on nuclear weapons could not bring decisive victory. Any nuclear war could also bring devastating consequences to oneself. He advocated the avoidance of total nuclear war or even limited nuclear war. However, he advocated the maintenance of a strong second-strike capability. The British and French, etc. proposed the theory of the lowest limit of nuclear threat theory and advocated the use of limited nuclear retaliatory force to defeat the enemy’s objective of nuclear offense.

Related to the nuclear strategy, the regular strategic theory of the nuclear condition of World War II also came up with some new developments. These new developments appeared after the “actual combat” of the nuclear strategy got into the dead end alley. This theory advocates the use of nuclear forces as the “shield” and regular forces as the “sword” and readily preparing for the use of nuclear weapons and the defense against nuclear weapons in regular wars. The representative books on this are Robert Osgood’s “Limited War”, Henry Kissinger’s “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policies,” Maxwell Taylor’s “Uncertain Horn” (phonetic), and John Collins’ “Big Strategy”(phonetic), etc. The American strategic theorists generally called the regular combat under nuclear condition as “limited war.”

>From 1960 on, the emergence of the new aerospace strategic theory, which advocates aerial supremacy and focusing on air and space control that were based on the development of aerospace technologies and military aircraft and spacecraft, have received great attention from countries all around the world. In the early 1960s’, the American President Kennedy declared, “The one who could control space would control the earth.” In March 1982 the American, Greywhelm (phonetic) and some others published a research report “High Frontier- New National Strategy”(phonetic)They believe that outer space is the future important battlefield. It will become the new strategic frontier. During this period, there were other strategic theories that drew people’s attention. One strategic theory was the alliance strategy using the confrontation of the east and west large military groups as the background. Another is the strategy of combined combat by various forces from multiple countries, which used military technological advancement as the background. In this, the fighting strategy is that the air and ground become one and the air and space become one. This regional war strategy and deterrent strategy were based on the background of international strategic structural changes. The modern military technological development, which resulted in new strategic theories, provided important conditions and momentum for new innovations in the military field.

# **Subsection 4. The Strategic Theories of Marxism**

The strategic theories of Marxism: a new scientific system of strategic theory was created by Marx and Engels toward the end of 19th century. Marx and Engels used the scientific view of the world of dialectic materialism and historical materialism to comprehend and analyze war and strategic problems. They first established the scientific war view and strategic perspective in war history, and revealed the strategic guidance regulations and combat strategic guidance regulations in establishing the armed forces. They also illustrated epistemology and methodology, which could lead to correct understanding of war and strategic problems. The basic theoretical work and views of Marxism, which were related to war and strategic problems, were reflected in their works, (The Declaration of Communists), (The Defeat of the Troops of Piedmont), (The Report of the Communist Allies Central Committee to the Allies), (The German Farmers’ Revolution), (In the year 1852 the Possibility and Outlook of the Holy Alliance’s War Against the French), (The German Revolution and Counterrevolution), (The Siege of Saiwashitopor), (Revolutionary Spain), (The Now and Then of the Mountain Combat), (Persia and China), (The History of Rifles), (Attack), (Troops), (The Short Comments on War), (The Civil War of France), (Anti Dulin Discussion), ( The Origin of the Family, Privatization, and Country) etc.(all phonetic). The most important Marxism theoretical viewpoints on strategic theories are:

**The scientific discussions and the judgment on the origin and nature of war.**

Marx and Engels indicated that the war of human society originated from the conflict of economic interests, which appeared toward the end of the primitive society. The violent relationship originated from an economic relationship and was the product of economy. In short, the economy was the materialistic basis of violence. In the class society, war was the tool, which directly served the politics, and the politics controlled the war. The nature of war depended on what impact it brought to the development of society. The war at different stages could change its nature due to the shift of political objectives. The war could be classified into progressive, revolutionary, liberation, defensive war and reactionary, counterrevolutionary, invasion, and offensive wars. (The defensive and offensive here was meant to be from the view of political significance.) The former should be supported and the latter should be opposed.

**Related to the theories of the nature of the military and establishment of the armed forces.**

Marx and Engels indicated that the military was gradually formed because of the appearance of classes in the nation. The military was the organized violence of the classes and was a special public right of a nation. The military with a different nature would have different duties in the society. The revolutionary military was the tool of those oppressed people against the oppressors. The reactionary military would oppress the people in a country and was the tool used to colonize, plunder, and fight for supremacy. The regular army of the capitalistic class should be abolished and the regular army of the proletariat should be established and maintained. The structural development of military organization and the productivity of the society and the social political system have very close relationships.

**Related the theories of a people’s war.**

Marx and Engels based their beliefs on the principles of materialism, which believed the people were the creators of history, to review the war and fully affirmed the decisive function of people in the war. In the year 1849, Engels clearly proposed the concept of the “people’s war.” He also regarded this kind of people’s war, which reflected the interests and desire of the war participants, as the true revolutionary war. Meanwhile, he emphasized that the people’s war should be based on the full awakening of the people. The people’s war should have a large regular army to be the main force of the entire armed forces. It should have a set of flexible combat methods, which could fully develop the power of all war participants.

# **Related to the strategic theories of positive defense.**

Marx and Engels believed that the national war and national in-country revolution all have the element of defense from the political perspective. But the war on defense should not be mixed up with the military actions. The war on defense should not exclude offensive combat actions. If the enemy fired the first shot, the side, which was forced to react, had plenty of excuses and the right to take offensive combat actions to attack the opponents until their defeat. The most effective defense was still the active defense by engaging offensive actions. One should take the initiative as long as one could to influence the enemy movement and not be manipulated by them.

**Related to the principles of troop concentration**.

Marx and Engels emphasized that the fascinating part of strategy is troop concentration. The major objective of war is to defeat the enemy, so one should be good at troop concentration and thoroughly defeat the enemy. The action must be quick, that time is the essence of troop movement and time is victory.

**Related to the influence on the modes of war due to the advancement of science and technologies**.

Marks and Engels believed that the innovation on the modes and methodologies of combat had more to do with the inventions of better weapons and the improvement of the elements of soldiers and less to do with the creativeness or insights of those talented commanders. The advancement of science and technology promoted the changes of the modes and methodologies of wars. In relatively peaceful times, the improvement on the modes of war often lagged behind the progress of military technology. During a long period of peace, the improvement of weapons due to the advancement of industry could bring just as much backwardness to the methodology of war therefore it is essential to pay attention to the improvement of war methodologies.

**Related to the creative nature of the war methodologies of the proletariat**.

Marks and Engels emphasized that the new materialistic foundation of a society and a new political condition of a society produced new war methodologies. The modern war methodologies had made the liberation of the capitalistic class and the farmers as its premise. It is the military expression of liberation. The liberation of the proletariat had its own expression in military matters, and they would create their own special and new war methodologies.

The birth of the strategic theories of Marxism was one unprecedented great revolution in the developmental history of human military thinking. It was one part of the newly arrived concept form of the proletariats. It had fully realized the innovative spirit of the proletariats in their exploration of the mystery of war strategy. It is a sharp weapon to guide the proletariats in their victorious military struggles.

Lenin and Stalin, in their establishing and strengthening the first Soviet political power, countering foreign invasion, struggling to defend national security, had inherited and further developed the strategic theories of Marxism. In the important writings (Revolutionary Troop and Revolutionary Government), (The Lessons Learned on Moscow Uprising), (The Bankruptcy of the Second International), (Socialism and War), (The Military Outline of the Proletariat Revolution), (War and Revolution), etc**.** (phonetic),had analyzed in-depth the wars and strategic guidance regulations during the period of imperialism and proletariat revolution.It had become a major component of the strategic theories of Marxism.

**Section 3: The Military Strategic Theories of Mao Ze-dong and the Military Strategic Theories of the New Period**

The military strategic theory of Mao Ze-dong and its development in the new period possessed unique Chinese characteristics and style in its contemporary theories of military strategies. It focused on the embodiment of the Chinese Communists’ control over the military strategic thinking of the entire war front and its superb art of strategic guidance. It stood as an independent brand in the developmental history of world military strategic theories.

**Subsection 1. The Strategic Theories Of Mao Ze-dong**

The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were fermented and developed during the Chinese revolutionary wars and the defensive wars after the establishment of the country. During the period of 1920 to 1940, the Chinese Communists led the Chinese people in their struggles of national liberation and class liberation and fought hard during the wars of the people’s revolution. It was rare to find in the history of the wars the kind of fighting such as the Chinese revolutionary wars, with the disparity of strengths, the ferocity of the enemies, the complications of the events, the cruelty of the fighting, and the large scale of the battles. Mao Ze-Dong led the Chinese Communists; they learned war from the wars they won; countless victories in superb battles by defeating larger enemy forces by a smaller force, in the process they cultivated a large group of outstanding military strategists. It could be said that Mao Ze-dong was the most outstanding representative of them all. He once said, “I lived my entire life fighting and fought for twenty two years. I started out by lacking determination to fight to becoming eager to fight. I started our from not knowing how to fight to becoming good at fighting.” According to an incomplete statistical count, he directly participated and commanded more than 230 battles. After the establishment of the new China, Mao again led the military struggles in strengthening national defense, protecting national sovereignty and security. He won victories time and time again in counterattack battles for the sake of self-defense, thus, established the reputations of the military and the country.

The strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the practical applications and concrete expression of the military strategic theories of Marxism in the Chinese revolutionary wars. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin had clearly demonstrated and developed their regulations of war and war guidance during their times, based on the special traits of their time and implementation of their revolutions. They had formed and developed the military strategic guidance of the proletariat in their revolutionary wars. They had provided scientific methodologies to the Chinese Communists, which were represented by Mao Ze-dong, in exploring the regulations of Chinese revolution and forming military strategies, which were suitable for the Chinese revolutionary wars. The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the pure adaptation of the military strategic theories of Marxism into a Chinese mode.

The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were deeply rooted in the fertile ground of a traditional Chinese strategic culture. It absorbed broadly the best part of thinking from superb ancient Chinese culture. China has five thousand years of military strategic cultural traditions, at the end of the Chun-qiu era, the Sun Zi’s The Art of War, had reached the peak level of ancient military strategic theories. The outstanding military experts of generation after generation, have created model war examples, which contain endless supplies of the art of strategic planning. The military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong were the traditional Chinese military strategic culture, which was the most logical development and the newest accomplishment of the time.

The most important content of the military strategic theories of Mao Ze-dong was the strategic views, the guidance principles of a people’ wars, and the strategic thinking on active defense of Marxism.

**Subsection one. Strategic Views Of Marxism**.

Mao Ze-dong based on the reality of the Chinese revolutionary wars, scientifically answered the basic theoretical questions on strategy and molded the Marxism strategic views, which possessed Chinese characteristics. He provided scientific methodologies to the Chinese Communists, so they could understand strategic issues and developed military strategies which suited the realistic situations of Chinese revolutionary wars. Mao Ze-dong’s Marxism strategic views contained the following major content:

Subsection A. The strategic problem is a study of the regulations of the entire situation.

Mao Ze-dong indicated, “The study of the war guidance regulations of the entire situation is the duty of the science of strategy.” (24) It is the same as saying that the strategy guides the entire war efforts. Any characteristic on taking care of all dimensions and all stages, belongs to the entire war and is part of the strategic issues. For example, taking care of the relationships, such as, between us and the enemies, between each battle and each phase of war, between the fore and aft, between all kinds of battle activities, between the directions of the battles, between various branches of the military, between the modes of the battles, between the decisive factors for the entire situation, the development of current history to the ensuing history, etc.” Mao Ze-dong’s discussions on strategic issues revealed that the objective foundation of the strategy is the war guidance regulations of the entire situation. Therefore, in order to study strategic issues, one should understand and master the war guidance regulations of the entire war effort. The war guidance regulations of the entire war effort had embodied the connection of the essence of all elements of the entire war efforts. The commander should know the entire war effort. He should know the entire war could decide and control the partial war effort. The success or failure of the war could be determined by whether attention was paid to the entire front. Not only the top commander has to know the strategic issues; the battle commanders and tactical commanders should have a certain degree of understanding of strategic issues. “Knowing the entire situation would facilitate the use of its parts. Because the parts constitute the whole.”(25)

**Subsection B. Politic is the soul of military strategy**.

Mao Ze-dong said, “War is the extension of politics.” From this point, war is politics. The war itself is the operation of political characters. From the old days, there was no war without “political characters.”(26) The military strategy has impacted on the entire war; thus, it reflects the political characters of the war. It is directly controlled by the politics, which are related to the war. Those who decided on military strategists must know the military and must obey the politics.

First, the political aim of war is the basic foundation of military strategy. The military objective of war, basically, is to defeat the enemy for self- preservation. The political aim of the war is to open roads for the political development of the country, nation, or political group. That is, when political development reached a stage, and could not proceed as usual, the war will erupt in order to wipe away the obstacles of the political path. The military strategy includes the military aim of the war; it also includes the political aim of the war. The political aim is more fundamental. As early as the year of the Red Army, Mao Ze-dong indicated that the Chinese Red Army is the armed masses, which would carry out political responsibilities. About the fighting of the Red Army, they did not fight purely for the sake of fighting. They fought for the sake of propaganda to the masses, organized the masses, armed the masses, and helped the masses to establish revolutionary political power. The military path, which is military strategy, of the Red Army, must obey the political responsibilities of the Red Army. When Mao Ze-dong discussed the strategic guidance of the anti-Japanese war, he seriously indicated that the political aim of the anti-Japanese war was “to get rid of the Japanese Imperialism and build a free and equal New China.” The war could not be concluded if this aim was never achieved. Even if there were compromises, the war would recur, because the great masses would not obey. They would continue to fight to fulfill the political aim of the war. The military strategy of the anti-Japanese war, must obey the political aim of thoroughly expelling the Japanese imperialists.

Second, the military strategy must have a whole set of political practices to match. The war is not just the competition of the military strength and strength of the materials, it is the competition of human will. Therefore, the military strategy must have a whole set of political practices to match, especially, the political mobilization and political outline of the war must be the soul of the military strategy. The Chinese revolutionary war could win victories over the enemies within and without the country border, the most fundamental reason was the reliance on the mobilization of millions of people. The most important point here is to execute political mobilization of the war, tell the troops and masses the political aim of the war, and let them realize their fighting was for a just cause. Then let them understand the reason for fighting, and what is the relationship between them and the war.

**Subsection C. In formulating strategy, one should focus on the specific trait and development of the war**.

Mao Ze-Dong emphasized, “The war and war guidance regulations are all developmental.” The war has its specific traits due to the differences in time, location and nature. Therefore, “When we study the war guidance regulations of different historical periods, different nature, different location, and different nations, we should focus on its special traits and development. We object to the Mechanism on war issues. (27) For those who commanded the Chinese revolutionary war, they should recognize that this war had its own specific regulations compared to other wars and other revolutionary wars. If one did not recognize these specific regulations, one could not win victory. Therefore, the military strategy of the Chinese revolutionary war must be established on the basis of fully recognizing and mastering the specific regulations of the Chinese revolutionary war. To study the specific regulations of the war, one should analyze the fundamental elements and conditions of both sides. One should also contrast and synthesize these elements and conditions, in order to find out the connection of their true nature and the specific regulations of this war, and then using these as basis to formulate the military strategy of war guidance.” During the fighting period of the land revolution, Mao Ze-dong pointed out the basic trait of this war was that it occurred in a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, in which the political and economical development were greatly lacking balance. The enemy was large, the Red Army was small but was led by the Communists and it was a land revolution. This situation regulated the possible development and possible victory over its enemy of the Chinese revolutionary war, but it was impossible to achieve quick development as well as quick victory. This determined that the main modes of Chinese revolutionary war were the repetition of the “circle and annihilate” or counter “circle and annihilate.” Thus, the defense strategy became the most important and complex war problems of the Red Army.

**Subsection D. Planning and implementing military strategy is the competition of the subjective guidance capabilities of both sides**.

Mao Ze-dong pointed out; “ The war is a competition, by the commanders of both sides, in using the materialistic basis of their military forces, financial power, etc., as their turf, to grab the superiority, and the initiative of the subjective capability. The result of competition could be either win or lose. Aside from the competition of the objective materialistic conditions, the victor won by the correctness of subjective command and the loser was lost due to the error made in the subjective command.”(28) The planning and implementing military strategy is the competition of the subjective guidance capabilities of both sides. Under the conditions that the enemy was strong and us weak, the use of mobile and flexible planning and implementing military strategy could turn around the situations of the enemy and us, and became the key link to win the final victory. From the perspective of military command, to express subjective guidance capability is mainly taking good care of the problems of initiative, flexibility, planning, etc. in the war. The initiative of the war means the freedom of military operations. Whether taking initiative or being passive, the superiority and inferiority of the fighting forces are the objective basis. But the superiority or inferiority of the fighting forces is not really the matter of initiative or passiveness. It has to wait for the struggles and experience the competition of subjective guidance capabilities, to see the real emergence of initiative or passiveness. This requires the implementation of a highly flexible strategic command, which is the issue of flexibility of the war. The only way to achieve the victory of war is to exercise a high level of flexibility on strategic command by timely changes of tactics and modes of fighting based on the conditions of the troops and terrain’s; to change the superiority or inferiority status of both sides; and execute the initiative to be taken against the enemy. The flexibility is highly related to the planning. Mao Ze-dong indicated, “Everything needs preparation to succeed; without preparation could bring ruin.” The war does not have absolute precision. It has relative precision to a certain degree. This gives war planning an objective basis. But, the war has precision, which is low level and temporary. Therefore, the war planning is impossible to be fixed without change and should be changed and improved as the war goes on.

**Subsection Two. War Guidance Principles Of The Peoples’ War**.

Basically speaking, Mao Ze-dong’s military strategies were the people’s war strategies. In his illustration of the “Ten big military principles,” he pointed out: “Our enemies were very familiar with our fighting methods but they still could not save themselves from defeat.” “It was because our strategies and tactics were based on the people’s war. Any troop which were anti-people could not use our strategies and tactics.”(29) “Soldiers and people are the root of victory.” The deepest root cause of war power is imbedded in the masses. The troops, which gained the whole-hearted support of the masses would never be defeated in the world. Our army was a new type of people’s army, “which stood close together with the Chinese people. Their only objective was to serve the Chinese masses with all their heart and soul.” Under this objective, the basic starting point for our army to set the military strategies was to implement the people’s war, that is, to rely on the support of the masses and motivate people with fighting fervor to win the victory of revolutionary war.

**Subsection A. To preserve oneself and defeat the enemy is the basic principle of military strategy**.

Mao Ze-dong had indicated that the military objective of the war is to preserve oneself and defeat the enemy. The objective of the war is the nature and basic principles of the war, which is the foundation of any war actions. From technical actions on one end to the war actions on the other end, it is for the fulfillment of this nature of war. This is the essence of what Mzo Ze-dong absorbed from the military thinking of the past and present, from the Chinese and otherwise, and was one of the basic conclusions that he acquired from the experiences of Chinese revolutionary wars. In his theory of preserve oneself and defeat the enemy, Mao Ze-dong revealed the basic regulations of the war, which greatly enhanced the Chinese revolutionary war commanders’ awareness to thoroughly execute the war objective of preserve oneself and defeat the enemy. Thus, it had afforded them a highly mobile and flexible strategic guidance, which allowed them to obtain initiative at the battlefield even under adverse situations.

**Subsection B. Attribute the building of bases and creating battlefields as the strategic responsibilities**.

According to the military strategies of Mao Ze-dong, the building of bases and creating battlefields were unitary. The building of bases resided in the building of battlefields. Early in the period at the Jing-Gan Mountain, Mao Ze-dong indicated that the border area of Hu Nan and Jiang Xi occupied by the workers and farmers, were based at Ning Gang as the center. These were not only the bases for advancing the revolution but also the important conditions for developing the Red Army and victories over the enemies. By concluding the experience of land revolution war, Mao Ze-dong indicated further, “The conditions of the people are the most vital condition of the Red Army. These are the conditions of the bases.” If the bases had good people conditions, they were the most important conditions, which allowed the Red Army to hide their actions, tire out the enemies, force the enemies in making mistakes, and exercise initiative on the battlefields, which finally brought defeat to the enemy’s “circle and annihilate” tactics. Mao Ze-dong indicated during the period of the Anti-Japanese war, the guerrilla bases were the strategic bases for the objectives of allowing the guerrilla troops to rely on them to implement their strategic responsibilities, achieve the preservation and development of themselves, and annihilate and expel the enemies. These strategic bases were the bases for fighting the guerrilla wars. They were also the battlefields for guerrilla to fight their battles. Mao Ze-dong used the “make eyes”(phonetic) of the Go game as an example to illustrate the opening of guerrilla war bases behind the enemy lines. He emphasized its strategic significance. When the liberation war was just getting underway, Mao Ze-dong had repeatedly instructed the commanders of all strategic areas that they should regard the mobilization of the masses to create battlefields as their strategic responsibilities. The “Create the Battlefields” that Mao Ze-dong emphasized, was not only about the preparation of war material conditions, such as selection of terrain, building the military position, etc. He was talking more about the preparation of the conditions of people and masses, which were required in the development of the revolutionary war. Therefore, the creation of the battlefields that Mao Ze-dong stressed had broad content and deep meaning. It included mobilizing and organizing the masses, establishing revolutionary political power, equipping the masses with arms, and proceeding with the broad and deep social revolution or reform, satisfying the political and economical need of the masses, and drawing the masses to the revolutionary war. This is building the bases and creating the battlefield. The bases are the strategic bases of the army, it is what we relied on to realize all the strategic responsibilities and the war objectives.

**Subsection C. The mode of war should make timely changes according to the changes of the war**.

The war situation is complex. The battles opened up in different directions. The superiority of the enemy and us could shift and turn, thus, there are needs for changes of the mode of war to adjust and compliment each other. But many modes of war cannot be equally regarded. One fighting mode should be the major mode, which could be supplemented by other modes. To select and change the major fighting mode according to the development of the war is a fundamental issue of strategic guidance. The big strategic changes of several of our battles in our military history used the changes of major mode of fighting as its fundamental content. For example, during the era of the Red Army, the guerrilla warfare was changed to the campaign warfare. During the Korean War, the campaign warfare was shifted to the trench warfare. The objective basis for selecting and changing the major mode of war is the contrast of the forces of the enemy and us. For example, during the Anti-Japanese war, the enemy was strong and us weak, thus, the best way to achieve the military objective was adopting the guerrilla warfare. Only through the guerrilla warfare, would it reduce our own losses and achieve more victories. That would also reduce the territories occupied by the enemy and expand our bases. As the Anti-Japanese war progressed, the contrast of the forces on both sides changed, which prompted the gradual transition to a more advanced mode of fighting, which is the campaign warfare. From practical experiences, we learned that the timely changes of the major modes of war are sure ways to win victories.

**Subsection D. Do not fight a war, when one is not ready and confident. Even if one is in the worst possible circumstance, the strategy should be well prepared**.

The preparation of strategy is the action to prepare strategy before the war erupts or during the process of fighting. Its function, is to deal with a sudden war, and the second is that, during the fighting, it requires to pave the way for the strategy of the next stage. Mao Ze-dong emphasized vehemently that on the basis of scientific prediction of the war process, one should prepare the strategy well. In his final conclusion of the counter “circle and annihilate” fighting experience of the land revolutionary war, he pointed out that the victory achieved during the counter “circle and annihilate” fighting, and the extent of the completion of missions during the preparation phase, were closely related. Better preparation would achieve bigger victories. Therefore, in the selection of timing for preparation, we would rather be faulted for early preparation than being too late. Mao Ze-dong indicated in his book “Discussions on Protracted Warfare.”(phonetic) that “ ‘Everything could be a success if there is preparation. If not, it will bring failure.’ If there is no prior planning and estimation, one will not achieve victory in war.” Just before the victory over the Japanese, Mao Ze-dong reminded the entire Communist party and troops to be alert to the danger of civil war and prepare the strategies. For example, he ordered each strategic area, to organize the scattered guerrilla troops into regular field battle corps or regional militia, and change the guerrilla warfare to regular campaign warfare, etc. This whole set of policies assured the Communists and the troops to take the initiative during their fights against the Nationalists, who were attempting to grab the credit of the successes of the Anti-Japanese campaign, and during the ensuing war of liberation. After the eruption of the Korean War, Mao Ze-dong considered the situations of the American troops’ invasion, he timely turned the strategic center to the Northeast of China. He assembled crack troops to form the reserve units, which allowed the quick organization of two hundred fifty thousand advanced units into battles once we joined the war, and the grasping of initiatives on both the political and military fronts. Mao Ze-dong specifically emphasized that the preparation for war should be based on the most difficult and darkest situations. When the decision to join the Korean War was made, Mao Ze-dong pointed out that preparation should be made that the Americans would declare war against China. The preparation should be made that, at the least, the Americans would bombard the big cities and industrial bases with their air forces. They would also deploy the navy to attack the coastal areas. There were also need to prepare that the Chinese could not kill the American troops in large quantities inside Korea, so that the war became a stalemate, which could bring ruin to the Chinese construction plans already underway. It could also bring resentment to China from the capitalistic nations and some other people. We should be prepared both from the materialistic and psychological sides to deal with the most difficult and darkest situations. In the National Assembly of 1955, Mao Ze-dong said, “If we think things over from the worst possible situations, we would never take a beating. No matter what kind of work, we should think from the worst possible situations and prepare for it.” (30)

**Subsection E. You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can win then we fight, if we cannot win, we leave the scene**.

In 1965, Mao Ze-dong simply generalized his principles of using the military as “You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can win then we fight, if we cannot win, we leave the scene.” (31) The deep significance of this experience is that in executing a people’s war, we will not be ruled by the enemy and follow their will. We will take our own initiative and let the enemy be ruled by us and not use their advantages. When we are facing the attack of a strong enemy, if we do not have the confidence of winning, we should step back and maneuver to find and create opportunities in order to achieve final victory. This is “to control the enemy and not be controlled by the enemy.” It is a flexible and mobile military strategy by taking initiative and by avoiding passivity. Mao Ze-dong pointed out in his (Chinese Revolutionary War And Its Strategic Issues.) that during the early stage of the counter “circle and annihilate” war efforts, the Red Army had the need to use the withdraw tactics, and move bases to the central area. That tactics allowed us to pick the military spots we liked and with good people’s conditions, so that the enemy would be under our control; make more mistakes; which allowed us better chances to attack. During the Anti-Japanese war, Mao Ze-dong emphasized further that we should gradually achieve partial superiority and initiatives to gradually achieve more strategic superiority and initiatives. During the liberation war, Mao Ze-dong clearly proposed the battle concept, “You fight yours and I will fight mine.” In April of 1947, Mao Ze-dong instructed the northern Chinese regions organizing the Jeng Tai Battle to thoroughly implement the war guidance on the policy of “You fight yours and I will fight mine. (Each fight his own.) That was the policy of each fight with total autonomy.” (32) In July of the same year, Mao Ze-dong again instructed the Eastern China Field Battle Corps, “…should adopt the tactics of first fight the weaker enemy, and then fight the stronger enemy, you fight yours and we fight ours. (Each fight his own.) Fight with total autonomy and put the enemy in a passive mode.”(33) “You fight yours and I will fight mine; if we can defeat the enemy, we continue to fight. If we cannot defeat the enemy, we leave the scene.” These fully reflected the essence of our highly mobile and flexible war guidance.

**Subsection F. Concentrate superior forces and individually destroy the enemies**.

Generally speaking, Chinese revolutionary war was in a state that the enemy was stronger than us. From one after another partial creations of superior forces against the enemies and defeating them as the basic way, it changed the strategies from passive to mobile and from inferior forces to become superior forces. The key here is to implement the principles of concentrating the superior forces and individually destroying the enemies. Mao Ze-dong had indicated, “Concentrate the forces are necessary in all the campaign war, warfare of quick decision, and war of annihilation. The concentration of forces is a priority and the most important.” “To win victory from the defense strategy, the basic step is the concentration of forces.”(34) When the enemy forces are superior, if our army wanted to win victory from the defense strategy, we should implement the principles of concentrating the forces and individually destroying the enemies’ forces. This principle requires that, when the enemies are making attacks from different directions, our army should pick the right moment to concentrate superior forces several times the size of enemy forces and circle and destroy one of the weaker enemy forces. We should not equally divide our forces to counter the attacks from several directions. That way, we could not defeat any single attack but would entrap us in a passive fighting mode. The superior aspect of this principle is; first, it could achieve total annihilation. The total annihilation is the most effective way to defeat the enemy and supply us, to crumble the moral of the enemies and raise our own morale. Second, it could be quickly resolved. Quick resolution allowed our military to expand the war results and avoid the reinforcement of enemy forces. It could be said that the concentration of forces and individually annihilating the enemies was a superior tradition, which was practiced early in the development of our military.

**Subsection G. Destroying the enemy’s effective strength as the major objective, we do not care about the loss of one city or one piece of land.**

One important question faced by the strategic guidance of the Chinese revolutionary war was how to recognize and administer the relationship between the land taken and destroying the enemy’s effective strength. When Mao Ze-dong was discussing the implementation of withdrawing tactics at the early stage of the counter “circle and annihilate,” he indicated that “About the issues of losing territory, often there is the following occurrence, that is, only by losing that you do not lose. This is the principle of “If we want to take, we should first give.”(35) Losing part of the territory of the bases and destroying what the masses posses at their homes, is a price to be paid for the destruction of the enemy’s effective strength. If what we lost is the land, but what we gained is victory, we could recover the lost land and expand our territory, this is a “money making business.” In the Liberation war, Mao Ze-dong clearly proposed that, “We have to regard the destruction of the enemy’s effective strength as the major objective. We do not regard holding the cities or taking the cities and land as our major objective.” This should be one of the strategic guidance principles that our military should follow. Only through heavy destruction of the effective strength of the enemy, could we acquire and hold the land. If we are unable to largely destroy the enemy’s effective strength, we will lose the land, which we acquired. Therefore, to grab and hold the land is the result of heavily destroying the enemy’s effective strength. This may require many repetitions and seesawing to finally take the land and hold it. The best thing about implementing this principle is that we would throw the baggage to the enemy, which would make their supply line long and their forces scattered. On the contrary, our army could fight the battle with light burden, concentrate our forces, advance and withdraw at will, and search for easy targets and destroy them.

**Subsection H. Be careful with the initial battle and execute effective decisive campaign**.

The initial battle and decisive campaign are important issues of strategic guidance. The initial battle could have large impact on the entire situations. Mao Ze-dong pointed out that from the side of implementation of defense strategy, in order to defeat the enemy attack, the first counterattack is crucial. “The result of the first battle, whether it is a win or loss, will have strong impact on the entire situation. In fact, it could even have an impact on the decisive battle.” (36) The initial battle has strategic significance. Therefore, the strategic director of the Chinese revolutionary war must thoroughly follow the principle of “Be careful on the initial battle.” First, it must be won. We should make sure those conditions, such as, enemy situations, the terrain, the masses, etc, are all advantageous to us and not to the enemy. We would act only when we have confidence to win. Otherwise, we would rather withdraw and wait for the next opportunity. Second, we should pay attention to the plans of the entire war. The plan for the initial battle should be the prelude of the plan for the entire war. If the initial battle has no advantage to the entire situation but could be harmful, even if it was a victory, it was actually a defeat. Therefore, before fighting the first war, one should think about how to fight the second, third, fourth, or even the decisive campaign. Third, we must take care of the next strategic phase. When the strategic director is planning the initial battle at the strategic planning phase, he should calculate the subsequent phases, at the least, he should calculate the next phase. When calculating the withdraw phase, one should calculate the counterattack phase. When calculating the counterattack phase, one should calculate the attack phase. When calculating the attack phase, one should calculate the withdraw phase. If no such calculation was made and one only restricted oneself to the advantageous or disadvantageous situations in front of oneself, it would be the sure way to bring defeat. The decisive campaign is the battle to exhaust and destroy the enemy and determine the win or loss. Thus, more care will be needed to make the selection. Mao Ze-dong emphasized, “We propose that the decisive campaign under all advantageous situations, no matter whether it is fighting big or small battles, we should not allow any negativism.” (37) But we firmly object to fight the decisive campaign, of which we lack confidence to win, especially we should avoid to fight the decisive campaign under disadvantageous conditions and have no confidence to win, during the defense strategic phase. Even if there is a fundamental shift of our and the enemy’s strengths, after we have moved into the strategic counterattack and attack phases, the principle of “Execute effective decisive campaign. Avoid the decisive campaign which is disadvantageous” still applies.

**Subsection Three. The Strategic Thought Of Active Defense.**

Active defense is one of the basic military strategic principles of Mao Ze-dong, which reflects his military path of the thinking on the people’s war.

As early as the period of the revolutionary war, while he analyzed the rules of the Chinese revolutionary war, he indicated, “The enemy ruled our entire country, we had a very small army. The fate of our revolution would depend on whether we could beat the enemy’s tactic of “circle and annihilate.” On this point, “The initial and most critical problem was to preserve our forces and wait for opportunity to strike the enemy.” If the only emphasis was on offense and not defensive method, we were the “Number one fool.” As to the revolutionary war, the adaptation of defensive strategy was not only militarily necessary, it would also benefit the politics. “All defensive war on just cause, could have the functions of causing political dissension and division, it could also mobilize those backward people to join the war effort.” The defensive strategy could reflect, to a certain degree, the just nature of the revolutionary war and caused the army to win sympathy from the masses. Therefore, “The defensive strategy became the most complex but important issue of the Red Army in their fight.” Whether the Red Army could correctly implement the defensive move became vital to its existence. The correct defense could only be active defense. Mao Ze-dong said, “The active defense could be named as offensive defense. It could also be called as decisive campaign defense. Passive defense could be called as ‘concentrated defense,’ or ‘pure defense.‘ The passive defense is actually a false-defense. Only an active defense could be called real defense, which was a defense using both counterattack and attack.”(38) The war principle of the Red Army is to recognize active defense, and oppose passive defense. Mao Ze-dong’s thought of active defense had theoretically provided correct solutions to the military strategic problems of the Chinese revolutionary war. It paved the way for the Chinese revolutionary war from victory to victory.

In general, the active defensive strategy must well manage the three important relationships, i.e., defense and offense, inner line and outer line, protracted and quick solution, based on the development of the battle situations.

First is the issue of the relationship between the defense and offense. Mao Ze-dong indicated that, from the entire war process, the defense and offense are the phases of a completely different strategic nature. They could not be mixed together. Before a fundamental change of the situations, where the enemy was strong and us weak, the Chinese revolutionary war could only rely on defensive strategy. Only after we obtained superiority over enemy forces, the Chinese revolutionary war could move into offensive strategy. At that time, the defense became local. But, we could not totally split up the defense and offense. The general principle of the active defense is based on offense to reach its defensive goal. Mao Ze-dong’s creativity lied in his ability in combining the defense and offense from the dialectic relationship of the strategy and campaign battles and proposed a strategy, which would use offensive moves in the defensive strategy. The significance is that we should use the vulnerabilities of the overly extended enemy front, which required them to divide their forces to hold the strategic locations and communication lines, so that we could use highly mobile, flexible campaign war or guerrilla war to divide and destroy the effective strength of the enemy. At the same time, we avoided losing our strength in the trench warfare. The “To tempt the enemy so they would enter deeply” tactic used in the land revolution period, the behind the line guerrilla warfare during the anti-Japanese war period, and the campaign war with the sole objective of concentrating superior forces and destroying the enemy forces individually, had fully reflected the flexible handling of dialectic method on defense and offense.

The relationship between the inside and outside fronts is closely related to the defense and offense. Mao Ze-dong indicated during his land revolutionary war period, the fight bases of the Red Army was at their bases, which was the inside front fighting in the strategy. “But we could or even should change it on our campaign or battles.” We had implemented the “outside front fighting within the inside front fighting.” We had turned the big “circle and annihilate” tactic of the enemy and turned it around to become our small “circle and annihilate” tactic against our enemy. We had used the enemy’s tactic of dividing the advances with combined attacks and turn this tactic around against the enemy. Thus, we were able to shift the strategic superiority of the enemy forces into situations that we were in a superior status during the campaign battles. During the anti-Japanese war, Mao Ze-dong further expanded this thought. He combined the inside front of the strategy and the outside front of the campaign battles and made it into the basic war guidance principles of strategy against the Japanese. He demanded the adoption of flexible campaign war, using several divisions against one division, several tens of thousands of people against ten thousand enemy, several troop advancement against one advancement, from the outside front of the battlefield to suddenly encircle one troop advancement and destroy it, which would force the enemy’s strategic outside front of the campaign battle and offense becoming the strategic inside front and defense. Thus, our own inside front and defense of the fighting strategy could become the outside front and offense in the campaign battles.

In executing attack in the battles and outside front fighting, we demand speedy resolution. Therefore, in implementing active defense military strategy, we should use the dialectic recognition and management on the issues of the relationship between protracted or quick solution. The Chinese revolutionary war became protracted due to the fact that the enemy was strong and us weak. Therefore, insisting on protracted war is one of the most important directives of the strategic guidance. But the campaign battles should be just the opposite. It should not be protracted but should reach quick resolution, which was also due to the situations where the enemy was strong and us weak. We lacked weapons and ammunitions, the amount of troops were less than the enemy, if we did not grasp the opportunities and make quick battle solutions, it was very likely that we would be defeated by the enemy forces, which swarmed in from various directions. Therefore, our campaign battles should seek quick resolution. In order to achieve such, the basic conditions are to prepare thoroughly; do not miss good opportunities; concentrate superior forces; use encircle and flanking tactics; select well the military position and strike the enemy while they are in motion, or strike the enemy before they firmly establish good military position, which they occupy. If we have not solved these problems, it is impossible to achieve quick solution on campaign battles. In general, in order to thoroughly execute the military strategic concept of defense strategy, it would require, from the dialectic relationship of the strategy and campaign battles, to be aware and master the contrasting and compatible relationships of defense and offense, inside front and outside front, protracted and speedy resolution, and insist on combining the strategy of protracting defense inside front and the quick resolution of offense outside front of the campaign battles.

After the establishment of New China, the military struggles led by the leadership of the Communist Party, had shifted from taking the political power of the country to strengthening the political power and defending the national security. Thus, it had faced a bigger stage of military struggles. Mao Ze-dong’s active defense strategic thoughts had newer development. In April of 1955, Mao Ze-dong indicated during a Central Secretariat Conference that the directive of China’s defense strategy was active defense and we would not initiate a war. In March 1956 the Chinese Military Commission Broader Conference formally announced that the Chinese Socialism would adopt the military strategy of active defense. From then on, though the international strategic structure had gone through some changes, we had also gone through some large or minor adjustment in terms of the targets of war, the major direction of the strategy, the mode of war, etc. However, despite these adjustments, the military strategy of active defense has been the basis of our military strategic concept.

Under the new environment of a newly established country, basic spirit of the active defense strategy was for the purpose of defending the country’s sovereignty, security, and the territorial integrity; insisting on the ground of self-defense; and implementing the policy of taking action until we were attacked. The key points were: First, the military principle was that we would not fire the first shot. China will not invade another country. We would not initiate attack, even though we were under the threat of invasion or even the intimidation of the war. We would insist that if the conflict could be resolved through peaceful method, we would not resort to arms. This was determined by the nature of Chinese socialism. Second, militarily and politically, prevent or advance the war. Prior to the war, we should continue to strengthen the military forces; expand the international unified front of maintaining peace and oppose war and maintain the peaceful environment needed for socialism construction. We should use positive initiative in military preparation and political struggles to prevent war, it is an indispensable content of the active military defense strategy. Third, using active counterattack or offensive battle to achieve the objective of defense strategy. We have adopted a strategy to counter the action of the enemy. But if the enemy forced war upon us, we should be able to counterattack with vigor and stop the offense of the enemy at a prescribed location. By gradually taking away the enemy’s strategic initiative, we will then turn the defense strategy into offensive strategy and thoroughly defeat the enemy’s invasion. Under the active defensive strategy, China has agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; will not use nuclear weapons or use nuclear weapons to intimidate countries, which do not have nuclear weapons. That said, we would resolutely use nuclear counterattack to any enemy which attack us with nuclear weapons.

The active military defense strategic thought was given a richer content than during the period of revolutionary war. It fully reflected the objective requirement of the military struggles at an expanded international stage on safeguarding the national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. It has become the basic foundation for the Chinese to proceed with their national defense and military constructions.

**Subsection 2. Military Strategy Of The New Period**.

After the 11th Three Central Conference (phonetic), China entered a new historical period. Our strategic guidance on military struggles also faced new historical conditions. First, due to the structural changes of the international politics and economy, the forces seeking world peace continued to increase. The danger of world war was curtailed and the regional wars became the major type of war. Thus, dealing with the possibility of the eruption of regional wars became the major subject of our military. Next, due to the progress of advanced technologies, such as communication technology, aerospace technology, nuclear technology, bioengineering technology, computer technology, etc., which caused the world military revolution to go into deeper development. The weapon and equipment systems developed, the military structure, the fighting methods, and even the style of war, went through tremendous changes. The war using advanced technologies became the future mode of war. Our military needs to be equipped with the capabilities to win these modern technological, especially the advanced technological, warfare. For this purpose, our military has established the military strategic concept of the new period. This way we have control over the entire situation of military constructions and battle training and gone even deeper to refine the active defense strategy of our military.

**Subsection One. Insists on the people’s war under the conditions of modern warfare**.

Compared to modern warfare, the past wars that our army fought, there were a lot of changes from the materials, technologies, tactics, and even to the mode of the entire war. The fighting methods that our army was familiar with are no longer suitable to the needs of modern warfare. But it does not mean that the people’s war is passé. Using the people’s war as the strategy for all out war is still the way to win victory in modern warfare by our army. Deng Xiao-ping said, “We will insist on our people’s war. We are not going to invade other countries. If the enemy wants to invade us, our “unitedthree”(phonetic) will make the enemy soak in the big ocean of the people’s war.” (39) Jiang Ze-ming also emphasized that we should never abandon the thought of a people’s war. We will always insist on the people’s war, which is a treasure of winning victories and defeating enemies. The people’s war is not only a powerful weapon for us to win the future wars, but also a potent weapon to stop foreign invasions. A strong people’s army plus large militia and reserve units, will make anybody think things over. To insist on the thought of the people’s war, we need to be based on the new situations and study the new methods of organizing the people’s war and new fighting methods. The strategy and tactics of the people’s war should also make advancement. We should maintain good traditions but the concrete fighting methods must be created on the basis of the changes of historical conditions. According to the strategic thought of the people’s war, we should combine the capable regular army and strong reserves of the national defense; adjust to the requirements of the traits of the future military struggles and develop the market economy of socialism; pay attention to the construction of the reserves of the national defense; raise the quality; improve the organizational system; improve the structure; raise the capability for speedy mobilization; and improve the levels of military training. This way, we can truly achieve the objective that if the army gets called they can respond quickly and fight.

**Subsection Two. Insists on active defense strategy concept.**

In 1982, Deng Xiao-ping again declared, “What kind of concept that we should adopt in the future for anti-invasion war? I support the concept of “active defense.” (40) The active defense itself is not just a matter of defense. The defense includes offense.” Jiang Ze-ming also pointed that continuing the execution of an active defense military strategy concept, not only is inheriting our army traditions, but also pertinent to the current level of the national and military situations of our country. That is, China still insists on the military status of self-defense; implements the principle of attack after we were attacked; and still uses active initiative on military readiness and political struggles to stop the war and maintain peace. If the war broke out, we will use active offensive moves to reach our goal of defense.

**Subsection Three. Stand firm on winning the regional war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies**.

Under the new historical condition, we should more thoroughly understand the thought of a people’s war and the concept of active defense military strategy. It is a reflection of the requirement of modern warfare. Deng Xiao-ping started to emphasize from the latter part of 1970s, that our military should seriously resolve the problems of our lacking the capability in directing modern warfare and the lack of capability in fighting a modern warfare, and work hard at raising the defensive fighting capability under modern conditions. Jiang Ze-ming made the point a step further, that is, according to the developmental changes of the international situation we should pointedly prepare to deal with the regional war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies. We should strengthen our capacity in the defensive war and quick responding war under the conditions of modern technologies, especially the advanced technologies. For this purpose, our military constructions must implement changes from quantity pattern type to quality efficiency type and from people intensive type to technology intensive type. Through implementing the strategy of using technology to strengthen the military, we raise the volume of applying advanced technologies in the weapons and equipment; develop the military organizational structure which could meet the demand of modern warfare; cultivate large amount of high quality military personnel who are knowledgeable about the modern technologies and modern warfare; and establish one highly efficient, together, and of capable being a modern regular army.

**Section 4: The World’s New Military Revolution and the Trend of the Development of Strategic Theories in the Present Age**

**Subsection One: The World’s new military revolution**.

Toward the end of the 1970’s, the leader of the Soviet military believed that the information technology based on computers as its core, which entered the military field and the appearance of precision guided weapons, were causing changes in the military and had led to a new technological revolution.

The Gulf War of 1991 showed the people in the world the miniature form of the first advanced technological warfare, which caused people to pay attention to the new development of the war and military. Many countries, especially the United States, which has faster development in information technology, started continuous and in-depth discussions on the military revolution. Many people believed this rising military revolution was the unavoidable result of the quick development of the advanced technology and its wide applications to the military field. The core of this military revolution is to utilize the superiority of information to combine closely the available technology, advanced war thoughts, and military organization and structure and fully develop the potential of available technology, which could cause the revolutionary advancement on the military capability. This military revolution will be the total reform of the military field. It is related to a series of important big changes to the military weapons and equipment, the theories of combat, organization and structure, etc. It also pushes the movement of changing from the industrial era to the information age in the military constructions and war methods.

The advanced technology, especially the development of information technology, not only was demonstrated in regional wars, such as the Gulf War and the War in Kosovo, but also brought great impact to the reforms of the war and military field. Many theories and concepts brought up in the American military’s discussions on the military revolution have become more systematic and were incorporated into official policies in the 1990s and became the operational guidance in the command of the American troops’ development. In April of 1996, the American Joined Chiefs of Staffs published the document (The combined concept of the year 2010)(phonetic), which outlined the entire design of the American military development blue print of the 21st century. It proposed that relying on the superiority of advanced technology, especially the information technology, to “establish a strong military, which could intimidate the enemy in peace time, and could win victory in war time, and to defeat the enemies in any conflict.” In April 2000, the American Joined Chiefs of Staffs again declared (The combined concept of the year 2020)(phonetic), and also contemplated the concept and plan of the proposal of establishing a “military revolutionary troop,” which could deal with the requirements of the information age. It proposed the use of the opportunity of having the superiority on information technology, quickly changed the theories of troop size, organization, and campaign battles, which could best utilize this technology. This happened so that it would compress the quality of the current military strength and bring quick transformation into a military, which has more advanced technology and stronger capability. The United States is trying hard to assure the leading role in the future world strategic structure through the earlier practice of military revolution than other nations and the maintenance of its leading military superiority.

Some major European countries followed the lead of the United States and also started to proceed with the research and practice of the military revolution. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, etc. have already adopted practical steps, which could meet the requirements of the military revolution; use the advanced weapons systems, which are led by information technology; and emphasized the use of “system assembly,” to raise the total war capability. Countries such as Japan, India, Korea and other countries in the Asian-Pacific region are trying to speed up their military reforms and have made great efforts in developing and importing advanced technological weapons and also actively seeking new war theories and military organization and structure, which could adopt advanced technology weapons. They are aiming at matching the military constructions and development with the momentum of the military revolution and the progress of time. This new military revolution will no doubt bring new challenges and opportunities to the development of national defense and military constructions of many nations in the world. Those countries which have grasped the opportunities, will achieve great changes in the military capabilities and strategic initiatives. Those countries which failed to grasp the opportunities will quickly become backward and increase its disparity from the advanced level. The danger is easily discernible.

The major characteristics of the current new military revolution of the world compared with the other military revolutions are:

Basic Characteristics. The new military revolution will use the technological revolution of the information as its core and proceed with thorough reforms to the military of the industrialized era. The changes made by information technology to the military of the industrialized era are reflected in the following four major areas: First, it has greatly enhanced the information superiority, which could be symbolized by “In charge of the battlefield sensitivity**”**(phonetic)The understanding of the battlefield made the war participants increase their totally, accurately, and timely understanding of the situations of the enemy and us, which created the needed conditions for exercise of precision fighting. Second, through the “system assembly” the dispersed weapons and force units could be combined into a whole unit, which could perform the total war capability to the maximum. Third, through the combined use of modern industrial technologies, which produced the precision guided weapons and long distance attack weapons, they could open the path for making smart military tools and enhance the war efficiency of the military. Fourth, it produces the numerical battle simulation and the computer assisted decision-making systems, which greatly enhance the war command effectiveness. The above changes have made fundamental impacts to the military development and future victories. The basic objective of the new military revolution is to establish a troop of information, which could adjust to the information society based on the foundations of the development of information technology, thus, implement the transformation of the military and of war from the industrialized era to the information age.

Characteristics of its entirety. Those quickly developed advanced technologies after the 1980s, such as information, bioengineering, air and space, new energy sources, new materials, and oceanic development, etc., have changed the face of war to a great extent and increased the warring capability of mankind. The new military revolution is the result of the wide application of advanced technologies mentioned above. It does not rely only on single or small amounts of technological development, but is does rely on the entire movement of many clusters of advanced technologies. Information technology is the one which tied all these advanced technologies into a whole. The information technology is the leading factor in the current development of the advanced technologies. It is the cord which tied all the advanced technologies together. This is the fundamental reason why the new military revolution must use the technological revolution of information as its core.

Deep and far characteristics. The new military revolution will touch upon the military establishment and war. It will bring deep and far impact in the military field and far surpass any military reforms and revolution of any historical period. Only the technological advancement will not bring military revolution. It will only become a military revolution with true significance by adopting the organization and structure and the war theory, which have been adjusted to the new technologies. In modern military history, the technological advancement in areas such as mechanized troops, air power, radio, communication, etc., could only bring revolutionary changes to the military capabilities after the use of the blitzkrieg concept by the Germans and their adoption of the troop organization and structure, which had adjusted to these changes. After the emergence of the aircraft carrier, its capabilities have been fully realized only after it has proposed a unique ocean war concept and totally abandoned the old mode of naval fighting structure. In fact, the nuclear revolution of the military field did not come about when the nuclear weapons were invented. It came to existence about fifteen to twenty years after the invention of nuclear weapons and the proposal of the concept of using nuclear power of the nuclear threat strategy and the integration of nuclear weapons into the military forces of the nation. Therefore, the new military revolution is the total revolution of the military field. Its basic thought is to closely integrate the current advanced technologies, advanced war thoughts, and military organization and structure, and make revolutionary advancement on military capabilities.

Long term characteristics. The implementation of new military revolution is a long process. The American military experts believe that it will take many decades. At the present, many developing countries in the world are only at the beginning stage of this revolution. It will take them time to fully appreciate the new military revolution and decide on the correct orientation.

**Subsection Two. Trend of the development of strategic theories**.

The present age new military revolution of the world is the product of the information age. It is a great social phenomenon of the human society at the historical turning point. The new military revolution not only brought deep changes to the military strength and strategic methods, it also greatly expanded the people’s strategic thoughts and vision. Under the push of a new military revolution, the present age development of the strategic theories displayed the following trends:

**Subsection A. Develop strategic theories, which adapt to the requirements of the information age.**

The development of strategic theories must fully reflect the requirements of the time and carry the clear traits of the time. In the recent years, following the human entry to the information age, many countries have treated the exploration and development of the information security strategic theories, which have adjusted to the requirements of the information age, as their hot topics of strategic research.

Following the development of the information technology, the degree of using information in the society is getting higher. Currently, in the developed countries, information has become important as strategic resources. The information industry has become the nations’ key industry. The information network has become the important basic strategic facilities of a nation. The information security becomes the most important security factor. Under this circumstance, if a nation does not have information security, the discussions of the securities of politics, economy, military, science and technology, and culture, will be in vain. Through the destruction of a nation’s network system and the computers’ soft and hardware facilities, it is possible to bring severe impact to the proper operations of the entire nations’ economic lifeline and military system. This kind of strategic destruction is definitely unmatched by any weapon systems of the past. In 1999, the 21st century’s National Security Committee of the United States made an announcement in the (New Century National Security Report), and defined the weapon of information war as a weapon of mass destruction and made it compatible to other mass destruction weapons, such as, nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. After this, the United States’ (National Security Report) of the year 2000, listed the protection of the security of important basic information facilities of the energy resources, bank and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water supply system, etc., as the national key interests. From a thorough awareness of the strategic importance of information, the information security adopted a clearly targeted and operable strategic counter measures, which will become the definite choice of any nation which is entering an information society. For those countries who are behind in information technology, the first question they have to answer is, how to control others and not be controlled by the others in the process of speeding up the acquiring of information, and establish self-autonomy and self-defense capability of their information system in their strategic plan on information security.

**Subsection B. Develop strategic theories, which could adjust to the changes of the international structure.**

After the end of the cold war, the bipolar international structure was broken and has undergone continuous changes. All major countries in the world have eagerly adjusted their strategies and study the way to form new strategies, which can adjust to the changes of the international structure. The United States has tried hard to grasp the “period of strategic opportunity after the cold war.” It has pushed the military constructions and war strategy toward the changes on the global information control and global long distance precision strike, so that the United States can gain absolute control in the new international structure and establish the “new world order” under her leadership. Other countries also tried hard to adjust their strategies based on the reality of their own nations and develop non-symmetrical forces and non-symmetrical strategies. In doing so, they hope to further elevate their nations’ international standing under this new international structure; to strive for more say in international affairs; create and maintain international environments, which is beneficial to the national economic development, peace and stability.

In the exploration of strategic theory, which could meet the changes of international structure, the theory, which is prepared to deal with various threats of war, has received the most attention. During the cold war, theories of war and strategies of the majority of the countries, including the United States and Soviet Unions, were established on the basis of dealing with a World War. Following the changes of the international structure, many countries have entirely re-adjusted their military strategies of siege and defeat in regional conflicts and local wars; used the regular forces with advanced technologies to win victories at local wars as their major tactics; valued how to deal with uncertain and long term threats and challenges; and deal with small scale arms conflicts and suddenly emerging incidents.

**Subsection C, Develop strategic theories, which adjust to the advancement of advanced technology.**

First, Search and propose new strategic theory based on the development of advanced technology. The rapid development of advanced technology greatly strengthens the functions of the military forces, and severely changes the face of war. On one hand, it has led to the continuous emergence of new war tactics and modes; greatly enhanced the capability of long distance battles; elevated unprecedented precision of attacks; and multiple killing powers. On the other hand, it is equipped with strong capabilities of battle adjustment and control. It can flexibly select the kinds of targets based on needs and the range and implementation of striking methods. Even with continuous and wide applications, it would not be required to carry the burden of the “nuclear threat.” The results of the development of advanced technology weapons and their wide applications at battles suggested that both the advanced technology weapons and the superiority of advanced technology possess the functions of strategic intimidation. It is a far superior method than the nuclear weapons when the intimidation turns towards real war. Amongst the new generation advanced technology weapons, those mid-distance precision attack weapons such as the cruise missile, which has high precision and can penetrate the defense, and ground to ground battle and tactical guided missiles, etc., all are equipped with the intimidation and real battle dual-functions. The “battle space sensitivity”(phonetic) of the information technology and information attack and defense capabilities, etc.. They are also equipped with dual capabilities of intimidation and real battle. The intimidation effect, which combined with the advanced technology weapons and the superiority of information, is quite different from the “regular intimidation” of the nuclear intimidation. This new theory of intimidation has increasingly been valued. Those countries with leading edge advanced technological development will have more “trump cards” in their hands and will have more flexibility in selecting the strategy and more strategic turn around spaces in future international struggles.

Second, based on the advanced technological development, nations enrich and expand the traditional strategic theories. In this respect, the most typical example is that some countries are expanding the theory of “air supremacy” to “space supremacy”. The American Air force has been continuously changing their traditional aviation power to aerospace power. In recent years, they are developing the Air force strategy for the next century, clearly proposed to move from aviation and space power to space and aviation power. (phonetic) and emphasized the increasing reliance and urgency of the military on space and demanded the attention to “use the strategic high ground for shooting energy”(phonetic) from space. The United States military is still planning to develop the space weapons and has also proposed the strategic theories of “space control” and “space supremacy.” While forming the new branch of the military, the Space Troop, the Russians clearly included the space war into the range of the modern war. They also clearly divided the space into two large war zones of space near the ground and moon space. (phonetic). All these suggested that the theory of space strategy would become an important direction of the future strategic development.

**Section 5: Basic Regulations of the Development of Strategic Theories**

Looking back at the development and history of strategic theories, we can gain some understanding of the following regulations:

**Subsection One. Strategic theories are developed due to the implementation and development of war, the war implementation is the source and development power of the strategic theories.**

Strategic theory, basically, is the guidance regulation of the entire war, which is reflected in the people’s mind. In ancient times, we could not even talk about consciously controlling the war. Due to the development of war implementation, people gradually recognized that there was the existence of some regulations in the guidance and policies in the war and war preparation. Some factors have relatively stable and absolute connections to victory and defeat of the war. This way, the strategic consciousness and the early sprouting stage of the theories of strategy started to emerge. The strategy as a specific research area and a subject of study gradually became independent. In China, the strategic thoughts started early (Book of History),(I Ching),(Book of Poetry) (phonetic),etc. There were many ingenious strategic thoughts in these wise old books. In the Chun-qiu and the Warring States period, the society went through rapid reforms; the wars occurred frequently; the war tactics and methods were continuously upgraded, and the strategic application became more self-aware and mature. It was based on the large amount of war implementation during this period, that many military books, which set the rules, emerged. Among them, especially (Sun Zhi’s The Art of War) had revealed many basic regulations of the military activities from the strategic viewpoint, and had reached the zone, which was difficult to reach by the latter people. In Europe, famous wars, such as, the war of Greece and Persia (550 B.C.-449 B.C.), the Buno war(phonetic)(334 B.C.-323 B.C.), Julius Cesar’s Gallic war, etc. also contributed greatly to the establishment and development of strategic theories. About the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the French Revolution and Napoleon’s war, had pushed forward the development of strategic theories. Romeny(phonetic) (The general discussions of the art of war.**)** and Clausewitz’s (The Theory of war**)** were written based on the conclusion of these two wars and other capitalistic wars. The 20th century has been a turbulent century with frequent wars, which were rich in styles and forms. Almost at every big war, especially the typical war, it would be accompanied by one change and leap and bound advancement of strategic theory. Looking at the history, the war implementation was like a testing ground, which inspected the past strategic policies and strategic war theories. It was also like a barometer, which totally reflected the newest movement of military development in a very focused manner and just like the cultivation base, which continuously produced new embryos of strategic thoughts. Therefore, researching and developing strategic theories must pay attention to the war implementation, which included the past wars and modern wars. Only this way, it is possible to win the battle of tomorrow with accurate and potent strategic guidance and promote continuous development in the strategic theory.

**Subsection Two. Strategic theories are developed through the historical progression of social reforms. The birth of new social relationships and the emergence of new social forces have great facilitating functions on the development of strategic theories.**

War is a product of privatization. It is the highest form of struggle, which solves the conflicts amongst classes, nations, countries, and political groups. It is the continuation of politics through different means. Strategy is formed and developed through fierce struggles amongst different classes, and intense crashes amongst political powers. Historically, every political revolution had its unique presentation on military strategic thoughts and the force of a new class had important impact to strategic thoughts. Whenever new social relationships started to sprout, the force of a new class stepped on to the historical stage and the society underwent large reforms. It would bring prosperity, development, and great breakthrough to the strategic theories. For example, Chun-qiu Warring States era was the time that our country moved from the slavery system to the feudal system. At that time, the new born feudal class made bold military reforms and was creative in their realization of political demands, which quickly made Chinese ancient strategic theories prosperous and mature. The development of productivity relationship of the capitalistic class and the rise of the capitalistic class revolution broke the feudal system and the shackles of the religions and theologies. It also broke through the depressed and fruitless situation of several hundred years in the middle centuries. The French revolution liberated the large amount of farmers from their reliance on feudal land. Thus it fostered the scarifying spirit of the masses to defend their fatherland, which made the creation of Napoleon’s war system and strategic theory possible. From which came the strategy, which was based on the concentrated, massive, quick, fierce, and sudden attack and bold military initiative. Lenin indicated with great enthusiasm that the masses of the French revolution displayed great creative spirit; changed the entire strategic system; abolished the old rules of war; created new methods of war. The proletariats belonged to the class with the most advanced and rich with revolutionary and creative spirit in the history. Marx indicated, “The liberation of the proletariats will have their own chance of military performance.” After the birth of Marxism, the strategic theory gained great development and thorough reforms, which fully illustrated this point. The scientific view of the world of Marxism is like sunlight, which lit up the territory of military science and established the military strategy theory on the scientific basis of historic materialism. It was because of this that it has become a true science. Marx’s strategy, which was related to the people’s war principles, active defense, and concentrated forces, etc. possessed a very special meaning in the history of strategic development. Mao Ze-dong’s military thoughts, which related to his brilliant discussions of strategic issues and the ingenious and skillful application of strategies in the Chinese revolutionary war, became a brilliantly dazzling jewel in the field of strategic theories.

**Subsection Three. The development of strategic theories was based on the premise of the productivity and the possibility of supplying war materials due to this productivity. The development of productivity, the great advancement of the science and technology in particular, is the propeller, which allowed the creativity of the strategic theories and made it advance by leaps and bounds**.

Any war cannot depart from economic conditions. “The victory of violence is based on the production of weapons. The production of weapons is based on entire productivity. Thus, the materialistic resource of violence relies on ‘economic power’ and ‘economic conditions’.” The entire history of the development of strategic theories illustrated that the economy is the origin of the development of strategic thoughts. Engels said, “Nothing relies on the economic premise than the army and navy. Equipment, formation, organization, tactics and strategy, must first rely on the level of productivity and the conditions of transportation.” In the agricultural and manual trade industry era, the war tactics were rather backward due to the individual labor as the trait of social productivity and low productivity level of social materialistic resources. The space of war was narrower, which restricted the time, space, and vision of the strategists. Thus, the connotation volume of the strategy in this period was smaller. In the big industrial era, the rapid development of social productivity truly made the human history becoming the world history, which brought big changes to the military. This way, the military strategists in the capitalistic countries had broken through the skylight of the military strategic thoughts. They tried hard to expand to overseas and to the wide-open space. Compared to the simplistic value on land by the feudal society, they placed more value on resources and markets. This gave the needs and materialistic protection to the development of capitalistic strategic theories. The emergence of the strategic thoughts, such as the “naval supremacy,” “air supremacy,” “mechanized war theory,” and “all out war,” etc., reflected the need to expand the capitals. They were also developed on the basis of modern science and technologies and the development of mechanized weapons and equipment, such as war ships, airplanes, tanks, etc. After World War II, nuclear technology became the major factor, which impacted the changes of the strategies in every country in the world and many nuclear strategic thoughts emerged. After the 1980s, the rapid and fierce development of advanced technology changed the face of the human social life, which included the military field. The characteristics of the advanced weapons, such as high concentration of science and technologies, heavy investment, and large consumption, had further intensified the military’s reliance on the economy and science and technologies. The competition of the military increasingly became more of a competition of national power. Thus, to eagerly elevate the combined power of a nation has become the focus of many countries’ strategic thoughts.

**Subsection Four. The nature of the strategic theory is like the art of playing ‘go’ of the politics and military. The structure of political and military struggles deeply impacted on the development of strategic theories**.

The strategic plan possesses the characteristics of opposition and playing ‘go’. The method of opposition and the set up on the ‘go’ game will affect the birth and growth of strategic theories, contents, and methods. The ancient Chinese was geographically in relatively sealed situations. During its long history, various internal political forces or divisions of powers of the Chinese nationalities had many ups and downs; they fought to grapple the powers. The final conclusion was that they were trying to solve the problems of unification and consolidation of their political powers. On this land, there was constant ‘together long enough, they split up; split up long enough, they get together’. This richness and changeable quality of the structure of the political and military struggles undoubtedly had contributed greatly to the formation and changes of the Chinese strategic theories. China had long brewed the intimidating strategy of ‘victory without a fight,’ the alliance strategy of ‘to ally with forces, which oppose to our enemies,’ the military strategy of ‘regular or irregular, which generate strength,’ and the strategic thought of ‘secure the center and strengthen the border area.’ Outside of China, after the capitalism had connected the world into one entity, the world structures, such as the Frankfort system, Versailles-Washington system, and Yalta system, etc., all had great impact on the development of strategic theories. Especially, starting in the 1940s, the world strategies, guided by the bipolar confrontation of the ‘Yalta structure’, had persisted for almost half a centuries. The ‘deterrent strategy’ and “**surpass the** deterrent theory” (phonetic) of the United States were deeply branded by this structure. Entering the 1990s, the bipolar structure broke up. The international strategies had generally moved toward the tendency of multipolar structures. But there was a big loss in the balance of international strategic powers, which was reflected in the military unilateralism (phonetic), the strategy of ‘absolute superiority,’ and the strategy of ‘absolute security.’

**Subsection Five.** The strategic theories possess the continuity and inheritance of the historical and cultural traditions. Each nation’s cultural traditions, especially those deeply ingrained in the national cultural psychology, will have deep and far influence on the developmental processes of strategic theories**.**

From the historical perspective, the development of strategic theories had experienced the processes from simple to scientific, from confusion to precision, from fragmentary to systematic, from generality to specific. But the strategic theories do not come from one source. The strategic theory of each nationality and country possesses unique characteristics from the very beginning due to the differences of cultural backgrounds, geographical environments, social systems, and historical traditions, etc. They will continue to remain different. The influence of each national culture on the strategic theory, Firstly, is represented on the orientation of the strategy. For example, China has 5000 years of uninterrupted history of civilization, which formed a very unique cultural heritage of the nation. The Confucianists advocated kindness and self-discipline. The Taoists advocated gentility and plain living. The Mohists advocated working hard and enduring hardship and honesty. The military specialists advocated grabbing power and developing strategies. The political strategists of the Warring States era advocated being careful about time and assessing the situations. The Legalists School advocated agriculture and war education.(phonetic). They all had made great impact to the development of Chinese strategic thoughts and strategic culture. The Chinese philosophy of honoring the sameness and valuing the oneness and the 2000 year history of a united nation with multi-nationalities, had made the concept of national unity deeply ingrained in the hearts of the people. The national unity occupied a very important position in Chinese strategic thoughts. Second, is illustrated on the methodology of strategic thoughts. The differences of the philosophical methods of the east and west were the important reasons why their strategic theories possess different characteristics. The premature and well-developed dialectic thought of China and the intellectual brilliance, which was unique in the Chinese culture, made the Chinese strategic theories rich with bright speculative and scheming colors. Mao Ze-dong’s military thoughts naturally belonged to the treasure chest of Marxism. But from the brilliant discussions of his strategic issues in the Chinese revolutionary war, and his unprecedented strategic artistry, we could see the long and continuous traditions of our strategic culture.

# **Footnotes of Chapter 3**

1. Marx and Engels Selected Work, the 3rd Volume, page 122.
2. The Historical Record of Emperors.
3. The Historical Records. The original records of five emperors.
4. Sun Zi “The Art Of War”.
5. The Russian “**Milstein**. (phonetic) etc: “The Discussion Of Military Science Of The Capitalists.” Shanghai People’s Publishing Firm. Published in 1959. Page 12.
6. Marx and Engels’ “ Military Literary Works”, The 1st Volume, age 363.
7. Marx and Engels’ Whole Works. Volume 20. The People’s Publishing Firm. Published in 1971, Page 362.
8. The American, **John Collins’** (phonetic) “Big Strategy**”,** TheChinese People’s Liberation Army Military Science Institute. Published in 1978, Page 5.
9. The Russian, **Milstein**(phonetic), etc. “The Discussion of Military Science Of The Capitalists.” Shanghai People’s Publishing Firm, Published in 1959, Page 31.
10. Marx and Engels’ “Military Literary Works” The 1st Volume, Page 187.
11. The American, **John Collins’** (phonetic) “Big Strategy”, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Science Institute. Published in 1978, Page 10.
12. The Swiss, **Romney** ‘(phonetic) “The General Discussions of Military Art” The Liberation Army Publishing, Published in 1986, Page 87.
13. Taken from the Peng Guang-qien’s edited “The Selected Foreign Military Famous Works.” Military Institute Publishing Firm. Published in 2000, Page 239.
14. “Lenin’s Selected Works” The 2nd Volume, People’s Publishing. Published in 1972, Page 673.
15. The Prussian, Clausewitze, “The War Theory”, The 1st Volume, The General Chief of Staff Publishing, Published in 1964, Poage 78.
16. The Prussian, Clausewitze “The War Theory”, The 2nd Volume, The General Chief of Staff Publishing, Published in 1964, Page 476.
17. The Prussian, Clausewitze, “The War Theory”, The 2nd Volume, The General Chief of Staff Publishing, Published in 1964, Page 233.
18. The American, Mahan, “Naval Supremacy”, Liberation Army Publishing, Published in 1998.
19. The Russian, **Milstein**(phonetic), etc. “The Discussion of Military Science Of The Capitalists.” Shanghai People’s Publishing Firm, Published in 1959, Page 119.
20. The Russian, **Milstein**(phonetic), etc. “The Discussion of Military Science Of The Capitalists.” Shanghai People’s Publishing Firm, Published in 1959, Page 157.
21. Transposed from “The Basic Situations Of The American Military” Military Science Publishing, Published in 1985, Page 23.
22. The Russian, **Sokolovsky**, (phonetic) edited, “Military Strategy” Soldiers Publishing. Published in 1980, page 432.
23. Referred to the “Chinese Military Encyclopedia” Marx And Engels’ Military Theories, The Separate Volume on Mao Ze Dong’s Military Thoughts” Bao Xi-Xiu’s selected relevant detailes. Military Publishing. Published in 1992.
24. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 695**.**
25. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 695.
26. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 307.
27. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 692 and 693.
28. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 2, Page 318.
29. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 4, Page 355.
30. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 6, Page 404.
31. “People’s Daily”, 1965 September 3rd.
32. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 4, Page 41.
33. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 4, Page 127.
34. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 744 and 745.
35. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 732.
36. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 741.
37. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 2, Page 336.
38. “Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literary Works” Volume 1, Page 719.
39. “Deng Xiao-ping’s “Discussions On National Defense and Military Constructions” Page 60.
40. “Deng Xiao-ping’s “Discussions On National Defense and Military Constructions” Page 98.

**Chapter 4**

**Regulations of Strategic Thought**

Strategic thought is a form of advanced thought, of which the strategy has full grasp of the objective matters. The main body of the thought, based on many factors of strategy for the purpose of forming strategic thoughts, strategic principle, and strategic policy, implements the concept exercise. It is an intersection and melting pot of the military science and the science of thought. It is a science of thought, which is the highest form of reflection on the territory of military art. The strategic thought is the practical application of epistemology and methodology in the military field, which penetrates all phases of the war preparation and war implementation. The true nature of strategic evolvement and development, is the exercise and development of strategic thought. It is a topic selection and creative activity under the big historical background. It is the thought process, which handles the military campaign from the perspective of war guidance. In researching strategic thought and the true nature of strategic thought, the traits, modes, methods, and regulations, are all the new subjects for a more in-depth research on the science of strategy.

**Section 1: The True Nature and Characteristics of Strategic Thought**.

The strategy is a general plan to plan and guide the entire situation of war preparation and war implementation. Its true nature and characteristics also determine the true nature and characteristics of the strategic thought.

**Subsection One. Nature of Strategic Thought**.

**Subsection A. The strategic thought is the highest form of reflection of the science of thought on the territory of the art of war**.

The strategic thought is the highest form of thought process, which determines the strategy and war implementation. It is a total thought process for the field of the art of war to proceed with total planning, implementation of the broad vision policy, and guidance.

The strategic thought reflected a certain level of thought process and is another kind of thinking method. Viewing it from its method, the strategic thought is a broad vision thought with total control and coverage of the entire situation. Although it has levels of high and low, its grasp of the entire situation does not distinguish inside or outside. For example, if the senior military commander is familiar with the entire strategy of the country, he will have a more accurate grasp of the entire situation of the military constructions and war strategy. If the battle commanders are familiar with the entire situations of military constructions and the war strategy, they will have better arrangement for their own troops and execution of their responsibilities. Therefore, all strategic commanders and practitioners need to understand and handle the nature of the strategic thought; increase understanding of the entire situation, and be familiar with strategic thoughts.

Strategic thought, being the highest form of thought process of the territory of the art of war, does not exclude other thought at different levels or forms. On the contrary, it should utilize the good points and achievements of other thoughts so that its own quality can be improved. From the viewpoint of its forms, such as logical thought, thought by form, thought by inspirations, etc., they could be of use in the strategic thought and in elevating the quality of the strategic thought.

**Subsection B. The strategic thought is the reflection on the brain of the war practice on the entire thought process**.

Existing in the decision-making consciousness, the decision of war practice includes the military concept exercise, which includes strategic thought. Viewing the strategic thought as a concept, it does not start operating by itself. It is also not a fixture in the brain of the strategic director. It is a reflection of the war practice and the need of practice, which the war director reflects upon.

>From the origin of the strategic thought, we can say that the strategic thought came from war practice. Separating the strategic thought from the fertile ground of war practice, it is like water without a source or a tree without roots. But, the strategic thought is not a carbon copy of the past war practice and also not merely simple inheritance from the past war guidance. In the initial war practice, after the strategic commander’s brain first came up with the strategic thought, he would integrate the results of his thinking into execution, which will then provide a foundation and starting point for the future strategic thought.

The reflection of war practice on the brain of the entire strategic thought process is a reflection which can have mobility. It is completed during the process of continuous improvement of the main body of strategic thought. The past war practice provided knowledge and experience to the main body of the strategic thought. But it will take the realistic requirement of war practice to add the wings with more drive, flexibility, freedom, and creativity. Of course, the mobility of the main body of thought cannot separate from the intense restriction of implementation. The results of thinking away from the movement of the main body of the thought will be deeply branded by the time.

**Subsection C. The quality of strategic thought will influence the qualities of strategic guidance and war practice**.

Thought reflects practice, but the objective of thought is to guide practice. In order to plan and practice war from its entirety, the war commander needs to do so through strategic thinking and the results of this thought.

The strategic thought is a process. This thought process is the concrete thinking process of the war commander. For example, the war commander needs to judge the situation, firm up his strategic goals and strategic principle, devise the strategic plan, implement strategic policy, plan military forces construction, and implement the principles of its application.

Under the condition of war, he has to take care of each direction of the war, the relationships of various stages of the war, and the succession of past responsibilities and current responsibilities. In processing the above strategic plan, the quality of strategic thought will greatly impact and decide the correctness of strategic guidance. The low quality of thought will cause errors on the strategic guidance, and lose the initiative, which bring grave consequences, such as defeat to the war.

**Subsection Two. Characteristics of the strategic thought**.

**Subsection A. The wholeness.**

The war as a whole consists of many elements. This can decide the commander ‘s thinking method, which should be equipped with a broad vision, and be synthesized and whole. He should emphasize the connection and coordination between individual departments and elements. The military opposition does not limit itself to the military field but could extend to a wider arena, such as politics, economy, science and technology, culture, and diplomacy, etc. The strategic thought should also include these contents. In the ancient war history, the individuality of the strategic thought was more prominent. In the modern war, the colonial and social aspects have greatly increased. Moreover, the alternating war or peace and the fashion of the existing peace are also problems of wholeness. It requires the strategic director during the processes of strategic decision-making and strategic guidance to combine both and implement the thinking in a coherent manner.

**Subsection B. Opposition characteristic.**

War is the highest form of enmity and opposition of two enemies. It is the competition of their forces of materials and spirit. Therefore, in the activities of strategic thoughts, one has to always raise questions from the opposite side, based on the conditions of the military forces and its applications. Then look at your own realistic situations and think about the thought of how to oppose the enemy. The commanders of both sides will think about their strategic thoughts, which is also a form of opposition. The competition of strategic thought, is the competition of the policy determination and wisdom. This competition will pierce through the entire process of strategic thought from the beginning to the end.

**Subsection C. Certainty**.

War is a very special social phenomenon, it is a big system with high complexity, which possesses many changeable elements, false impressions, and rich with corresponding changes. The target of strategic thought, is full of uncertainty and accident. Especially the enemy situations and the development of the battle situations are hard to grasp with precision. But the main body of the thought cannot allow the results of strategic thought to become fuzzy due to its difficulty. The strategic thought should start from imprecise status and end with a clear and certain conclusion. Strategic thought cannot depart from the thought of theory and careful decision. However, the logical reasoning must be based on uncertain realities, so that conclusion with certainty can be decided. The strategic thought without certainty loses the meaning of strategic thought, which made it impossible to follow the proper method and path of war guidance. War strategy cannot stay at a swaying state of “Maybe it is this way or maybe it is the other way.” The action should get started by selecting one central focus from many possibilities and selecting one plan from many optional plans. Of course, war is rich with complexity and change. The strategic thought should maintain certain flexibility, and recognize, adjust, and solve the new situations and new problems, which emerged from the territory of strategic thought.

**Subsection D. Forward-looking characteristic**

The forward-looking characteristic of the strategic thought is a developmental form of military science of thought. All the accomplishments of the ancient or modern Chinese and foreign famous strategic thoughts have reflected this anticipation and preposition. The forward-looking trait of the strategic thought is the origin of the mobility of the strategic thought. If the strategic thought lacks the element of forwardness, it loses the value of practice guidance. The big errors made on the predictions of future situations of war had brought life-long regrettable defeats to many strategists in history. Therefore, it is required to accurately or near accurately reveal the future developmental process; demand the main body of thought to rely on various historical and current relevant factors; use all the wisdom and decisiveness, and devise the plan for future war. Those anticipation and preposition by the likes of fortunetellers could bring grave danger. Only by realistically starting out from the scientifically forward-looking thought, can a path be opened for successful strategic guidance

**Subsection F. Characteristic of inheritance**

To a certain degree the strategic thought reflects on the traditional concepts and characteristics of thought formed under the influence of different national characteristics, geographical environment, production methods, cultural background and the social political structure. Traditional strategic thought is a unique method of strategic thought, which was formed under little by little accumulation of traditional culture. It is a habitual methodology, which is formed under the sublimation of history, culture, and experience. Accompanying the development of time, the strategic thought is also developing. But no matter how it has been developed, strategic thought, more or less, carries the mark of tradition.

**Section Two: Formula of Strategic Thought**

The formula of strategic thoughtis the main body of strategic thought process, which has embodied the relatively stable characteristics of method and pattern. Starting the analysis of the formula of strategic thought to research the active characteristics of the main body of strategic thought is helpful to the scientific study of the inheritance of the ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign, strategic thoughts in its entirety. It could better grasp the objective regulations of the strategic thought.

**Subsection One. From the nature of strategic thought, the strategic thought can be divided into objective strategic patterns and subjective strategic patterns**

The objective strategic thought started out from the real war and is an objective thought process, which reflects the war and the objective regulations of the strategy. This thought follows the internal regulations of the development of matters and combined the general meaning and experience, which went through a reality check. The content of the thought is objective. It is a true reflection of the situations of the objective target. In the history of war, any war guidance, which won victory, is the result of objective strategic thought.

The subjective strategic thought started out from subjective volition of the strategic thought process. Using the thought process, which is mainly based on what we possess in the brains, such as, data and experience, to make strategic judgment and policy, such thought content could be too subjective and unilateral. The so-called discussing military matter on paper, is a display of this kind of thought pattern. Wan Ming’s “leftist” leaning adventurism was the most typical of this kind of subjective thought. They had neglected the reality that the Chinese revolutionary war was in low ebb, and mistakenly thought that the Chinese revolution was at high tide and demanded the Red Army to fight big regular wars, which brought disastrous consequences to the land revolutionary wars. At the early stage of the Korean War, the United States ignored the condemnation and serious declaration of the Chinese government, believing that the Chinese would not or dared not to participate in the Korean war, and decided boldly to attack toward the north. This kind of unilateral subjective strategic thought pattern brought wrong judgment and failure to the war activities. The war experiences proved that the subjective strategic thought seldom made correct strategic judgment. It is one thought pattern that we should try hard to avoid.

**Subsection Two. Based on the openness of the thought, the strategic thought can be divided into closed strategic thought pattern and opened strategic thought pattern**

The closed strategic thought relies on experience and traditions. It does not automatically exchange information with the outside world or exchange very little information with the outside world in their war and strategic research. The closed strategic thought often looks for counter measures from experiences during a sudden and rapid change of situations. But this thought pattern often would instinctively resist the thing from outside, and leaning toward organizing, verifying, explicating, and interpreting the theories of people in history. The approach mostly follows certain fixed directions and moves forward or backward along it, which restricts thinking and suffocates creative spirit.

The opened strategic thought is the one, which can exchange information timely with the outside world. It is a thought pattern, which is good at adjusting to new situations and rich with vitality to replace the old thinking method. The main body of this thought pattern, no matter vertical or horizontal, will exchange information with the guest body and proceed with comparisons in either direction. In the present information age, there is information at any time and any place. Therefore, it is only possible to obtain a scientific conclusion by broadly and accurately handling the information from all directions and conduct vertical and horizontal comparison, analysis, and in-depth research. The opened strategic thought defeats the narrow-mindedness of the “Yeh-lang’s braggadocio” and the ignorance of being a “frog in the well.” It enhances the openness of the strategic thought. It is also good at catching the changes of information; adept at absorbing the past achievement of the science of strategy; good at accepting the past successful experiences, and makes war into an opened system to proceed with thinking. Through exchanges of information with the outside world, it has strengthened the vitality of the thought and allowed the forming of correct strategic judgments and decisions.

**Subsection Three. Through different recognition of the application of power of the main body of the thought, the strategic thought can be divided into scheming type of strategic thought pattern and power type of strategic thought pattern**

The scheming type of thought values victory through the use of wisdom. The power type of thought values victory through the use of force. The Chinese traditional strategic thoughts always pieced together by the thoughts of using the schemes to win victories. They tried to use limited forces to win victories in the wars or achieve the objectives of the wars. The thought, “The better military wins by strategy,” was valued by the Chinese traditional strategic thought. The traditional Chinese strategic thought believed in, “Not to use the soldiers to win the world” and pursued the ideal situations, such as “Defeat the enemy without fighting,” and “ Use the strength and virtue to succumb the opposition, use the strategy to defeat the enemy.” The traditional Chinese strategic thought also valued martial virtue; advocated the “Just war,” and opposed to a war which was not just.

The western strategic thought is more concerned about the competition of real force, and emphasizes the opposition of forces. Clausewitz’ “The Theory Of War” was a typical work of the western power type pattern of strategic thought. “Unlimited Violence Theory” was its theoretical ground stone. Despite his emphasis on the wisdom of the commanders and the use of strategies and tactics, but from its entirety, focus on the forces was the key.

The modern American strategy is a typical power type of strategic thought pattern. It uses the superiority of real military forces as its foundation and stresses more the competition of military forces and weapons. From the Independence War to prior to the Korean War, the United States military basically is practicing the “Fire power consumption theory,” which is a theory of forces against forces. After the Korean War, especially the Vietnam War, the American military went through changes on its strategic thought. They attempted to integrate the wisdom of Sun Zi and the opinions of Clausewitz into one and moved from the emphasis on force alone to emphasis on both forces and strategy. When the Americans made a final conclusion of the Gulf War, despite its talking with relish about the application of Sun Zi strategy, in fact, the American military have not totally stayed away from their emphasis on the traditional pattern of force and technology.

**Subsection D. Based on the extent of the reliance of strategic thought on experience and traditions, strategic thought can be divided into conservative type of strategic thought pattern and innovative type of strategic thought pattern**

Conservative type strategic thought is starting out with experience and is a thinking habit using habits and traditions as the references in the thought process. This thought is based on the similarity of things as its foundation. It is based on the similarity and commonality of two situations, by using the past experience as guide it makes inference on the direction of development or trend of another situation. Thus, it allows the prediction on the trend of war development. Although history never repeats itself, there is certain similarity. When the situation is very similar to the past situation, the use of past experience is still one quick way to solve the problem. But this thought process often suffers from the bias that the first impression is more lasting than the others. It refuses to accept new things and has an impact on the understanding of the nature of the matter and its regulations. It brings restrictive, symbolic, subjective, unilateral, and conservative attitudes to the thought. There are plenty of examples which could show us that by accepting the past war experience as a guide for the next war, had brought many defeats.

For example, during World War II, the French were so enamored by their successful trench warfare of World War I in their historical experience, they practiced the passive defense strategy and relied on their national security solely on the 400 kilometers long Marginot Line near its border with Germany. When the German troops took a circuitous path of the Marginot Line and attacked by crossing the Ardon Mountain (phonetic) at the Belgium border, the 3 million strong French army collapsed in a matter of one and a half months.

The innovative strategic thought can be called as the type of strategic thought looking for something different or the open up type of strategic thought. It is a thought pattern which uses new perspectives, new routes, and new possibilities to seek the best solution of the strategic problems. The outstanding characteristics of this thought are its building on the past results of people’s thoughts as foundation and forms for new discovery and proposing new views. The innovative strategic thought can systematize, theorize, and regularize the experience and reflects deeper and broader the inner nature of the war and actively guides the war effort.

**Subsection E. Based on the depth and width of the understanding of the main body of the thought, strategic thought is divided into single type strategic thought pattern and system type strategic thought pattern**

Single type strategic thought is the kind that, from the system of war with multi-elements, multi-connections, multi-changes, multi-functions, multi-trends, only one specific element was chosen, following one direction, one thought perspective, and one logical principle to think about the problems and developed into one strategic thought. The outstanding characteristics of this thought pattern are that it has strong direction, and a clear and precise target. For the kind of war, which has clear and simple situations, using single thought direction and perspective to ponder the problems is enough to defeat the enemy. But this kind of thought often displays the absolute and simplified manner of understanding the problems, which can make the lively battlefields fixative and lead to superficial, unilateral, and absolute conclusion.

System type strategic thought is starting out from the multi-dimensional relationships of the war and its “intermediary,” It is moving along multiple thought directions, multiple thought starting points, selecting multiple thinking paths, to thinking on its entirety, historically, in solving the problems. It is a thought pattern, which analyzes the combination of each element, part, and dimension of the war and makes scientific generalization and correct decision. In other words, it treats the war as an organic whole by making a combined inspection of all composites of the system and assuring the efficacy of the entire system. This thought demands higher quality of the main body, which is more beneficial in deeper understanding of the nature of war and grasping the regulations and the entire trend of the war development. That is, to systematize the fragmented pieces, rationalize the experience of practice, elevate things to profoundness from superficiality, and achieve total understanding with more objectivity and accuracy. The system type of thought is beneficial in controlling the entire situation, forming the plan in mind, selecting good policy, and assuring victory. Under the new historical condition, the characteristics of mutual connections between all elements of the war are quite prominent. It has also displayed characteristics, such as broad involvement, heavy reliance, and strong developmental nature. The objective requirement of the strategic thought should pay attention to its connectivity, systematization, conformity, and adopt more of the systematic thought.

**Section Three: Methods of Strategic Thought**

The methods of strategic thought are seen when the main body of strategic thought is guiding the war, the pattern and methods of understanding, and grasping all aspects of the problems of the war. The difference in the methods of strategic thought directly display the depth of understanding of the objective situations of the field of war. It directly influences the nature and extent of the functions that the military decisions have on the process and conclusion of the war. Aside from following the science of thought and general scientific methods of thought, strategic thought has some other methods, these methods are:

**Subsection one. Method of broad-vision plan.**

The greatest characteristics of the strategic thought are its entirety and its broad-vision traits. Thinking from broad-vision and grasping the problems are the most important method of strategic thought. The method of broad-vision planning is that the main body of strategic thought standing at the front edge of the time, looking from the advantageous ground of the entire strategic situation, using far-reaching and a broad field of vision to inspect the war. This method of thought has three requests from the main body of the strategic thought:

First, one must have full understanding of the entire situation. One must have some idea as to the international strategic structure, the world military developmental situations, especially, the situations of his country, situations of the military, and fighting power. “One who does not strategize for the whole situation, will not be able to strategize for a small area.” If the main body of war lacks a broad-vision view, he will see the trees but not the forest. He will see the river but not the ocean, which could lead to errors in decision-making. Second, one must stand of the advantageous ground of the entire situation and fully research and understand the structure and characteristics of the entire strategy for both sides and then plan the strategy and plot the tactics by grasping the enemy’s weakness and aiming at the most vulnerable point of their crucial strategic links.

Third, one must be good at grasping the big situation and make timely basic judgments. War and strategic research is a big system program, which combines the false and true elements. This research requires concrete quantitative research and experimental verification and requires broad-vision qualitative analysis. The broad-vision qualitative analysis must be timely and accurate in order to grasp the key points and make the final decision.

**Subsection Two. Method of historical deduction**

History does not repeat itself but it will not be stopped. The movement regulation of strategic thought is contained in the historical changes. Historical deduction method is a thought method, which discovers the general regulations and method from history and researches and applies them under new conditions.

Historical deduction method contains content in two areas: First, it values the analysis of the military practice activities of the strategists and searches for the thought method that war guidance director should have mastered. From the entire military history, there were many brilliant strategists. Based on their needs, on one hand, they assembled the past successful experiences; on the other hand, they supplemented and expanded them. Napoleon carefully studied the wars of Alexander, Hannibal, Cesar, Gustav, and Frederick, etc. He used them as his models and combined the new thoughts from wars, such as those new strategies and tactics from the military science of the capitalists, especially those from the French capitalistic revolutionary war, and developed them into fairly complete form. Second, it values the analysis of typical war examples and concludes with general regulations and then combines these regulations with the reality and uses them. The historical deduction method demands the main body of strategy must be adept at “getting rid of the garbage and preserving the choices parts” and form new thought using the traditional experience as a reference. During the second internal revolutionary period, Mao Ze-dong in his writing, “The strategic problems of Chinese revolutionary war,” he, one by one, reviewed the five counter “circle and annihilate” measures. He analyzed the positive and negative sides of those five countermeasures. From the historical deduction and correlation, he found the regulations of the Chinese revolutionary war and obtained the initiative of the war. Our military has acquired rich experiences on strategic thought from the war implementation of several decades and through historical deduction methods that have been incorporated into the modern strategic thought.

**Subsection Three. Method of systems assembly**

The world competition of military field in the present age has been largely reflected on systems assembly. To deal with this change, strategic thought must use systems as its center and master the thought method of system assembly.

Methods of systems assembly is incorporating the results of science of systems to the process of strategic thought. The system is put into the war and investigated, based on the whole; circled the target; and planned for the entire situations. It requires that, while thinking about problems, use the perspective of the system. It always uses the whole and part (elements) of the system; connects the target and structural function and the external environment and the relationships of their mutual effects, investigates the target accurately and when combined reveals characteristics of its regulations, and searches for the best concept model of strategic implementation. To strengthen the consciousness of the whole is the key of using the thought of system. Method of systems assembly, on one hand, demands that we should investigate and research the war within the range of the entire country and the world. On the other hand, it demands that we should understand the war as a whole and absolutely not look at a problem unilaterally, as isolated, and motionless. Otherwise, one will see the trees but not the forest.

**Subsection Four. Method of mathematical inference**

Mathematics is a great tool which is used to understand the nature, society and human life and helps to create the materialistic and spiritual cultures. Marx said, a course can only be considered to be complete when mathematics is successfully applied. The use of the method of mathematics is the leverage and the bridge that allows science to go from the descriptive science to the “precision science.” It provides strategic thought with a tool of an abstract and logical inference.

Many brilliant strategists in history had good mathematical training. During the creation period of the capitalist’s military science, the first most typical person is Henry Loyd (phonetic), who highly praised the functions of the method of mathematics used in strategic thought. He even demanded, “Each military officer must know mathematics.” (1) Napoleon was equipped with high mathematical training. He also treated learning mathematics well as the necessary qualifications of being a good soldier.” When Romney (phonetic)was making the summation of the past wars, especially Napoleon’s wars, many times, he used mathematical views to interpret many military topics of discussions. Engels firmly believed, “In order to establish dialectic and, at the same time, the materialistic natural concept, one must be equipped with the knowledge of mathematics and natural science.” Mao Ze-dong’s military works also showed many quantitative analysis of military data.

The war phenomenon is the same with all the things in the world. All nature can be represented by certain quantity, thus, if there is no quantity, there is no quality. Only after effective quantitative analysis of the changes of a war phenomenon, that the understanding of its nature can be deepened and the regulations of the changes from quantity to quality be mastered, thus, achieving the objectives of gaining benefits and avoiding damages. Method of mathematical inference of the strategic thought is a method of using the quantitative analysis, using the numbers as the standards of measurement, and through the collection, organization, calculation and analysis, to proceed with strategic decision-making. This method guarantees the important conditions of reliability and inevitability of the logic of strategic thought.

One important form of mathematical inference is military planning method, which uses mathematical theoretical tools and a calculating method to quantitatively analyze, describe, and operationally plan many elements of the war. It is a kind of scientific method, which masters the nature and regulations of the war from the relationship of combining the quality and quantity. The method of military planning involved the following steps: to identify the problems and goals; design the project of military planning; collect relevant numerical data; develop mathematical models; calculate, analyze, and appraise. The military planning method has been widely used in the modern strategic decisions. Especially, the military of many countries have paid attention to the method of simulation, to verify the strategic concepts and predict the processes and outcomes of military conflicts. It has provided an “experimental” basis for the development and deployment of strategic powers, the distribution of military resources, the establishment of war plans, and the protection of the logistics, etc.

**Subsection Five. Method of movement tracking**

Sun Zi said, “The military is constantly changing its formation, the water is constantly changing its shape.” The war is the opposition of two enemies. Various materialistic factors (power) and spiritual factors (power) of the two antagonists are mutually contradictory and mutually opposite, when they appeared at the battlefield it caused the movement of war. The method of movement tracking is that the main body of strategic thought is controlling the war in movement and it is the method of thinking about the countermeasures during the movement.

The fluidity of war is its important characteristic. The situations of the battlefield are changing rapidly, if one cannot grasp the movement of war, he will not grasp the pulse of war, and it will be difficult to perform correct guidance. The fluidity of the future war under the conditions of advanced technology will be quite special, the flows of people, material, and movement of information increased exponentially. In particular, the information flow becomes the most important resource of the war. The main body of strategic thought handles the quantity and quality of information, thus, the extent of the ability to manage them and the quickness and accuracy in application, to certain significance, determines the success and failure of the strategic operations and the victory and defeat of the war.

The main body of strategic thought in the movement tracking is particularly interested in tracking the thought changes. The Russian and Japanese military confrontation in the Far East from the year 1917 to the year 1945, the military strategic mutual movement had as many as 7 changes. This is the causality of the method of strategic thought. Depend upon the continuous and incessant changes of the situations, the original judgment and determination should be revised and changed.

**Subsection Six. Method of Strategic Opposition**

War is an opposition of powers but it is more of a competition of wisdom. Strategic thought is a thought of countermeasure and the process of the movement of strategic thought. It is also a process of fighting with wisdom and strategies of the main body of strategic thought of the two antagonists. Sun Zi “The Art of War,” said “If one is not aware of the strategies of his vassals, he will not feel comfort in dealing with them.” The strategic thought should be further developed in opposing the enemy’s strategic thought. The opposition of strategic thought demands that the main body of the strategic thought conducts the fight with the enemy with wisdom; infers in the brain about the war; uses the strategy, which is one step better than the enemy’s and guide the strategic actions to victory.

The advancement of technology has made new demands to the application of strategy, at the same time, the technology has added wings to the strategy and allows it to use a broader world. Under modern conditions, the most prominent characteristics of the development of military strategy are, its introduction of many advanced scientific theories, which are equipped with method and significance, and its integration of quantitative and qualitative analysis. The war spiraled up from simple to complex, which prompted military strategy to depart daily from experience and observation. Theoretical illustration and quantified verification have become one of the most important factors of the scientifically developed military strategy.

In the strategic thought, no matter whether it is the analysis of truth and false, the contrast of strong and weak, or the application of regular and irregular approaches, it cannot depart from the guidance of dialectic. But this is not about all of the methods of strategic thought. Even from the ancient military strategies, one could see it has hidden logical method, planning method, mathematical method, etc, and other scientific methods. It is only that these methods in those days appeared to be rather simplistic and immature. From the 20th century, following the incessant deepening of human understanding of objective matter, one after another, various scientific methods have arrived. It is particularly true about the rise of the group of soft science and technology, the core of which is the system’s theory. It has provided the military strategic thought a unique path for new ways of thinking and a new tool for the competition of wisdom. In the future war, it is quite significant that various modern scientific methods would be applied to the strategic thought.

**Subsection Seven. Method of Predicting Ahead**

The method of predicting ahead is a method of thought, standing on the advantageous ground of time, surpassing the limitation of time and space, based on the correct understanding of objective regulations of war, predicting and making judgments accurately on the developing trends of war, so that a scientific decision can be made. This method of thought is based on what Marxism said about the objective regulations that, “Things are developed in a twisted pattern and moving ahead like a wave pattern.” Based on history, i.e., fact, and information, future predicts from part to whole, and from phenomenon to the true nature. It is a reflection and extension of the past and reality. It is also a prediction and creation of the future. The exceeding characteristic is the most prominent characteristic of the method of predicting ahead. This exceeding basically is exceeding the presentational reality, point to the direction of advancement, and predict the future.

The famous ancient military thinker Sun Zi advocated that the war commander must actively surpass others in his prediction of victory. “If prediction of victory is no better than the others, it is not the best of the commander.” In the past, current, and even the future, the theory and practice of military matters are the results of predicting ahead. Early in the beginning stage of the anti-Japanese war, even though facing the Japanese troops with better weapons and equipment, Mao Ze-dong had predicted the final victory would belong to the Chinese not the Japanese. Meanwhile, Mao Ze-dong predicted three developmental stages of the anti-Japanese war. The final results of this war completely proved that Mao Ze-dong’s great predictions were correct. Just like what Lenin said, “Mysterious prediction is merely a myth, scientific prediction is truth.” (2) The future war with advanced technology will be wisdom intensive not technology intensive. The activities of fighting with forces and wisdom will doom to fail if only relying on measures to deal with emergency situations and lacking the power of predicting ahead.

**Subsection Eight. Method of Experiment and Simulation**

The war simulation has long existed. From the 1960s, due to the theories of the science of military planning and systems engineering, the continuous development of computer technology, the war simulation has moved into a new stage with wide application of computers. Borrowing from the simulation technology of the computers, the results of strategic thought could be executed, inspected, and revised inside a laboratory. The strategic plan in the brain could go through “pretended simulation” through the computer technology. The practice of arm-chair type discussions on military affairs, the deployment of troops on a table, the fighting on the net, and the pretended war simulation, could all become good references for determining and revising the strategic plan. Due to the applications of computers and simulations, the strategic research has been moved from the “black box operation” to become simulative and transparent and provides certain experimentation to the strategic thought. Relying on imagination and technology, the strategic thought, to a certain degree, shed the restrictions of reality, simulated the reality in the laboratory, and designed the future with this pretended simulation. Designing future battlefields with this exceeding view will provide new momentum to the strategic thought.

The development of the method of strategic thought not only is directly restricted by the military practical experience, it also has been influenced by the developments of the scientific technological thought and philosophical thought of the time. Different levels of accomplishments of the scientific technological thought and levels of philosophical thought will generate different methods of strategic thought. From the perspective of certain significance, the methods of strategic though of each historical period were influenced by the methods of the scientific technological thought and philosophical thought of the time. It was originated from the references used in the research methods of the scientists and the application of the understanding methods used by the philosophers. The method of thought belongs to the ability to think but it is not a simple matter of thinking ability. It is special method, program, and tactics, of processing the target of thought. The method of thought is a unique element of thinking ability and it is a tool that must be continuously studying, familiarizing, mastering, and applying by the main body of thought. Objectively, the development of military practice demands that the main body of thought combines the use of the methods of strategic thought of the time so that it can actively control the war.

**Section 4: General Rules of Strategic Thought**

The strategic thought is the execution of practical thought, which is for the purpose of achieving the strategic objectives. It pursues and emphasizes the quality of thought and not the form of thought. In order to raise the quality of strategy, we should understand the rules of strategic thought and master those essential, definite, and stable connections of the strategic thought processes. Rules can be divided into general rules and special rules. From their general meaning, it can be said that the rules of strategic thoughts can be shown in the following manner.

**Subsection One. The philosophical basis of strategic thought is its world-view and its methodology**

Any thought activity is affected by the world-view and methodology and will be left with their marks. From the past to present, all the strategic thought activities had their own displays of various world-views and methodology, such as, idealism, simple materialism, simple materialist dialectic, metaphysics, pragmatism, and dialectical materialism, etc. Behind the birth of various strategic thought patterns and thought methods, there are deep philosophical reasons. Various strategic thoughts are merely different expressions of military philosophy.

The philosophy of Marxism is a true reflection of the most general rules of the nature, of society, and of human thought. The philosophy of Marxism as the science of world-view and methodology provided the viewpoint, stand, and method, which are the scientific guides to the execution of strategic thought. The series of methods offered by the philosophy of Marxism are the basic method of strategic thought. As the peoples’ military, under the leadership of Chinese Communists, its nature and purpose determine that the strategic thought must accept the guidance of the world-view and methodology of Marxism. The world-view and methodology of Marxism is the strong foundation in trying to better the thought process, method, quality, and improve the thinking ability. They are necessary elements of the main body of strategic thought. Only by mastering the world-view and methodology of Marxism that it could allow us to stand on the advantageous spot of the thought of the new era and be good at judging the situations and controlling the entire situation. The military domain is currently facing an unprecedented and profound revolution, which makes new and higher demands on the strategic thought. Marxism has always made up-to-date development with the time. This has fully proved the truthful nature of the philosophy of Marxism. It also indicates that there is the need of using the highly intelligent philosophy of Marxism to understand new situations, answer new questions, and to provide the strategic thought and practice with correct direction and guidance.

**Subsection Two. The national security interests and their political relationships restrict the direction of strategic thought.**

The strategic thought as the preparation and practice of war and the thought activities of the establishment and applications of the military forces have always been proceeding under the rules and restrictions of the national security interests and their political relationships. Looking from the relationships between the country and the military, the military is a major part of the country’s political power, the tool of executing the national policies and fulfilling national goals, and the guardian of national interests. This requires the main body of strategic thought to embrace the national interests and develop its own thought practicing activities and let the results of thought better serve the interests of the country. Looking from the relationship between politics and war, the politics is the mother of war; the war is the continuation of politics and is the tactic to achieve political goals. Thus, it has determined that practicing activities of the main body of strategic thought must focus on the politics; serve the politics; and piece it through the politics, from the beginning to the end. Any strategic thought is the proceeding of thought, which embraces security interests must carry bright political colors.

Any main body of thought and its thought practice activities in the field of strategic thought cannot be isolated and aimless. Most of them directly attach to certain country, nation, class, or political group, and are based on the political entity in proposing the security requirements and processing the strategic thought. Some main bodies of strategic thought do not have clear attachment to a political entity, but the results of their strategic thought is always formed under certain political structures and political relationships. It also reflects on the current and future military designs with certain political leaning. From the past to present, the Chinese and foreign strategic thoughts have never departed from the politics. There is no strategic thought, which has not served the political and military struggles.

Countries with different natures will have different security interest requirements; countries at various stages of development, security goals are not all the same. The national security interests and security goals and their developmental changes, restricted the use of strategic thought. The developmental change of politics determines the developmental change of war, and determined the developmental change of strategic thought. The developmental stages of the strategic thought of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have reflected the lively restrictions of security interests and political situations on the strategic thought. In short, in the war days, the people’s army, which shouldered the burden of liberating the country had processed the strategic thought under the banner of armed struggles in grabbing political power. After the establishment of the New China, the people’s army, being the pillar of people’s democracy, had embraced the strengthening of the political power; fulfilling the unification; protecting the national sovereignty and security, and proceeded with the strategic thought.

**Subsection Three. The strength of the strategic thought depends on the practical experience of the main body of the thought, structure of knowledge, and thought method.**

Practice is the source and basis of thought**.** The operation of strategic thought cannot be separated from the practical basis of strategic guidance and the experience data supplied by the practice. Practical experience can be divided into direct and indirect. Direct experience is definitely valuable, but human life is limited, experiences are limited, therefore, in the experience of the main body of thought, the indirect experience could weigh heavier in proportion. In general, if the main body of thought possesses more experiences, more width and depth, it will be beneficial in raising the quality of thought.

The raising of the quality of strategic thought by the knowledge structure of the main body of thought has an important significance. The knowledge structure often containsbasic knowledge, specialized knowledge, and supplementary knowledge. Thought is the collection and application of knowledge. From the view of the main body of thought, it can be said that it could be better to have better basic knowledge, specialized knowledge, and supplemental knowledge. But, comparing the main body of thought with the ocean of knowledge, it is so minuscule in comparison. Even with the whole life spent on it, it will only get to know its small corner. Clausewitz said, “The knowledge required in war must be the knowledge of things that humans should directly deal with in the war.” This demands that the main body of strategic thought embraces its own responsibilities and establishes and improves its own knowledge structure. Knowledge is power, it is also the energy source of thought. A person with limited knowledge of strategy will not be able to produce high quality strategic thought results.

Closely related to the function of knowledge is the ability to use knowledge. In strategic thought, the method of using knowledge sometimes is more meaningful than absorbing knowledge. This method of using knowledge is the method of thought. Method of strategic thought can be affected by philosophical training. In war history, there is an extremely close relationship between strategic guidance and philosophical training. Those military commanders, who fought tirelessly and frequently and planned their strategies incessantly, were all equipped with higher philosophical training. Those commanders, who were so confident of themselves and could not be flexible in their strategic guidance, could not avoid tasting the bitter tastes of defeats for not knowing the philosophy. In history, any famous strategy has possessed profound philosophical inner secrets. For example, Sun Zi’s “The Art of War,” which was created more than two thousand years ago, symbolized the mastering of the dialectic materialism that Sun Zi had forsaken the shackles of fatalism; for the first time moved the strategic thought closer to the truth; realized the first historical leap of the human understanding of war and the national security questions from the simple dialectic method. In the modern era, Clausewitz and others, based on war experiences of the rising materialism, using the weapons of natural science, the enlightenment, and the spirit of dialectic thought. They cracked the religious and theological shackles and began to use scientific brains and methods to explore the war guidance issues, which realized the second historical leap on human understanding of the war issues. The third big leap was started by Marx and Engels’ military theories, which deleted the unscientific elements, such as, mechanical materialism and idealistic historical view, etc. and provided the most reliable stand, view point, and method in inspecting and solving strategic problems with a truly scientific manner. It opened up the path to reveal the truth in its entirety. Mao Ze-dong’s military thought represented the greatest achievement in this big leap. The fact proved that the advanced philosophical thought and the thought method once mastered by the main body of strategic thought, it could fully apply the acquired knowledge and ability and create the miracle of strategic thought. The strategic thought under the conditions of advanced technology could affect this broadly and deeply. If there is no guidance of scientific strategic method, it is impossible to practice the strategic thought decisions successfully.

**Subsection Four. The extent of fierce military opposition and the degree of accuracy of judging the situations can decide the operational rhythm and thought structure of the strategic thought.**

The fierce military opposition is the external propelling power of the strategic thought. The rhythm of the thought is determined by the extent of opposition fierceness. If the opposition is fiercer, the situations change faster. The problems it presented will be sharper, more urgent, and the rhythm of thought activities quicker. The main body of thought must adjust to the quickly changing situations, and search for countermeasures in the rapid thought processing, then it could get away from the difficulty and grasp and master the initiative. Quick rhythm thought processing often shows its prominence in the war era or in the fast and sudden changing situations. If the situation is relatively slow, the rhythm of thought processing will also be relatively slow. The rhythm of thought is connected to the issues of the stability of the thought results. If the situations change rapidly, the rhythm of thought will move faster, which will lower the stability of thought results. If the situation is stable, the thought is in good order and the stability of thought results will be stronger.

But, there is one other situation that exists in the practice of strategic thought. It is the difference which resulted from subjective judgment of a situation. The same situations, some could see the tip of the emerging danger and timely propose a countermeasure. Some could only see relaxation but not the danger with no countermeasure. That is to say that different judgment to a situation could result in different thought conclusions. This demands that the main body of thought not be unilateral; the mind should be awake when the situation is tense; must be adept at knowing the nature from the appearance. It also demands that when the situation is relaxed one should maintain alertness for troubles and the sharpness of the thought; should prevent the laziness of the thought, which could cause big errors when judging a situation.

**Subsection Five. The integration of the results of strategic thought and strategic power is the basic form of realizing the objective of strategic thought**.

The process of strategic thought and the results of the thought belong to the matter of concept form. If the concept form is changed to workable material form and realizes the goals of strategic thought, it must be done through strategic practice.

The process of strategic practice is the process of power construction and application. The most major one is the process of armed forces construction and application.If the strategicpractice will be brought to victory, it requires a military force that can realize the strategic goals. The integration of the results of strategic thought and strategic power is the basic form of achieving the goals of strategic thought.

Strategic thought usually makes demands on the force construction and application and points out the roads and methods of construction and application. But the limits of force construction and application bring restrictions to strategic thought. If the strategic thought proposes a target, which is too tall or too big, the ability of adjustment between construction and application is impossible, which will make the strategic goals impossible to reach. Therefore, in the process of strategic thought, it demands that the feasibility and possibility of the force construction and application be considered.

The important key link of the integration of the results of strategic thought and strategic power is the authority of final decision-making and command, which is the authority based on the construction of the results of strategic thought and the power of application. If there is no such vital link, the result of thought and power will not be unified and the strategic goals not realized. This kind of integration, sometimes, is direct and sometimes, it is indirect. In the Chinese revolutionary war, the reasons why Mao Ze-dong could use his own results of strategic thought and successfully implement them and achieve strategic objectives, was that Mao Ze-dong embodied the political leader, military commander, and military theoretician in himself. He had the conditions to integrate the results of strategic thought, force construction and application together. Of course, it does not mean that the results of those strategic thoughts, which do not have the authority or limited authority, are lacking in significance. If only one result of strategic thought is scientific, if will be picked and inspected by practice. It will be indirectly integrated and achieve the goals of strategic thought. Following the development of war, the increasing complexity of strategic factors, the modern results of the strategic thought become more of a reflection of the results of group wisdom. But, no matter it is individual wisdom or group wisdom, which came up with the results of strategic thought, it will all enter into the final decisions and concrete practice of forced construction and forced application. Only then, the strategic goals can be achieved.

Footnotes:

1.”Capitalist Military Science” Military Science Publishing. Published in 1985, Page 14-15.

2. “ Lenin’s Whole Works” Volume 27, page 462.

**Chapter Five**

**Methods of Strategic Research**

Strategic research is an activity of knowing the strategic field as well as the process of raising, analyzing and solving problems in this field. In order to make our understanding be in accord with objective reality, we must pay great attention to scientific epistemology and methodology. Methods of research on the science of strategy, after all, are scientific methods of correctly understanding strategic issues. Essentially, they belong to the domain of strategic thinking and the methods of comprehension that strategic researchers use to seek the law of development and the law of guidance for the theory of strategy. Methods of strategic research have the functions of guiding, reprocessing and examining. They may lead subjective recognition to develop toward the direction that is in keeping with objective reality. They may reprocess and collate rich material of feeling to discard the dross and select the essential, to eliminate the false and retain the real, to change from this to the other and from the exterior to the interior. They may advance a system of ideas and theories to a rational recognition. In the process of this practice, they may re-think and re-understand the existing recognition so as to examine the accuracy of understanding. As a tool of understanding to explore the law of guidance for strategy, methods of research on the science of strategy are a multi-level methodical system of knowledge. This system is roughly composed of three parts or three levels; namely, the methods of Marxist philosophy, the general methods of scientific research and the specific methods of research on the subject of science of strategy. The methods of Marxist philosophy, also known as dialectical materialism, are in the position guiding the activity of understanding. The general methods of scientific research are applicable in all fields of scientific research and reflect the common law of scientific researches. They specifically apply the methods of Marxist philosophy in the activity of scientific research. The specific methods of research on the subject of the science of strategy have the characteristics strategic research. They are based on the other two to reflect the properties of the special law of understanding and military epistemology and methodology in the strategic field. All methods have their important function of understanding strategic issues and are indispensable bridges carrying out strategic research toward real rational knowledge.

**Section One: Persisting in Following Marxist Philosophy for Guidance**

Marxist philosophy is a scientific summary of general laws of nature and the society. It is a scientific world outlook and methodology that was created firmly based on the development of modern natural sciences and discriminatorily inherited the fruits of mankind’s all excellent historical thinking and thoroughly apply them to the historical field. It is a unity of sciences and revolution, a unity of theory and practice and a unity of Marxist stands, viewpoints and methods. It is a revolutionary, scientific and practical philosophy. It has the universal significance of guidance for correctly recognizing and reforming the world. Undoubtedly, it is also the scientific guidance that strategic research must comply with.

The degree that the field of understanding needs the methods of philosophy is in a positive ratio to the complexity of its targets. In military practice, the special complexity caused by high political nature, huge risk, sharp antagonism, and change and uncertainty of strategic environment makes the field of strategic understanding full of “mist.” We must rely on telescope and microscope to get a true vision through the “mist” since it is not enough to do it merely by our native eyes. “The Marxist methods are political and need a military telescope and microscope” (1) Being the basic methods for the universal tenet of scientific understanding and scientific thinking, the Marxist philosophy provides the sharpest ideological weapon of thinking from the highest theoretical level for strategic research to point out the accurate approach to clean the mist and eliminate the obstacles to let understanding most profoundly touch the essence of the problems of war and strategy. “We will be more and more close to objective truth when marching along the road of the Marxist theories; we will get nothing else but confusion and mistakes if we take any other road.“(2)

Persisting in following Marxist philosophy for guidance to study strategy requires us to uphold the most fundamental stands, viewpoints and methods of Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Marxist philosophy theoretically expounds the basic viewpoint of practice first, the basic law of unity of opposites and the basic principle of the broad masses creating history. It also centers on military dialectics to unveil Marxist military philosophy, featuring a series of contradictions, such as war and peace, attack and defense, advantage and disadvantage, active and passive, whole and local, internal and external, sustained and quickly decided, concentrated and dispersed, false and real, and irregular and regular; as well as the law of movement of antagonist unity, mutual reliance and transformation, and acting and interacting with each other. Marxist philosophy has fully, dialectically, objectively, systematically, expansively, specifically and with connectivity analyzed strategic issues and provided a golden key to open the gate of strategy. It is “one of the important methods used by a revolutionary party to accurately decide its political and military guiding principles for strategy and tactics.“ (3)

Persisting in following Marxist philosophy for guidance to study strategy demands of us to steadfastly uphold the Marxist outlook on war. Outlook on war is mankind’s general outlook and basic viewpoint on war, as well as the starting point of studying the issues of war and strategy. Compared with all others, Marxist outlook on war most scientifically, correctly and profoundly answers a series of basic questions of war, such as its root, essence, development and extinction and the attitude toward war, which is one of the most valuable parts of Marxist philosophy. First, as Marxist outlook on war believes, all conflicts in history are the result of the contradiction between productive force and the form of contract. War does not come naturally nor exists constantly. It originates from the fight of economic interests and ends in the withering away of class society. War will eventually retreat from the historical arena along with the death of private ownership and classes, but before then, as long as there are roots and risks of war, we should never hold any peaceful illusion that “the world is pacific.” Second, war is a behavior of brutality and a continuation of politics through violent means. Politics affects and controls all aspects of war, and war is always subordinated to politics. No matter how the modern means of war develops, including the emergence of nuclear arms and information weapons, no way and possibility are there to change the political property and brutal essence of war. The theoretical view of war, including the so-called “theory of mercifying war,” “theory of non-violent war,” “theory of non-military war” and “nuclear war is no longer the continuation of politics,” are ill-founded. Third, wars are divided into righteous wars and unrighteous wars. Their nature is determined by their impact on the development of society. Wars promoting progress of society and further liberating productive force and being people‘s, revolutionary and anti-aggression in nature are righteous wars; those hindering advancement of society, killing new productive force, and being aggressive, expansionist and predatory in nature are unrighteous wars. We do not indiscriminately support or oppose all wars, but we do uphold righteous wars and discard unrighteous ones. Fourth, the broad masses of people participating in wars decide the destiny of wars. The people’s war developed for the basic interests of people in that they conscientiously take part is a genuine revolutionary war. People’s war is the magic of foiling foreign invasions and defeating all reactionary forces.

(1) “Selected Works of Mao Zedong” vol. I, People’s Press, 1991 Edition, p. 212

(2) “Selected Works of Lenin” vol. II, p. 143

(3) “Selected Works of Mao Zedong” vol. I, People’s Press, 1991 Edition, pp. 326 - 327

**Section Two: Comprehensively Applying General Methods of Scientific Research**

The general methods of scientific research are a system of methods of understanding that mankind has gradually formed and accumulated and has been proven to be effective in a long practice of knowing and reforming the world. They are tools of common property in the activity of scientific research. Before the emergence of Marxist philosophy, the methods of scientific research were limited to the theories of natural philosophical methods represented by Aristotle and the theories of analytical methods represented by the classic dynamic school. Along with the great improvement and theoretical synthesis of natural sciences and the generation and dissemination of Marxist philosophy, the methods of scientific research have entered the era of comprehensive thinking. The general methods of scientific research are a specific application of Marxist philosophy in the field of scientific research. They have universal adaptability and important practical value to developing strategic research.

The general methods of scientific research are a group of methods of which the most adopted ones in strategic research mainly include the method of induction (which is the method of elevating from individual analysis and comparison to general reasoning), the method of deduction (which is the method of guiding cognition from general to individual and from whole to partial), the method of analogy (which is the method of analyzing the identical or similar aspects of two things to infer the identity and similarity in their other parts), and the method of mathematics (which is the method of judging the possible development of a thing by the regularity of its quantity). In addition, in the field of modern strategic research, the following specific methods are more and more applied:

**I. Method of System Analysis**

System, composed of certain mutually connected elements functioning and relying on each other, and sub-systems, is an organic whole having specific performance when placed in a certain environment. System analysis is an operation of systematic thinking of basic problems through modeling, optimization and comprehensive appraisal of the system to select the possibly adopted programs to provide a reliable basis for policy-makers. Modern warfare and military struggle are a large system competing between two opposing systems. Using this method to study strategic issues means that we treat the whole situation of war as an organic whole to fully grasp the mutual connection, mutual influence and mutual restriction among the elements inside the system and between the system’s interior and exterior environments. After doing this, we conduct kinetic analysis of the viewpoints of development and those of the system and fully observe the internal connection and transformation of the elements that most affect the war to find the essence of military problems and the law of military movement through the numerous and complicated military outward appearances. Then, in the many contradictions, we find out the nature of decisive problems and the major contradiction and select the best of all kinds of feasible programs to make the most optimized decision of strategy.

**II. Method of Statistics Analysis**.

This method is a method of scientific research which first collects data through survey to get the concept of quantity by conducting classification calculation according to the quantity specifications and show them in the form of numbers and then look for the internal connection of things and their law of development. In ancient China, there were abundant practices of statistical skills. Such as recorded in “Zhou Yi” that “the ancient China governs by knotting a rope,” which emphasizes that the method of statistics being an important tool for political domination. Also recorded in “Ying Cheng Shu Qi,” “Three thousand people ascended. Hurrah!” It was the government statistics of the Shan Dynasty on the recruit of temporary soldiers. As pointed out by Lenin, statistics is one of the most powerful weapons to know the society. Of course, it is also one of the powerful weapons to understand the law of war and the guidance of strategy. The US militarist Dupuyee (phonetic) analyzed over 600 cases of historical campaign combats and recorded 90 items of data in each case to build a sizable data bank of land wars and studied and calculated the formula of experience of the troops’ actual combat strength based on the analysis of this data. During the Liberation War in China, Mao Zedong statistically analyzed the new situation of the change of strength between the two fighting sides after the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign. While the total enemy force had reduced from 4,300,000 to 2,900,000 and ours grown from 1,200,000 to 3,000,000, he concluded that the PLA had superiority not only in quality but also in quantity, thereby he revised the original strategic goal of defeating the KMT in five years, to overthrowing its rule in just one year. This was a famous example of using statistical analysis to assist decision-making. Structurally, this method can roughly be divided into descriptive statistics and deductive statistics. The former is for the purpose of describing and showing a group of data, which is in the nature of reports, while the latter is the higher stage of the former as it strives to expound on the trend of development of certain activities and outward appearances. The latter is more used for strategic research.

**III. Method of Comparison Research**

Comparison is a method of logical thinking which conducts contrast analysis on a certain type of thing to determine the different or identical points among them. Difference and identity among things are the objective basis of the method of comparison. Comparison can generate differentiation and can find the essential identify in things. On the surface, they are greatly different; likewise, the essential difference in things that are greatly identical on the surface. Thus, comparative thinking includes the thinking to look for identity and the thinking to look for difference. Comparison has been widely applied to all fields of modern scientific research and is also quickly infiltrating into the military field to form such specific subjects as comparative military philosophy, comparative military history and comparative military policy. Application of the method of comparison in strategic research may intensify the thinking of strategy to create new points of strategic excitement. It may also widen our vision through contrast to deepen the recognition of strategy. It may search for the trace of the development of strategy and its future trend through the reading of history so as to reveal the law of war and the law of strategy guidance on a wider background of strategy. As one form of comparative study, the contrast of world military powers has become a habitual practice of evaluating the strategic situation of the current field of strategy. The contrast report of the world military forces issued annually by the Institute of Strategic Studies of London has become an important referential index of the study of modern strategy. In addition, comparative research of strategic culture, which has a profound power of observation, has also more and more attracted the attention of strategists. Comparative research has various forms as it can do not only lateral comparison but also longitudinal comparison, not only qualitative comparison but also quantitative comparison. Lateral comparison is the comparison of things that exist at the same time, such as the comparison of strategic resources, military strength and military policies of different countries; longitudinal comparison is the dynamic comparison of one thing developed in the longitudinal surface in the order of different times, which is a perpendicular comparison or historical comparison. Qualitative comparison is to compare the properties of the essence of different things, such as the strategy of positive attack promoted by superpowers and the positive defense strategy for self-defense. Quantitative comparison is to compare things in quantity to determine their qualities in order to accurately judge the difference therein. When applying the method of comparison, we must notice the comparability of the things and the expansiveness of comparison and the comparison of essences. Despite “any comparison cannot be perfect, “ (1)  it is undoubtedly an important ladder to help us recognize the law of strategic guidance.

**IV. Method of Analyzing Causes and Consequences**

The development of anything has its own logic, and war and strategy are no exception. Any war and strategy have the natural factors to cause their forming, and we can search for the essence and pattern of a thing by analyzing its causes and consequences. From the historical great migration of all “barbarians“ when the Germans dominated during the late Roman Empire and the farming and nomadic people in the edge zones mixed in different stages of development, we can find some historical messages of national conflicts on the line from the Mediterranean Sea to West Asia. History itself is the target of analyzing causes and consequences. “From the study of history, we may get the perspective power to practical problems.“ (2)  Of course, we cannot take to this type of research simply, linearly and artificially or make guesses at random, nor can we start from our subjective thinking to look for one piece of evidence or two in history to record them as real footnotes. Instead, we should be guided by dialectical materialism and historical materialism and assume a very solemn attitude to carry out deep analysis and reach for the roots to find the connection between the essence of history and that of reality.

**V. Method of Social Survey**

This method is a method of research which, on the basis of directly and systematically collecting the material of pertaining experiences and through analysis and collation of data, expounds the internal connection and law of development of things. This method can reveal facts and its antenna may widely penetrate into the spiritual space of people or even the society to find out people’s wishes, needs and will. It has a power of strong persuasion and deep observation. This method is an indispensable mean for social workers to understand the lively society. It is an important method for strategic research as well. The factors affecting strategy are active, changing and lively. Through expansive and penetrating social surveys, we may more really observe the current situation of all types of strategic elements, understand the intention of all political forces and their mutual relationships, evaluate the possible trend of the development of strategic situations and make decisions on strategy that are in keeping with reality. Social survey may be divided into general survey, sample survey, typical survey and case survey . To strategic research, the most popular kinds are sample survey and typical survey. Sample survey is to draw samples at random or not at random to carry out cross comparison or lateral tracing observation to develop survey and obtain information. Then, we use the results of sample survey to deduct the overall form of survey. It is based on the theory of probability and stresses the survey of quantity. Type survey is to select a certain number of units and individuals as the types to conduct a close, systematic survey according to an objective and a plan. in order to obtain first-hand data. Its theoretical basis is the principle of dialectic unity of individual and common characters and stresses the revelation of essence.

Regardless of the kind, the acquisition of data usually can be specifically carried out by forum (personal or group forum), observation, interview, and questionnaire. An important application of social survey is done by Rand Company of the US in 1964. It was called “the Method of Delfield (phonetic)” (1) Rand sent anonymous letters (questionnaires) to specialists (targets) to ask for their opinions, and then treated their answers by statistics to timely return the feedback to the specialists to further acquire their opinions. After several rounds of correspondence and adjustment of opinions, the feedback became unanimous and steady. The classic Delfield method required four or five rounds of exchanges to reach a conclusion. This method has been widely adopted in strategic research by the modern world. It is one of the feasible ways of collecting opinions and wisdom from strategic experts.

In the process of applying the aforementioned methods to developing strategic research, we need to pay special attention to the following points and firmly grasp them:

First, combining quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Mathematics is “the helping tool and form of performance to dialectics.” (1) Fostering the sense of quantization is very important to strategic research. Mao Zedong once criticized some people for not knowing to pay attention to the number of things by saying that, “those people do not understand to pay attention to the boundary of numbers that decides the quality of things. All of them have ‘no number in mind.’ At the end, they cannot but make mistakes.” While paying attention to quantitative analysis, we, however, should be careful not to stress it to an improper degree. Military struggles are activities created by people with a purpose, such as attack and defense, righteousness and unrighteousness, encirclement and counter-encirclement, aggression and anti-aggression That number cannot indicate many outward appearances and qualitative analysis, therefore, we need qualitative analysis. Only by qualitatively understanding the quality of things can we find different solutions to contradictions. The revelation of the law of war and the law of strategic guidance by science of strategy is led by the mutual movement of a series of strategic elements, and qualitative analysis is to judge the change of the quality of these elements and the impact brought by them. Quantitative analysis mainly provides basis and material for qualitative analysis, while qualitative analysis is the flying of the quality of quantitative analysis. The result of strategic research, after all, needs to be expressed by qualitative analysis; thus, the study of science of strategy must handle well the dialectic relationship between quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, combine them and materialize their unity with qualitative analysis as the leader.

Second, combining macro analysis and micro analysis. The essential character of strategy is its wholeness; thus, strategic research must “be like a high-rise building to overlook the whole situation“ with an emphasis on controlling the overall tendency, and comprehensively employ the specific methods of abstraction, generalization, consolidation, comparison and deduction to mix complicated outward appearance, incident and process into different logical or theoretical systems. In order to not stick to one time and one case, to discard unrelated details and one-sided material and to strive to find the common nature and pattern of things, we need both macro analysis and micro analysis. Strategic research, however, cannot stay away from specific micro observation of certain strategic elements, such as textual research, authenticity proof, quantitative analysis, level analysis, philosophical analysis, etc. to provide reliable data, from specific to abstract, for revealing the law. Without micro analysis, macro analysis is like a wood without root and a creek without source. Without macro analysis, strategic research will forever be research at a low level unable to see the whole of things and to revel the essence and law. The high composition and high diversity of the nature of science of strategy and modern military science require macro analysis and micro analysis to be tightly combined with macro analysis as the leader.

Third, combining static analysis and dynamic analysis. Static analysis is to analyze the actual situation of strategic issues at a certain time and place. It has the feature of recognizing the relative stability of the development. Dynamic analysis adds analysis of the time element of the problem and treats the whole strategic situation as a non-stop developing process: of a movement and as a process in which all strategic elements are linked to each other and function mutually to conduct a connective and orderly analysis. These two analyses become a prerequisite to each other and mutually supplement. War as a process in which two opponents combat each other, continue to readjust their strategies, keep altering their forms of fighting, and constantly deploy their troops again for fierce competition. Since the situation of war changes instantly, it is all very important to combine static analysis and dynamic analysis with emphasis on the latter.

Fourth, combining special research and comprehensive research. The whole situation of strategy is a big system, containing numerous sub-systems and many aspects and phases of strategy; thus, we usually start strategic research from the special research of each aspect and phase. Special research helps us deepen our understanding of strategic issues at a certain aspect and phase of strategy, but being relatively independent and localized, it is difficult to explain the position and function of a certain aspect and phase in the overall situation of strategy. Only by conducting comprehensive research to synthetically refine, examine and sublimate the individual and separate results of special research into an organic unity can we fully reveal war and the law of strategic guidance.

Fifth, combining historical inspection and actual inspection. Strategic research is a unity of history and actuality. The former can enhance the sense of depth of history in the study and predict the trend of future development from the path of the historical past. However, strategic research is, after all, a moving body with life and vigor and its objective is guiding an actual military struggle; thus, while making historical inspection of the research’s targets, we should pay more attention to inspecting and analyzing the actuality of strategy, making actual inspection as the research’s basic point. Historical inspection must be subordinated to and serve the study of actuality to find a proper point of junction among history, actuality and future.

Sixth, combining lateral comparison and longitudinal comparison. Lateral comparison is a comparison done in historical process, which is usually comparing one’s own country with itself; while longitudinal comparison is a comparison conducted in a wider space. Strategic research particularly needs to expand the study of longitudinal comparison by placing one’s own country in the large environment of global strategy to compare with other countries, other military forces, especially with realistic and potential strategic opponents. From the comparison we will find the advantage and disadvantage, and strong points and shortcomings, thereby accurately setting strategy and stratagems.

“Complete Works of Marx and Engels” vol. 20, p. 35

(1) “Complete Works of Lenin” vol. 8, p. 423

2) Li Jijun: “Military theories and War Practice” Military Science Press, 1994 edition, p. 11

**Section Three: Properly Applying Scientific Methods of Research Methods with the Science of Strategy’s own Characteristics**

There are many special methods for studying science of strategy, and the most common ones include research on war examples, war simulation, inspection of real units and comprehensive analysis of military situation, etc.

**I. Method of Study of War Examples**

The fact that wars and military struggles never repeat makes it difficult for researchers to have the condition to exercise the same strategy in real wars. Study of war examples is perhaps a good way to compensate and substitute this loss of opportunity. For writing “On War,” Karl von Clausewitz studied more than 130 war examples and compiled seven volumes of war history. Jomini (phonetic), the author of “Discussion of the Art of War,” wrote several military history books, such as “Military History Commenting War of Revolution 1792-1801,” and the “History Commenting War of Federick (phonetic)” and “Napoleon’s Political and Military Life.” Exactly like what Romini said, “A military history containing correct comments is indeed a great school of real wars.“ (1) Anatomizing war examples is likly to have a dialogue on strategy with historical strategy directors and military commanders as it may give us the needed experiences and teachings from their victories and defeats in guiding wars. Like legal workers to cases of their trade and medical practitioners to examples of ailment, strategic researchers should take study of war examples as a fundamental practice because it is an essential way to know the law of guiding strategy.

**II. Method of War Simulation**

War simulation is a method of study that uses visible means to display the configuration of war and strategic countermeasures, such as checker exercises, sand-table operations, computer analogy, etc. Ma Yuan, a famous general of the Han Dynasty in ancient China, piled up rice to plan a mountainous offensive; Prussian troops in the 19th century pioneered the inclusion of war simulation in the procedure of their war plans. Because war simulation features direct image and display of opposites, it carries much weight in strategic researchers’ minds; but we must also realize that since war simulation is a false act and full of relative immobility and subject color, it cannot substitute all and make its results absolute and unchangeable.

(1) Discussion of the Art of War” p. 344

**III. Method of Inspection of Real Units**

This method includes maneuver of real units and drill of experimental troops. It may create an environment of look-alike strategy that is closer to real combat for us to synthetically inspect and evaluate strategic theory, organizational system and weapon efficacy. Though active and lively, it consumes a lot of manpower, material and financial resources and is subject to the limitation of time and space; therefore, we cannot frequently organize and implement it.

**IV. Method of Comprehensively Analyzing Military Situations**

This method is to induct and collate military intelligence and strategic information collected by all approaches to find out the connections therein. Its purpose is to watch the enemy’s strategic intention and grasp the trend of its development so as to take strategic countermeasures against them. This method is often used to evaluate strategic situations. When applying it, we must pay attention to all facets, accuracy and details, and avoid being subjective and one-sided as well as jumping to conclusions.

**Section Four: Exploiting the Functions of Information Technology in Modern Strategic Research**

The information revolution of the 1970s that completely combines computer technique and the theory of military planning and management has changed from full digitalization of material simulation, language simulation and symbol simulation to computer simulation. This speedy development of information technology has cast an unprecedented impact on social life and has also provided new scientific means for strategic research. Not only can we rely on computer technique to merge historical experience and future prediction into one body, to combine quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis as well as analytic calculation and process analogy, and to connect computer automatic reasoning and specialists’ experienced guidance, we can also synthesize dynamic artificial battleground models and cultivate a look-alike combat environment, which means that we can provide a modern war laboratory that is close to real battle. In this laboratory, we need not move one soldier or one weapon to show again a look-alike battleground situation, to direct a play of war, to examine the results of strategic theories and plans of decision-making, thereby in a certain extent compensating the shortcoming of war unable to be repeated and experimented. By so doing, we can make strategic research no longer empty talk and a repetition of backward guidance in the past. Instead, we will direct it to stride into a new era of comprehensive innovation. and revolution. The technical foundation supporting this modern “combat laboratory” mainly includes the following techniques:

**I. Technique of Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS)**

The most advanced simulation technique in the world in the 1990s, DIS, is a natural product of the development and merge of system simulation technique, communications technique and computer technique, which has attracted world attention and been widely applied and has produced enormous military and economic results. Through local and wide area networks, DIS has organically linked geographically scattered simulation equipment and systems into a whole to form a comprehensive simulation environment that men may participate in to work and make time and space interactively unanimous.

In a virtual battleground environment, DIS can make the battleground look real and share resources to allow direct contact between the command units and combat units. It can support an open systematic structure of a multi-faceted training environment; and can adapt to all current and soon-to-appear analogized and training systems. These features also permit the trainees to watch the unified joint analogized maneuvers at their localities so that there is no need for a special space to accommodate them and their equipment and for funds to transport them. It will greatly enhance the effectiveness of combat simulation and also allow all military services and branches to organize joint training more flexibly and conveniently and commanders and combat units at all levels to take part in the training locally. By so doing, they can spend a smaller price and a shorter time to carry out large-scale exercises at the campaign and strategy levels.

**II. Technique of Virtual Actuality**

Also called fair-land technique, this technique is supported by the conversion technique of digital information. As computer three-dimension image technique is more developed and applied everyday, this technique is a new reemerged technique in three-dimension space, which is based on the theory of space cognition and of simulation and developed by combining high-tech techniques, such as computer image, image processing and display, space data bank, sensing, position tracking, man-machine interaction and control, and communications. The basic concept of virtual technique is using computers to generate a sensible environment including hearing and feeling with vision as the main body. In this simulated environment, users can take a specially designed hardware program to observe, feel, operate and test to get a personal on-the-scene feeling, thereby able to get a more profound understanding of the target of research.

**III. Technique of Artificial Intelligence**

Artificial intelligence is a science which studies how to automate the activities of the human brain. In other words, it uses computers to simulate the activities of deliberating, analyzing, inferring, judging, planning and learning by the human brain to solve the complicated problems that can be done only by specialists. In the military field, this technique has given play more and more to its function. It is the basic means to materialize automation of decision-making in combat simulation and the fundamental condition for simulating the entire process of fighting.

Application of information techniques is moving toward an unprecedented width and depth in strategic research. At present, the more popular application includes the following:

First, evaluation of the efficacy of strategic arms systems. An important aspect of strategic research, it evaluates the possible degree that strategic arms can reach their expected targets in their missions under certain conditions and their total longevity of penetrating the enemy’s weapon systems. During the process of evaluating, computer technique provides a strong calculating tool as it can tabulate a lot of complicated mathematical figures. Simulation technique furnishes a look-alike environment as it can more scientifically acquire the systems’ special efficacy under specific surroundings, and networking technique can link simulated arms systems with simulated combat environments to systematically evaluate the arms and propose programs to improve them.

Second, appraisal of the efficiency of strategic combat actions. It refers to appraising how much the actions can reach their expected targets when implemented.

Combat actions are the actions carried out by a certain number of military strength (including personnel and arms) according to certain programs under the condition of certain environments. During the process of appraisal, computer techniques may describe the combat strength and programs for the combat actions and scientifically calculate the efficacy of their actions. Simulation techniques may analyze look-alike environments and combat actions and provide a supporting platform for appraising the efficacy of the actions to dig up problems and find solutions to improve the war plan of strategic operations.

Third, analogy and simulation of combat. This is the process of using certain models to analyze the experiment of combat in order to reveal the law of military actions, which may analogize the entire process of combat to condense the relatively long process of combat into a shorter one. Simulation technique is the key technique for analogizing and simulating combat actions. Through a set of mathematical relationships and logical principles and according to certain interrelationships, this technique simulates a process like the real one and an information process to build a virtual battleground environment for appraising combat actions and to provide methods for discussing new theories of operations.

Fourth, smart decision-making system. It refers to the system that uses models and artificial intelligence technique to analyze, evaluate and compare selected programs of military actions to provide useful support for military commanders to make decisions. Computer technique and simulation technique may analogize military actions to be appraised. It also reflects the quantity change of military actions and reveals the law therein. Artificial intelligence techniques may provide more reliable scientific means by optimizing the programs of military actions and selecting the satisfactory ones for commanders to scientifically make decisions.

Fifth, analysis of national defense system. It means to systematically analyze national defense building including national security and strategic issues and then to evaluate and select them for optimization. During this process, computer techniques and simulation techniques are used to develop a combat simulation system to analogize and appraise the selected combat plans and military models. They are also used to analyze and handle the needs of arms systems, to discuss military organizational systems and to plan reasonable utilization of defense resources. Artificial intelligence techniques are applied to assist decision-makers in generating programs of combat actions.

**PART II**

**GENERAL RULES OF WAR AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE**

**Chapter Six**

**Strategic Decisions**

Strategic decisions are the decisions and plans made for the entire situation of war preparation and implementation. The core link of strategic guidance at the highest level, they are an important responsibility and basic duty of the strategic director, aiming at grasping the basic law of the contradictory movement of war through analysis and seeking methods to solve contradictions concerning the overall war situation so as to give play to our own preponderance and win the war. Strategic decisions are reached based on fully controlling national security and whole war situations to make strategic assessments. Generally, they include determining strategic objectives and missions, setting strategic directions and deployments, and drafting strategic plans and preliminary programs.

**Section One: Assessing the Strategic Situation**

Assessing strategic situations is the precondition and basis for making strategic decisions and setting strategic determinations. In terms of essence, strategic decisions are the strategic director’s kinetic reflection to objective strategy and the law of its development. He can weigh pros and cons to set corresponding strategic countermeasures only through analyzing and assessing the war situation, revealing the strategic opponent’s main attempts, determining the nature and degree of deterrence and projecting the possible situations of the happening, development and ending of war. Thedecisions would be correct if the assessment is accurate or wrong if otherwise; thus, the strategic directors of both belligerent sides first strive to beat their counterparts in estimating the enemy and setting the situation. The one who is defensive in strategy and has inferior arms must be able to stand the test on this problem to avoid a larger mistake.

Assessing strategic situations means that the strategic director analyzes, determines and predicts important situations and reaches conclusions concerning national security and the whole war. His basic mission is to know and analyze international and domestic strategic environments. In particular, based on peripheral security and features of the development of the war, he emphatically answers questions pertaining to threat to national security, major opponents, relationship between the enemy and our side, and the come and go of the factors of war and peace, and also determines the possible deterrence of the war, the enemy’s war-readiness, its attempt of invasion and main operational direction, when and where the war bursts, the nature and scope of the war, the form and method of operations and their possible changes, the ratio of forces for the war, the course and ending of the war, etc. Accurate assessment of strategic situations relies on the director’s spirit of being highly responsible to the state and nation and his firm stand on protecting the country’s fundamental interests; on his holding of the idea of strategically looking down upon the enemy and tactically respecting them; on his application of the viewpoints and methods of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, his use of modern scientific theories, methods and technical means, and his learning of the successful historical experiences and useful foreign practices.

**I. To assess strategic situations, the strategic director should first observe all kinds of situations, analyze all elements and estimate all conditions from the whole situation to conduct an overall objective analysis and comprehensive assessment.**

Analysis and argument of the situation of national security and the whole war situation cannot be constrained by one time and one case and cover the whole by one-sided thinking. It is even worse to make a wrong decision out of a mistaken conclusion due to subjective analysis and wishful thinking and departure from reality. The strategic director must start from objective reality and completely control the overall trend of the whole situation as well as the combination of history and present time, the full view and development of strategic situations, and all elements that generate grave impact on national security and whole war situation so as to reach a correct conclusion. As to his assessment of the degree of deterrence to national security, it cannot be too light or too heavy. On the eve of the Soviet War of Defending the Motherland, for example, the German forces had already clearly indicated their attempt at invasion, but the Soviet leaders blindly believed that “nobody dares to pull the nose of a pig into the Soviet garden” and consequently suffered a great loss.

**II. To assess strategic situations, the strategic director should grasp the basic elements and pivotal points that cast decisive effect on national security and war situation, reveal their internal connection and make deep-going essential analysis and key judgments.**

Assessing strategic situations involves political, military, economic, scientific and technical, geographical, social and historical situations, and the information and intelligence collected by reconnaissance, investigation and research are often mixed and not totally reliable. They cannot be used as a real base for the assessment. In order to look for truth from the complicated and changing superficial outward appearance, the strategic director must correctly recognize the objective situation and at the same time not be bewildered by the camouflage and deception; therefore, he must choose deep-going essential analysis to find the main causes that reflect the mutually connected and internally essential matters through perplexing outward appearances and discover the needed law that decides the development of things from uncertain and unstable factors. He must also conduct deep-going analytical appraisal and scientific argument to obtain fundamental knowledge of the war situation and conditions.

**III. To assess strategic situations, the strategic director should focus on the development and changes in the serious situations that affect national security and war situations and grasp basic laws and trends** **to do ceaseless systematic analysis and dynamic assessment.**

Strategic situations are developmental; war situations are always changing. The strategic director can discover new directions of movement and aim at new tendencies to provide accurate and reliable data for decision-making and uninterruptedly conduct tracking research and dynamic assessment only by continuously controlling new situations in the complete process of war preparation and implementation along with the ever-increasing developments and changes of objective situations and of the level of knowledge. As attested by numerous examples, the side that has won in a war or achieved the goal of a big action as well as many other successful decisions are the result of their knowledge of changes and ability to change themselves and follow the changed objective situations to recognize and direct wars so as to make subjective guidance more in keeping with objective reality. For example, during China‘s land revolution, the Central Red Army in its Long March successively decided to abandon the plans of rendezvousing with the Second and Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan to proceed into Guizhou and founding a base in northwestern Sichuan. The decision was an accurate assessment of the development of the then situation and the change in the ratio of forces between our side and the enemy. The change was caused by the enemy and the situation and made the Red Army always in an active position. In 1985, Deng Xiaoping’s introduction of peace and development, a two-point world famous strategic proposal, was an accurate conclusion based on the development of the time and the change of international strategic situations. It has provided a scientific base for the guiding thought for a strategic change of the building of our national defense and military forces.

**Section Two: Setting Strategic Guiding Principles**

Strategic guiding principles are the general principles and general programs for directing strategic actions and also the core contents and key links of strategic decisions. Not only are they the basic standards for strategic actions to win a victory in the whole strategic situation in wartime, they are also the general standards and overall concepts for strategic actions for delaying war and war-readiness in the time when war has not yet happened and the situation is relatively pacific Under certain objective conditions, whether the strategic guiding principles are accurate or do not hold a decisive significance to the success or failure of strategic actions. According to the scope of their application, strategic guiding principles may be divided into general strategic guiding principles and specific strategic guiding principles. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War, the general strategic guiding principles governing the whole war situation and the entire process of war was “protracted warfare,” but for different strategic stages, frontal battlefield and stay behind battlefield, there were separate guiding principles for the stages and the war situations. Under normal circumstances, strategic guiding principles need to spell out the nature and requirement of strategic objectives, strategic missions, major strategic directions, major operational forms, strategic deployments and strategic actions, the duration of war and such essential items as strategic stages, strategic steps and strategic measures.

**I. Defining strategic objective and strategic mission**

Any strategic action is performed for achieving a certain objective. Strategic objectives may be divided into general strategic objectives and the strategic objective for each strategic period, each stage of war, each strategic theater and each military service. Regardless of the classifications, all strategic principles are having national interest and the whole war situation as the base and are determined by such factors as certain political and military situations and strategic postures, particularly the two sides’ strategic attempts, organization of armed forces, combat capability and strategic steps and possible changes as well as natural and geographical conditions.

For clear-cut general strategic objectives, the strategic director should first know national interest and the general guiding policy and basic requirement to strategic actions. Then, he should refine the political and economic goals of strategic actions and the military goals on this basis. During the time of our socialist modernization, developing social productive force and economy and enhancing comprehensive national strength are the collective manifestation of our national interest and our Party’s general line and general guiding policy. We need a safe and stable strategic environment, particularly a peaceful and stable peripheral environment and a steady and unified social surrounding for them. Accordingly, the general strategic objective is to ensure the peace and stability for a benign development of our foreign and domestic strategic environments to support a smooth implementation of national reform, opening and modernization. The political objective is to consolidate the regime, prevent sabotage from without and within, protect national unification and territorial integrity and maintain national dignity and international position. The economic objective is to guarantee an un-blocked proceeding of national economic building and opening to the outside world. The military objective is to guarantee the fulfillment of political and economic objectives as the basis to ensure no encroachment on our national interest, to prevent and curb possible foreign invasion and get ready to deal with it, and win in possible local wars and armed conflicts. If the nation is generally in a time of war, the collective manifestation of general strategic objective is to resist invasion, maintain peace, defend China’s independence and territorial integrity, while the military objective is to stop fighting by fighting, and resolutely eliminate or drive the enemy out and thoroughly crash foreign aggressions.

When defining specific objectives of strategic actions, the strategic director should mainly follow the motto of “preserving self and annihilating enemy” and the principle that conforms with the strategic objectives and the possibly provided strategic means to lay the strategic targets on a realistically reliable basis. Neither can he have wishful thinking to treat illusion as reality, nor can he be over-cautious to arbitrarily give up the objectives that could be achieved. To set up strategic objectives for a certain stage or theater or for a certain service, it must be done in a planned and step-by-step manner, no matter whether it is for deterrence or actual combat or for attack or defense.

Strategic missions are important missions performed to achieve strategic objectives. They are determined in accordance with the major conclusion of strategic assessment and strategic objectives as well as the strategic environment and the two sides’ actual capabilities. They change along with the change of the situations and the related strategic conditions. In a certain time, strategic missions can be separated into general missions and missions for a phase or a locality as well as primary missions and secondary missions. In peacetime, their basic contents are strengthening defense and military building and preparing and restricting war; in wartime, they are to mobilize all available strength and give play to our preponderance to defeat the enemy. When deciding strategic missions, the strategic director must take the whole situation into consideration to correctly separate general and specific missions for each stage and each strategic group and primary and secondary missions for the initial and subsequent actions. In the meantime, he should have confidence to accomplish these missions as planned.

**II. Deciding major strategic direction and strategic objectives**

Strategic directions are the directions of decisive significance to the whole war situation to perform strategic actions. They usually refer to the spaces with a definite strategic depth and width. By the type of strategic actions, they may be divided into strategic offensive directions and strategic defensive directions. Although the directions for action can be divided into major and secondary ones, there should be only one major direction at one time. Whenever a major strategic direction is selected, it can serve as the foundation for strategic decisions and the gravitational center for war-readiness, strategic deployment and employment of troops. Thus, selection of major strategic direction is the key to achieving strategic objectives and completing strategic missions. Major strategic direction should be determined in accordance with strategic objectives and the strategic missions to be accomplished. It should also be done by the degree and direction of threat that we face in a given time and by the strategic attempts, ratio of strength and strategic postures between the enemy and us, as well as geographic conditions. Generally, the strategic director chooses the direction that is most threatening and harmful to us or the direction that can give the enemy a fatal strike and also easy to concentrate our forces and develop our actions. The success or loss of our strategic actions on major strategic direction depends on the support of strategic actions on other directions and requires the strategic director to emphatically coordinate them. It is also possible for major and secondary strategic directions to switch their positions under certain conditions, but it must be prepared beforehand and could cause severe losses if otherwise. For example, during WWII, France made the shortcut roads between Paris and the border area the major direction as it would affect the country’s security and the whole war situation. It built the Maginot Line along those roads to defend fascist Germany’s strategic attack, but there was no needed defense elsewhere including the France-Belgium border. The French troops could not put up any defense at all when the German forces penetrated the country through the Alden Mountains.

Choosing strategic targets is to make strategic missions concrete and indicative. In wars, major strategic targets are things of military, political or economic significance, such as centers, important places, strategic groups, buildings, facilities, transport lines, etc. For example, in the Gulf War or the air raid of Yugoslavian states, the US chose military groups, national and military centers, airports, bridges, missile positions, power plants and refineries as its strategic targets. To correctly select strategic targets is not an easy job as it has to take the overall strategic situation into consideration and pick up the most important, most worthy ones, for attack or defense among numerous targets in order to accomplish strategic missions. The classification and number of targets are usually decided by their value and position, their influence to the whole situation of strategic actions, and the ratio of strength between the two fighting sides.

**III. Deciding strategic steps and strategic deployments**

Strategic steps are the staged overall arrangement made for fulfilling strategic objectives and the accomplishment of strategic missions. For deciding them, it is necessary to review the whole situation and pay attention to linking and changing the front and the rear, coordinating the right and the left and separating the important and the less urgent. The fighting in a war always passes a process, and the offense or the defense usually goes through several phases. Although we may bypass one combat phase under certain conditions, we cannot change at will the two stages of preparing and implementing strategic actions and those impassable phases in the stage of implementation. For example, retreating first and counterattacking later by the Red Army during the War of Land Reform and the three stages of defense, stalemate and counterattack during the Sino-Japanese War were unavoidable and irreversible strategic steps. The major strategic direction, the first-time strategic action and the current mission and major strategic mission should be treated as the key points for deciding strategic steps, while the subsequent stages, actions, missions and the steps of implementation in other directions should be basically considered beforehand and then be gradually set in conjunction with the actual situation and be refined and specified in a timely manner. When determining the order of strikes, whether to hit the strong or the weak first or vice versa should be decided by the specific situation, especially the ratio of forces and the strategic situation, and not by our own will. To attack the weak first and then the strong is a general principle of guidance, but for twisting the war situation and changing the balance, this principle can be reversed when there is assurance of its success.

Strategic deployment is the organization, disposition and division of missions of all forces for achieving strategic objectives and materializing strategic steps. A complete and key strategic deployment is one of the basic conditions that is good for giving play to our overall power and forming a superior situation as well as guaranteeing smooth and successful strategic actions. It is decided by the results of strategic missions, objectives, directions and attempts and the ratio of the enemy and our side in conjunction with geographical conditions. Its major contents include the organized disposition, area situation, direction of mission of all directions, strategic theaters and all military services and branches in peacetime and wartime, and the position, function and mission requirement of all strategic echelons in strategic actions. Whether in peacetime or in wartime and whether offensive or defensive, strategic deployment should be focused on concentrating employment of superior forces in the direction, location and time of decisive significance. It relies on deploying necessary strength in secondary directions and other locations and time; on establishing and maintaining strong strategic reserve troops and un-blocked strategic logistic lines; and on paying attention to the troops’ combined organization, echelon deployment, stereoscopic arrangement and strategic camouflage. Strategic deployment must be convenient for the building of war preparation and deterring actions in peacetime, but also for concentration and development, command and coordination of troops in wartime in order to ensure all types of forces able to bring their own preponderance into play and support one another and also to flexibly react to different strategic situations and emergencies.

**IV. Setting the form of strategic actions**

Strategic actions have diversified forms. By their nature and requirement, strategic actions can be divided into two forms: armed and unarmed, deterring and actual, positive and negative, for decisive battle and for indecisive battle, seeking combat and avoiding combat, and for war of annihilation and for war of attrition. By their type and style, they can be divided into strategic attack and strategic defense, whole strategic attack and strategic defense and local (strategic direction, strategic theater and military service) strategic attack and strategic defense. By their form and scope, they can be divided into battle of maneuver, battle of movement, positional battle, and guerrilla warfare, special battle, strategic interior line and strategic exterior line, and regular and irregular land, seaborn and airborn battles. By their form and content, they can be divided into strategic blocking and strategic counter-blocking, strategic air raid and strategic counter-air raid, strategic air dropping and strategic counter-air dropping, and battle of missiles, battle of information, chemical warfare and meteorological warfare. By their form and time, they can be divided into strategic attack or strategic defense during the initial period of war and during the middle course of war, strategic retreat or strategic counterattack during strategic defensive, strategic penetration, strategic encirclement, strategic turnabout, strategic decisive battle, and strategic pursuit during strategic offensive as well as protracted warfare and battle of quick decision. As strategic actions change and develop their forms constantly, they require the strategic director to be based on specific strategic attempts, missions and related conditions to make realistic selections targeting different situations, paying attention to coordination and support, and give play to our overall power.

**Section Three: Setting Strategic Plans**

Strategic plans are specific programs set beforehand for accomplishing certain strategic objectives. They are also the preliminary programs for actions for in what time and stage to do what. They are concrete manifestations of strategic decisions, and media links for the implementation of materializing certain strategic attempts and the basic method of overall planning and guiding strategic actions. Their goal is to avoid and reduce the blindness of strategic actions and ensure strategic guidance to be more planned, active and flexible so that the actions in each part and each link form an overall superiority under unified planning and coordination.

Along with the development of strategic situations and the changes of the conditions pertaining to strategy, the type and contents of strategic plans are gradually increased and become more complicated, and they have developed into over one hundred multi-level, multi-type comprehensive plan systems. In terms of level, there are not only the state’s overall strategic plan (grand strategic plan) but also the armed forces’ united plan and strategic plans for each strategic direction, each strategic theater and each military service and each strategic group or the general plan for guiding the entire process of war preparation and implementation and the plans for each strategic stage, each war situation or each strategic action The plans for strategic actions can also be divided into plans related to war mobilization, strategic development, strategic operations, strategic coordination, strategic support and strategic command. In terms of category, they can be divided into whole war plans and local war plans, nuclear war plans and conventional war plans; regular war plans, guerrilla war plans and special war plans; offensive strategic plans and defensive strategic plans, etc. Generally speaking, the contents of strategic war plans include strategic assessment, strategic attempts, strategic missions, strategic deployments and strategic support measures and strategic rear work. These contents are some specific measures and methods all for thoroughly implementing important items of strategic decisions, such as setting the order, deadline and form of strategic actions; the force, deadline and method for accomplishing certain strategic missions; the troops, deadlines, place and mission for strategic coordination; the deadline, contents and methods for all types of strategic support and rear work. All of them are collectively reflected in different kinds of documentary materials, such as charts and writings.

It is true that all things are set if prepared and are not set if unprepared. Correct strategic decisions would fail if they are not fulfilled by perfect scientific plans. In the meantime, any omission and mistake in the plans will lead strategic actions to confusion and loss; thus, strategic directors and strategic commanding organizations must keep their eyes on the whole situation, have rich far-sight first and do the planning and arrangement thoroughly. They can not do only one step and attend to one thing at a time and lose sight of another. The general requirements for setting strategic plans are:

**I. Making them in a complete, perfect and scientific system and keeping relative stability**

Setting of strategic plans involves political, military, economic, diplomatic and natural elements and includes the aspects of preparation and implementation, building and utilization, deterrence and actual fighting, and armed forces and unarmed forces, and passes through many links like strategic reconnaissance, strategic analysis, strategic assessment, strategic planning, strategic evaluation, and strategic selection. All these require the setting of strategic plans to follow systematic working steps and procedures and conduct overall calculation, painstakingly planned and scientific proven. To strategic targets, strategic missions, major strategic directions, and strategic deployment, as well as the basic problems, such as the condition, deadline, scope, method and progress of strategic actions, the strategic director should timely take the form of from the bottom to the top or vice versa, widely apply modern sciences such as the science of planning and management, theory of system, theory of information to carry out penetrating quantitative and qualitative analyses. After repeated thinking and close proving, he will make the contents of strategic plans more conclusive and more scientific. In order to ensure the stability and continuity of strategic plans, he should scientifically decide the setting of strategic plans and the cycle of their implementation so as to form a system of strategic plans of a reasonable structure, complete contents and full categories that combine near-term, intermediate and long-term plans.

**II. Taking the most complicated and most** **difficult situations into consideration, making various preparations and holding a larger adaptability**

When setting strategic plans, the strategic director should think of all elements and conditions, fully estimate all difficulties and problems, and be footed in the emergence of complex and hard situations. Setting various programs and stressing thinking about the difficult aspects is good for keeping a cold mind. Overcoming paralysis, despising the enemy and avoiding the wrong inclination of subjection is good for fully mobilizing the enthusiasm and creativity from all sides to maintain our side always in an active position. The reason that proletarian revolutionists and strategists like Mao Zedong conducted correct strategic guidance in the long strategic practice was that when setting strategic plans, they fully estimated the situation and various possible changes, planned for the worst and strove for the best, and kept various plans and did many preparations so that they could comfortably pass the difficult problems and defeat the enemy no matter how severe and complicated the situations were.

**III. Selecting the best one among many decisions: making it specific and complete with maneuverability**

Strategic decision is the preliminary program of actions to solidify strategic guiding principles. The contents concerning objectives, directions, preparations and timings, measures and methods must be clearly targeting, regulating, practical and maneuverable. It is the common requirement for setting different strategic plans as they would be made in vain and cause confusion and mistakes if otherwise. The decisions must go around the most influential problems, aim at the situations that are most likely to appear and then select the best feasible ones out of all kinds of programs which specifically and closely carry the important items concerning strategic actions. This therefore requires the strategic director to be skillful at controlling the gravitational center of strategy, conducting detailed analysis and observation of the change and tendency of strategic situations, and repeatedly comparing and debating the advantage and disadvantage as well as the feasibility of all programs so that he can decide on really reasonable basic programs for strategic actions to follow.

**IV. Carrying through positive activity and innovative spirit and making considerable flexibility**

Positive activity and flexible innovation are the basic qualities and abilities that the strategic direct should have. They are also an important guarantee to correctly guiding strategic actions. They must be carried through all the way in the setting and implementation of strategic plans. The main manifestation is timely setting and revising strategic plans based on objective reality, daring to assume responsibilities, upholding truth and changing mistakes to make the plans genuinely according to situations and find out countermeasures and programs to change our plans while the enemy change theirs, handle emergencies freely and not by sticking to one style, find out advantages and avoid disadvantages and go for benefits and skip harms. The PLA has attained victories one after another in a long complicated and difficult environment and under highly flexible operational conditions. The important reason for them to do so is that they have outstandingly fulfilled the planning of war guidance and successfully set and implemented a series of strategic plans that contain superb art, deep thinking and creative spirit.

**Section Four: Mechanism and Procedure of Strategic Decision-Making**

Strategic decision-making is both an activity of knowing and an activity of practicing. Different from macro decision-making in other fields, strategic decision-making that affects the issues related to national security and whole war situations cannot be tested beforehand, and the selection of strategic action programs can at most be practiced by models in laboratories. It is decided by the inherent essential characteristics of war. Any specific strategic decision-making is subject to special conditions. Whether it is correct can be tested only through specific strategic practice, and this type of practice is tested for only one time. However, the result and impact of the decision-making in wartime are more direct and obvious than those in peacetime. This special feature requires the strategic director to more rigidly and carefully follow the basic rules for the activity of decision-making and comply with higher standards and special mechanisms and procedures to scientifically make strategic decisions.

**I. Making strategic decisions by rigidly complying with the thinking procedures required by the law of knowing**

All correct strategic decisions are the products of subjective recognition in the keeping with objective reality. As an activity of thinking, strategic decision-making is not produced and operated out of empty thinking nor inherited in the mind of the director. Instead, it is a reflection of the law of the movement of war and an embodiment of the law of strategic thinking. When making strategic decisions, the strategic director cannot pay attention only to the instant moment of “making a decision” and “finalizing;” instead, he should have the control of the basic procedure of the whole process of decision-making. As a whole, the basic procedure of decision-making includes three major stages; namely, assessing strategic situations, setting strategic decisions (setting strategic guiding principles) and making strategic plans. This basic procedure of knowing the situations and making decisions exists not only before the forming of strategic plans but also after it. The three aforementioned stages can be specified into a number of procedures of implementation, such as collecting information, analyzing, assessment, clarifying decisions, drafting programs, executing programs, supervising and inspecting and readjusting and revising. “Correct deployment is originated from correct decision, correct decision is originated from correct assessment, correct assessment is originated from thorough and needed reconnaissance, and the thinking stringing through all types of materials of reconnaissance.” (1) Only by strictly following the basic requirements for all stages of decision-making can we guarantee the scientific assurance of decision-making.

**II. Proving first and decision-making later. Paying attention to survey and research, giving full play to the consultation of thinking tanks and brain trust organizations.**

The science and accuracy of decisions are first decided by conducting a complete survey and full proving. The more complete the survey is, the more scientific the proving and evaluations are, the more reliable the assessment strategic situation and strategic decisions as well as the preliminary programs are, and the larger the possibility of having a smooth implementation of the programs and producing the best results is. Only by taking a Marxist world outlook and methods for guidance and widely applying the theories, methods and means of modern sciences and techniques to completely, accurately and timely collect and treat all types of information, intelligence and data for conducting repeated thinking and penetrating analyses of “discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, changing from this to others and from the exterior to the interior” can the strategic director make proper decisions.

Since the complicated factors, the many variables, and the numerous volumes of information are unprecedented that modern strategic decision-making involves, some strategic directors cannot handle them with ease; thus, as the “outside brain” for strategic decision-makers, all types of think tanks and brain trust organizations hold a prominent position. Strategic decision-making must pay attention to their functions in analyzing and assessing situations and decision-making. Strategic research departments and consultation organizations must consist all kinds of specialists to keep their agencies to be relatively independent and maintain routine contact with the decision-making departments. On this issue, the consultants must prevent consulting for the sake of consulting and merely making footnotes for the decision-making departments. They must also prevent the inclination of substituting their independent analysis and assessment by consultation.

**III. Carrying out collective decision-making and combining collective responsibility with contingent decision**

Collective decision is the special feature of the behavior of modern decision-making. Only by making collective decisions is good for widely bringing democracy and group wisdom into play and reducing the mistakes in decisions to the lowest level. However, to stress collective decision does not deny or overlook the dictatorship on decision-making; on the contrary, we ought to persist in the principle of strategic guidance of high concentration and unification. Modern strategic situations are complicated and changeable, and a war situation is more floating, uncertain and risky. Therefore, it requires the strategic director to be not only smart but also able to determine, to collect the wisdom of all sides, to coordinate the relationships of all sides and all systems and at last to make a decision. He can neither make dictatorial decisions nor hold lengthy discussion without a conclusion; otherwise, he will be confused for listening to too many opinions and unable to form a unified will, action and force. To stress collective leadership and collective decision-making does not reject the necessity of personal responsibility; on the contrary, the two are complementary to each other. Especially in an emergency, the timeliness of decision making is all the more important and requires the strategic director to show his spirit of being responsible to the whole situation to quickly and continuously make an independent assessment and handling in order to grasp the opportunity for fighting, seize and maintain a strategic activity, report the case afterward and assume the full responsibility for his decisions.

**IV. Combining decision-making with implementation and timely readjusting and revising decisions**

Correct strategic decision-making and strategic planning can be materialized only through the implementation by pertinent organizations and personnel. Carrying through strategic decisions, implementing strategic plans and conducting preliminary strategic programs are also the process of practicing the results of strategic decisions to solve the contradictions between subjective guidance and objective reality. The strategic director passes down the contents of strategic decisions to the lower levels in the form of plans, resolutions and directives. After the decisions enter the phase of implementation, he should supervise and inspect status on the one hand and quickly and timely collect and treat the information and intelligence submitted by the lower levels on the other. He should especially listen to the opinions and suggestions by the commanders of certain strategic directions, strategic theaters, military services or the ones responsible for certain strategic actions, and accordingly determine the changes of strategic situations and control the development of strategic postures in order to timely revise strategic decisions and action programs to keep strategic guidance always built upon the basis of objective reality and ensure the accuracy of strategic decisions.

1. “Military Works of Mao Zedong” vol. I, Military Science Press, Central Documents Press, 1993 edition, p. 699

**Chapter Seven**

**War Preparation**

War preparation is the political, economic, science and technology preparations that countries or political groups carry out for restraining or carrying out wars, and it is the spiritual as well as material foundation for war prevention and implementation. Good war preparation may deter wars, once a war breaks out, it can help to win with confidence. War preparation, on the basis of time, can be divided into peacetime preparation, preparation just before going into war, and preparation during the war. While peacetime preparation is the foundation, the other two preparations are preparation works carried out according to the actual war situations, based on the peacetime preparation. Whether or not the war preparation is proper and sufficient may have a direct impact on, or even determine initiatives or passive acts, determining a win or defeat. Good preparation will result in better winning opportunities; otherwise, it will be difficult to win.

War preparations have been provided with different characteristics in different historical times. During the era of cold weapons, due to the simple mode of operations, manpower and material preparations were mainly arms making, military provisions collection and training of reserve personnel, etc. With the merging of the industrial revolution, weapons and equipment were undergoing drastic changes, war attritions have been in significant rises, the content of war preparation became more complex and extensive, including the preparation of war systems, the preparation of war laws and regulations, the preparation of strategic materials, national economic distribution, and battlefield development, etc. War mobilization organizations solely responsible for war preparations also emerged.

With the rise of the modern new technology revolution, the extensive applications of microelectronics, computer technologies, aeronautic and astronautic technologies, nuclear technology and new material technology in the military realm, required that significant changes take place in military weaponry, as well as to the mode and pattern of war. The forms of wars are being moved from mechanized wars to information wars. The entire military system and society are increasingly connected closely together, and the sources of fighting capacity are increasingly coming from the integrated national strength. As a result, the position of war preparation has become more and more prominent, and the requirements for war preparation have become more and more stringent. The development of integrated national strength has become more and more a basic focal point of modern war preparation. Science and technology preparation are increasingly becoming the core of war preparation, and manufacturing products for both peacetime and wartime use, and goods for dual military and civilian uses are becoming the basic mode of modern war preparation.

**Section One: Political Preparation**

Political preparation is comprised mainly of organizational preparation, spiritual preparation and law and regulation preparation, which is the political foundation for carrying out wars. Strengthening political preparation is very significant for fully exploiting the organizational capability of state political power in organizing the overall national strength, mobilizing the masses in actively preparing and supporting wars, and providing powerful organizational assurances, spiritual dynamics, and law and regulation orders for wars.

1. ORGANIZATIONAL PREPARATION

Political organizational preparation is mainly for establishing a national political leadership system and national defense leadership system that are suitable for the requirement of wars, and it is a key link that plays a decisive role in war preparation.

Establishing a strong, powerful national political leadership system that takes overall responsibilities is critical. Regardless of their characteristics, all countries must be provided with the two functions of ruling the country and protecting the country. Engles once said: “War and war carrying out organizations have become routine functions of the life of countries and nations.” 1 High-tech wars, especially information wars, involve all the aspects of our social life, which must be carried out by mobilizing the entire strength of the society. Wars are becoming more unexpected and short, initial actions are usually provided with the characteristics of decisive battles that require quick transition from peacetime to wartime. Therefore, if we have to enhance all national development in peacetime for war preparation, and concentrate manpower, materials, and financial resources quickly in carrying out effective wars, we must establish a national political system that integrates the leadership of national economic development and the leadership of war preparation and implementation. Our country has established a socialist political system with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party and the national political power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party are carrying out a highly centralized and unified leadership. This political system is beneficial to economic development and war preparation under the overall planning, which results in the two being mutually enhanced and coordinated.

Establishing an integrated peacetime and wartime, crack, and highly effective national defense leadership system is critical. National defense leadership system refers to the leadership system that is established for leading war preparation and implementation by the government, and regulations concerning its duties, authority, inter-relationships, and related systems, and it is a key assurance for the government’s good work in war preparation in peacetime and effective implementation of war in wartime. All countries in the world have established their national defense leadership system. Countries such as the U. S., Britain, and Russia have organized national defense decision making and implementation organizations under the direct leadership of their presidents or prime ministers, which organize and lead war preparation and implementation. In our country, it is carried out under the unified leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Central; the State Council leads and manages national development operations, the Central Military Commission leads the entire armed forces, and the national mobilization commission is established under the State Council and the Central Military Commission as a discussing and coordinating office for organizing and coordinating mobilization works. Regardless what kind of organizational form is taken, the national leadership system must be able to

1. pp.10, “The Origination of the Family, Private Ownership and the Nation”

carry out peacetime and wartime integration, streamlining and high efficiency in its planning. It should be capable of war preparation works in peacetime, and organizing and guiding the country in transforming from peacetime into the state of war, and carrying out the war quickly.

1. SPIRITUAL PREPARATION

A country will face dangers in peacetime if it forgets to prepare for war, and a country will be safe if it continues to prepare for dangers in peacetime. This has been a historic rule since we entered the class society. Spiritual conditions remain to be key factors in winning a war; the spiritual preparation of war is the ideological foundation for all other preparations.

Strengthening national defense education will result in the establishment of the masses’ firm Marxist view of war. National defense education is an important assurance for strengthening people’s national defense concepts, developing talented national defense personnel, enhancing national qualities, and spreading the spirit of patriotism, and it is a key measure in carrying out successful war spiritual preparation works. All the countries in the world are paying close attention to national defense education, and treat it as a solidifying act of carrying out war preparation and strengthening national defense development. As early as 1958, the U. S. had already promulgated the “National Defense Education Act.” The Soviet Union’s “National Defense Law” clearly ruled that military patriotic education must be provided to all citizens. In our country, the “National Defense Education Law” was promulgated in April, 2000, and national defense education teams have been formed in all the appropriate locations. All levels of the party and government propaganda and education offices and army political departments, unions, communist youth league, and women’s organizations are treating national defense education as a very important duty. Through national defense education, the masses’ Marxist view of war will be established, which clarifies that wars are the product of a class society. As long as there are classes, and the country is not destroyed, wars will continue to exist, thus, we must do well in war preparation, preventing external enemies from invading us, maintaining our national sovereignty, security, and unity. We should clearly understand that the revolutionary war is the people’s war. We must mobilize and arm the masses before we can carry out the war, stir up the masses’ enthusiasm of joining the army, fighting the war, and supporting the front line.

Strengthening external propaganda, in order to create a good international environment for war preparation and implementation is a key factor. Under modern war conditions, both war preparation and war implementation are closely related to international strategic patterns. Different reactions and concerns of the international community are unavoidable. As a result, we must do well in external propaganda works through various ways. In peacetime, the government must propagate vigorously about our country’s national defense policies; establish a peace-loving image for our country and people, and ensure the smooth implementation of our national defense development. In wartime, we should seek international understanding, sympathy and support through external propaganda.

1. LAW AND REGULATION PREPARATION

War preparation laws and regulations are a general term of laws and regulations formulated and approved by the government, enforced and implemented by the government, in adjusting all the social relations in the process of war preparation. War preparation laws and regulations mainly include laws, decrees and regulations that regulate war preparation activities as the integral parts of our national legal system. Establishing a sound war preparation laws and regulations system, providing war preparation with legal protection, are key measures in assuring the smooth implementation of war preparation. For legal standards that are not formulated for war preparation or legal standards that are outdated or flawed, we must prepare or revise these promptly in order to make them suitable for the new situation. We must strengthen our national laws and regulations education, continue to enhance military personnel and people’s legal awareness, and strictly enforce the concerned laws in our work. We also need to strengthen supervision of law enforcement, and always obey the law, enforce the law strictly, and investigate and punish all the law violators, in order to ensure the thorough implementation of national defense laws and regulations.

Using the law to protect smooth implementation is an inner requirement of the modern social economic condition. Under the modern conditions, a number of economic elements are in co-existence, the ownership system and benefits are plural, war preparation must rely on the authority of law, and is forced to follow and execute itself within the scope of its involvement.

Using law to protect the smooth implementation of war preparation is an important condition for winning high-tech wars. High-tech wars, especially information wars, are joint operations of all service branches. The high-tech weaponry, rapidly changing battlefield conditions require that the command must be organized in a strict, scientific, and precise fashion, No commander can adapt to the situation by impromptu decisions or individual wisdom. Therefore, all the aspects of the military realm, such as organizations, command relations, duties of Personnel, etc must be regulated with sound laws and regulations in peacetime, which will result in unified command, unified systems, discipline, and training, and everything is covered by law and regulations. It will form a strong fighting capacity in wartime.

We must continue to perfect national defense laws and regulations in order to provide legal protection to war preparation. For legal standards that do not apply to war preparation, imperfect, or outdated laws, we must formulate or revise them promptly in order for them to fit the new situation. We must strengthen national defense law and regulation education, continue to enhance the legal concept of the masses and military personnel, strictly follow the words of the law, and enhance supervision of law enforcement so the law will be followed closely. Law enforcement will be strict, law violators will be prosecuted and punished, and national defense laws and regulations will be carried out thoroughly.

**Section Two: Economic and Technological Preparations**

Economic and technological preparations are measures taken by concerned government economic and technological departments according to plans for war preparations, saving rich war resources, in transforming into wartime successfully while facing war threats. The purpose is to enhance our economic and technological strength continuously, improve the level of transforming economic and technological strength into war strength, and support the requirement of war, which usually includes industry, agriculture, communications and transportation, post and telecommunications, medicine and health care, finance, science and technology, etc., which are the material foundation that a war relies on for its implementation. The degree of economic and technological preparation has a strong impact on the process and outcome of wars.

I. RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMY

The distribution of the national economy is the geographical distribution and disposition of all quarters of national economy. It is related to the overall situation of national politics, economy, military and ecological environment, and it is a key strategic issue. Wars can not be separated from territories, although with the emergence of long range strategic weapons, the functions of the natural space of territory are declining in wars, the economic distribution, however, is still playing a significant role in successful war preparations, and maintaining the economic stability in wars is critical.

The economic distribution is doubly limited by the rule of economic development and the national military strategy. It must take into consideration the interests of economy, national defense and national security. In economy, a rational economic distribution will be beneficial to the rational development and use of economic and natural resources of the whole country, and enhancing the integrated economic beneficial results. In the military quarters, it may help the enrichment of national war potentialities, strengthening and consolidating the emergency materials and finances in the strategic front and rear. It will improve the national defense stability on a continuous basis. In the political quarters, it will be beneficial to the unity of all the nationals and regions in the country. Therefore, in the overall national economic distribution, we should take into consideration not only the need of development, we should also pay attention to the need of national defense, which will defend against the enemy’s sabotages, maintain the survivability and development of economic strength under war conditions. It is also beneficial to rapid transformation from peacetime to wartime, and maintaining basic independent war supply support and mutual support of all strategic regions under local war conditions.

1. PREPARATION OF CONCERNED NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECTORS

Engles once pointed out: In any place and at any time, economic conditions and resources always help “violence” to victory, without them, violence will not be violence. Modern wars have once again proved this scientific conclusion. If we want to win a war, we must first develop our national economy vigorously, and do well in mobilization preparation.

Industrial preparation. The rapid development of wartime military industry depends on the development of civilian industry in peacetime. Only a strong foundation of civilian industry in peacetime can provide dependable support to the development of military industry in wartime. a. A rational distribution of industrial productivity is needed. We must be able to combine concentration and dispersion, which not only help production, but also fit the requirement of national security; b. formulate an industrial mobilization plan, based on future war requirements, select factories that can be easily transformed into military production in wartime, and make preparations on technical information, raw materials, production facilities, and technical strength, in order to assure the smooth production switch in wartime; c. carry out the work of generalization of military and civilian products, which enables surplus military production capability to support local development in peacetime, and for civilian factories to produce goods suitable for military needs promptly in wartime.

Communication and transportation preparation. Maneuverability is the life of the army. Personnel and weapons and equipment maneuvers can not be carried out without transportation means. Strengthening communication and transportation preparation; a. combine local transportation developments, and establish a national defense transportation system. Civilian railways: Build military terminal platforms at larger stations for better military transportation. Civilian super highways: When building new highways, aircraft runways should be built in sections of the highway for emergency landing and takeoff of military aircraft. National defense requirements should be taken into consideration in designing civilian bridges and tunnels, making it capable of handling heavy military vehicles. Civilian ports: They should be built to meet the requirement of military ships docking and loading/unloading; b. perfect the registration and draft system of civilian transportation means. Personnel and material transportation is a very busy endeavor in wartime, the contradictions of transportation volume and capacity will be prominent, and requisition of local transportation means for war use is a common practice for a large number of countries in the world. During the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands Islands (or Malvinas Islands), 80 percent of the British forces’ logistic support ships were 86 requisite commercial ships. In order to solve the problems of insufficient transportation capabilities during the Gulf War, the U. S. used several hundred aircraft from more than 30 airlines, more than 2000 civilian ships that assured the requirement of military actions. As a result, we must carry out scheduled registration of all motorized vehicles, ships, aircraft and other transportation means in peacetime, and sign contracts for wartime requisition with the owners of these transportation means. We also need to register all the technical personnel in the transportation realm, and carry out war and front line support training in order to improve their ability to carry out wartime duties; c. carry out preparation works for protection preparations for transportation infrastructure facilities. We should enhance protection of key transportation hubs, bridges, docks, airports, and key highways, enhancing protection, maintenance, building, facilities, stockpiling protection materials and equipment, in order to assure the smooth operations of such facilities during enemy air strikes or natural disasters.

Post and telecommunications preparation. Post and telecommunications is the nerve center of all the government quarters, and it is a key measure of collection and transmission of information. With the evolution of war patterns and the changing mode of operations, weapons and equipment are turning to information and intelligence, the environment of battlefield magnet fields is getting more complex, battlefield situations change rapidly, operational paces are faster, which require a higher level of requirement for communications support. The increasingly rising position of communications in wars has become a key factor in winning high-tech wars. Therefore, all the countries are paying attention to perfect their layout of communications networks, enhance the development of microwave and satellite communications, and establish circuitous and multi-channel communications facilities in key strategic directions and pre-developed battlefields according to the requirements of future wars. All levels of communication departments should incorporate all the national post and telecommunications systems and communications owned by all the government components into an integrated national communications network according to operational duties, which will be under the concentrated management and operation of the post and telecommunications departments. The military, in combination with the development of the local information superhighways, will establish a sound command automation system. Some information facilities may be shared by both the military and the civilian sectors that are capable of enhancing the information network’s regenerating ability, and assure the smooth operation of command in wartime.

Financial preparation. With the development of the economy, science and technology, weaponry has become more and more technology oriented, the attrition of war materials is doubling all the time, and financial preparation has become a key aspect of modern war preparation. Its contents mainly include: working out a sound finance and tax system, assure smooth tax collection so the government is provided with sufficient financial resources; strengthening financial management, perfecting financial control measures in wartime, maintain domestic financial stability in wartime; reserve enough foreign exchange to prepare for use in wartime, and prevent foreign economic sanctions.

Science and technology preparation. Under high-tech war conditions, science and technology now plays an increasingly important role in the key elements of fighting capacity, thus, carrying out science and technology preparation is quite significant. Science and technology mobilization is mainly high-tech personnel mobilization, and high and new technology mobilization. The key objects of mobilization are scientific research units, colleges and universities, and science and technology personnel in high and new technology firms who have had advanced education and professional specialties, that fit military specialties. After the mobilization is carried out, these personnel will be assigned to reserve units for necessary training. Based on the military requirement, research and development of high-tech products for military use, carry out the civilian to military technology transformation work, and provide technological support to the military in wartime could be their tasks. At the same time, put dual-use equipment with high technological content in the reserve force organizations, in order to make them more convenient to be mobilized and drafted with personnel in wartime. Continue to uncover the “civilian-to-military” potentials of technology intensive products (or trade) and technologies, carry out technology reserves in order to transfer them quickly to produce military products and support the frontline.

Additionally, we should also do well in agricultural, medical and health care war preparation works.

1. DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY PREPARATION

Defense science and technology and the defense industry are scientific research and production activities that are carried out to meet the requirement of our national armed forces in peacetime, and weaponry in wartime, and they are key links in transferring our national economic strength to fighting capacity. Ye Jianying once pointed out: “developing defense science and technology and defense industry is the material foundation of war preparation, and it is also a strategic duty in carrying out national defense modernization.” 1 Our defense technologies and defense industries have been growing and developing since the new China was founded, and we have established technologically advanced powerful nuclear, aeronautic and astronautic weaponry, electronic materials, and shipbuilding, etc.. Research and development, and industrial systems, have successfully developed guided missiles, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, satellites, space ships, and a myriad of conventional weaponry. It has a significant impact on accelerating our military modernization development, protecting our national security effectively, and enhancing our international standing. At the same time, they have also brought about and promoted our national economic development and the progress made in the science and technology trade.

Defense science and technology and defense industry preparation should be guided by operational requirements. High-tech wars, especially information wars, are joint operations carried out by units of all the branches of service, which demonstrate the integrated form of ground, sea, air, space and electronic operations. The matches on the battlefield are increasingly becoming the struggle of air superiority, sea superiority, space superiority, information superiority, and long-range precision striking capabilities. Defense science and technology and the defense industry should do their best to meet the requirement of the above-mentioned operations, vigorously researching and developing modernized weaponry, especially the “killer’s mace” weapon systems in order to improve our strategic operations capabilities.

Defense science and technology and the defense industry’s preparation should be integrated into the overall national economic development. National economic development and science and technology advancement are the foundation of the development of defense science and technology. The defense industry, which must be dependent on the former, must do their best to be both military and civilian compatible, while promoting the progress of science and technology and the development of our national economy. For instance, more than 90 percent U. S. military industrial corporations are based on dual products. At the same time, all countries are generally paying attention to enhancing the combining of domestic and foreign defense science and technology research organizations and components of defense industries in order to improve their level of weaponry through joint research and production.

VI. STRATEGIC MATERIAL RESERVE

Strategic material reserve is maintained by the government for dealing with unexpected situations such as wars and other incidents, supporting the normal operation of the national economy and meeting the national defense requirement by stockpiling or saving a certain quantity of key materials and information. It is a key measure carried out by the government in protecting material supplies in unusual times. Generally, it is divided into national material reserves, army material reserves, and mobilization material

1. Ye Jianying: “Report at the Plenary Session of Central military commission,” December 12, 1977

reserves. The basic requirements for strategic material reserves are suitable quantity. The quantity of material reserve varies in countries with different conditions of resources, economy, and strategic thought. For materials that are scarce in the country and rely on imports, of heavy consumption in wartime, and long production periods, planned large

quantity reserves and procurement should be made in peacetime. The reserve quantity

should be determined, not only for the need of future wars, but also for economic beneficial results, not for “the more the better.” Because, reserving is drawing out a part of materials from the production turnovers, separate them from the production process, and turn the real productivity into potential productivity. This will doubtlessly affect the creation of the general social products. We should, by and large, under the premise of assuring the need of war preparation, save reserves and support national development.

Taking into consideration both military and civilian. While meeting the requirement of the military, strategic materials reserves also needs to consider the needs of industrial and agricultural production and people’s livelihood in wartime. The material reserves that meets the requirement of wars relates directly to winning the war. The material reserve that meets the requirement of production and people’s livelihood, however, is a necessary condition for supporting the successful operations of the war. Therefore, strategic materials reserve must be carried out by taking into consideration the overall situation, not only reserving military materials and production materials used by defense industrial productions, but also reserving materials and products required by industrial and agricultural production and people’s livelihood.

Rational distribution. The distribution of strategic material reserves must be in even density for prompt supply, and existing warehouses and facilities should be fully utilized to be near the locations of consumption. Strategic materials that are under the direct control of the government should be stored near the industrial production bases, locations that have convenient transportation access and are concealed, which can be used as soon as a war breaks out. Military strategic materials reserve should be done in a manner that even if the theater and strategic rear, troop and theater rear are carved up by the enemy, it still can support the requirement of independent operations. The reserves of every level must do their best in dispersed disposition, underground tunnel storage should be built for larger warehouses in order to avoid significant loss resulting from enemy air raids.

**Section Three: Armed Forces Preparation**

Armed force preparation is the war preparation activity carried out by the government or political groups in organizing army and other armed organizations according to the requirement of wars. Armed force preparation is the core of war

preparation and all other preparations are carried out around the armed force preparation.

1. OPTIMIZING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The army organizational development is comprised mainly by determining the rational size and the authorized size of the system needed. The sizes of the army are restricted by all kinds of conditions, in general they should be mutually adapted to the environment of national security, economic enduring capability, and long range development objectives. The sizes should not be too large, but not too small either. “A small army can not defend, but an army too large is hard to support.” Under high-tech conditions, the size of an army and its fighting capacity are not always in a direct ratio. If the size is too large, the quality of its weaponry can not be improved with the limited supporting funds, and this may even result in a lower fighting capacity. Therefore, under the premise of meeting the basic requirement of national security, we should do our best to compact the size of the army, and use the saved military funds in developing weaponry, which is the best choice of enhancing the quality of army development. A rational army size also needs a scientific army system establishment. The system establishment is an organizational form of personnel and the key elements of fighting capacity, such as weaponry. A scientific organization may combine personnel and weaponry organically to form a stronger fighting capacity. The adjustment and reform of an army system establishment: a. smooth up the relationship: make the ratio of officers and soldiers, officers and troop units, combat units and non-combat units more reasonable, organizations more crack, and units more substantial, and the joint operations command systems can adapt to the requirements of wars. b. optimize the structure in order to make the strength structure of service branches and branches of arms within the service branches suitable for the requirements of wars. The reform of the army system is a major event that may affect the overall system and has a far-reaching effect. It should be carried out in a steady and positive manner, under the premise of maintaining national security and the stability of the army. It requires full research and proof to form a frame and thought of a long-range overall adjustment and reform in order to make the reform a planned endeavor.

1. IMPROVEMENT OF WEAPONRY

Weaponry is the key integral part of the army’s fighting capacity, and it is the material foundation of carrying out operational duties. Under high-tech war conditions, the army fighting capacity is increasingly relying on high performance weaponry. According to the conditions of the structure of the army strength and the trend of development, and possible operational duties, we should determine a rational weaponry system, form tactics, campaigns, and strategic levels weapon systems that can be inter-complemented. At the same time, auxiliary facilities, repair facilities, simulation facilities, and infrastructure facilities should also be developed simultaneously. We may encounter difficulties in deploying some high and new technology weaponry in large quantities; generally, we should deploy only a part of such weapons for training purposes in order for the concerned units to master their performances. For current equipment, especially those that will still be useful in future wars, we should do our best to modify them with modern technologies in order to improve their performance and result in less investment, more production and high beneficial result. We should adopt a suitable competitive weaponry procurement system; carry out the combined approach of indigenous research and development, and active import, with indigenous research and development as the core. Under the condition of sufficient funding, we should import some selected advanced foreign weaponry that are beneficial to enhancing the modernization level of our army weaponry.

1. STRENGTHENING EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Education and training is the army’s core work in peacetime, and it is a basic way of transforming the potentials of personnel and weapons to real fighting capacity. It shortens the gap with actual combat operations. If we can make good use of education and training, we will be able to make good use of the army’s most basic link of practice in peacetime. Therefore, regardless of stopping war or winning war, education and training is placed in a strategic position. In carrying out successful education and training, first we must develop qualified military personnel. The key to ensuring the long lasting good quality of the army, and winning wars is people. The struggle for taking over the military commanding point is basically the race for talented people. Under high-tech conditions, the content of science and technology is getting higher in weaponry, knowledge will become the guiding factor of fighting capacity. The match with the enemy will be seen as a match between high quality talented personnel of the two sides. Therefore, we must carry out strengthening the effort of developing military personnel, and raise the level of training. At the same time, the rapid development of science and technology is having an increasingly stronger influence on military training, science and technology and military training integration has become an inevitable historic development. Therefore, the key to enhancing the military quality is carrying out successful military science and technology training, enhancing the science and technology content of military training. We must always maintain the advanced and scientific training content and method, and apply new scientific training approaches in order to make training more effective and closer to the requirements of high-tech wars.

VI. MAKE GOOD MOBILIZATION PREPARATION

The preparation of armed forces mobilization is a series of activities carried out by the government in leading the army and other armed organizations from the peacetime structure to the wartime structure. Generally, it includes the mobilization of active units, armed police units, reserve units, militia units, reserve personnel, and corresponding mobilization preparation of weaponry and materials. Armed force mobilization is the core content of war preparation. Good preparation will be significant to stopping wars, maintaining peace and national security, seizing strategic initiatives, and winning wars. In future wars, the content of science and technology in weaponry is high; attrition of materials is huge; eruptions are sudden, which require a higher degree of armed forces mobilization, and preparations should be done in peacetime. 1. Establish an active duty and reserve duty combined military service system. Maintain a crack standing army for use as the backbone in the early stage of operations and units’ expansion exercises; at the same time, establish a sound reserve service system, reserve a large number of well trained reserve personnel as the foundation for military personnel mobilization in wartime. 2. Establish a sound armed forces mobilization organization with authority, which carries out mobilization preparation in peacetime, and organizes mobilization implementation in wartime. A sound and complete mobilization plan should also be formulated for all mobilization preparations to be carried out in an orderly and planned manner. 3. Carry out reserve service registration. The focus of this registration are technical personnel of universities and colleges, science and technology research units, high and new technology firms who are eligible for reserve officer service and enlisted reserve service. 4. Establish reserve units and militia organizations. Our reserve service units are put into the arrays of the People’s Liberation Army, which are given fixed weaponry, and they are comprised of trained, politically reliable and high quality reserve personnel. These units carry out military training in peace time according to regulations, and they are transferred to serve active duties in wartime according to mobilization orders issued by the government. Militia units are organized from armed people who are not separated from production. Under the guidance of military organizations, these units are responsible for war preparation duties in peacetime and participate in combat and support duties in wartime. 5. Divide military specialty technical personnel reserve districts. Carry out integrated draft, reserve, and mobilization. 6. Reserve corresponding weaponry and war material. Register and list all the military and civilian dual-use materials, prepare draft and requisition plans for war preparation needs.

**Section Four: Battlefield Preparation**

Battlefield preparation includes preparations that are carried out in pre-determined battlefields according to operational requirement. It comprises mainly survey, planning, development and management carried out to pre-determined battlefields, and uses the results in creating favorable battlefield environments, supporting the smooth implementation of future operations. Battlefield preparation is carried out according to our national military strategy, operational duties of involved units, geographic environment of the pre-determined battlefields, possible enemies and national economic conditions.

1. THEATER DIVISION

A theater is also called a strategic region, which is a level one army organization, and a region divided and set up for carrying out strategic operational duties. It is a complete regional operational entity comprised of military, political, economic, natural and geographic elements, and it is an army command organization that lies between the Headquarters and the strategic campaign corps, which is provided with the command authority over the area under its control. It is deployed with corresponding army strength and weapons, and a relative independent operation system. Rationing theater division may constitute rational strategic layout, forming a favorable strategic posture, which is good for organizing a war or campaign operation.

A theater is an independent or relatively independent battlefield. Under local war conditions, a war is usually carried out centering on a theater. A theater should be provided with the function of mobilizing and organizing the manpower and materials of the entire region, and assuring military actions, and the ability of dealing with wars of different modes. Therefore, it must be provided with relative administrative and economic integrity, relative military independence and a large volume of space; geographically, and geographically easy for defense and offense, so it is beneficial to carry out its strategic duties under the guidance of the national general strategy, and fully exploit the superiority of the theater.

The theater division requires a comprehensive analysis of factors such as strategic positions, natural geographic characteristics, economic and social conditions, and the volume of the region, etc., in an effort to work out a complete operational system. This makes it not only good for every region’s independence, and protracted operations, but also easy to support each other. The theater division is not fixed or unchangeable, with the development and changes in domestic and international situations, changes may take place to a theater’s geographic limit, and theaters can be merged or taken apart.

The military region of People’s Liberation Army is provided with the characteristic of a theater, and it carries out a military region and theater combined system. Its main functions are under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and the Headquarters. It is based on the general strategic intentions, it works out the region’s operations plan, coordinates operational activities of the army, air force and navy units within the region and directly leads army units under its command for organization and development, military training, political works, logistic support and equipment development; and leads militia units, military service, mobilization, people’s air defense and battlefield development works in the region. This system is good for organizing armed forces development and operational actions within the coordinated region. We should make full use of the overall force of the people’s war and carry out our strategic operational duties.

1. BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT

Battlefield development is the battlefield preparation with building military projects and facilities in a pre-determined battlefield as its main content. It includes constructing defense projects, repair and building transportation lines, reshaping terrains, reserving operational materials, and compiling battlefield information, etc. A good battlefield project may result in advantageous postures in operational deployment, assure the security and stability of the operational command system, and enhance the effectiveness of weaponry. The U. S. military made a quantitative analysis and contrast on a number of battlefield project examples since WWII, the result indicated that use of similar weaponry, those battlefield examples with battlefield projects were able to lower the enemy’s offensive speed by 69 percent, on every kilometer of offensive advancement, the attacking side suffered 1.8 times more casualties than the defensive side, and destructed tanks were 1.2 times more. At the same time, excellent battlefield conditions are capable of providing offensive units of its own side with reliable covers and rear bases, store strategic and battle materials in advance, and support offensive operations to win.

Under high-tech conditions, reconnaissance measures have become omni-directional, all-weather, around the clock, and high efficiency three-dimensional reconnaissance systems, which make battlefield projects more vulnerable to enemy reconnaissance. Therefore, in our battlefield development, we should do well in concealment and camouflage against the characteristics of enemy reconnaissance, in order to provide functions such as optical reconnaissance, anti-infrared reconnaissance, and anti-radar reconnaissance, etc. In developing a battlefield, we should pay attention to rational layout, true and false and feint or ambush setups, develop a certain false position, feint targets to confuse the enemy. During the Kosovo war, Yugoslavians used concealment to protect the union’s strength effectively. Battlefield development should also pay attention to developing and using new protection materials and technologies in order to improve the project’s destruction resisting capability. According to the new situation that naval and air operations and information wars will become the main modes of operation in future wars, we should prioritize the development of naval and air battlefields and information facilities. Using all available conditions, expand and enhance the capacities of airports, docks, radar observation and communications stations, communications centers, electronic facilities, navigational facilities, etc.

The battlefield development of the arms of all service branches should be carried out with priorities and integration. The army battlefield development is mainly carried out for defense works required for future offensive and defensive operations, such as command and communications, transportation, logistic and technical support bases, anti-air strike, anti-landing projects and war materials advanced storage facilities, etc. The naval battlefield development includes the development of pre-determined operations sea area and coastal area operations facilities, mainly naval force station and dock facilities and logistical support, equipment maintenance, defense, command, and navigation systems that are used to support the stations and docks, surviving and maneuvering operations of the naval force. Among the above, naval station and dock system is the core of naval battlefield development. The air force battlefield development is mainly for developing an air force battlefield system with the airport net, command net, radar net, communications net, navigational net, meteorological net, technical support net, logistic support net, radio technology reconnaissance net, ground to air firing position net as its basic content, and the airport net as the principal part. The battlefield development of strategic guided missile units includes the battlefield development of land based, ship based and air based strategic guided missile units. Due to the fact that the land based strategic missiles are provided with a high hitting rate, maneuverability and flexibility, their battlefield positions are concealed, easy to be reinforced for anti-nuclear attacks, therefore, it is the principal part of the development of strategic guided missile units battlefield, which mainly includes construction of operational positions, command posts, reserve positions, construction and repair of roads and bridges, building defense facilities, and battlefield camouflage, etc. Under high-tech war, especially information war conditions, army, navy, air force and strategic guided missile units battlefield development must be integrated, for instance, army, navy and air force all have their air units, and they all need to build airports; the communications systems of all the arms of service branches have already been integrated. Therefore, it is required that the battlefield development of all the arms of service branches must be planned as a whole, in order to form a complete battlefield system.

**Section Five: Transformation from Peacetime Status to Wartime Status**

The switch from the state of peacetime to the state of wartime is the final stage of war preparation, and it is also the final critical moment. It requires that the war decision makers must be able to grasp the timing and assess the situation, making accurate assessment on war risks, issuing mobilization orders at an appropriate time, and transform the whole country or a part of the region, and concerned departments into the state of wartime.

1. SHIFTING TO THE STATE OF WARTIME AT AN APPAROPRIATE TIME

Grasp the opportunity, and make decisions at an appropriate time. The first problem we need to solve in transforming from the state of peacetime to the state of war time is making a right decision to go into a war; the key is correct analysis of and assessment of the enemy’s situation. We should fully use all kinds of approaches, widely collect hostile countries or region’s political economic and military conditions, and carry out a comprehensive analysis on this intelligence, under the enemy’s war intentions at the earliest possible time. We must determine if the war threat is potential or real, all-out or local, a single country, regional, or a group of countries, thus, we can determine the timing and approach of transforming from the state of peacetime to the state of wartime based on the assessed situation. Once we have entered the state of wartime, the political, military, economic, cultural, diplomatic activities of the entire country will be transformed into the state of wartime accordingly. If the decision is wrong, acting too early may affect our national economic development, which may result in unnecessary anxieties, and we may become passive internationally. To act too late, may affect our armed force’s strategic deployment, which may result in passiveness and losses in the early stage of the war.

Issuing mobilization orders. The mobilization order is an order announcing that the entire country, a part or region or certain departments are entering the state of wartime. Mobilization orders are usually issued by the highest authorities, the head of the state or the head of the government. Our constitution provides that the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee should make the decision and issue the order on behalf of the President of China. The issuance of the mobilization order is a routine process of war preparation. A kind of situation may happen in wars, in which a country may have already entered war mobilization, the mobilization order, however, is not issued. During the war of aggression against Vietnam, for instance, the U. S. did the same. The method of issuing mobilization orders are divided into two categories, public issuance and secret issuance. Regardless if it is public mobilization or secret mobilization, the order should be distributed to concerned organizations and personnel via all the allowed transmission methods at the fastest speed.

Shift to the state of wartime. After the mobilization order is issued, regions, departments, and businesses responsible for mobilization duties should switch to the wartime system quickly according to the mobilization plan. The armed forces switch to the state of wartime quickly. All the active duty military personnel are not allowed to retire or to be transferred to civilian jobs, visit relatives and take leaves, personnel on leave are called back immediately, units responsible for combat should be assembled at assigned locations for replenishing weapons and equipment, and move to front lines quickly, based on situations. The reserve units should be assembled quickly for replacing uniforms, issuing weapons and equipment, carrying out handover, change of command, clarifying duties, and carrying out training before fighting the war with limited time. The militia units should carry out preparations for fighting the war and supporting the front line, and organize into established units, and take necessary training, and if conditions permit, form new units (or elements). Economic departments should mobilize civilian factories production switches, in order to produce weapons, equipment and war materials badly needed by the front line troops. Science and technology research organizations should draw human and financial resources for researching and developing needed weaponry. The education sector should organize local concerned colleges and universities to train and develop personnel for the military. The propaganda and cultural department should carry out political mobilization, propagate patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and join the army and join the war propaganda education. Foreign and foreign trade departments should actively seek foreign aid, establish a united front through all kinds of approaches, making friends and attacking enemies. All businesses are mobilized and switched to wartime systems with organizations and plans in order to serve for the war.

1. LOCAL MOBILIZATION AND GENERAL MOBILIZATION

War mobilizations that are carried out after switched to the state of wartime are divided into local mobilization and general mobilization according to their different scales.

The local mobilization is the mobilization that is carried out by the government in certain areas and departments. When a part of the region is under the threat of war, generally, the government only carries out mobilization in that area and its surrounding areas, making people, military personnel, and concerned political, economic, propaganda, cultural, etc. organizations in that area to switch from the state of peacetime to the state of war time. Concerned departments or companies in other areas should carry out necessary mobilizations according to the requirement of the war to support areas that are facing war threats. The state of the armed forces are under unified deployment of the government. After the founding of our country, this type of mobilization has been carried out during wars carried out by our country such as the War against U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea and other border self-defense counter attacks. Local mobilizations are usually carried out only in certain departments, mainly in the armed forces and other concerned departments. The United Kingdom in Britain-Argentine War at the Falklands in April, 1982, the U. S. France, and Britain in the Gulf War, and NATO forces in Kosovo War all carried out this type of mobilization.

The general mobilization is the overall mobilization carried out by the government over the entire country. The government will shift military, political, economic, science, technology, cultural and diplomatic activities onto the track of wartime, and carry out unified allocation of human, material and financial resources for the war. General mobilizations are usually carried out while the country is facing large scale wars, which require the forces of the entire country to be implemented. During WWI and WWII, all the participating countries carried out general mobilization. During our war against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party issued “The Ten Guiding Principles for Resisting Japan and Saving Our Country,” in mobilizing all the nations, political parties and factions, industries, agricultural quarters, business quarters, and academic sectors in the country to participate and support the War against Japan. After WWII, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the war against the U. S. Aggression, Egypt and Israel in the Middle East War, Iraq in the Gulf War, and Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War all carried out general mobilization.

Carrying out general mobilization or local mobilization should be determined by the scale of war and the national strategic intentions. The scale of mobilization must correspond with the scale of war, thus, war requirements can be met, initiatives can be seized, and war winning conditions can be created. General mobilizations and local mobilizations can be switched under certain conditions. With the expanding of the scale of war, a local mobilization may be upgraded to a general mobilization; with the shrinking scale of war, the general mobilization originally carried out in all the country’s trades, professions, and industries may be switched to local mobilization gradually. The guiding official of war preparation must handle these changes properly; make adjustment to the mobilization at appropriate times, in order to fit the requirements of the war.

In sum, the following principles must be followed in carrying out successful war preparation:

Carry out unified leadership, and take into consideration the overall situation. War preparation is a government action. In our country, strengthening the Chinese Communist Party and the government political power under its leadership that provides unified leadership to the war preparation is an essential assurance for carrying out successful war preparation. Only by doing so, we can have a strong political core, and united willpower and united actions. At the same time, it is also required that all the relationships must be handled correctly under the unified leadership. 1. Handle the relationship between the primary strategic direction and the secondary strategic direction correctly. Under the premise of arranging the overall nationwide war preparation, the government should do its best to carry out war preparation in the strategic direction. 2. Properly handle the relationship between the armed forces war preparation and other preparations. While treating armed forces preparation as the focus of war preparations, preparations such as science and technology, industry, agriculture, transportation, post and telecommunications should also be carried out successfully. 3. Correctly handle the relationship between military supplies and civilian supplies, under the premise of following the overall national economic development situation, carry out war preparations with plan, priorities, steps, and proper pace according to the degree of national security threats, make every effort to make the war preparation work develop and strengthen with the national economic development every year, in order to enhance the ability of dealing with wars continuously.

Manufacture products for both wartime and peacetime use, manufacture products for both military and civilian use. The government should put war preparation into the entire national economic development and social development planning; it should make every effort in carrying out integrated military and civilian supplies, peacetime and wartime inter-connections, which may produce double social and defense beneficial results, not only developing the economy and improving people’s living standard, but also carrying out successful war preparation, and ensuring national security. In the development of the armed forces, we should take a road of a combined crack standing army and a strong reserve force, in order to keep a small army in peacetime and have a large army to deploy in wartime. On the defense industry, military industrial companies not only produce military products, they also produce for civilian use, thus, military industrial productivity is maintained with civilian support of military industries. In peacetime, civilian firms should consider the need to convert for manufacturing military products in wartime. On science and technology, both the military and local firms should carry out mutual achievement transfers; develop science and technology personnel who can be used by both the military and the local people, so put defense science and technology in the development of national science and technology. On battlefield development, communications net, roads, airports, ports, docks and bridges, etc. should be built for use by both the military and the local people. On strategic material reserves, the requirement of war and disaster rescue support should be combined, and reserves and development and utilization should also be combined in order to convert passive reserves to active reserves.

Long term accumulation and laying a good foundation. War preparation in peacetime is the foundation for carrying out war in wartime. The quality of preparation will determine the outcome of wars. Never fight a war without preparation is a long standing principle of operational guidance, and it is a basic guiding ideology of carrying out war preparation. Future wars will raise newer and higher requirements for war preparation, and preparation work will be more complex and arduous. Therefore, war preparation must adhere to the guiding principle of long term accumulation, carry it through the beginning and ending period of peacetime development, in order to reserve powerful war potentialities through continued preparation to meet the requirement of wars.

Overall preparation and prominent focal point. Wars involve all the aspects of social life, thus, in carrying out full preparation, we must take into consideration all the aspects from material to spiritual, from systems to laws and regulations, and from macro and micro, etc. Our country has long border lines, vast territories, and a large number of neighbors, and our international environment and peripheral surroundings are very complex, therefore, it is impossible that the future wars we will face are of a fixed mode. As a result, our war preparation must fit the requirement of protecting our national security, and it must be provided with the ability to deal with complex and difficult situations and different modes of operation.

**Chapter Eight**

**War Control**

War control is the limiting and restraining actions the leader of a war takes consciously on the eruption, development, intensity, and the aftermath of the war. The objective of war control is preventing wars, once a war is unavoidable, we should control its vertical and lateral escalations, and make every effort in paying a small price for a big victory. War controls includes arms control, crisis control and armed clash control, etc., which are the key contents of current strategic studies and strategic guidance.

**Section One: Arms Control**

Arms control refers to monitoring and limiting activities over the status of arms development. Practically speaking, arms control refers to certain restraints carried out by concerned parties on the volumes, characteristics, deployment and approaches and rules of use of arms through the form of treaties or agreements, and it is a compromise reached by concerned parties in consideration of their own security interests. Arms control should do its best to maintain the strategic balance between concerned countries through military powers and activities.

Arms control includes military capability control and military activity control, existing military forces control and military forces development control, military forces quantity control and military forces quality control, and unilateral military forces control and bilateral and multi-lateral military forces control. Even though it is impossible for arms control to eliminate wars fundamentally, serious arms control, however, is actually beneficial to adjusting the strategic relationship between countries, alleviating and limiting the escalation of arms races, creating an atmosphere of mutual trust, and, as a result, the objective of preventing and controlling wars is achieved. Therefore, arms control is a key link in the chain of war control.

1. THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMS CONTROL

As a unique non-war military measure, arms control is provided with its own characteristics:

1. It is political. As a strategic measure of maintaining national interests, arms control should follow and serve specially designated political goals. It is a major diplomatic activity of a country, as well as a form of international political and military struggles. At the same time, it is a measure or method of struggles taken by the leader of wars to affect or even change the action and will of the other side with the “energy” of military force and the possible result through arms control dialogues that act on the cognition and information systems of the opposition side.

2. It is not directly violent. As a key aspect of non-war military actions, arms control is a “non-direct violent” strategic exchange that is built on the foundation of force, and it is the application of “latent” peaceful means of the military force. Therefore, in peacetime, a number of countries usually conceal their political characters and strategic intentions by exaggerating the peaceful nature of arms control, and interfere with other countries in making their correct strategic decisions.

3. It is limited. The goals achieved by arms control are usually the result of compromises and concessions of interests made by concerned parties. Achieving the goals of arms control usually depends on the willing implementation of the concerned articles of arms control agreement by the concerned parties on a voluntary basis. Although a number of arms control treaties and agreements are provided with verification mechanisms, however, the scope and methods of verification are limited. At the same time, arms control can only make certain adjustments to the process of the arms race and its content, which has some impact on alleviating the situation; however, it can not stop the arms race fundamentally.

4. It is balanced. Judging from the history of arms control, almost every arms control agreement was reached as the result of the relative balance between certain interests and strengths of the concerned parties. The parties of arms control are always trying to restrain the other side through a myriad of means in order to gain certain strategic benefits for themselves. When the content of negotiation has affected significant strategic interest of any involved party, the arms control agreement will be hard to reach.

5. It is related. The world is an inter-dependent and inter-related organic body, the military action of any country may affect a number of countries. In the interacted relations of association of countries, the actions of arms control of any country will cause chain reactions.

1. THE STATEGIC OBJECTIVE, PROCESS AND METHOD OF IMPLMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL

Arms control intends to provide greater security with a lower level of arms, and gain maximum security benefit with the smallest possible security investment. Judging from the angle of war control, the functions of arms control are: 1. Adjust the strategic relationship between countries, stabilize or lower the level of arms confrontations. 2. Adjust the scale, speed, and level of arms development, and make it controllable. 3. Restrain the growth of triggering factors of war at a certain level, prevent wars, especially sudden, and accidental wars.

Arms control is a complicated process that is affected by a myriad of domestic and foreign policy and technical factors. Generally speaking, this process can be divided into three stages.

1. Agreement negotiation. Arms control, diplomatic and security policies and strategy development have an inseparable relationship. Whether or not an arms control negotiation should be carried out is determined by four factors: Strategic stability assessment and the view on threats this stability may face; emergence of new weapons and technologies; the degree of verification of the agreement; and international and domestic political situation.

2. Implementation and management. The management of the agreement involves promoting and verification of the implementation of the articles of the agreement, and sanctions against actions of violation. The implementation of the agreement may bring up some political and technical problems, as well as financial and social problems, which merit special attention.

3. Verification. An arms control agreement will produce good results only if all the signatory countries of the agreement are willing to honor its provisions. Therefore, it is very important to include proper verification systems in the agreement. Verification is generally provided under three methods: 1. on the desk control, i.e., using reconnaissance carried out by commonly used reconnaissance equipment; 2. national technical reconnaissance, such as satellite reconnaissance; 3. site inspection.

Arms control is divided into vertical arms control and lateral arms control, the former aims at limiting or reducing the scope of military potentialities, and the latter aims at the proliferation of certain arms. The methods of arms control implementation reflect the complexity of the objective of arms control.

>From the subject of arms control, the methods of implementation can be divided into three categories: 1. it is implemented through self-restraint of the country that has passed the agreement, i.e., unilateral declaration of arms control measures; 2. implemented through negotiation and settlement by diplomatic talks between two countries that have direct interests, and implemented it in the form of agreement; 3. the agreement is reached through negotiations of a number of countries, the multi-lateral agreement with binding force is reached in the form of international law.

From the point of view of the operating form of arms control, there are five methods of implementation: 1. The approach of limitation. Each side strictly stipulates and restricts the plans of arms development in order to prevent imbalanced military force. 2. The method of prohibition. Clear rules should be worked out for the realm of undeveloped arms and the scope of certain strategic weapons that have yet been deployed, and prohibit any party to seek superiority within these realms and scopes. 3. The method of reduction. Reduction should be carried out on weapons systems that no longer have strategic significance, in order to alleviate the tense relationship between countries and the world situation, or change the focus of the arms race. 4. The method of prevention. Prevent nuclear countries from proliferating nuclear material, nuclear technology, and nuclear devices to non-nuclear countries, and eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear wars resulting from nuclear countries’ expansion and nuclear weapon modification. 5. The method of freeze and adjustment. Freeze saturated weapon systems, adjust strategic weapon development plans according to the military force balance and one’s own requirements, enhance survivability and attacking capacity of strategic weapon systems, and stabilize the balance relationship of the strategic force.

We can see that the methods of implementing arms control are provided with the characteristics of interaction, flexibility and compulsion. Interaction means that all the concerned parties of arms control should consult one another; truly effective agreement can be reached and implemented fully only through mutual trust and mutual understanding. Flexibility means the stress of cooperation and compromise in arms control struggles, flexible use of principles and policies and dialectical unity. Compulsion means all the parties involved in arms control must carry out the concerned obligations of the treaty according to the international treaty, and a strict verification mechanism is based on the premise of compulsion.

From the point of view of the concrete realm of arms control, the practical methods of implementation are generally as follows:

Ban weapons and weapon systems. This method includes abolishing or destroying existing weapon systems, preventing the import of weapon systems, banning research and development of the quality of the existing weapon systems and new weapon systems, etc.

Quantity and quality restrictions. Carry out quantitative balance. Determine the limit of arms and armed forces, or at least reach an agreement freezing certain weapons, while carrying out qualitative restrictions.

Nonproliferation. This is the focus of lateral arms control, and it is a special form of arms export control policies. Nonproliferation means countries that own certain technologies and materials do not transfer them to countries that attempt to obtain them, so the latter will not be able to do so. The “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” signed in 1968 is an example. The concept of non-proliferation is being applied to chemical weapons and certain guided missile technologies.

Geographic restriction of military uses. Ban the use of certain specially designated geographic areas for military purposes. For example, the 1968 “South Pole Treaty,” the 1972 “”seabed Treaty,” the 1976 “Space Treaty,” and the 1984 “Moon Treaty,” etc. that ban military facilities construction and weapons and weapons of mass destruction testing in the involved areas. The concept of the peace zone and the non-nuclear zone, which had been very popular during the 70’s and 80’s of the 20th century, is a new development of lateral arms control.

Establishment of means of trust and security. The purpose is to reduce and eliminate war danger and eliminate the possibilities of surprise attacks caused by misunderstanding, communications disruption, and technical malfunctions, if conditions permit. These measures include the establishment of direct communications links, overhead verifications, establishment of ground observation posts, exchange military visits, etc. between governments.

1. THE BASIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ARMS CONTROL

In order to promote the development of arms control moving in the direction of justice, rationality, comprehensability, and balance, the following basic principles should be followed in international arms control struggles:

1. Create a favorable international atmosphere and conditions for arms control. Impel all countries to follow the goals and principles of maintaining international peace and security established by the “Charter of the United Nations,” and the requirements of concerned international laws. The guiding strategists should do their best in preventing arms control being turned into a tool of powerful countries for controlling weaker countries, and measures for optimizing arms, and seeking unilateral military superiority by a small number of countries. While trying hard for arms control, we should solve all kinds of regional conflicts with justice and rationality, and firmly oppose seeking force or armed threat in international relations. Because, hegemonism and power politics are significant disasters of world peace and development, they also have a direct impact on the process of international arms control, even make it going backward.

2. Assurance for non-violation of national sovereignty and security, maintaining a proper defense and self-defense capability is a basic right provided for every sovereign country by international laws. All countries, regardless of whether they are big or small, have the right to participate in discussing and resolving arms control issues on an equal basis. Guiding strategists must stand firm in defending national independence and sovereignty and opposing any countries in interfering with the internal affairs of his or any other countries in the international arms control struggle.

3. The principles of abiding by equal negotiations, opposing forced arms control. Arms control must be bilateral, not unilateral, and it is negotiated on an equal basis, not bullied as in “only control others but not himself”. We must stand firm in opposing exercising double standards in arms control, and implementing “forced arms control.” We must firmly oppose coercing small countries into accepting unequal military conditions with such approaches as political pressures, economic sanctions, diplomatic interferences, military threats, or even military attacks, and hurt the legitimate national rights and interests of weak and small countries.

4. Preventing and stopping the new round of arms races. We oppose not only treating arms control as a direct measure limiting or weakening the opponents’, and maintaining and developing our own military superiority, or even seeking new military superiority. After the cold war ended, the new round of the arms race fighting for high-tech superiority has been getting worse. Especially, certain countries are backing away from their original positions in the arms control agreement, in an attempt to develop and deploy guided missile defense systems, which for sure will ruin the balance of world strategic balance, and lead to a significant reverse of the situation of arms control. This is a serious challenge to the realm of international arms control.

**Section Two: Crisis Control**

Crisis refers to a dangerous situation when relations between countries or political groups are reaching the crossroad of conflict or military clashes. It occurs or is developed under two conditions: 1. Contradictions that are existing in two or more opponents are deteriorating, which may result in the significant increased possibility of military confrontations between the two sides, or the state of military stability that results in the existence of the two opposing sides is deteriorating significantly; 2. Serious imbalance of military forces makes the relations between two opponents deteriorate, or pose a significant challenge to the current structure of certain international relations.

As a part of war control, crisis control is the control over political or political emergencies that are the result of intensified contradictions of interest between two countries. It works on the entire process of the evolution of crisis and all its component elements, and it is an active control of the subject of crisis management over all the unstable and undetermined elements of the process of crisis.

1. THE STANDING AND FUNCTION OF CRISIS CONTROL

According to concerned statistics, during the 57 years between 1929 -1985, 323 international crises took places in the world, an average of 6 annually, and a total of 698 countries have been involved in these crises.1 We may say that as a phenomena of changing or destroying the state of system balance, crisis is a product of intensified contradiction. Although it has not yet resorted completely to force, it is full of the danger of wars and close to wars, and it is possible to transform to wars. Whether or not we can

1. Hu Ping: “International Conflicts Analysis and Crisis Management study,” Military Yiwen Press, 1993 Edition, pp.223.

carry out effective crisis control will be determined by the escalation of the crisis toward war development, or the crisis is resolved gradually and key elements of peace are recovered.

A complete crisis control strategy includes not only efforts to limit destruction and passive influences of crisis within the smallest scope, and resolve the crisis by paying a minimum price in the shortest time possible, in order to prevent the crisis being transformed into wars. It also includes the vigorous elimination of crisis causing passive elements, stopping crisis before it germinates. Crisis control theories should require guiding strategists paying close attention to prevent and stop conflicts before they take place, and this has a positive significance.

Unless there is a special significance or purpose, the basic purpose of crisis control is to prevent a crisis from developing into a conflict. The concept and theories of crisis control are produced by preventing the development of a crisis, and that develops with the development of conflict prevention practices. As world basic contradictions and hegemonism are still in existence, crises can not be avoided completely. Strengthening crisis control and vigorously establishing a sound crisis control mechanism are provided with an important strategic significance.

1. THE MEASURES OF CRISIS PREVENTION AND CRISIS CONTROL

Crisis is a process of development, which includes the stages of the beginning of crisis, crisis escalation, crisis degradation, and the end of crisis. The beginning of a crisis indicates that the levels of interactions of conflicts between two opponents are rising; its characteristic is the gradual feeling of threat from external opponent(s). Crisis escalations are usually seen as a synonym of crisis; it indicates a stronger situation twist than the beginning stage of crisis, the possibility of conflict eruption is rising. The stage of crisis escalation is usually accompanied by military actions such as army alert, mobilization, troop transfer, or deployment changes, etc., which make the sense of threat more acute. Crisis degradation is a reversed process of crisis escalation, which is characterized by the drop of the number and intensity of interactions of conflicts. The end of crisis signals the end of conflicting interactions between opponents, the end of crisis, however, can not completely recover to the state prior to the crisis. After a crisis is ended, the result and influence produced by the crisis are often not limited to a certain aspect, level, or relationship between countries, as international systems, and even the mode of behavior of international politics may be affected.

In the realm of strategy, crisis control and crisis handling are carried out with the following measures:

1. The measure of building up trust. When concerned countries want to prevent crisis between them, they will establish concerned measures of trust in the sensitive realm that involve their major mutual interests, such as scheduled meetings of high level officials, military exercises announcing systems, scheduled border meetings, establishing hot line communications, etc. These measures may help concerned countries in prompt negotiation if an emergency situation takes place, in order to prevent unintentional crisis escalation.

2. Increased transparency. It is in fact a process of information exchange, i.e., publicize the country’s own intention and capability to a certain extent, in order to reduce the opposite side’s feeling of threat. For instance, on a voluntary and not endangering national security interest basis, foreign policies and military strategy and strength may be publicized according to the country’s conditions; under the premise of not leaking national military secrets. Major military activities such as military expansion or reduction, alert, development, and deployment adjustment status of military units, can be informed to concerned countries selectively.

3. Strengthen personnel exchange and contact. Improve mutual understanding and friendship through establishing the head of state hot lines, carrying out exchange visits of high level political and military officials. When a crisis emerges, the two concerned sides can communicate directly; correctly and promptly inform the other side of its intention and determination, and exchange each other’s views, in order to avoid distortions and delays in the process of information transmission.

4. Mutual arms reduction and control. Through arms reduction and arms control, crisis can be prevented or resolved, strategic balance can be maintained, and arms races can be controlled. A series of existing arms control and reduction bilateral international treaties have provided some practical and feasible measures and approaches for crisis control and management.

5. Formulate rules and establish supervision organizations. Established rules of crisis control should stand firm on justice, effective and scientific standards. At the same time, an authoritative and legal executive supervision organization should be established to ensure the implementation of the rules.

When preventive measures are not effective, and crises can not be avoided, we should take a further step by using measures to delay and prevent the escalation of crisis to prompt an early ending of the crisis. In this respect, negotiation becomes the main approach of resolving the crisis.

Negotiation is a special form of struggle, and it is a complicated process of making mutual concessions or conditional promises carried out by concerned countries for resolving crises; it is a key approach of handling crisis. Whether or not a negotiation is appropriate may result in significant impact on the process and outcome of the crisis.

Before a negotiation begins, good preparation is the foundation of successful negotiation. A negotiation can be carried out only on the foundation of full preparation. The position of negotiation is determined by the interests of the negotiators. Through creative thinking, negotiators can come up with selective plans that can not only reflect their side of need, but also easily be acceptable to the other side, and this is a basic requirement of negotiations. Negotiations are also a strategic art, which is provided with rich negotiating tactics and skills. Negotiators who knows how to use negotiating tactics not only can win maximum benefits for their side, sometimes they are also able to turn around the process of negotiation, in order to make it develop in a favorable direction.

1. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CRISIS CONTROL

Even though the character, category, scale, characteristic and impact of every crisis are different, and the approaches of crisis control are also different, on the basis of understanding the basic rules of crisis evolution, however, strategic handling of the general principles of crisis control has an important strategic significance on the process of controlling a crisis effectively, and heading off the crisis altogether.

1. Weigh advantages and disadvantages properly, find out the point of intersection of interests. In a crisis, guiding strategists should know how to weigh advantages and disadvantages, and fully access crisis escalation and degradation, the efficiency and cost ratio of war and peace, go for advantages and avoid disadvantages, make the best use of the situation, in order to achieve the objective of crisis control and stop the crisis. In this respect, the basic interest and general interest, current interest and long-term interest should be handled properly, and the focus should be on maintaining the basic interest and long-term interest; we should not only consider our own strategic interest, we should also acknowledge the basic interest of the opponent being endangered, otherwise, the opponent may give up on peaceful solutions for resolving the crisis, and seek the approaches of crisis escalation or even conflict to solve the problems.

2. Appropriate compromise; make every effort to “double win” or “multiple win.” Crisis control and management signifies a certain compromise or interest exchange of the contradictory two sides. If no one wants to make a concession, and insists on his own opinions, when a crisis is developed to a certain stage, it may result in serious confrontations and even conflicts. Therefore, in order to prevent a crisis going out of control, the guiding strategists should try to get both sides, and/or at least one side to make necessary concessions. Naturally, for their own side, many crisis controls are not “zero-sum” games, as long as all the involved parties are sincere in solving the problems, and are willing to make concessions, avoid the use or view of the “zero-sum” game approach in dealing with crisis, a “double win” or “multiple win” result can be attained.

3. Maintain continuous communications between the two sides and send clear and true information to the opposite side. In a situation of a fierce confrontation between the two sides carrying out negotiations, suspicions between them, mistrust and hostility are getting worse quickly, any insignificant action taken by a side may be seen as a threat to the other side, thus, the confrontation may become more intensified. Therefore, the guiding strategists should pay attention to communicate continuously with the other side in a situation of confronting crisis, and send clear and true information to the other side continuously. In addition, concerned issues of the crisis should be discussed in order to avoid misunderstanding and misjudgment by the opposite side.

4. Use forced measures carefully, prevent negative impact. Forced measures are carried out mainly for stopping a crisis or preventing crisis from being expanded or prolonged. These measures include mainly weapons embargo, economic sanctions, and military blockades, etc. Under specially designated conditions, these measures have a certain positive significance on the situation of crisis control; however, taking forced approaches may intensify contradictions, thus lead to crisis escalation. Sometimes, they may provide excuses for the intervention of power politics, which will help the new interventionism.

In sum, in crisis control, dialogues are better than confrontations, political settlements are better than military force settlements or threats, and preventive control is more desirable than forced control.

**Section Three: Armed Conflict Control**

As crisis control is not always effective, if a crisis is out of control, it may develop into an armed clash and a local war. Once a crisis is turned into an armed clash and local war, the duty of guiding strategists is to strengthen the control over the armed clash, in an effort to avoid further widening and escalation.

1. THE CONTENT OF ARMED CLASH CONTROL

Speaking of the elements of armed clashes, armed clash control mainly involves the goal, approaches, object, method, time, and space control of the conflict.

1. Control the goal of armed clashes. It is important to control the goal, and it is the most basic control. If the strategic goal of an armed clash is running out of control, it may lead to very serious consequences. Armed clashes in history often resulted in both sides trying to conquer each other to the extreme, by seizing resources, extorting compensations, occupying territories as the strategic goal of armed clashes. These unlimited and absolute goals will never work under modern conditions. All the parties of modern armed clashes must accept the strict restraint of political goals in their strategic goals. The international relations criteria represented by the United Nations Charter are used to determine rights and wrongs, and the essential basis of strategic goals.

2. Control the approaches of armed clashes. In recent history, under the condition that the destructive power of operational approaches were still relatively limited, the international community had already used strict restrictions in the form of international laws on operational approaches, and it banned the weapons with extreme lethality, random killing or injury, and cruelty, and banned the use of suffocating, poisoning, and germ weapons. Under modern conditions, not only nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are provided with power of mass destruction, even conventional weapons are also provided with unprecedented explosive forces. For example, a part of high-performance missiles, high explosive cluster bombs, and a number of new concept weapons are capable of producing compatible destruction effects as a small nuclear weapon. Therefore, the current armed clash approaches emphasize banning of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction in armed clashes.

3. Control the target of armed clash. Making strict distinctions between peaceful civilians and combat personnel is a basic principle of the law of war. If an armed clash is unavoidable, guiding strategists must strengthen the control over the object of the armed clash, peaceful civilians and civilian things should not be the target of armed clashes; for projects or facilities that contain dangerous forces, such as reservoirs, dams, and nuclear power stations, should not be targeted even if they are targets with strategic value.

4. Control the method of armed clashes. The international laws clearly stipulate the banning of the operational method of random attacking and bombing of personnel, areas, and things of different characters; ban the operational method of controlling the natural process, changing the conditions, contents and structures of the earth (including biological groups, rocks, under water levels, and atmospheric layer, etc) or the outer space, and using them for military purposes, which may result in widespread, long-term and serious harms; ban large scale random air and naval bombing against large cities, industrial centers, people massing areas that are treated as direct bombing targets; ban extreme cruel barbarian collective killings such as the shocking “Nanjing massacre” carried out by the Japanese militarists “animal group.” The above-mentioned requirements are still quite significant. Guiding strategists should pay close attention to carrying out the control of armed clash methods.

5. Control the duration of armed clashes. “There has never been a case that a country will benefit from a protracted war.” 1  Once an armed clash takes place, its process should be controlled, and try to end the clash as soon as possible. The modern high-tech armed clashes not only require shortened clash durations, they also speed up the pace of clashes, and the shortened process of armed clashes has provided the technical possibility. Naturally, when a small and weak country fights a powerful country in a war, the former often uses time in exchange for space, in order to carry out the transformation from passive to active, this use of time, however, is also relative, not unlimited.

6. Control the space of armed clashes. The battlefield space of modern wars has been expanded significantly, and the integrated multi-dimensional ground, sea, air, and electromagnetic battlefield has been formed, and the war system is increasingly global. These developments, however, do not mean that the space of war actions can be expanded without limit. On the contrary, because of the expansion of the related space of the clash, the control of modern war space becomes more warranted. The control of modern war space should require specially the strengthening of the control over outer space, and oppose militarizing outer space. They should require that under the restriction of the political goal of wars, every effort should be made to restrict the battlefield within a limited scope, in order to reduce the war’s negative impact on the stability and peace of the international community.

1. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARMED CLASHES CONTROL

Armed clashes involve national territories, sovereignty, and interests, and they have an impact on regional government relations and even international strategic situations. Therefore, guiding strategists should follow certain aspects in carrying out armed clash control:

First, we should be always prepared, and prevent the problem before it starts. The agent of armed clashes is complicated, sudden, thus, we must rely on preparation in dealing with armed clashes effectively. Clashes can happen anytime, even in a situation of stable international strategic situations and benign peripheral security environments. Clashes may still take place, triggered by accidents. Therefore, in terms of strategy, we should maintain high alert, and be ready to deal with all sudden incidents. We should strengthen the collection of strategic intelligence, find out symptoms promptly, and make scientific forecasts on the situation of crisis, correctly assessing the possibility and character of clashes. We should have a draft strategic plan, in order to get prepared and deal with the clashes handily.

Secondly, we should be quickly and decisive, and make every effort in seizing the initiative. Once an armed clash is unavoidable, we should try our best in seizing the strategic initiative. Armed clashes are a form of struggle that is strongly limited by

time factors, thus, quick decisions are the key to seizing the strategic initiative. When

A clash occurs, all the parties that take active actions want to grasp the advantageous opportunities, act quickly, and make every effort in defeat the other side before the latter has a chance to react. The party that is forced to react also emphasizes quick reaction, and carrying out quick situation assessments, quick decision making, and quick action taking.

Finally, we must react flexibly, and stop clashes effectively. When a clash occurs, we should base our decisions on the requirements of political and diplomatic struggles in regulating military actions strictly, trying hard to win without a fight, or to defeat the enemy with a small force.

1. Quote from “An annotation of Sun Zi On The Art of War” Military Press, 1991, pp. 23

When the opponent tries to escalate the clash, but has not had a chance to do so, we should try hard to stop the opponent before hand. When the opponent begins to carry out escalation or deterrence, we must do the same, using similar escalation or greater escalation to defeat the opponent’s escalation and deterrent. When the opponent tries to cause trouble at an advantageous time, and triggers a clash, we should not only take quick and firm actions to attack the trouble maker fiercely in retaliation, we should also avoid over reactions that may result in expanded clashes.

**Section Four: Strategic Guidance of War Control**

The essence of war control is a type of active control and handling of war by guiding strategists. As evidenced by practices, as long as guiding strategists can make full use of subjective initiatives, carry out correct strategic guidance to a certain degree, crisis and crisis escalation can be prevented, and the goal of war control can be achieved.

1. ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL INTEREST, CARRY OUT WAR CONTROL

National interest is the sum total of the requirement of national survival and development. Maintaining and improving national interest is the basic agent of all the national external actions, and it is also the starting point and the home of guiding strategists in carrying out war controls. Therefore, if guiding strategists want to carry out war controls effectively, they must do the following: 1. They must understand and handle the national interest, correctly deal with the basic national interest and the general national interest, long term interest and short term interest, overall interest and local interest from the height of the overall strategy. Generally speaking, we must resort to force only if our basic national interest, long-term interest, and overall interest are under serious threat, and there is no way we can resolve it with measures other than war. 2. Place military forces under the control of strict national interest goals. 3. The selection of war approaches must be corresponding with the goals or interest to be achieved. War leaders should select corresponding military measures according to the goals of national interests they want to maintain and achieve. Deploying the military force properly is a required condition for effective war control. 4. War leaders should make adjustment to the original military strategy as they wish, according to the gains and losses of the national interests. At the same time, we must use it as a basis in controlling the pace and intensity of war, and end the war at an appropriate time.

II. OVERALL FULL PREPARATON SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT FOR WAR CONTROL

For guiding strategists, “A war can not be won without plans and preparation in advance,” 1 similarly, without advance plans and preparation, it will be difficult to carry out effective war control. A successful war control is established on the basis of overall full preparation.

The war control preparation comprises two aspects of spiritual preparation and material preparation. If a guiding strategist wants to make advance preparations for war control, he must have scientific foresight on the prospect of crisis or war. A successful war control should be started on a long term basis, devote the efforts to preventing crisis formation and eruption fundamentally, and/or stop them, or eliminate them when they are still germinating. Because of this, guiding strategists should keep a close eye on current international strategic situations; clearly and objectively understand the type, intensity, and development trend of the conflicts of interest between concerned countries, in order to provide necessary assurances for carrying out material preparations. The length of a strategic early warning period, and whether or not the forecast on the prospect of crisis and clashes is scientific are not only a yard stick for measuring the levels of their competence, they are also a pre-condition for determining the outcome of war control.

Second, there should be a plan or advanced proposal in place dealing with various crises and incidents. In order to be fully prepared when a crisis or clash takes place, and enhance the control ability over crises and clashes, emergency plans and programs should be done in normal times. The emergency plans and programs of war control should take into full consideration all of the complex factors of crises and clashes, and take corresponding countermeasures and actions, at the same time, save enough time for guiding strategists to make timely adjustments to original plans and programs according to the changing situations.

Finally, we should develop war control preparations on the foundation of our firm and dependable strength. Strength is not only the backing of arms control negotiations, it is also a pre-condition for carrying out controls over crises and armed clashes. As evidenced by experiences in history, guiding strategists’ ability of controlling wars are closely related to their own countries’ comprehensive strength. A country with minimal strength will find difficulties in doing anything for war or crisis control, and it often becomes the easy target of aggression and control of hegemonists. Therefore, strength preparation is the most basic and dependable preparation of all the war control preparations.

1. FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES IN CARRYING OUT WAR CONTROL.

As a major strategic issue, war control must be acted on and influenced by political, economic, science and technology, diplomatic, and cultural factors. Similarly, all the strategic measures are provided with different positions and functions in war control. Generally speaking, economic measures are the foundation, political measures are the leader, and military measures are the backing. Therefore, on the one hand, guiding strategists can carry out effective war control only by the comprehensive use of all kinds of military and non-military measures; on the other hand, guiding strategists should select war control measures skillfully according to specially designated conditions and political goals, in order to achieve the objectives of war control.

During the era of the revolutionary war and the early stage of the country’s founding, the old generation of proletarian revolutionaries with Mao Zedong as the core had established the models for the search and practice of war control theories. During the process of commanding the People’s Liberation Army in military struggle actions, Mao Zedong always stood on the strategic height of the political and diplomatic struggles. He carried out skillful deployment and arrangement for our military operations, and made our military operations in the battlefield and our political and diplomat struggles closely coordinated, which formed an integrated force.

For instance, after the Korean War entered the cease fire and negotiation stage, Mao Zedong promptly directed our army to base itself on the spirit of “carry out the fight and talk at the same time, and use fight to prompt talk,” using active military actions to support diplomatic talks struggles, which resulted in our winning of the struggle of cease fire negotiations. In the late 50’s of the 20th century, in order to maintain the unity of the motherland, and smash the scheme of “Two chinas” created by hostile international forces, Mao Zedong himself commanded the bombardment operation against Jinmen, which resulted in “Artillery fires has developed into a special dialogue among U. S., China, and Chiang Kai-Sek , which is a kind of negotiation that is not conducted on the negotiation table.” 1 It fully demonstrated Mao Zedogn’s profound war control thought and superior war control art.

VI.. FOLLOW AND APPLY INTERNATIONAL LAWS IN CARRYING OUT FAVORABLE WAR CONTROL STRUGGLES

The formulation and development of international laws are closely associated with war controls. In comparison with traditional international laws, current international laws are becoming increasingly stronger in limiting wars. “The United Nations Charter” formulated after WWII stipulates: all the member countries can not threaten or invade the territorial integrity and political independence of any country by force. In fact, other than self-defense, it has eliminated the right of using force within the scope of sovereignty. Even if it is a legal action of self-defense, guiding strategists’ freedom of selecting war controls and decisions is not unlimited. When a guiding strategist is carrying out war control and making decisions, if he does not want to consider the restricting functions of international laws, and influences of international rules, even if he wins tactically, he may lose more strategically. Therefore, following and applying international law is a pre-condition for strategists in carrying out war controls.

Modern international laws not only raise a higher requirement for guiding strategists’ actions of abiding by international laws, they also provide more powerful legal means for controlling crises and clashes. The functions and performances of the complete set of international dispute peaceful settlement mechanisms based on the principle of equal sovereignty and non-interference of internal affairs are becoming increasingly stronger. And the international community’s crisis control mechanisms and the restraining mechanism for preventing proliferation of mass destruction weapons are increasingly mature, which make war control more and more feasible and workable. We should, however, emphasize that an international law is the product of the struggle of national will and compromise of all involved countries, and its war restraining and adjusting functions are ultimately determined by the balance of the strength of the involved countries.

**Chapter Nine**

**Strategic Deterrence**

Actual fighting and deterrence are two basic functions of the armed forces. The

so-called deterrence refers to military behaviors that a nation or political group displays in its military power or indicates its determination to use military power to subdue the opposing party to its will and forbid it to take or escalate hostile actions. Strategic deterrence is part of military strategy as well as a strategic behavior for deterrence in the overall situation.

Strategic deterrence and strategic operations are dialectically unified. The latter is to accomplish strategic objectives through direct battlefield fighting with an enemy, and its footing is to win in a war or to stop a war with war. The former is aimed at curbing the explosion of war or limiting the scope or escalation of war, and its footing is to stop the war or achieve the strategic objectives without fighting or by just a small fighting. They are functioning with each other, and their common objectives are foiling the enemy’s attempt and accomplishing our own strategic goals. To study and grasp the law of strategic deterrence has important significance to protecting national security and interest.

**Section One: Conditions and Effects of Strategic Deterrence**

To bring strategic deterrence into play, one must have three fundamental conditions:

First, sufficient strength for deterrence that can affect the whole strategic situation. The strength for deterrence is the material foundation and precondition of implementing strategic deterrence with evaluation of its capability as the basic backing. Without relying on realistic strength, strategic deterrence cannot really generate the expected results and could even fall into passivity. In “The Story of Three Kingdoms,” Zhuge Liang played “the Ploy of an Empty Town” to fool Shima Yi and succeeded. The basic reason for his success was that he did command a large army in peacetime. If their total forces did not match each other, Shima Yi,, though very suspicious, would definitely not be tricked by the illusion created by him.

Actual military strength, especially one for strategic strike, is the main body for strategic deterrence and the most basic, most direct and most effective factor to its implementation. Other than military force, the strength for strategic deterrence also includes non-military factors, such as the size of a nation’s territory, number and quality of its population, its geographical condition, economical power and S&T level. These factors can be transformed into direct meaningful strength for strategic deterrence only when they are conscientiously developed and strengthened. The stronger the strength for deterrence is, the larger the possibility of success in deterring the enemy.

Second, the determination and will for using strength for strategic deterrence. As the strength is the existence of objective material, a material strength transformed into deterring effect can be useful only by human “determination” and “will.” If there is no determination, the strength for deterrence is but a sword hung on a wall no matter how strong it is, it cannot produce the power to scare the enemy. Only by having the determination and will to employ the strength and placing the sword over the opponent’s head can a strong power of deterrence be formed. For example, at the end of the 1930s, the military strength of Britain and France which was not weaker than that of Nazi Germany could stop and check Hitler’s expansionist ambition. Yet, due to Hitler’s threat, the two countries took the policy of appeasement and signed the “Munich Agreement” with Germany, instead of having the determination and actions to use their strength to stop aggression at the critical moment. Consequently, it fanned the annoyance of Nazi nations and led to the explosion of World War II. Theory and practice have fully attested that it is necessary to resolutely make determination at the critical moment to achieve a large strategic deterrence with a small strength. If a side is indecisive and over-cautious, it would throw away the effect of strategic deterrence which could be produced originally. Thus, strength and determination are two wings of strategic deterrence and neither can be absent.

Third, a way to let the opponent know and believe the two aforementioned conditions. Deterrence is a mutual behavior between the “deterrer” and the deterred. Fighting changes strength into violent power and fiercely casts it on the other side. The two sides directly use material strength to destroy each other. Deterrence, however, is different as it turns strength and determination into information and delivers it to the deterred to directly work on its mind and threaten it with a psychological pressure. When this pressure reaches a certain level, the deterred will lose its confidence in winning or consider the fighting not worthwhile; then the “deterrer” can achieve its expected objective of deterrence. Thus, the consequence of strategic deterrence is decided not only by strength and determination but also by the deterred to get the said information. Even if the “deterrer” has a strong strength and determination, the deterred would not believe the information and its effect if it does not get the message or receives only an incorrect one which it considers to be just a bluff. Deterrence can generate its expected result only when the deterred knows and believes that it will be punished more severely if it acts rashly after receiving the message. This indicates that the last standard to measure the effect of deterrence is not only how powerful the information is but also how much the deterred believes in that power.

Among the three basic conditions, strength is the most basic one. Not only is it the foundation of strategic deterrence, it also backs determination and will. Determination is the soul of strategic deterrence, while delivery of the information is the necessary condition to generate the effect of deterrence. One point worthy to be stressed is that due to the form and means of transforming strength and determination toward information and the quality of the other side‘s psychology, the “deterrer” would face the phenomenon that strength and information of strength are not equal to determination and information of determination. This type of inequality gives the deterred a space to manipulate all kinds of deterrence and also causes the “deterrer” more difficulty to play strategic deterrence. For example, despite the highly powerful and all-sided strategic deterrence conveyed to Iraq by the multi-national troops before the Gulf War, it failed to generate the expected consequences and eventually led to the explosion of the war.

Strategic deterrence has two basic effects: to stop the other side from doing something, or to force the other side that it must do something. Both have the same essence of subduing the enemy to our will. Strategic deterrence produces different effects at different times and situations depending on the strength and the opponent.

In peacetime, its main effect is using the nation’s military, political, economic, cultural and diplomatic power as strategic strength to delay or stop the burst of war, which is also called curbing a war. Under modern conditions, even a small local war can result in huge loss; therefore, fully utilizing strategic strength to stop a war, to protect national security and stability, and to create a good foreign and domestic environment for national development in keeping with the nation‘s fundamental interests embody strategic deterrence specifically in three aspects: appropriately maintaining it is good for stopping the strategic situation from worsening under normal conditions, it might delay the burst of war and create conditions for the nation to make other political choices or do its war-preparations better when the strategic situation is getting rigid and the risk of war is nearing ; and it might give the nation the last chance to avoid a war or let it attain the initiative in the war, especially in the first strike when the war will occur imminently. At this time, the major effect of strategic deterrence is to create a favorable military posture for the nation to enter the state of war.

In wartime, strategic deterrence mainly serves war and its effect of displaying our momentum to the enemy by the deployment of troops or of showing it our strength by the power of attack or of subduing the enemy by winning the war with a small fighting force. For example, to perform “surgical“ strikes in a local war is actually an employment of strategic deterrence. .

The two belligerent parties are a unity of contradiction. When both sides are equal, either side can adopt correct strategic guiding principles and skillfully bring strategic deterrence into play to scare the other side that the loss would outweigh the gain by continuing the war. This ploy could shake the other side’s determination and will and force it to give up its attempt of fighting, thereby to break up the stalemate of war. When they are unequal and the strong side can play its deterrence well, it could very quickly form the situation of “the strong bullying the weak.” On the contrary, if the weak side adopts a strong and powerful strategic deterrence, it could transform its weakness into strength. During the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign in the War of Liberation, after having completed a strategic encirclement of Beijing, the PLA adopted the principle of “beating the two ends first and then the middle section“ to threaten the Group of Gen. Fu Zuoyi with its strong power to gradually peel off the group’s will of fighting. Consequently, the group could not but accept a peaceful reorganization to allow the PLA to liberate Beijing without fighting. This was a typical example of strategic deterrence successfully serving war.

Generally speaking, strategic deterrence is a form of struggle in the military field that can be adopted by either side for strategic attack or for strategic defense. Because both sides have the same purpose of serving the military strategy of the nation or political group and being subordinate to it, the offensive nation or political group always uses it for blackmailing the defensive side and forces it to abandon its determination of resistance to accomplish the political objective that can be done only by war. On the other hand, the defensive nation or political group usually takes strategic deterrence to make the offensive side feel that its attack will be defeated or its gain will be out-weighed by its loss to give up its attempt of attack. Thus, by its nature, strategic deterrence can be divided into offensive and defensive postures. The former is usually used by those nations or military groups conducting expansionist aggression, while the latter by the nations adopting defensive strategy.

China is a socialist nation observing the guiding principle of positive defense. Our strategic deterrence, in essence, is self-defense. It is the difference from other nations, particularly those that are most basic and most evident in hegemony. In the new historical period, our strategic deterrence has the main mission of deterring foreign invasion, protecting our rights and interests, preventing the conspiracy of sabotage by foreign and domestic antagonistic powers, thereby keeping the stability of our motherland’s national political situation and defending its territorial integrity and unification.

**Section Two: Types and Forms of Strategic Deterrence**

Types of strategic deterrence refer to the forms of employing strategic deterrence forces for eliminating or slowing the threat of war to achieve our strategic objective. Generally speaking, the types of strategic deterrence correspond to the types of strategic forces. Judged by the current situation, there are the following types:

First, nuclear deterrence. It means that relying on nuclear deterrent, one side threatens to use nuclear arms or shows its determination of employing them to shock and curb its opponent’s act and state of deterrence. The essence is to warn the other side of the intention to use nuclear arms or carry out a nuclear counterattack and its severe consequences, thus producing the feeling of fear after weighing the pros and cons. As a result, the “deterrer” would force the deterred to be subordinate to its will and abandon the original attempt of attack for it to achieve its political goal.. In the Gulf War, Iraq once boasted of using chemical weapons, but it eventually stopped while facing the US nuclear deterrence.

Building of nuclear deterrence is based on people’s knowledge of nuclear arms’ effects on mass destruction. In 1945, the US, being the first nation succeeding in developing atomic bombs, dropped them in Japan’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August of the same year, causing enormous personnel casualty and financial loss and shocking the whole world. The emergence of nuclear arms has broken the past belief that weapons could function only in the field of campaign or combat and the traditional mode that strategic objectives could only be achieved gradually. It has greatly affected the building and employment of military forces and significantly changed the theory and practice of war. The concept of strategic weapons and nuclear deterrence has thereby been produced.

Application of nuclear deterrence is based on the level of nuclear deterrents developed by nuclear nations. At present, nuclear deterrence is divided into three levels: first, maximum nuclear suggests a nation can deter another nation by disarming it with a large nuclear attack to achieve the goal of stopping or blackmailing it. Second, minimum nuclear deterrence is that a nation with a small number of nuclear deterrents can deter another nation by raiding its cities and targets to form a deterrence. Third, intermediate level of nuclear deterrence is that a nation has “sufficient” (effective) strength to launch a nuclear strike to deter another nation with a certain intolerable destruction. It is a form between maximum and minimum nuclear deterrence.

Second, conventional deterrence. In contrast to nuclear deterrence, it is the deterrence by conventional military forces. It is the original type of deterrence, but conventional arms have correspondingly dropped in position along with the emergence and development of nuclear weapons after the end of World War II. Some nuclear nations once over-stressed the importance of developing nuclear arms and lowered the position of conventional weapons; however, along with the history of post-war development and the growing exposure of the limitation of nuclear arms, the effect of conventional weapons has regained its old status. First, under the condition that nuclear deterrence is poor in credibility, conventional weaponry has become a double-edged sword as they can be used for both actual fighting and deterrence, making them a more credible means for deterrence. Second, conventional weapons are strong in controllability and small in risk. Generally, they do not cause a catastrophe like nuclear war and are easy for achieving the goal of military strategy. Third, the swift development of military skills after WWII has made conventional weapons and equipment to be more and more hi-tech. As the power of conventional weapons and equipment is continuously increasing, the gap in operational efficacy between non-nuclear arms and nuclear arms has been narrowed and advanced guidance skills have made long-distance precision strikes possible. This series of changes has laid a foundation for the rise of conventional deterrence.

Conventional deterrence has two more obvious developmental tendencies. One is its deterring strength is multi-variant and integrated. Along with the development of military high techniques, the deterring capability of conventional weapons in all fields including land, sea, air, space and magnetism has been universally improved. In the meantime, in order to adapt to the need of modern warfare and to combine all military services and branches, some nations have preferably chosen to integrate all kinds of deterring forces into one body. The other is that conventional deterrence is included in overall deterrence. Since the effect of conventional deterrence in stopping war is limited, the only way to enable it to effectively react to all forms of challenge is to include it in overall deterrence and combine it with other deterring means to make them complement one another.

Third, Air strength deterrence is the deterrence by means of air strength and the product when space and air weapons have been developed to a certain stage.

At present, there are more than 130 nations in the world engaged in air activities. Military application of space techniques has been quite popular and military struggles in the air are getting more fierce. Air military functions include surveillance reconnaissance, missile pre-warning, weapon guidance, meteorological support, air-mapping support, and environment air-mapping. They can provide continuous, real time and global services of positioning, navigation and timing for the troops of all services in joint operations; and render communications support for joint operations that have a wide coverage, large volume, strong disturbance-resistance and good confidentiality to satisfy the need of communications for command, coordination, and intelligence. They can also use the offensive weapon systems on airborne platforms to launch fire or electronic attack at the enemy’s military targets in the air or in the atmosphere. It may be said that the current military building and hi-tech warfare cannot be departed from air forces for even one minute. The war and armed conflict will be gravely affected once our air systems are destroyed by or are attacking the enemy’s.

Along with the development of air techniques, some space superpowers are positively studying and making space weapons and forming space forces while developing artificial satellites, space shuttles, manned space stations, space flights and missile vehicles. They are gradually unfolding struggles to seize “space control.”

The breakthrough of air military techniques has laid a foundation for the emergence of the new state of deterrence, which is, air force deterrence and signified that application of this new deterrence is not remote. Its most deterring features are that it has a conspicuous strategic nature and produces a large deterring effect to the enemy. It has a high reliance on techniques, particularly air techniques. It must build its deterring credibility on feasible and reliable air techniques. It has flexible deterring methods and can disturb, damage and destroy in the forms of deterrence. It is restricted by such elements as international opinions and air regulations.

Fourth, information deterrence relies on the great power of the science and techniques of information and deters with the momentum and might of information warfare. What it pursuits is the best effect of “defeating the enemy with fighting” and strives to win a victory by bloodless countermeasures.

Along with the speedy development and wide dissemination of information techniques, information deterrence, while injecting strong vitality into the development of modern society, also brings a new topic -- information security -- to the field of national security. At present, information warfare that touches information attack and information defense, is marching from the stage of theoretic research toward that of actual war-readiness. In the future, a large information offensive of “electronic Pearl Harbor” will be strong enough to destroy the enemy and start a war. Since it has a certain destructive effect and impact, information warfare will display its specific deterring potentials.

Information deterrence has the following characteristics: first, infiltration. Since it is dispensable, deliverable, expandable, sharable and predictable, information deterrence can be infiltrated not only on the military field but also other social domains such as political, economic, cultural and S&T fields to enlarge the psychological effect on people. Second, it can be ambiguous. Usually, information deterrence is launched together with information attack, and there is no clear-cut boundary between actual fighting and deterrence. Under the deterrence from different directions, it is uneasy to determine the source of information attack. As the networks of information are widely connected, one move can affect the whole operation, and the scope of deterred targets can be expanded easily. Third, diversification is a deterrent. Since both soft kill and hard destruction can destroy the devices of the enemy’s flow of information, it makes information deterrence diversified. For example, some nations divide the forms of information warfare into unauthorized visits, vicious software, destruction of data banks, electronic intelligence, electronic attack and offense by conventional weapons. Fourth would be two-way stopping. A large information attack victimizes not only the enemy but could also victimize other people or even ourselves; therefore, information deterrence like weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear deterrence, could stop the enemy and also ourselves. The manifestation in this aspect is all very obvious in nations where information networking is well-developed.

Fifth, people’s war deterrence. This refers to the type of deterrence that fully demonstrates and gives play to the enormous power of a people’s war to the enemy. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have been facing the threat of foreign invasion, but under the leadership of our Party Central, we are footed on fighting early, fighting big and fighting a nuclear war to be fully prepared to fight the people’s war well. We have stopped foreign invasions, protected our national rights and interests and created the typical example of people’s war deterrence. Generally speaking, it belongs to deterrence of self-defense and justice. Only the people’s armed forces standing at the same height as the people’s interests can carry out this type of deterrence.

The result of a war is determined by the nature of the war and the support of the people. Representing the interests of the broad masses of people, people‘s war has mobilization and participation of all people as its political base and can bring the war potentials of our country and nation into maximum play. When the enemy is falling into the sea of people’s war, it will face the danger of drowning. This is where the basic reason that people’s war has a strong power of deterrence. Other than the elements like politics, organization and leadership, the deterrence of people’s war also relies on the factors of national economy, S&T, geography, history and culture, etc. to develop its power. For a country has a vast territory, abundant resources, a large population, a developed economy, advanced S&T and the tradition and experience of people’s war, the deterrence of its people’s war is definitely stronger in credibility. Although the world is changing, the basic law of the deterrence of people’s war cannot change. On the contrary, the development of new and high techniques have injected into the law a new opportunity for survival and new vitality and has made its contents richer and its form more diversified.

Because they are different in national situations, different nations have different basic means of deterrence; however. Some nations have had a common choice, which is, to comprehensively apply all types of strategic deterrence and fully develop the effect of overall deterrence to serve the country’s military strategy. At present, China has a limited but effective capability of nuclear deterrence, a rather strong capability of conventional deterrence and a huge capability of people’s war deterrence. The combination of them will become a comprehensive strategic deterrence with a consolidated national strength as its base, conventional strength as its main body, nuclear strength as its backing and reserve strength as its support.

To show the effect of deterrence generated out of strategic deterrence, it is necessary to rely on military actions. The so-called military action of strategic deterrence means the activity that a nation or political group demonstrates in its armed forces and its determination of using them on the whole war situation to force its enemy to be subdued. It is one of the strategic types of action as well as a specific means and form to deliver the message of deterrence and implement strategic deterrence. The precious part of strategic deterrence is to work on its “momentum.” There are many ways to do it, but all of them are centered on “momentum.” After all, there are only three ways; namely, “creating momentum by military preparations,” “showing momentum by the display of strength to the enemy,” and “enhancing momentum by military strike.”

Creating momentum by military preparations is increasing the strategic posture of “moving round stones on high mountains” through strengthening the power of military preparations and increasing the ability of fighting to deter the enemy’s attempt for adventure. The development of weapons and equipment, mobilization for people’s war, deployment and readjustment of military forces, the building of a battlefield, military alliances, etc. can generate the effect of creating momentum by military preparations. In 1962, targeting the KMT troops‘ adventurous plan of “counterattacking the China mainland,” the PLA openly enhanced the military deployment in the southeastern coastal areas of China to scare the enemy troops out of their attempt of “counterattacking the China mainland.” During the Cold War, the US and USSR developed an arms race between them in the hope of attaining the upper hand in military confrontation. Both cases were the examples of creating the posture of deterrence against the other side through increasing military preparations.

Showing momentum by display of strength to the enemy means to clearly display the strength of deterrence to place a psychological pressure and fear on the enemy to force it to subdue. Review of large military parades, joint military exercises and military visits are the often used forms of deterrence. In the War of Defending the Motherland, the Soviet troops resolutely braved the risk to hold a grand review of military forces in Red Square at the critical moment when the German troops were attacking Moscow. Not only did it arouse the morale of all people, civilian and the military alike, it also gave Nazi Germany a great shock.

Enhancing momentum by military strike means to show our strength and determination to the opponent to cause certain losses to them through offensive actions, consolidating the ongoing posture of deterrence and enhancing the credibility of deterrence. This form of deterrence has the nature of both actual fighting and deterrence. “Surgical“ strike is one form of enhancing momentum by military strike.

Different forms of deterrence are connected and functioning with one another. When combined, different forms may create deterrence at different levels and in different strength; thus, we need to focus on different situations, such as the state and size of deterrence, to flexibly employ the forms of strategic deterrence so as to reach the expected results.

**Section Three: Principles and Requirements of Strategic Deterrence**

Application of strategic deterrence has its own features and law and also many contingent and uncertain factors. As it has an important significance to the implementation of military strategies and materialization of national interests, it is necessary to provide for its correct planning and guidance as a whole.

**I. Focusing on the overall situation and making decisions carefully**

This is the foremost principle of applying strategic deterrence and the basic guarantee to achieving military and political objectives. Strategic deterrence is the type of deterrence focusing on the overall situation, which requires comprehensive utilization of the nation’s military, political, economic, diplomatic, S&T strength as well as an adoption of an appropriate form of struggle to deter the enemy’s act of war and achieve our goal of winning with or without fighting. In the meantime, it is also a complicated action of aggression. In front of the sharp conflict of interests of two belligerent parties, all types of contradictions are intermingled. In these contradictions, other than those we have already known or can measure, there are many unknown or immeasurable ones, such as the degree of the psychological effect and impact brought by the actions of deterrence, human subjective initiatives, contingencies during the process of deterrence, particularly the invisible factors in them, such as tricks and schemes played by both sides, that cause mobility and actions, appearance and essence, physiology and psychology to show quite complicated situations. If we fail to handle these situations well, it could cause deterrence to fail and the war to escalate. Thus, when applying strategic deterrence, we must stand on the height of the overall situation to painstakingly plan the setting of stratagems, deployment of troops, selection of targets, choice of scope, achieving of objectives and use of means and forms, so as to strive to maximize the efficiency of deterrence and accomplish the expected strategic goals.

In order to do this, we should comprehensively consider the need and possibility of deterrence and make careful decisions based on a complete analysis and weighing of the pros and cons. The need of strategic deterrence is manifested mainly in three aspects: first, the need of military struggle. Strategic deterrence is an essential means to accomplish military strategic goals, and its risk and price are lower than actions of war. When a nation needs to use its strategic strength to achieve its military objectives, strategic deterrence is always the first choice. Generally, actual fighting is used only when deterrence has failed or a forced-to-do situation has come up. Second, the need of political struggle. Like strategic operations, strategic deterrence is also a means to achieve political ends as it can bring huge political benefits. The more pressing politics needs are regarding strategic deterrence, the clearer the targets and the effect are. Third, the need of diplomatic and economic struggles. In diplomatic and economic struggles that are directly related to the interests of a country and a nation, when the goals are unable or difficult to be reached through diplomatic channels, strategic deterrence is always an important selection to decision-makers.

To apply strategic deterrence also needs to consider the possibility of achieving its goals. The goals can be achieved only when both the interior and exterior conditions are ready. As to the interior conditions for implementing strategic deterrence, first, there must be forces for deterrence to convince people because we cannot deter the other side under any circumstance if we do not have actual or sufficient strength. Second, there must be the determination of “adding pressure on the enemy.” If we lack firm determination and strong will, the effect of deterrence is empty and powerless. Third, to achieve strategic deterrence, we must have the important factors, such as the right environment, decision-maker’s talent, national cohesion and morale of officers and men. As to the exterior conditions, first, we must understand and grasp the target’s basic situations; its offensive and defensive forces; and its decision-maker’s psychological features and possible reactions to our deterrence and sensitivity and tolerability to our message of deterrence. All these are key elements to deciding whether our deterrence will succeed. Second, the possible reaction to deterrence from the international society is critical. If our deterrence has the support of the world community, it will be obviously enhanced; otherwise, it will be significantly weakened.

**II. Developing our strong points and avoiding our weak points, and using our troops by measuring the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.**

The important difference between strategic deterrence and strategic operations is that the former needs to clearly and unmistakably show the enemyour superiority so that they understand the effect of our strength and give up their determination and attempt at continuing the confrontation. It therefore requires that when applying strategic deterrence on the basis of widely collecting and collating intelligence data, we must analyze and assess the two sides’ actual situations. We must find out the source, type and size of threat, the enemy’s actual power and its attempts proving strength as well as the impact on our national interests. When staging strategic deterrence, we can target the enemy’s weak points and develop our preponderance, hide our vulnerability and shortcomings and show our strength and sharpness so as to demonstrate our strength, stratagems, determination and will that can scare the enemy away and subdue their troops.

To be able to develop our strong point and avoid our weak point and to use troops by measuring the enemy’s, at first we must grasp the enemy’s psychological features. Their psychological changes are the interior reasons and data in the result of deterrence, while our own strength and will and delivery of information are only exterior factors. In order to move their decisions toward our preset direction, we must understand their psychology and basis for decision-making as well as the elements affecting their decisions. We must analyze what they are most afraid of, and then base our specific situations to select the means and form of deterrence that are in keeping with our own strategic attempt and at the same time can most deter the enemy. By so doing, we can aim at the enemy with a target and “attack a target that the enemy must save” to enhance the credibility of deterrence. Second, we must know the enemy’s attempt and the risk that they can tolerate. In terms of the mechanism of effect, deterrence is not only a competition of strength, it is also a match of success. Implementation of strategic deterrence can subdue the enemy or force them to compromise only when we can create psychological shock to them to make them feel that it is not rewarding to keep on fighting. Therefore, to fully consider the enemy’s gain or loss is of significance to determining the target and power of our strategic deterrence. Third, we must be based on the ratio of the two sides’ forces to determine the target of deterrence. When applying strategic deterrence, we must first know the goals we wish to reach. Whether it is to force the enemy to abandon a certain attempt or restrain their actions or direct them to do something else. The said ratio, especially the strength of our forces for deterrence, always controls the selection of the objective. If the objective is too low, deterrence will lose its meaning; if it is too high, the force of deterrence is unable to endure and could cause a dysfunction of the deterrence. Only when the objective and the strength are matching can we achieve the objective.

**III. Working with various methods and unifying the actions**

**“**Working with various methods and unifying the actions” means that when taking military actions for strategic deterrence, we must comprehensively employ various methods and handle well the relations between attack and defense and false and real. In the meantime, we should keep highly focused and unified to combine the strength, determination and information of deterrence, enhance the overall results of deterrence and be sure to direct people and not to be directed by them.

To workwith various methods, first, we must sek all forms of deterrence to support one another. In the present world, along with the trend of multi-polarization of the world, information of the society and high-technology of military affairs, it is more and more difficult for national security to deal with the reality and potential threat it is facing. Only one means or one approach of military deterrence is insufficient. The only way to give maximum play to the efficacy of strategic deterrence is to combine nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, air strength deterrence, information deterrence and people’s war deterrence while supporting the combination with struggles in the political, diplomatic, economic and S&T fields to make all forms of deterrence work together smoothly. Second, we must pay attention to combining attack and defense. In war, preserving self and annihilating the enemy is dialectically unified and attack and defense complement each other. Strategic deterrence must follow this law as well. In the deterring actions for self-defense, we also need to take the form and means of offensive deterrence when necessary in order to enhance the effect of deterrence. Third, stressing the cooperation of false and real. Strategic deterrence stresses the effect of actual military strength, but it does not reject “creating momentum“ with actual strength as the base. As attested by social practice, while partially showing actual strength, using false actions to confuse real actions is affective. Playing emptiness and realness back and forth can not only cover one with the other and vice versa to protect strategic forces from being beaten, but it can also occasionally get the result of deterring the enemy and subduing them without fighting. “The Ploy of an Empty Town” play by Zhuge Liang is a typical example. It is necessary to do so under special circumstances. Taking nuclear deterrence for example, we sometimes need to cover the scope and quality of the troops for nuclear deterrence to confuse the enemy.

To unify actions we must group all aspects of strength constituting the overall deterrence at the highest decision-making level to carry out concentrated and unified leadership, including the overall coordination of all types of means and forms of strategic deterrence and unified leadership over the actions for strategic deterrence. Second, we must pay attention to a close coordination of all positions. Exchange of information must be done at all times between all means of deterrence, between the forms in the same means of deterrence and between troops and localities. The coordination must be close and strong in order to form an overall concerted effort.

**IV. Measuring and controlling situations and striving for initiative**

Measuringand controlling situations and striving for initiative means that in application of strategic deterrence, we must watch the timing and measure the situations and take actions upon favorable opportunity. We should be flexible and changing and always strive for initiative to fight the enemy.

As a means of military struggle, strategic deterrence can play up its effect only by changing the enemy’s psychological situation. It should control the power of struggle more rigidly than strategic operations as it could lead to defeat and lose the initiative in military struggle if otherwise. To estimate and control the strength of deterrence and strive for initiative, we must do the following: First, reasonably setting the strength of strategic deterrence. If we set it too high, the enemy cannot take it and will rush to danger. If we set it too low, the enemy cannot feel the pressure and it will diminish the effect of deterrence. Thus, we must set the strength at an appropriate degree. Second, leaving some leeway for the enemy to compromise and concede. Strategic deterrence is a hard posture, but it does not mean that we do not give the enemy room for compromise and concession. If we fail to do so, it would directly affect the materialization of our goals of strategic deterrence and escalate the confrontation. In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the US and USSR mutually placed pressure of deterrence, but both gave the other side room for compromise and concession, thereby having solved the crisis and avoided an escalated confrontation. Third, timely evaluation of the effect of deterrence and readjusting the strength of strategic deterrence is important. As modern reconnaissance and communication skills are well developed and the message of deterrence is delivered rapidly, the function of strategic deterrence can be felt in a short time. It therefore requires us to collect and collate the intelligence of the enemy’s reactions and evaluate the effect of our deterrence when applying it. If the feedback from the other side indicating that the deterrence is not powerful enough, we should amplify it; otherwise, we should tune it down. If the enemy shows signs that it has already launched or escalated the war, it means the deterrence has failed and we should immediately make preparations to fight back. Fourth, rapidly and resolutely handling contingencies found in the process of deterrence to maintain initiative in the action of strategic deterrence is critical.

**V. Being prepared ahead and substantiating actual fighting**

Being prepared ahead and placing our footing on actual fighting means that before implementing strategic deterrence, we must be well prepared for fighting and an escalated confrontation. By so doing, we would be able to deal with the fighting and escalation and win the war once deterrence fails.

Strategic deterrence is based on actual fighting. Basically speaking, application of the strength for strategic deterrence in actual fighting can play up the effect of strategic deterrence to cause the enemy to pay a big price. The stronger the ability for actual fighting is, the larger the effect of deterrence will be. Thus, while applying strategic deterrence in actual fighting, the fuller our war-readiness is relates directly to the possibility of success for deterrence. If otherwise, not only the pure bluff cannot boast the effect of deterrence, it will produce a reversed result sometimes.

Again, strategic deterrence cannot do everything. If there is a mistake in the action of deterrence, it could cause it to fail and lead to the beginning or escalation of a war. Many of the local wars and armed conflicts occurring since WWII were started by mutual deterrence and then entered the state of war after deterrence lost its effect. The show of this type of transfer between war and no war is usually very fast. Generally, strategic deterrence has a large scope and its impact covers a big area. It posts a higher requirement to its organization, command and coordination, and its strength is difficult to control. In addition, the existence of uncertain factors such as changes of the situation. of strength, external interference, internal contradiction, unbalanced psychology, etc., can more easily cause the situation to go out of control and deterrence to fail. It, therefore, requires that when applying strategic deterrence, we must be firmly footed on the worst and the hardest situation and prepare ahead so that when deterrence does not work or succeed, we can remain cool in our thinking and effectively deal with the new situation.

**Chapter Ten**

**The Principles of Strategic Actions**

Principles of strategic actions are the basis and standard for planning and guiding the whole situation and process of war. They are gradually formed based on the summary of war experiences and correct understanding of the law of war. They advance along with the development of war.

Since there was war in human society, people have started a continuous search for and summarization of the experiences and methods of defeating the enemy and winning wars. After going through a series of regular and thorough refinements and generalizations of war experiences, they have gradually formed primitive and relatively simple principles of strategic actions. Along with a long-term accumulation of war experiences, they have had a rather profound understanding of the basic law of war and summarized and generalized some fundamental rules and methods from those experiences. The planning and guiding of war, such as concentration of forces, unified command, full preparation, being mobile and flexible and gaining initiative are lessons learned. Those rules and methods have almost become the basic contents of the principles of strategic actions for all nations at all places and times. Of course, they are not stereotyped and unchangeable as they take the set form of war as their basis and have the outstanding characteristics of their time. Through the development of time and the advancement of science and techniques, they have been innovated and perfected, in substance as well as in form. Besides, in different stages and countries and for strategic principles in different periods, their emphasis and focuses are not the same, thereby forming different systems of strategic principles that have not only common features but also independent characteristics.

In the revolutionary war under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, revolutionaries of the old generation like Mao Zedong closely integrated the Marxist military theory during the practice of China’s revolutionary war. They absorbed the essence of the old and applies the modern as well as foreign and domestic strategic theories to creatively set a complete series of strategic principles for people’s warfare with the Chinese proletariat style. The principles include knowing ourselves and the enemy and gaining subjective initiative to cope with the reality of war. By preserving ourselves and annihilating the enemy, we attain initiative and avoid passivity. By flexibly employing military forces and war methods, closely integrating war of movement, war of position and guerrilla warfare, we have learned to concentrate our superior strength and eliminate the enemy individually. We should never fight a war when we are unprepared and not sure of winning. We must be cautious in the initial battle, unifying command and being coordinated and united, and closely coordinate military and non-military struggles. Whether in the past, at present and in the future, all of these principles are strong weapons directing our troops to conquer the enemy and win in war. Under new historical conditions, the rapid development of military techniques have profoundly changed the traditional state of war. The original concepts of war, its theories of strategy, principles of actions and forms of combat are facing new challenges. It means that we must be based on Marxism and the Thought of Mao Zedong and guided by the principles of military strategy in the new era to be innovative and develop the principles of strategic actions for local wars under hi-tech conditions to correctly direct the PLA to stage military struggles in the new era.

**Section One: Correctly Setting a Principle Strategic Direction**

A principal strategic direction means the direction that is most influential and decisively significant to the whole war situation. It is the focal point of the struggle of contradictions between two belligerent parties, the key point of the two sides concentrating their employment of forces and the critical point of strategic guidance. Correctly setting a principal strategic direction is the foremost problem that strategic planning and guidance must solve.

Principal strategic direction is a centralized reflection of major contradictions of two opposing sides on the whole war situation, the most important and most significant position affecting the whole war situation and the specific reflection of strategic key points. Thus, the setting of a principal strategic direction has not only basically and uniformly pointed out the direction for war actions in a certain period of time, it has also clearly raised demands for solutions to such problems as the building and utilization of military strength, direction and objective of war-readiness and major forms and methods of combat. It has clarified and specified the strategic goals and missions to make strategic directors able to grasp and direct the war on the whole war situation and all theaters and aspects able to regulate their own actions around the principal strategic direction. This assures them the smooth carrying out of our their strategic actions in that direction.

Principal strategic direction is the key point of the overall situation and also the standard direction for centralized employment of strategic forces. Only by setting a principal strategic direction can strategic goals, forces and means be organically combined around it in a certain time and space to form a favorable strategic deployment. We may say that military forces and strategic means would become loose sands and could not be injected into the actions to fulfill strategic goals if there is no accurately set principal strategic direction. Only by having correctly selected a principal strategic direction can we concentrate our forces for deployment around it to form a strategic posture that is in our favor. This includes closely coordinating Army, Navy, Air force and strategic missile units and organizing regular armies, reserve units and militia forces into an orchestrated combat system. This forms an overall operational body so that we can be sure that there are concentrated sharp weapons and well-trained troops in the important combat directions and stages to timely and effectively form a “fist” for strategic fighting. With this “fist,” we can launch an all-position, all-time and all-space strike against the targets and carry out strategic attacks to rapidly foil the enemy‘s war plans and strategic deployment and fatally attack the enemy. With this “fist,” we can render strategic defense to form an all-sided defense system with key points, great depth and three dimensions to crash the enemy’s strategic offensive. With this “fist,” we can not only form an effective strategic deployment to stop wars, protect national unification and maintain territorial integrity in peacetime, but also successfully perform strategic combat duties and achieve expected strategic aims in wartime.

The principal strategic direction is set in accordance with national strategic interests and the basic status of international and domestic strategic situations. It mainly includes principal defensive direction and principal offensive direction. The former is determined chiefly by the nature and degree of strategic deterrence from foreign enemies, which is usually the most direct threat. The latter is determined chiefly by the nation’s strategic attempt and our posture and the enemy’s, usually the important direction concerning the whole war situation and the direction where the enemy has a weak defense and is good for our development. Thus, the strategic director should be familiar with all situations, accurately analyze international strategic situations, and closely watch the changes of security situations and tightly analyze such hot problems as those pertaining to a nations’ foreign policy, strategic tendency, military deployment and conflict and contradiction with our national interest. He can assess the degree and development of their deterrence to our security. In the complicated international strategic setup and the peripheral security environment, he should grasp the major contradiction affecting our national security, properly evaluate the risk of war and combine the domestic situation to carry out comprehensive a comparison and analysis and accurately determine the main opponent and principal direction that are threatening our national security. In particular, when there are two or more directions under deterrence, he should separate the good one from the bad one and make distinct the primary direction from the secondary direction so as to catch the major contradiction and accurately set the principal strategic direction.

Once the principal strategic direction is set, the strategic director should always center his guidance on it and raise the actions in this direction to the height of the whole situation. He should then get familiar with whatever problems it has, so that he can use his creative thinking to painstakingly plan, skillfully arrange and closely organize a coordinated link with other directions to make the situation a whole. This should have the primary and secondary directions in proper order and the heavy and light combats under good control to continuously win victories and attain the initiative in the principal direction so as to smoothly push forward the whole war situation.

Setting of a principal direction is relatively stable. It should not be changed at will because of the changing strategic situation as we would have serious consequences if otherwise. However, when the situation undergoes a severe change, it could also make a big mistake in strategic guidance if we stick to the old rules. The strategic director should be good at controlling the development and changes from the whole strategic situation. He must use timely adjustment of the direction of strategic actions in order to keep our active position in war and military struggles. For example, since the founding of the People’s Republic, we have adjusted our important principal strategic direction three times. The three generations of our Party’s leadership have used their sharp and thorough observation to scientifically analyze the development and changes of international situations and the degree of their influences to our national security. They have accurately assessed the major opponents and directions of threat to our national security at each time so that we have been able to resolutely defend our national unification and territorial integrity and protect the modernization of our national defense, security and socialism under very complicated and difficult conditions. In the mid-1950s, as foreign forces led by the US strategically encircled us so severely that they could attack us, the Party Central and the Central Military Committee (CMC) knowing this situation, decided to make the southeast coast area as our principal strategic direction. Between the 1960s and 1970s, as the Sino-Soviet relations broke up and the USSR stationed a large army along the Chinese border to deter us more seriously, the leadership resolutely moved the principal direction to the three northern regions. In the 1980s, according to the new international situation, they changed the principal strategic direction again. Through timely adjustments, we have always kept our strategically active position.

**Section Two: Striving to Accomplish Goals of Strategic Actions While Paying a Small Price**

Goals of strategic actions are the direct political fruits that war wants to reap. They are specifications of strategic goals as well as the starting and ending points of a series of strategic planning and management including setting strategic guiding principles, drafting strategic plans, confirming strategic missions, deciding strategic deployments, selecting strategic means and organizing strategic support. Thus, deciding on the goals of strategic actions is an important principle concerning the whole situation.

Deciding goals of strategic actions is an essential substance of setting military strategy. Clausewitz once pointed out: “Strategy is the application of combat for fulfilling goals of war. Thus, we must set goals that are adaptable to the objectives of war for the whole military actions.” Goals of strategic actions are the indispensable contents for planning and directing the whole situation of military strategy. They can be divided into general goals and specific goals. The former controls the entire process of the strategic situation and is the direct manifestation of political ends in military actions. The latter is the political end that each strategic stage seeks, each strategic strength and each fighting means must be separately accomplished and the decomposition and thinning of general goals for horizontal connection in stages of time and other aspects. Only having set the general goals can we make an overall plan and deploy the whole military situation as well as solve a series of important strategic problems including war preparation, military building and strategic guiding principles effectively. Meanwhile, only by setting specific goals can we base our general strategic attempt at dividing the steps and directions necessary to achieve strategic actions and enhance the objectives and plans of war to ensure that goals are fulfilled. For example, in the initial period of the War of Liberation, based on the general goals of “striking down Chiang Kai-shek and liberating the entire China,” Mao Zedong had decided the general goal for the PLA was to eliminate 100 brigades of the KMT troops in five years. He then set a specific, concrete number to be annihilated annually for each theater. These goals had changed the ratio of strength between the PLA and the KMT forces and become the key to accomplishing the objective of war.

Setting goals of strategic actions is the prerequisite condition for selecting strategic means. The aim of military strategy is to combine and unify strategic aims and means. Goals of strategic actions are the precondition for choosing strategic means; strategic means is the practical measure of achieving strategic goals. They are closely related, and both must be present. Goals of strategic actions are the direction and standard for choosing strategic means. Different goals need different means, or the same goal can choose different means. The key is that the two must be properly planned and managed. With clear-cut goals of strategic actions, the strategic director can change the use of them according to military situations, correctly calculate the problems of how to develop and apply military forces to avoid a divorce between them. Based on the need of the goals of strategic actions, he can improve targeting at the application, flexibility and adaptability of strategic means and accurately employ the methods of actual fighting and deterrence to form mobile and flexible strategy and tactics. In short, only being under the guidance of correct goals of strategic actions can the application of strategic means meet the requirement of political and military struggles. This will bring the efficacy of all kinds of strategic actions into full play to form a whole operational might and render a better service to the fulfillment of political objectives.

Setting goals of strategic actions usually should meet the following requirements:

First, the goals must be in keeping with the basic national interest. They are a specific manifestation of general national policy and objectives in the military field. Their setting must take the principle of maintaining and defending the national interest. In terms of politics, the most important goal is political independence, sovereignty integrity and national unification, which are the most fundamental requirements. In terms of security, it is protecting territorial integrity and ocean rights to prevent them from foreign encroachment, which is the most fundamental requirement to guarantee the fulfillment of other national interests. In terms of economy, it must provide the most powerful insurance for the safety of national economic construction. It should fully consider and embody the needs of national interests and be subordinate to and serve the objectives of the nation’s political struggle in a certain period of time, which we must strive to accomplish even though there are difficulties and dangers. On the contrary, we should not act rashly in violation of national interest even though the goals can benefit us militarily. As a socialist nation observing an independent and autonomous foreign policy, the goals of strategic actions must uphold anti-aggression and anti-hegemony and protect world peace and national security. After the Cold War, although the environment for peripheral security has been relatively improved and massive armed invasion endangering China’s survival could be avoided, hegemony and power politics, however, still exist and are developing. Foreign and domestic hostile powers are ganging up with each other to be crazily engaged in splitting China. The historically inherited disputes over border areas and ocean rights are not yet totally settled and the threat of war is not completely eliminated; thus, goals of military strategic actions in the new era must fully consider the above situations and thoroughly satisfy the requirement of China’s basic interests.

Second, the goals must adapt to international situations. Correctly selecting goals of strategic actions has the aim of solving the security problem that China is facing at certain times. Having an accurate understanding of the international situation is to macroscopically grasp major contradictions and the tendency of development of the world. The world strategic situation is a concentrated embodiment of the growth and decline as well as diversification and composition of comprehensive national strength of various countries. Its formation decides those countries’ function and position in the international society. The powerful countries’ tendency of aggression essentially reflects the nature and demand of their economic and political interests, which is an important factor to understand the relations of those countries, especially between great powers, and to correctly assess the whole situation. The tendency of war in the current world situation is a big issue affecting world security and to find out the kinetic reason for war is the basic way to analyze the threat of war. Development and change of the situation of peripheral security is an essential condition directly affecting national interests and a side view reflects the core problems among our neighboring countries, such as the contradiction of interests, strategic attempts and military movements. Thus, only by correctly understanding the international situation can we go along with the tide of history to catch the major conflict of interest among the deterring countries and correctly select our principal strategic direction. We can be clearer and more specific about the goals of military strategy and also be more practical in our targeting.

Third, the goals must be beneficial to accomplishing our strategic objectives. Accomplishment of strategic goals is an important symbol of fulfilling military strategic objectives. As a form of specific manifestation of strategic objectives, strategic goals must appropriately and clearly embody all indexes of the objectives to make them not only practical and feasible but also satisfy strategic needs. We cannot set the goals too high to exceed the normal requirements of national interest and the actual capability of military forces and cause them to divorce themselves from strategic needs and move toward the opposite direction. Nor can we set them too low to make strategic objectives unable to be fulfilled on time and bring losses to our national interest. Therefore, when setting the goals, we must make them clear and specific and highly feasible in order to facilitate the grasping and conducting of them in military actions and ensure a smooth materialization of strategic objectives.

Fourth, the goals must be compatible with strategic combat capability. Armed forces‘ strategic combat capability is a fundamental condition to materializing the goals of strategic actions. Strategic goals cannot be divorced from reality and raise missions that strategic combat capability cannot accomplish. Nor can we set the goals too high to abuse the means of strategic combat, and even set them too low to affect the materialization of strategic objectives. The mistakes of military adventurism and military conservatism have given China’s revolutionary war unfavorable lessons or even failures; therefore, in order to keep strategic goals in line with the reality of strategic combat capability, we must “do what we can..” It means that we must base the reality of strategic combat capability on set strategic goals and select means for strategic combat according to our needs. We must strive to heighten the level of strategic combat to make it adaptable to the need and to closely combine the application and building of military forces to lay a material foundation for the fulfillment of strategic goals.

Fifth, we must attain the biggest victory with the smallest price. On the selection of goals of strategic actions, we should foster the concept of military effectiveness and results. We should never pay a huge sacrifice and price for a limited victory and advantage; instead, we should minimize the cost and sacrifice and strive to realize our strategic goals with the lowest price as it is an important display of the strategic director’s superb art of command. For this reason, under modern conditions, when setting strategic goals, we must base our plans on the characteristics of modern high-tech warfare to select vulnerabilities in the enemy’s operational system and strike them hard. We must try to go for the favorable and avoid the harmful and proceed to the real and bypass the false and use one soldier as ten. Unless the nation is in danger of life or death, we should never fight a decisive war at any cost. Under normal conditions, we should not fight to overcome the enemy if we can do it without fighting or not fight a large battle if a small battle can serve the purpose. We must strive to use a small battle or create a momentum to cause a strong psychological shock to the enemy to achieve the consequences of “subduing the enemy without fighting” or “subduing the enemy by a small battle.“

**Section Three: Never Fighting a Battle Unprepared or Unsure of Winning**

War is a big fundamental matter affecting the life and death, honor and shame and gain and loss of a country, a nation or a political group; thus, we must insist on the principle of being careful with war and conducting it with extra caution. When facing the threat of war or military pressure, the strategic director must calmly analyze the situation and weigh the pros and cons to carefully make strategic selections. He must not despise combat and rush to conclusions nor be timid and indecisive. He must strive to closely plan and be fully prepared and strive to win the war when the situation is more in our favor.

**I. Closely planning and being fully prepared**

War is full of unpredictable “traps” and “mist” and is more unpredictable and less certain than other societal elements. Never fight a battle unprepared or unsure of winning, requires close planning and fully being prepared before any military actions. In the ancient Chinese book of war, the teachings of “calculating in the temple,” “the way of using forces is to plan first and then take action,” “to fight an enemy and win a war should have a plan first.” “The enemy is always defeated when beating it with a plan.” All emphasized the importance of close planning and being fully prepared. Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, believed planning operations and demands allowed each common action to achieve this sort of unification. Napoleon thought that everything would end in nothing if not planned beforehand. In the long practice of China’s revolutionary war, Mao Zedong used the viewpoint of material dialectics to profoundly analyze the probabilities and uncertainties in wars and pointed out “due to the uncertainties in wars, to carry out planning in wars is more difficult than applying it in other undertakings. However, things stand when planned and fall apart when not. We cannot win victory in a war without previous planning and preparations.” He summarized a series of logic of military knowledge and strategic guidance, from reconnaissance, assessment to planning and preparation, thereby achieving a maximum unification of the probabilities and uncertainties in wars and military struggles and successfully solving the contradiction in the planning nature of subjective guidance and the probability in objective reality.

**II. Being sure of both subjective and objective conditions**

Being planned and prepared is the precondition of attaining victory, but it does not mean that we are sure of winning. As Mao Zedong said, “We do not fight a battle unprepared and unsure of winning, and we can fight a battle prepared but unsure of winning.“ In order to fight a battle sure of winning, on the one hand, we must positively prepare all material conditions for defeating the enemy. On the other, we must start from a safe basic point on strategic guidance and do what resources permit, making multiple preparations and leaving a leeway. Only when we have subjective initiative can we be sure of wining, both subjectively and objectively.

Doing what resources permit means that the strategic director’s subjective initiative must be built upon the basis of objective conditions. He should try to attain victory within the scope allowed by objective conditions and never seek success by being divorced from or passing on reality, and more so to base his subjective initiative on his own wishful thinking. To persist in this principle, he is required to achieve comprehensive analysis and compare the situations of all aspects. He must correctly assess the two sides’ war capability and potentials, the degree of support that the enemy can obtain from other sources, the situation of the military struggle, and the development and tendency of the growth and decline of the two side’s military forces. Then, he will accurately determine the basic point for the work of war preparation and the guiding principle of strategic combat to strive to fight the enemy when the ratio of forces offers us an assurance of victory. When there is no assurance of winning, he should be patient and wait for the opportunity to come. For example, in the Korean War, Mao Zedong, targeted the reality of war, timely adjusted our guiding principle of large encirclement, large turnabout and large annihilation by ordering that it was appropriate for one army to wipe out only one battalion of the US and British forces when fighting with them, and setting the principle of “chipping off hard candy” to fight a small war of annihilation in hope of accumulating small victories into a big one, gradually weakening the enemy. At last, we had laid the foundation for winning the war.

Making multiple preparations means that we must fully foresee all complicated situations in war and make preparations ahead of time. The situation in battlefields change at a wink, they would catch the strategic director unprepared if he fails to see them fully in advance. In order to patiently and confidently deal with those complicated situations, he must start from the overall war situation and, on the basis of comprehensively assessing the situations of both sides, take materializing strategic goals as the main line to scientifically predict and assume other possible scenes while setting and perfecting the programs for principal actions. He should conduct strategic countermeasures with an objective and do well in corresponding preparations. In the principal program, he should think of strategic measures for ordinary situations but also preliminarily plan for complicated times. He can handle the situations well only with multiple wisdoms. For example, in the second year of the War of Liberation, when commanding the armies of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping into the Dabai Mountains, Mao Zedong fully estimated that Chiang Kai-shek could take three actions against the PLA troops in the mountains. Accordingly, he ordered our units to be fully prepared in ideology and in action. During the advance into the mountains, our armies, with preparation, could not only escape the encirclement and pursuit by the enemy forces and avoid the dangers caused by the difficulty in getting logistics supplies, but could also immediately open bases in the Dabai Mountains to beat a weak enemy and fight small battles of annihilation after completing strategic development in the area to stand firm in the enemy‘s hinder land and create conditions for our armies to enter into strategic offensive.

Leaving a leeway means that instead of fighting and calculating to the fullest, it is necessary to leave a leeway. Uncertainty in war situations decides the contrast of planning and preparation. No matter how good the planning and preparations are, they cannot fully cover all possible situations, and contingencies often happen. Leaving a leeway is to give ourselves initiative as well as to give it to our subordinates. By so doing, it would allow us a larger assurance to materialize strategic goals and over-accomplish our missions. Even if the situation becomes more severe, we can deal with it more flexibly without affecting the whole plan. During the initial period of liberation, Mao Zedong, based on the situations of the two sides and our army‘s early experiences in combat, demanded all units to stand firm and fight steadily and not seek quick results. What he asked from them was annihilating the enemy forces at a monthly average of eight brigades or around 100 brigades a year. He planned to take five years to totally defeat Chiang Kai-shek‘s forces. This plan had not only taken the situation of the two sides into full consideration, but had also left a large leeway to enable the number of killed enemy to pass the planned figure in the following year. At last, it took only three years to wipe out the KMT troops and liberate the whole of China.

Naturally, the strategic director always strives to have plans, preparation and assurance in war, but there is no absolute assurance. Generally speaking, it is better not to fight a battle with plans and preparations without an assurance of winning. If the preparations are insufficient but there is a beneficial opportunity as well as assurance to eliminate the enemy, we should catch this opportunity and take the chance to fight and make up the insufficiency while fighting. This, however, requires the strategic director to be able to accurately grasp the “degree” of preparations and assurance and combine brave action with patience and boldness, and caution to dynamically attain all victories.

**III. Being cautious for an initial battle and strategic for a decisive battle**

Initial battle means the first battle at the beginning of the war; strategically a decisive battle refers to the two sides concentrating their major strategic forces to fight a battle that decides the outcome of the war. The results of both battles cast decisive impact on the process and ending of the war. Thus, whether in the past or at present and whether to attack or to defend, being cautious for the two battles has the universal significance of guidance.

Why is the initial battle important? It is because the first battle will produce a series of influences on the whole war situation. If it is won, not only can one side maximize its destruction of the other side’s strategic deployment and disturb the next step of the other side’s war plan, but the victory enables the winning side to control strategic initiatives at the very beginning and to push the war toward a quick development that is only in our favor. On the contrary, if it is lost, although the losing side can still gain a leeway for turnaround, it is, as a whole, a weakness more exposed and the war situation would be further unfavorable. It would cost more effort to turn the passivity around and the process of fighting would be slowed. In addition, in modern warfare, to enter combat with a strong hand in the initial battle that attempts to achieve a quick decision in a quick battle, the weak side or the defensive side will have difficulty to twist the time and opportunity for a victory if it loses in the first round of fighting. Thus, for the first battle in strategic fighting, we must base our thinking on the requirement for a decisive battle to have closely planned and fully prepared and to exert extra caution to fight it under an absolute assurance of winning.

To be cautious for the initial battle, we must persist in the three principles proposed by Ma Zedong, which are, “must win, must look after the plan for the whole campaign, and must take care of the next strategic phase.” Not only have these principles expounded the common interest of the initial battle and the whole campaign and the whole strategic situation, they have also raised the requirement for fighting the initial battle well, which is the basic principle that all battles must follow under modern conditions. For future wars, whether it is special warfare for resisting local invasion by a strong enemy, or a strategic counterattack, or an offensive or defensive battle on the border or at sea, an air raid or anti-air raid, a blockade or anti-blockade, a landing or anti-landing, we must first have a resolute determination and active concept of winning the initial battle. For the initial battle of strategic combat, we must closely plan and be fully prepared, to have the assurance of must-win on the selection of target, direction and opportunity for fighting and the use of strength as well as the arrangement of time and space. When defending, we should calculate counterattack and attack; when attacking, we must calculate the defense for decisive battle, the pursuit and the defense thereafter. When the war starts, we must calculate how to end it. In short, only by fully considering all situations and doing subjective and objective preparations can we fight the initial battle to make it the prelude of the whole process of war and to deliver a decisive blow and strong shock to the enemy to powerfully push forward the development of war. This will lay a situation, a reliable foundation for a rapid accomplishment of strategic goals.

We must fight a decisive battle in our favor and avoid one not in our favor. Under modern conditions, due to the limited strategic goals and the enhancement of the forces’ strategic combat capability, the attacking side in local wars can be based on the need of war to choose the form of strategic fighting in its favor and has completed all preparations for strategic decisive battle before the war. This greatly enhances its possibility of winning the decisive battle in the initial battle. The strategic director must plan and manage the initial battle by raising it to the height of decisive battle in order to fight a favorable decisive battle and avoid an unfavorable decisive battle. He should positively keep sufficient strategic combat forces and diligently create a beneficial strategic posture, accurately select the time for opening fire and the use of a sudden, strong and fierce first surprise attack to flexibly maneuver seizure and control of local air command, sea superiority and magnetism employment to resolutely attain the victory in this decisive battle. When the timing is not yet ripe and the conditions are absent, he should be firm and careful to wait for the best opportunity or adopt effective combat actions to create favorable conditions for a strategically decisive battle.

**Section Four: Seizing and Keeping the Strategic initiative**

Strategic initiative is the right of autonomous decision-making and the right of free movement enjoyed by the strategic director and troops in the whole war situation. Based on material, strategic initiative being active or passive is determined by objective conditions, such as whether the nation’s strength is strong and whether its military troops are superior. The strong side, however, does not naturally readily control strategic initiatives as it needs to be seized and kept through subjective effort. The level of the strategic director’s judgment and stratagems can alter the original status of the forces’ strength; therefore, to control the strategic initiative, he must have not only superior forces but also excellent art of command. Only by tying the two tightly together can he have a firm grasp of the strategic initiative.

**I. Strategic initiative is not an illusion; it is materialistic and solid**

In war, because of its rich comprehensive national strength, powerful forces and fine weapons, one side, which is good in employment of troops, selection of means and delivery of combat methods, is usually in the active position as it can handle the situation more freely. Due to its poor national strength, insufficient troops and backward equipment, the other side is greatly restricted on application of forces and selection of war methods when facing a strong enemy and can easily fall into strategic passivity. As attested by the practice of war, strategic superiority and subjectivity cannot be separated from inferiority and objectivity, which, however, is only a common law. Intending to get rid of passivity, the weak side needs first, to enhance military building and strive to narrow the gap from a strong enemy by beefing up the preponderance of its own troops so that they have the necessary conditions and material foundation to seize strategic activity; second, to gain partial superiority and activity first while in strategic passivity and then exert some effort to wear off and strip the enemy’s strategic preponderance and activity to turn the partial superiority and activity into complete ones and eventually defeat it. In these two ways, the universal law of the strong wins and the weak loses still has the decisive effect; thus, to seize and grasp the strategic initiative, enhance military building and maintain and develop superiority are indispensable objective conditions.

As the material conditions to win a strategic initiative improve, strength being strong or weak has different standards and requirements in different times and different technical conditions. The strategic director should accurately grasp the relationship between qualitative and quantitative superiority in military building to genuinely make the building of a material foundation for seizing strategic initiatives. Along with the advancement of the industrial revolution started in the second half of the 19th century, mechanical weapons like artillery, tank, airplane, submarine, aircraft carrier, radio and radar, are massively poured into battlefields to cause the scope of war to be continuously expanded. Thereafter, organizing large military groups and holding numerous technical weapons have become the main style of military building and the quantity of them has been an important symbol of strategic superiority and activity. In the mid-20th century, the development and utilization of nuclear techniques pushed the energy of weaponry to its extreme and nuclear preponderance has become the ante for seizing strategic initiative. Since the 1970s, the speedy development of information techniques featuring computer and microelectronic skill has brought the mankind into the era of information. The revolution of new techniques has aroused a profound reform in the military field. On the basis of greatly enhancing the killing and mobility of weapons and equipment, wisdom and power of structure are added to enormously improve the operational efficiency of weapons. At the same time, information techniques have combined weapon platforms, command control, intelligence exchanges and logistics support into an operational system to make information control a new field for seizing strategic initiative. The side with it can grasp strategic initiative and deliver precision attacks against the other side with advanced information weapons and paralyze its operational system, while the side with a weak ability in information operations can hardly use information of a different quality to counter quantitative superiority. This development requires us to foster a brand new outlook of superiority under modern conditions, particularly under hi-tech conditions.

**II. Subjective initiative is the key to seize and maintain initiative**

War is not only a race of material forces, such as power in politics, economy, S&T and military affairs but also a race of will, stratagem, plan and command. In order to grasp initiative in the race, it does mean that the side with a strong military power can have strategic initiative even though we need the banking of a strong material strength. Under certain material conditions, the strategic director, in the domains of time and space of war, may and can fully develop his subjective initiative, create favorable situations and conditions and guide military forces to fulfill realistic strategic initiatives with positive combat actions. Thus, superior ability of strategic guidance is the key to winning the strategic initiative. The reason? On the one hand, subjective effort can bring the superiority of military forces into full play and materialize the strategic initiative; on the other, it can change and improve the original means and situation of military forces to a certain extent to create new strength and means to reduce and kill the opponent’s superiority and seize its strategic initiative. Such examples have often happened in China‘s revolutionary war.

Giving play to subjective initiative means that we should strategically avoid fighting with an enemy which has superiority in the technical field, strive to develop our advantages and hide our disadvantages, create and find opportunities for war and utilize favorable combat forms and methods to surprise attack the enemy’s operational systems in the time and pace of our favor. We thus restrict the enemy and limit the enemy’s strong items and push it into passivity. In other words, on strategy, we have to independently and autonomously organize and use our own forces, give maximum play to our preponderance, master the battlefield, move the enemy and force it into our control and not to be controlled by it. We should also make the enemy unable to attack us when they attack, but resolutely beat the enemy and eliminate it when we strike. We, instead of the enemy, should hold the initiative over which battle we will fight; and how, when, where, and in what form to fight it. It is the basic thinking of guidance and the highest degree of subjective guidance ability to seize strategic initiative by strategically developing the strong points and hiding the weak points and getting advantages and avoiding disadvantages.

Under modern conditions, seizing and maintaining strategic initiative will be more complicated and difficult. It raises a higher demand for the strategic director’s ability of subjective guidance. First, initiative is generated by a correct estimate of the objective situation and an accurate handling of military and political actions. Since it is difficult to unhurriedly deal with emergencies and catch opportunities for combat that disappear instantly if there is no correct estimate of the military strategic situation, it requires the strategic director to do the following. First, always keeping a sober mind and have a clear picture of the development of the situation so that he can timely and resolutely make decisions at a critical moment. Second, causing the enemy to have illusions and mistakes in a planned way. The strategic director should be good at applying stratagems. He should use strategic feign and camouflage to hide the real and show the false and move the enemy by giving them illusions to pass the uncertainty of war to them and save the certainty for ourselves. It is an important method to create superiority and seize initiative. Under modern conditions, he must be skillful at using hi-tech means to conceal his real attempt to lure the enemy into mistakes, while on the basis of creating favorable situations for ourselves, he should keep striking the enemy and continuously deprive their preponderance and initiative. Third, being good at planning, creating momentum and following momentum to fight for strategic initiative. We should take political and diplomatic struggles to win wide sympathy and support from the world to politically press and restrict the enemy so that they will not wantonly exercise their military power. We should also disintegrate the enemy’s strategic alliance and stir up domestic anti-war sentiments to make them fall into national dilemma and unable to support a long-term war.

**III. Implementing firm and flexible strategic guidance**

In the struggle of attaining and keeping strategic initiative and the fight of striving to materialize the set strategic goals, firmness is a very essential and noble political quality. As there is a lot of fierce confrontation and huge risk in war, the strategic director must be rich in stratagem and good at assessment. He must have guts and perseverance as well as momentum and courage to suppress all enemies and never surrender to hardships. Under any difficult condition, he can firmly keep his political conviction and clear mind to strive to find new opportunities in unfavorable situations, discover light in darkness and attain activity in passivity and use his resolute determination and staunch perseverance to fight to the end and solve problems so as to thoroughly break the dilemma and get out of passivity. The director’s firmness, however, does not reject the development and changes of the situations for him to measure the timing and examine the situation and flexibly handle the war. If lacking flexibility, the strategic director cannot adapt to the uncertainty of war and military struggle and is more unable to flexibly employ military forces and create mobile and vivid strategies and tactics to timely transform his strategy into positive and active strikes of the enemy and seizure and maintenance of the strategic initiative. Especially in a crisscross strategic situation, the strategic director is required to have the ability of flexibly handling complicated matters to suit all difficult scenes, handily dispose of crisis, cleverly and resolutely rid dangers and firmly and vividly gain victory. Thus, he must be good at closely combining the set of guiding principles with the realty of military struggle and carry out flexible and mobile strategic guidance according to the development and changes of strategic situations.

Organically combining firmness and flexibility of strategic guidance strategically and in principle are the two aspects of the strategic director to harness in war. Firmness comes from his profound understanding of the objective situation and accurate grasp of the whole war situation, while flexibility shows his ability to command properly and handle new situations arousing from the old ones. Firmness is firm with flexibility; flexibility is flexible under firm guidance. They are preconditioning and conditioning each other. Firmness without flexibility is opinionated stubbornness; flexibility without firmness is aimless and rash actions. Only by tightly combining the firmness of principles and the flexibility of strategy can the director make his guidance firm and vital and dynamically seize and maintain the strategic initiative.

**Section Five: Looking After the Whole Situation and Grasping the Center of Strategy**

The scope of control of the strategic guidance is the whole war situation. The most important job of the strategic director is to focus his attention on looking after the whole war situation and grasping the center of strategy. This is most important and most significant to the whole war situation, while linking the situations in the war into an organic whole and pushing and developing it toward the direction that helps fulfill strategic goals.

**I. Looking after the whole situation**

The so-called whole situation is the whole of war and formed by parts that are mutually connected and functioning in time, space and structure. In terms of national military strategy, the situation of the national strategy and the situation of the national peripheral security are a whole and each direction and theater are parts. The building of the national armed forces is a whole and the building of each theater, each military service, each military branch and other armed forces are parts; the complete process of war is a whole. The war preparation and the beginning, development and conclusion of each stage are parts. Strategy is a whole and campaigns and combat actions are parts. The whole situation is higher than its parts. It commands them and decides their positions and functions. Whether the strategic director can control the whole situation and look after all parts therein to generate strategic value for the actions of all parts in the whole situation is the most essential issue related to the success and failure of the war. When the whole situation is well taken care of, it can closely link each aspect and each stage to form a strong overall might in the whole situation to win the war. Otherwise, if the parts are unconnected and work on their own, the development of the whole situation will suffer setbacks and even failure. To look after the whole situation well, the director is first required to understand the situations of all aspects in the whole. This requires knowledge of the impact of time characteristics on international strategic situations, the main contradictions formed and developed by the global strategic setup, the tendency of major powers‘ strategy, the primary factors causing current wars and armed conflicts, the degree of threat to national security from peripheral environments and the influences of domestic political and economic situations. The building of the armed forces and geographical environment to military actions is critical. Only by finding out the internal relations of all aspects and all factors and accurately knowing and controlling the law of directing the whole situation can the director harness the development and changes of the whole situation and overall plan the process and ending of the war, uniformly managing the relationships of all aspects and all stages to coordinate and diligently move toward the expected strategic goals and directions.

Scientifically foreseeing the trend of the development of the whole situation is critical. The process of the development of war embodies the beginning, connection and transfer of all strategic stages. To harness the whole situation to develop toward the set goals, the strategic director should start from the interest of the whole situation and consider the process of the development of war as a whole and scientifically predict and plan each strategic stage to closely connect the current benefits with subsequent interests. This strategic stage with the following one in order to let the former stage and the next one fully be utilized, consolidate and expand the fruits created by the former stage so that each strategic stage will inherit benefits from the previous one and guide and connect the following stages to continuously develop forward. Mao Zedong has profoundly pointed out: “The Strategic director, when in a strategic stage, should calculate many future stages or at least the next stage. Although to foretell later changes and how more uncertain a future scene will be is difficult for they are farther in distance; however, it is still possible to make a rough estimate. It is necessary to estimate the scene of the future.” Otherwise, “We can only follow the war around and let it blind us instead of being able to place it under our control and adjust and regulate it to create the conditions needed by the war and lead the war toward the direction of our demand to attain victory.” Without this kind of calculation and simply proceeding without a plan, we would get only instant benefits and lose the control over the whole situation to cause mistakes out of little thought or indecisiveness.

Being good at planning and managing war from the whole. The whole situation of strategy is like a chess game. Each part is a man on a chessboard. If he wants to play a good game, the strategic director must keep the whole situation of the “chess game” in mind and be good at planning the whole game in accordance with his general attempt. He must skillfully move each and every “man” to make them closely linked and supporting one another to bring the strong overall power into play. Only by so doing can he attack and defend what he wants, which is like “writing a large essay“ of high ceiling and grand structure.

**II. Grasping the center of strategy and pushing the development of the whole situation**

Looking after the whole situation is not equal to treating all parts equally. Due to the imbalance of the development of things, the parts in the whole situation do not have the same positions and functions. The development and changes of a certain part could generate a decisive impact on the whole situation and become the center of strategy representing the interest of the whole situation or control the development of the whole situation. Although existing in a part, the impact decides the trend of the whole situation. We can catch the whole situation if we catch this part and enliven the whole situation if we treat this part well. Thus, the strategic director must be good at grasping the center of strategy and concentrate his energy on handling the issue of the center of strategy well.

To determine whether a certain part is the center of strategy does not depend on how its own value is. It must identify its function to the whole situation from the height of the whole situation. If the success or failure of a certain part does not generate decisive impact on the whole situation, it would be a general problem no matter how important this part is. If the solution of the problem of a certain part’s success or failure directly affects the fundamental interest of the whole situation, this part, therefore, is the center of strategy that has a decisive significance to the whole situation. Essentially, the center of strategy decides the contradiction and the contradictory aspect in the whole situation. In a certain time and space, the manifestation of the center of strategy is as follows: The acquisition of major strategic goals and the actions on principal strategic direction; the strategic link connecting the preceding and following actions and the timing for strategic transfer; and the spot responsible for the organization and deployment of the groups assuming major strategic missions and their relationship with other troops, and the focal point of confrontation and struggle between the two belligerent sides. There should be only one strategic center in a given time and space as there will be no center if there are too many. The strategic director must be good at starting from the overall situation and finding out the links and the direction of decisive significance through analysis and comparison of all aspects and all stages. After having found the strategic center, he should concentrate his energy of command, application of forces and organization of strategic support and take them as the center to coordinate the actions in all directions and all stages to push the whole situation toward the expected goal.

**III. Adjusting and transforming the center of strategy in accordance with the changing situation**

The strategic center in war is not fixed and unchangeable. Each period, each war, each strategic stage has its own situation, and so do the major contradictions that affect and check the development of the whole situation. Some center is demoted to be a secondary contradiction along with the solution of key problems, while secondary contradictions could be transformed into major contradictions affecting the whole situation under certain conditions. It happens so often along with the development and changes of situation. Thus, the strategic director must be good at setting the strategic center and also at timely adjusting it according to the development and changes of the situation in order to keep in his hand at all times the strategic issues that most affect the whole situation to ensure the targeting and continuity of strategic guidance.

Change of the ratio of forces between the two belligerent sides is the fundamental base to transform the strategic center. The quantitative and qualitative changes between the two sides to divide the development of war into different stages is a challenge. In China’s revolutionary war, preserving self was the major aspect of contradiction when the gap was quite wide. Striving to eliminate the enemy’s effective strength to gradually change the ratio turned out to be the basic point of planning and management when the ratio had changed in our favor. Annihilating the heavy enemy groups and seizing central cities became the core problem of strategic guidance when our forces had been close to or exceeded the enemy forces. Only by the timely changing of the center of strategy according to the ratio of strength can we guarantee that we are always strategically on the active position.

Adjustment of combat opponents changes a series of strategic issues, including the principal direction of combat, major form of combat and main battlefield environment; therefore, the strategic center naturally should also be adjusted. In the later period of the War of Liberation, in order to achieve the strategic goal of liberating the entirety of China, attacking cities and encircling and annihilating heavy enemy groups was the PLA’s key strategic point. In the Korean War, after strategic counterattack turned into strategic defense, resisting the attack of US tanks, airplanes and artillery and firmly guarding our positions became the key points of strategic command. In the 1970s, to prevent the surprise attack by the superpower and resist its massive armed invasion, our strategic center was whether or not we could check the enemy’s initial strategic assault and stop its march into our inland. Now, for unifying our motherland and creating a safe and favorable environment for national modernization, the strategic center should be placed in how to improve our forces’ capability of winning local wars under modern conditions, especially under hi-tech conditions.

The positions and functions of many factors in the whole war situation are not balanced, either. Material factors are the basis to determine the destiny of war, but under some conditions, certain spiritual factors, such as the people’s feeling and the forces‘ morale, also play a vital part. Along with the development and changes of war, the issues of logistics supply, personnel replacement , strategic maneuver, cadre quality, etc. can all be key links affecting the development of the whole situation. The strategic director must base decisions on the changes of these factors in the process of the development of war. He must clearly point out their importance and urgency and turn the most influential and pressing problems affecting the whole situation into the center of his guidance and concentrate his effort to settle them. Only by doing so can he look after the whole situation and strive to win the war at last.

**Chapter Eleven**

**Strategic Command**

Strategic command is strategic commanders and the strategic command institutions organized and leading the strategic war activities of the troops under their command. The strategic command is an important content of military strategy and the highest level of troop command. From the strategic perspective, strategic command is the necessary path to realize military strategy, it is related to the entire war and strategy. Reviewing the history of war, it can be seen that the intricacy of war will usually rest in the strategic command. The strategic command is the most attractive aspect of the entire art of war.

**Section One: The Elements of Strategic Command**

The elements of strategic command are the necessary elements which compose and influence the strategic command activities. In general, the elements of strategic command involve the main body of command (the strategic commanders and the command institutions), the object of command, and the means of command.

**Subsection one. Strategic Commanders**

Strategic commanders are the personnel who control the command authority of the strategic war and carry out the responsibilities of strategic war command. The strategic commanders are not determined by the size of the troops under their command. They have more to do with the command issues of the responsibilities of the entire war. The war commanders are a group of commanding bodies and not a single person. The supreme military commander is a special strategic commander. He is not the entire commanding team. As early as two thousand years ago, Sun Zi had indicated that the commanders are like the protective bars of carts, if the commanders can serve the country like the carts next to each other, fulfill their responsibilities, the country can be strong. If the carts are not attached close to each other, they will be unable to fulfill the responsibilities and the country will be weak. This clearly illustrates the tremendous responsibilities of the strategic commanders in their defense of national security and protection of the stability in the society. From the perspective of war and combat, it can be said that the important status and functions of the strategic commanders are mainly displayed as:

**Subsection A. The strategic commander is the one who concentrates the morale**

(Liu Tao, Long Tao) said, “If the commander is not kind, the troops will not be close to each other. If the commander is not brave, the troops will not be sharp. If the commander is not wise, the troops will not be trusting. If the commander is not clear-headed, the troops will be in decline.” This emphasizes that the status of the commander is regarded by his troops as the core and soul. In history, all those wise and able military commanders were able to attract their troops to surround them as if they were magnets.

The extremely difficult war environment is a severe test of people’s physical stamina and mental strength. The wisdom, tenacity, and will of the war commanders are the key to boosting the troops’ morale and maintaining the cohesiveness of the troops. During the Chinese internal revolutionary war period, our military, after the failures of five counter- “circle and annihilate” wars and the big losses at the beginning period of the Long March, was also able to hold the conference at Zunyi, which ended the control and adventurism of “Left” leaning Wang Ming at the party central. It firmly established the correct leadership of the new party central, which was led by Mao Ze-dong. It put Mao Ze-dong back in the vital position as strategic commander. With Mao Ze-dong at the core, the morale of the Red Army became cohesive. With high morale, the Red Army won victory after victory.

**Subsection B. The strategic commander is the initiator of military actions.**

The military is the armed group to execute political duties. It is a tool for a certain class or political group in fulfilling its own political aims. The strategic commanders are the representatives of this class. What they execute is the command authority that is given by this class. From a certain meaning, it can be said that the military commanders can make the desires of the class turn into the desires of the whole through his command. The orders from the strategic commanders are the “sources” of all orders of the subordinating commanders. The strategic commander is the “dragon head” who handles all aspects of the war.

**Subsection C. The strategic commander is the “director” of the war play**.

“The acting stage of the war commander must be built on what is permitted under the objective conditions. However, he can use this stage and direct many colorful, brave, and heroic plays.” (1) The war usually proceeds in two scenarios, one is in the brain of the strategic commander and the other is the actual battlefield where the antagonists get into real killing and destruction. Corresponding to these different scenarios, the commander’s “direction” of the war can be divided into planned direction and improvised direction, which can adapt to different circumstances. In the phase of planned direction, the will of the strategic commander is reflected on the strategic determination and war plans. After the war activities get underway, the strategic commander will use strategic determination and war plans to control the war activities of his troops. During the war, according to the changing situations of the battlefield, many unexpected things could frequently take place. The strategic commanders must be careful about timing and assess the situations, adjust the strategic plans accordingly, deal with various situations in a flexible manner, be firmly in control of the helm of the troops’ command, and lead the war to victory.

**Subsection Two. Strategic Command Institutions**

The main body of strategic command not only includes strategic commanders, it also includes the strategic command institutions. The main body of strategic command with a strategic commander does not have cohesive power. The main body of strategic command with the strategic command institutions is also unhealthy.

**Subsection A. The meaning, type, and composition of the strategic command institutions**

The command institution is “a permanent military establishment, which has the organization and command functions. For example, the Chief of Staffs or the Headquarters of each military organization.” The strategic command institution is the highest level of commanding institution, which executes strategic command functions.

Any country or troops has its strategic command institution. But due to differences of each country’s situations, military situations, and military traditions, etc, the concrete situations of the strategic command institution in each country is different. For example, the titles vary, such as, National Security Staffs, Armed Forces General Headquarters, Staffs Of The Three Branches Of The Military, The Headquarters Of The Three Branches Of Military, The Armed Forces Commanding Staffs Bureau, etc.

The first kind is the Bureau of General Staffs. Adopting the form of the Bureau of General Staff is beneficial to unified command and leadership of the military. The Bureau of General Staffs, which is under the leadership and policy of the nations’ highest military authority, leads the armed forces in organizing the war commands and military works. Generally, it has broader command and administrative functions. The Bureau of General Staffs manages the war commands and administrative leadership and it is beneficial for the two to work closely and harmoniously. But if the missions, responsibilities, and institutional structure of the Bureau of General Staffs are too massive and complex, to a certain degree, it will affect the concentration of the main forces and the organization of war commands. The strategic command institution of our military is the Bureau of General Staffs. The Navy, Air force and the Second Artillery Headquarters all possess the attributes of the strategic command institution.

The other kind is the Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs belongs to a joint system. It is the Headquarters’ first grade united command institution, which is established for the purpose of a unified war command. Its administrative organization is the Bureau of Joint Staffs (or equivalent to institutions, such as, the Joint Bureau of Staffs) under it. The Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs is the advisory organization of the nations’ highest military authority. It is also the executive office of the highest military commander who commands the entire troops. Due to its main responsibilities of organizing war command and planning all kinds of war plans, proposing suggestions, the range of authority is relatively smaller than the Bureau of General Staffs. This kind of strategic command institution separates military administrative leadership and war command. Due to its focus only on war commands, the institution is more effective and has more specific missions.

The names and types of the strategic command institutions of each country in the world are not all the same. Its composition is also different. However, it all contains branches of war, intelligence, communications, etc., which are directly relevant to strategic command.

**Subsection B. The status, functions, and responsibilities of strategic command institutions**.

First is a discussion of the commanding institution of a strategic commander. Under the instructions and orders of the strategic commander, the strategic command institution executes its command, control and coordination of military activities. Although each military strategic command institution in different nations has a different status and function, it is largely the same in terms of the Bureau of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs) as the highest commanding authority and the strategic command institution of the highest strategic commander. This is the true attribute of the military relationship of the Bureau of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs). The Bureau of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs) has a superior’s role over the strategic commanders.

Second is a discussion of the command center of the armed forces. The strategic command institution as the command center of the entire armed forces means that in the command system of the armed forces, the Bureau of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs) has the functions of the cerebrum and the core. Mao Ze-dong once said that the command institution has the functions of a brain. Deng Xiao-ping also said the Headquarters is established for the troops and it is the brain of the troops. The strategic commander is the core of the strategic command activities. But the Bureau of General Staffs (or a similar type of institution) must handle a large portion of strategic command works. Without information and intelligence supplied by the personnel of the Bureau of General Staffs (or a similar type of institution) there can be no reliance on the results of calculations, scientific evaluations, and verifications. If departing from various command technological means of the Bureau of General Staffs and its close organizational work, all units of the armed forces can not coordinate their activities and render the determination of the strategic commanders unrealized.

Third is a discussion of the leading organization of the military works. The type of the strategic command institution of each country in the world is not all the same. All those Bureaus of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs) which are in charge of military administration, military orders, military training, also possess the attributes of a military leadership institution. There are many countries’ Bureau of General Staffs (or the institution equivalent to the Bureau of General Staffs), which have these attributes. The Bureau of the General Staffs of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army not only is a strategic command institution, it is also the leadership institution of military works of the entire armed forces. It carries out all kinds of responsibilities of strategic command and it also carries the responsibilities of leading the entire military’s works.

**Subsection Three. Objects of Strategic Command**

The objects of command are referring to the subordinating commanders, command institutions and all the subordinating troops, which are under the command of the commander. To separate or combine the strategic commander from strategic command objects is the commanding authority. The objects of strategic command are in relation to the strategic commander. If there is no strategic commander, there is no object of strategic command to speak of. If there are no strategic command objects, the existence of a strategic commander becomes completely meaningless. It is because of the existence of these two that it forms the basic contradiction of the strategic command activities. All strategic command activities generate from this basic contraction.

All the armed forces of any country (or the United States) belong to the command objects of the main body of the strategic command. Armed forces are the combined titles of all kinds of armed organizations of a country or political group. It is a tool of violence used by a country or political group internally or externally. In general, the military is the main body, which is formed by combining other regular or irregular armed organizations. From a military strategic battle group at the higher end to military units and branch units at the lower end, the strategic commander has the right to execute his command and control. But, because of the high level of the strategic commander, he has no need and it is also impossible, to meticulously command and control every detail of the armed forces’ war activities. Therefore, the objects of command with more practical values are the direct subordinates of the strategic commander.

Due to the difference of national situations and military situations of each country, not all the objects of command in each country are alike. At the present phase, our country’s objects of strategic command are mainly each military region, each military branch, and the Headquarters of the Armed Police Unit, etc. During the war, each military region’s command institution is responsible to command various military branch units to engage in united war and combined campaigns. In our military, we have dual command systems for our Navy and Air force. When the Navy or Air force fights independently or fights with one of them as the major force, the highest command center commands them through the Navy or Air force command institution. If the Navy or Air force is fighting a coordinated campaign with other military branches, it will be under the command of the corresponding command institution of the military region. The war activities of our Strategic Guided Missiles Forces are under the direct command and control of the highest command center; the more concrete commanding works will be handled by the command institution of the Second Artillery Unit. The highest command center will exercise the command and control of all military activities of the Armed Police Unit through the command institution of the Armed Police Unit.

Some militaries of other countries have different objects of strategic command from our military. The United States has a separate system of administrative leadership and war command. The highest authority of the country exercises administrative leadership through the three separate branches, i.e., Army, Navy, and Air force; through the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and Can Lian Bu(phonetic), four Regional Headquarters, and five Branch Headquarters, and implements the war commands. Therefore, the objects of strategic command of the United States of America are the above mentioned organizations. They only accept, from above, the orders and instructions from the President, the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and, to the lower level, command all the troops in the war with full authority.

>From the perspective of the composition of war power, it can be said that any strategic team of the military or strategic unit formation, is the object of strategic command. For example, our combat troops during the Liberation War, the Allied Combined Military Groups of World War II, the regional military groups and their command institutions were the objects of command under the direct control of the supreme commander.

During the war some countries established some temporary institutions of strategic command, they are also the objects of strategic command by the Headquarters of the supreme commander. For example, our military established Huaihai Zong Qian Wei, Beijing-Tianjin Zong Qian Wei, Cross the River Battle Zong Qien Wei(phonetic). The Soviets also established the Northwest, Western, and Southwestern General Command Headquarters, etc., during the early stage of the Soviet German war, these were all the objects of strategic command of the supreme command Headquarters.

During emergency situations, the supreme command Headquarters can execute command beyond their ranks. In that case, every command institution of every lower level unit, branch unit, can also become the objects of strategic command.

**Subsection Four. Tools of Strategic Command**

The tools of strategic command are the intermediary systems, which combine the main body of strategic command (including strategic commanders and institutions of strategic command) and objects of strategic command. It is an indispensable material and technological means of maintaining the smooth operations of the strategic command activities.

During the phase of manual command, it proceeded with reconnaissance and intelligence collection by visual sighting, covert listening, search, capture, and dispatch of spies. It used fire signals, pigeons, and horse relays, etc., to pass on the intelligence. It used hand signals, verbal communication, drums, gongs, bugles, etc., to command the battles. Strategic command activities mainly relied on manual methods or simple command tools to accomplish its goals.

The method of mechanized command started during the early stage of the 20th century. The strategic command methods developed great changes due to the inventions and wide applications of telegraphs, telephones, slide rules, typewriters, magnetic recorders, blue print machines, image printing machines, copying machines, automobiles, and various mechanized tools and facilities. It allowed the very time-consuming and labor-intensive strategic command works to become much more efficient due to the use of all kinds of mechanized tools and facilities.

The automation of strategic command started about the middle part of the 20th century. Following the successful invention of the first electronic computer in the world, the means of command automation by using the electronic computer as its core facilities started to be developed. This kind of automated command method gathers command, control, communication and intelligence into one body. It can automatically collect, process, display, and transmit intelligence information, which, to a certain degree, supplements the final decisions. The unprecedented change of the methods of strategic command has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of strategic command.

The tools and materials of strategic command are one important factor to influence the effectiveness of strategic command. This is particularly true under the conditions of advanced technology. The strategic command activities are very difficult to be efficient once they depart from the advanced technological tools and materials of strategic command. If the levels of command of the antagonists’ strategic commanders are about the same or pretty close, the levels of technology of the tools and materials of strategic command become very significant when it comes to the efficiency of strategic command and to the conclusion of the entire war. Therefore, the military of every country competes to develop the tools and materials of strategic command with advanced technology. Especially, great efforts are spent on developing the strategic C4ISR system. It is a concentrated reflection of modern advanced tools and materials of the strategic command. The strategic C4ISR system usually involves strategic surveillance pre-warning systems, command center, and strategic communication system. The strategic C4ISR system is the highest form of military command automation system. It is a very complex and advanced technological system and is an indispensable materialistic technology for the smooth operations of strategic command of modern warfare.

**Section Two: Activities of Strategic Command**

Activities of strategic command is a combination of a series of command works, which is executed by the strategic commanders and institutions of strategic command in order to achieve the strategic command objectives. The essence of strategic command activities is decision-making and implementation of the decisions. In order to make the strategic decisions, the strategic commanders and institutions of strategic command must seriously organize strategic surveillance, collect strategic intelligence from all sides, accurately judge the strategic situations and scientifically implement the strategic decisions. In order to realize the strategic decisions, the strategic duties must be prescribed in a timely manner, designed meticulously, closely organized for strategic coordination, organize strategic protection in all directions, and strictly perform inspections and supervisions, etc.

**Subsection One. Execute Strategic Judgment**

Once the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command receive and clarify their missions, they must quickly organize the execution of strategic surveillance, collection of strategic intelligence from all sides, and, based on these works, execute strategic judgment. The so-called strategic judgment is the process of the strategic commanders and institutions of strategic command in analyzing and researching the strategic situations relevant to their strategic missions and coming to a final conclusion. The true nature of the strategic judgment is to reveal the nature of war issues and their internal relationships through complex phenomenon and obtain a correct understanding of the entire war situation. The content of which includes the judgment of enemy situations, judgment of our own situations, judgment of combat space and time, judgment of the situations of the society, judgment on the weather and hydrological conditions, etc. The strategic judgment is one of the important activities of the strategic commanders and institutions of strategic command. The conclusion of strategic judgment is the clear mission basis of making strategic decisions and the process of strategic operations.

In processing strategic judgment, one must use the world concept and methodology of the dialectic materialism; systematically analyze strategic situations from all sides; thoroughly inspect the advantageous and disadvantageous elements and conditions to complete the war duties; and assure the measures that one can obtain gains and avoid losses. We should prevent the subjective view, such as, using “One is often most impressed by the first idea entering his mind,” to replace objective analysis and research of strategic situations, so that the strategic judgment is not built on the basis of one’s wishful thinking.

Under the conditions of advanced technology, the excess and overload of strategic information could increase the difficulties of strategic judgment. It is because the accurate strategic judgment is relevant to those seeking valuable strategic information and intelligence, and is not directly related to the total amount of strategic information. Under the situations where the amount of strategic information has greatly increased, it will not be easy to pick and choose the precious strategic information. The advanced technological methods of surveillance, intelligence, and communication, can expel the traditional “war fog” to a certain degree. It can also change the lack of exactness of the display method of the war, thus adding new “war fog” to the judgment. Therefore, under the conditions of advanced technology, in order to improve strategic judgment, we have to effectively curtail the phenomenon of information overload and scientifically process and use the information.

**Subsection Two. Strategic Decision-Making**

On the basis of making strategic judgments, the most pressing and important missions of the strategic commanders are strategic decision-making. The strategic decisions are the basic decisions that the strategic commanders made for the strategic combat objectives and actions. These are the strategic combat intentions, the major strategic directions, the missions of strategic groups under command, the organization of military command, the principles of strategic coordinated efforts, etc., which are firmly established by the strategic commanders.

The decisions of the strategic commanders are the foundation of the entire strategic command task. It is reflected in a concentrated manner. The strategic commanders’ entire art of organizing and commanding the troops is concentrated. Although the command of the troops is unified, there are no set rules on strategic decisions. Due to the situations of war differing and changing so much, every strategic commander has his own unique command style.

The methods of decision-making: First is the suggestions first made by the institutions of strategic command, then the strategic commanders will make final strategic decisions based on these suggestions. Second, is that the strategic commanders summon the relevant lower level commanders and research together, using the thoughts gathered by the group, the strategic commander then makes the final strategic decisions. During the Soviet war with Germany and our revolutionary war period, the military Headquarters often used this method. Third, is that the strategic commanders first propose their initial views on the strategic decisions, and under the support of the institutions of strategic command, the contents of the decisions are gradually improved. No matter what circumstance, it always requires the full functions of the command institutions.

Making strategic decisions is a creative process with great responsibilities. The strategic commanders must have a deep appreciation of the traits of modern warfare. They must be able to predict the developmental process of the war and demonstrate persistent will, brave spirit, and strong capabilities of organization and planning.

**Subsection Three. Formulate The Strategic Plans**

Formulating the strategic plans is an extremely important task of the institutions of strategic command in thoroughly working out the decisions made by the strategic commanders. It should clearly reflect the contents of strategic decisions such as, the order in which the troops can proceed with their missions, its methods and time limits, the coordinated actions of the troops, protection and command formula, etc.

From the recognizable traits of the strategic planning, it can be said that the true nature of strategic planning is prediction. Prior to any strategic combat, in which real guns and knives are used in the struggles, in the heads of the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command, they will proceed with one round of “rehearsal.” Therefore, strategic planning is a rehearsal of the strategic combats by the strategic commanders in their thoughts. From this point, it can be seen that strategic planning is a great test of predictive power of all the personnel in the institutions of strategic command.

From the perspective of the attributes of strategic planning, it is a concrete reflection of the commander’s decisions and the basis for war preparation and operations of the troops. If the strategic decision is a “rough” conception of strategic war, the strategic planning is a “delicate” painting. It is the expansion and thinning of the strategic decisions.

The strategic planning is mainly the task of the institutions of strategic command. The strategic commanders need to provide guidance on this task because, either good or bad, the planning will directly impact on the efficiency and accuracy of how the strategic decisions are being reflected. The basis of strategic planning by the institutions of strategic command is the decisions and relevant instructions of the strategic commanders.

In strategic planning, it must begin from the most complex and difficult situations and make more than one preparation. Napoleon had said that war plans should have two. In fact, even with two plans, it is often difficult to deal with the complex and changing war situations. Mao Ze-dong indicated, “Due to the imprecise characteristic of the war, to implement plans for the war could be more difficult than implementing plans for other enterprises.” (2) At the time of making basic plans, several different situations must be considered and several preparatory plans be formulated. One of the major reasons the Soviet military did poorly at the beginning of the Soviet and German War, was that the Soviets only developed one strategic plan prior to the war. They attempted to fight a short-term border war at the beginning and then implement forceful strategic offensive actions and push the war operations into the enemy territory. Therefore, when it did not turn out as the Soviet military expected it caused great confusion in the military activities and resulted in great losses.

Under the conditions of modern warfare, the importance of formulating strategic plans became more critical. This is because there are multiple factors involved; the space of war has increased in dimension; the timing of war has become more precise; the methods and styles of combat have multiplied; and the war has become more complex. If without meticulous planning, the whole strategic combat cannot proceed orderly and smoothly. Under the conditions of advanced technology, it is a complex procedure to conduct strategic planning. It requires solving a lot of problems, proceeding with a large amount of calculations, and using mathematical simulations to predict the changes of situations. This puts more demands on the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command. Therefore, it is an important path to raise the efficiency of strategic command by using the strategic command automation system of advanced technology and effectively conduct strategic planning.

**Subsection Four. Prescribe Strategic Duties Downward**

Strategic duties are the duties of war, which can decisively influence the entire war or the situations of strategic direction. The content of strategic duties is determined by the troops’ structures, fighting powers, the realistic situations of the battlefield, and the natural terrain of the war zone, etc. of both our troops and the enemy troops.

To prescribe the strategic duties downward is a measure of letting the formulated strategic plans to work on the troops under command. The only way to convey the desire of the strategic decisions to defeat the enemy forces and change the realistic actions of the troops’ fighting with the enemy forces, is to quickly convert the decisions of the strategic commanders to become the strategic duties of the troops under command and convey them quickly downward. Strategic duties include: smashing the enemy’s force concentration at the war zone (strategic direction) and occupying important positions; destroying the enemy’s most crucial military industrial targets; destroying the enemy’s military command system; defending against sudden attacks from many different directions; and guarding the strategically important regions or positions.

The expression styles of the strategic duties differ in the military of each country and in historical phases. For example, during the Soviet and German war, the high command Headquarters of the Soviet military usually gave out the battle instructions to prescribe the strategic duties downward. Our military during the war period, the Central Military Commission, generally adopted the style of prescribing combat policies downward to the troops under command so that they had clear and precise strategic duties. During the final battle phase of the liberation war, Mao Ze-dong and the Central Military Commission prescribed the strategic duties downward, which was reflected in the telegraphs, such as, “The combat policy related to the Liaochen Battle,” “The combat policy related to the Huaihai Battle,” “The combat policy of Beijing- Tianjin battle,” etc.

In the history of strategic command, the ways that the strategic commanders prescribed strategic duties were in such styles as oral instructions and written instructions, etc. It is the same to say that the major methods of prescribing strategic duties to the troops are oral instructions or written documents (words or graphics), which used the regulated signals and orders to give out the duties. All these methods were used by our military during the past practices of strategic command. For example, during the liberation war period, Su Yu proposed to the Central Military Commission that they concentrate the combat forces of the central plain region and the main combat forces of the eastern China region to fight a large scale annihilation campaign. After listening to Su Yu’s plan, Mao Ze-dong agreed to his ideas and verbally gave him the war duties, which made Su Yu feel that he had received the “military order” from the Central Military Commission. There is no doubt that this was a model example of giving strategic duties verbally. The use of a series of telegraphs to prescribe combat policies by Mao Ze-dong belonged to the two latter methods of prescribing strategic duties.

Under the conditions of advanced technology, using the strategic command automation system, we can change the former ways of transmitting verbal command from face to face only, to communicate between different locations. The former way of using written documents to prescribe strategic duties downward can be altered by using the instant networking method from two different locations. Therefore, it is necessary to search under the conditions of advanced technology, the new method and new style of prescribing strategic duties by using the strategic command automation system.

**Subsection Five. Organize Strategic Coordination**

The coordination of strategy is that every strategic group in order to implement strategic duties and every military branch in order to achieve strategic objectives, following their commanded duties and the coordination of space and time, uniformly takes coordinated actions. It fully reflects the true nature that the strategic war could only achieve victory by common efforts of the forces and weapons of every branch. No matter whether it is between different military branches or within each military branch, coordinated actions must be organized.

The initial strategic coordination is relatively simple. It is about the coordinated battle by the foot soldiers and soldiers with vehicles, in which the strategic coordination and tactical coordination did not show clear distinction. With the development of war, strategic coordination becomes more complex. During World War I, with the emergence of tanks and airplanes, the war required ground and air coordination and foot soldiers and tank coordination. During World War II, because of the large amount of troops involved in the fighting and the wider war zones, major war participants formed various alliances, which brought big development to the extent and complexity of strategic coordination. Under the current conditions, there is even a higher demand for effectively organizing the coordinated actions of every military branch at ground, sea, air, space, and electronic “united five” battlefields and form a complete force to defeat the enemy.

Organizing strategic coordination is a very important duty of the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command. The strategic commanders must determine the sequence of coordinated actions when they are making decisions. They must also give instructions about the sequence when they regulate the battle duties. Thereafter, they should further clarify it while in the process of organizing battle actions. The institutions of strategic command should formulate meticulous strategic coordinated action plans based on the decisions made by the strategic commanders and relevant instructions of coordinated actions. They should also reflect the coordinated battle issues on other relevant planning documents. When the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command are organizing the coordinated actions, they should assure every military branch and every strategic group is fully aware. They must follow the action sequence of objectives, space and time, and the action methods of every force and the weapons in their execution of their duties. They must clearly protect all measures of battle actions, organize every branch, every war zone, every direction, every institution of strategic command of the strategic group to communicate the relevant situations to each other, and confirm the communication and contact methods of all the coordinated troops.

Under any circumstance, organizing coordinated actions must be beneficial to those military branches or strategic groups, which shoulder major responsibilities during the strategic battles or in expressing their fighting prowess. The success or failure of the strategically coordinated activities is directly determining the final results of the strategic battles. Therefore, the strategic commanders must give plenty of attention to the issues of important strategic coordination. For example, during the final battle of the Soviet and German War, to conquer Berlin had no doubt become the most important strategic duty of the Soviet troops. The supreme commander, Stalin himself, took the coordination role of four separate troops, which were advancing toward Berlin. Stalin used the telephone to contact the top commander of each advancing troops and solve many important coordination issues. Mao Ze-dong, as the highest commander of our military, always paid great attention to the issues of strategic coordination. >From the strategic command telegraphic documents of Mao Ze-dong during the war days, it could be seen that he was personally organizing and commanding in almost all strategically coordinated issues, which had great importance to the entire war so that all coordinated wars had been smoothly executed.

**Subsection Six. Implement Supervision and Inspection**

# Supervising and inspecting the execution of strategic decisions, orders, and instructions by the troops commanded are important components of strategic command and have important functions on strategic command. Only by practicing close supervision and inspection can the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command assure themselves that the battle decisions of the subordinating troops conform to the total strategic intentions. The battle plans of the subordinating troops and the strategic decisions must be in unison; and the subordinating troops are part of the whole coordinated forces. If there is departure from the necessary supervision and inspection, the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command would not be able to assure in time that the subordinating troops have departed from the strategic decisions. Their instructions in implementation are not known and they cannot practice close control over the subordinating troops’ strategic battle activities. As it stands, it will be very difficult to obtain high efficiency of strategic command.

The supervision and inspection of strategic command activities include the subordinates having timely and correctly received and understood their duties. The decisions of the subordinates must conform to the intention of the strategic commanders. The subordinates have correctly and in its entirety formulated the combat and battle plans, the coordination plans, and the whole protection plans on the battle actions with other troops; the subordinating troops have accurately prepared thoroughly in the regulated time, so that they can implement these plans, etc.

The methods of supervision and inspection have many different kinds and types. The common methods used by the strategic commanders and the supervisors of the institutions of strategic command are to inspect the troops by himself, to use communication equipment to have a dialogue, and to analyze and research the battle documents presented by the subordinates. Under the current conditions, we should value the use of advanced technology and use strategic command automation systems to implement supervision and inspection. On the issues of methods of supervision and inspection, the key is that it should be realistic and factual. The concrete situations should be analyzed in a concrete manner. We should definitely use the method that is most suitable to the real situations of the battle and the special traits of our own military. For example, during the Soviet and German war, the Soviet troops based on the special circumstances of the time, had devised two methods of supervision and inspection. The first method was to dispatch representatives of the high command to report to the Headquarters the real situation of the regional troops and reflect them to the supreme commander. They would also correct the problems existing in the implementation of the decisions and instructions of the high command by the subordinating troops. The second method was to dispatch official teams from the General Staff to inspect the troops’ conditions, situations, and the needs of livelihood and battles. They would then report directly to the General Staff the results of the inspection. These two methods had very good results during the war. During the revolutionary war, Mao Ze-dong personally established a very strict reporting system so that he would be able to understand and master the troop situations in a more timely and accurate manner and could more effectively control troop activities. He demanded the head of each combat corps and the heads of military regions to report the battle policies and submit their request for guidance at any time. Moreover, he demanded that once every month they present a report on the battle, a report on consumption and losses and the force conditions. He demanded that a policy-wise synthesized report and request for guidance be submitted every two months. The content of these reports and requests for guidance included the moods of the political officers, the political leaning of these political officers, the methods to correct their political leaning, the improvement or retrogression of battle technology, tactics, the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy forces, the highs and lows of enemy morale, etc. (3). The practice of this method proved that strict reporting and requests for guidance was a very effective method of strategic supervision and inspection that was practiced by our military.

The supervision and inspection themselves are not the goals. The real purpose is to make sure that the subordinating troops’ decisions and deployment conform to the strategic intentions and decisions through these methods. For example, when planning the Liaochen battle, the combat troops of the Northeast Military Region were very indecisive with regard to the aim of the initial battle. For this, Mao Ze-dong made frequent telegraphic exchanges with the leadership of the Northeast Military Region, in which he provided many instructions and corrections. He even condemned the Northeast combat troops and instructed them to attack Jinzhou as the goal of the initial battle, thus assuring the victory of the battle of Liaochen. It can be said that practicing close and scientific supervision and inspection was one of the good traditions of the strategic command of our military. This nice tradition is still significant in strategic command under the conditions of advanced technology.

**Section Three: Regulations of Strategic Command**

The regulations of strategic command are definite, internal, and true to the nature of the connections of all elements of the strategic command with its external elements. To reveal and understand the regulations of strategic command is an important duty of the science of strategy. It is also the foundation that correct suggestions can be made to the practice of strategic command. Strategic command must follow the general regulations of military command. For example, the forms of organization and methods of command are determined by the system of the armed forces and the command’s materialistic technology basis and conditions. All military units must have unified command organization and principles of methodology. All the components of the command system must maintain a certain proportion and the best mutual relationship. They should have commonality in command technology, materials, and command systems among the troops, which belong to the same group or are in coordinated actions. The time required to implement the command duties and all the time available must be adjustable. The effectiveness of accomplishing the command must be decided on the amount of intelligence used, etc. Aside from the above regulations, there are some special regulations of strategic command that need to be emphasized.

**Subsection One. Strategic Command Must Obey the Entire Political Authority**

The mutual relationship of strategy and politics demands that strategic command must obey the needs of the entire political authority. This is shown in three areas:

Subsection A. Politics is the basic standard to measure whether the strategic goals have been reached. The major objective of strategic command is to protect effective use of subordinating military to accomplish the determined strategic duties. The mutual relationship between political objectives, the objectives of war, and strategic objectives are the strategic objectives. Strategic objectives determine the objectives of strategic command. Apparently, if the strategic command departs from, or even violates the needs of the entire political authority, even though the war has achieved victory, it will bring passiveness to the entire politics.

Subsection B. The political objectives directly determine the effectiveness of strategic command. The nature of political objectives will have decisive impacts on the execution of war. In fact, the political objectives determine the justness or unjustness of the war and it will bring a fundamental impact to strategic command because, in a just war, strategic command can rely on the full support of the masses to the war efforts. If the war is unjust, the masses will protest against the objectives of the war. Another way to look at it is when the war is unjust and lacking the support of the masses, even if the strategic command is superb, it may not help in achieving victory in war.

Subsection C. Strategic command needs the leadership of the politics and needs the politics to create beneficial conditions. The politics of the nation not only regulates strategic duties, it can also create beneficial conditions for strategic duties. It is because of this that the politics owns institutions and means and can mobilize the largest personnel, materials, and resources, to assure military activities. There are many means and tools to achieve the political objectives, war is merely one of them. Under some circumstances, if departing from the support of other means and resources, which is controlled by politics, strategic command will not be able to proceed smoothly.

Although the emphasis is that strategic command should obey the entire political authority, it should not be ignored or totally neglected that a counter reaction of the strategic command could have a negative impact on the entire political authority. If once the politics has decided to achieve certain objectives through the means of war, it should not violate the regulations of strategic command. It requires the highest authority of the country to give strategic duties to the military within the limits of national resources, and create and provide beneficial circumstances for the effective implementation of the strategic command. It cannot violate the intrinsic objective regulations of the strategic command activities and interfere with the normal process of strategic command activities at will. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to achieve the political objectives.

**Subsection Two. Subjective Guidance Of the War Meets Objective Realty Of the War**

First of all, strategic command must be based on the objective reality of the war. The objective reality of the war is referring to all the objective situations outside of the brains of strategic commanders, which are closely related to strategic command. It includes materialistic elements, such as, the ability to fight the war, the situations of the battlefield, the time and space environment, the command system, etc. It also includes the spiritual elements, such as, awareness, morale, and emotions, of the troops. Mao Ze-dong indicated, “The people who guided the war cannot surpass the limits of objectively allowable conditions and expect to win victory. But they could and should actively achieve victory under the limits of objective conditions. The stage where the strategic commanders act must be established on the permissiveness of objective conditions.”(4) The strategic commanders must practice strategic command based on realistic situations of the war. During the second Chinese internal revolutionary war, Wan Ming, the “left” leaning opportunist, neglected the extremely complex situations of the Chinese revolutionary war. The objective reality that the Red Army was weak went unrecognized. He commanded the Red Army to fight a regular big campaign war with the superior forces of the Nationalists and almost put the Chinese revolution in ruin.

Secondly, the subjective guidance of the war has very positive and active functions to the objective conditions of the war and can influence the developmental changes of the objective reality of the war. This is demonstrated in, first, the correct subjective guidance can fully utilize all the beneficial objective materialistic conditions. The conditions of war are objective and they cannot determine victory or defeat of the war. Only the subjective efforts of the strategic commanders can win a war. The objective conditions can produce functions, which may determine victory or defeat. Just like what Mao Ze-dong indicated, “Victory or defeat of war is often determined by such conditions as, military, politics, economy, geography, nature of war, and international aids, etc., but are not limited to them. If you have only these, it only suggests the possibility of either victory or defeat, it does not win or lose by itself. In order to determine victory or defeat, it should add subjective efforts; it is guiding the war and implementing the war; and it is the self-aware activity of the war.”(5) Second, the subjective guidance of strategic commanders can change the objective reality to a certain degree. Those able strategic commanders can change bad situations to good situations and change passiveness to activity. For those lousy strategic commanders, they change good situations to poor, and active situations to passive. Third, during the war, the objective conditions possess certain possibilities, in order to change this possibility to fact, the subjective efforts of the strategic commanders often can have decisive impact. “War is a competition of forces, but the forces can change its original form during the war. Here, the subjective efforts; win more victories; and making less mistakes, are the decisive factors.” (6) If one can grab the opportunities during the war; grasp good situations, and achieve victory through subjective efforts, it is a valuable demonstration of the art of strategic command.

**Subsection Three. Implement the Concentrated and Unified Strategic Command**

Mao Ze-dong indicated that a unified command is a concentrated command. He often emphasized the decisive authority of war command needs to be “concentrated to the least number of people or even to only one person.”(7) He also pointed out, military command must “focus on one to avoid diversion”(8) Napoleon also said, “ In war, the most important thing is nothing but a unified command.” (9)

The basic trait of the concentrated unified command is the unification of the institutions of strategic command and the command relationship. The strategic war is a combined war and coordinated war of all the armed forces and all branches of the military. The participation in the war is massive thus the mutual relationships of these forces in war can make it rather complex. For this, the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command need to concentrate and achieve a unified command structure. During the Soviet war with Germany, the Soviet forces headed by Stalin’s high Command Headquarters, and our military, during the revolutionary war period, headed by the Central Military Commission, which was headed by Mao Ze-dong, are the kind of institutions of strategic command then needed. All the policy-making authority and command authority related to the entire war effort, were concentrated in the hands of the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command. It should not be interfered or overruled by any other level or institution. It should not allow the phenomenon of each does its own activities.

The foundation of concentrated and unified command is the unification of the strategic goals and will. All armed forces and military branches must aim at the unified strategic goals with unified intentions and implement unified strategic activities under unified strategic plans. Any branch of the military or military unit, if no permission is granted, cannot change, on its own volition, the war objectives and operational plans regulated by the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command. Only in this way, all war participants can achieve unified actions and form the greatest and wholesome combat capabilities to fight the enemy forces.

The key of the concentrated and unified command is to implement the coordination efforts of the entire strategic war and its process. During the war, every military branch and each different strategic direction has its own corresponding independence, which are mutually connected and mutually impacted. Only by implementing a reasonable structure and coordinating its activities from the beginning to the end, will allow the expression of maximum combat capabilities in its entirety. If there is no high level coordination capability in total, even though each military branch is equipped with everything, it will still be difficult to achieve strategic victory.

The emphasis on implementing concentrated and unified strategic command does not mean that the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command can interfere or even take over the command of the lower level commanders. In the process of implementing the strategic command, the strategic commanders and the institutions of strategic command should allow and promote the lower level commanders’ full exercise of their initiatives and creativity in reaching their military goals, at the premises of not violating the total strategic intentions. Under emergency situations, the lower level commanders should be granted the authority to take quick actions.

**Subsection Four. Grasp the Strategic Key and Plan the Entire War**

The so-called strategic key is the pivotal point, which can decide the whole situation of the war. When the strategic commander is practicing strategic command, he must “pay all his attention to take care of the entire war situations.” If he wants to plan the entire war, he must grasp the strategic key. The experience proves that this is “the move, which can be decisive to the entire situation.” Thus, it brings life to the entire war and it is the effective method to plan for the entire war.

Looking at this issue from the perspective of time, each phase of the war has a different impact to the results of the entire war. Those phases or processes of the war, which have apparently decisive impacts on the result of the war belong to the context of the strategic key. In order to accurately grasp the strategic key from the perspective of time, the strategic commanders must have strong predictive power on the progress of the war. Those strategic commanders who could only judge the situations one step at a time, or are only able to take care of the situation at hand, and not able to predict the direction of the war; are not likely to make good strategic commanders. During the Anti-Japanese war, Mao Ze-dong, being an outstanding strategic commander, indicated that the Chinese war with Japan could be divided into strategic defense, stalemate, and counter-attack as its three stages. He believed that out of these three stages, the stalemate period was the key. “This second stage is the transitional phase of the entire war, it is the most difficult period, but it is the key to turn things around. Whether China wants to become an independent country or it would become a colony, is not determined by the loss of big cities, it will be decided at the second stage by the efforts of all our nation.”(10) Based on this analysis he implemented his command. The victory against the Japanese completely proved that he had correctly handled the strategic key.

From the perspective of space, the important battle zones, strategic positions, major strategic directions, and other elements can become the strategic key, which have a decisive impact on the entire war. By researching the profound strategic command art of Mao Ze-dong, we discover that he was superb in correctly determining the strategic key and circled closely around the strategic key to implement his command of the entire war under different situations of the war. For example, when the Red Army was advancing eastward, Mao Ze-dong considered his move from the northwest of Shanxi, and indicated, “Guangsan and Shuitou line together(phonetic), that is, Shilou, Zongyang, Xiaoyi, and Xixian, four prefecture bordering areas, would be the key of the battle for our military. From the terrain, it is the best temporary bases in the rear.” (11) In September of 1936, he indicated the direction of development by the Red Army, “The key point is in Ning, Xia, not the west of Gansu. Because Ning, Xia is the key point of the entire northwest, including Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Suiyuen, inner and outer Mongolia.”(12) During the most difficult period of the Anti-Japanese War, Mao Ze-dong had paid particular attention to the functions of Honan, Huazhong, and Shandong. He emphasized, “Honan is the key area in the entire country for our long fight.” “Huazhong is our most important life line.” “Shan-dong is the key for transition.”(13) From this, it can be seen that the key of war is not constant. It changes with the changing situations of the entire war.

From the perspective of the forces, if we use parts of our forces well or destroy the enemy forces and cause decisive impacts to the entire war, then this can be considered as the strategic key. During the second phase of Huaihai Battle, our military had once encircled the military corps of Du Yi-ming at the Chengguang village area northeast of Yongchen and, in the south, we encircled the Huang Wei military corps at the Swangduiji area. Simultaneously, we had encircled two large enemy military corps. The Central Military Commission**,** Zong Qian Committee(phonetic) carefully analyzed the situation and believed from the perspective of the enemy, Huang was a smaller force and Du was a bigger force. Huang’s position was in the right position and its forces had been weakened and could easily be destroyed. From the Red Army’s perspective, the Hua (phonetic) combat troops had just completed its campaign to destroy the Huang Bai-tao’s military corps. “Our troops were tired and our forces had weakened.” If we had to use this force to attack Du Yu-ming’s military corps, it would not be easy. On the other hand, Zhong **(**phonetic)combat troops had many soldiers, and their determination to destroy the enemy after the Hua **(**phonetic)combat troops was increasing daily. After reviewing all the situations, the Central Military Commission and the Zong Qian Committee **(**phonetic) decided to first destroy the Huang’s troops and made it the strategic key of the second phase of the campaign and made the Zongyuan(phonetic) combat troops the main force. This correct decision assured the victory of the second phase of the Huaihai Battle.

Grasping the strategic key to deploy the troops for campaign and battle is an effective method in following the command regulations. All the problems of the entire strategic war, at the end, will be changed into problems of regional campaigns and battles. By grasping the strategic key and deploying troops for battles can organically tie the campaigns and battles, which have taken place at different times, and with different troops, thus beneficial to the realization of the strategic objectives.

**Subsection Five. The Initiative, Flexibility and Planning of the Strategic Command are Highly Unified**

The war is a competition of two antagonists on the basis of using the materialistic conditions of military forces, financial powers, etc. to seek superiority and initiative. The results can be victory or defeat. Aside from the objective materialistic conditions, the victor is superior in its expression of initiative than the enemy. From the perspective of strategic command, without initiative, there is no such thing as flexibility and planning.

The strategic plan is established on the foundation of the exactness and certainty of the war situation. It is based on the strategic commanders’ basic understanding of the situation of the war and its developmental trend to devise strategic war plans so that the duties of the war can be accomplished. The planning of the strategic command includes the subjective needs and objective possibilities, in which the subjective needs are based on the objective possibilities. Without the objective possibilities, the proposal of subjective needs belong to subjectivism, and it is not likely to be realized. Therefore, strategic plans is a subjective matter to be viewed as an objective matter, it must match the objective reality of the war. If no planning is emphasized in the strategic command, the entire troops’ combat actions will be aimless and blind and the results will be failure.

From another side, prior to the strategic commanders’ formulation of a strategic plan, they do not have a correct understanding or handling of the objective realities of the war. The imprecision of the war and the emergence of many new changes during the war makes it very unlikely for them to thoroughly practice the strategic plan in the entire process of implementing strategic command. This is why there is definite need of flexibility when implementing the strategic plan. In formulating a strategic plan, this flexibility demands consideration of many possibilities and the main possibility out of many possibilities and based on this estimation to finalize the major battle plan. In finalizing the major battle plan, one should plan to deal with many emergency situations, which could emerge. Thus, the plan not only contains the major battle plan, it can also be a very flexible plan, which possesses the ability to deal with emergency situations. This flexibility demands that it is adaptable to the changes of the battlefield and can change and adjust the original strategic plan accordingly, so that it is more pertinent to the new situations of the war. With regard to this point, Mao Ze-dong once said, “If the plan does not match the situation completely or not matching all the situations, we should form new judgments and make new decisions according to the new understanding of the situations. Thus, by changing the original plan, we make it more suitable for the new situations.” (14)

Flexibility is the reflection that the strategic commanders are fully expressing their own initiatives to influence the process and results of the war. It is not a passive way of dealing with the problem. The Chinese Red Army during their Long March, crossed the Red River four times. This initiative and flexibility in maneuvering the troops was a very outstanding example. After the Zunyi conference, the Central Red Army under the command of Mao Ze-dong, in view of the enemy’s increasing defense along the Yangtze River, changed the battle maneuver to Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangxi bordering areas. This kind of shifting tactics confused the enemy. It forced the enemy to judge that the Central Red Army was going to cross the Yangtze River to join with the Red Army Fourth Corps on one hand. It also made them judge that the Central Red Army was doomed to fail. It also made them think that the Central Red Army was going to join with the Red Army Second Corps and Red Army Sixth Corps at the western Hunan. The enemy totally became passive and got jerked around by the Red Army. Our military avoided confronting the concentrated enemy forces and attacked where they were vulnerable. After crossing the Red River four times, the Red Army advanced to Yunnan where the enemy was weak. We had destroyed tens of thousands of military forces, which were encircling and blocking the Red Army. Thus, we totally smashed the enemy’s dream of annihilating our forces in the Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangxi areas.

Flexible maneuvering is definitely not acting recklessly. It is not acting without considering the consequences. If departing from the entire plan and just seeking flexibility, or acting on one’s will in the name of flexibility, it could impact on the entire situation of the strategic coordination. It will influence and even destroy the smooth operation of the entire strategic plan. Therefore, in order to implement strategic command with high efficiency, one must insist on the highly unified initiative, flexibility, and planning.

Footnotes of Chapter 11.

1. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 2, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 306.
2. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Volume 2. People’s Publishing. Published in 1991, Page 495.
3. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 4. Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 364.
4. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Volume 2. People’s Publishing. Published in 1991, Page 478.
5. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Volume 2. People’s Publishing. Published in 1991, Page 478.
6. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Combined Works. People’s Publishing. Published in 1964, Page 454.
7. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Volume 1. People’s Publishing. Published in 1991, Page 213.
8. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 5, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 479.
9. >From “Chinese and Foreign Military Famous Quotes” Military Science Publishing. Published in 1986, Page 169.
10. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 2, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 293.
11. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 1, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 468.
12. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 1, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 592.
13. Mao Ze-dong’s Military Literatures. Volume 2, Published by Military Science Publishing. Central Document Publishing. Published in 1993, Page 525, 542, 681.
14. Mao Ze-dong’s Selected Works. Volume 1. People’s Publishing. Published in 1991, Page 180.

**Chapter Twelve**

**Strategic Offense**

Strategic offense is about implementing an attack on the enemy as part of the entire war and is for the purpose of achieving the objectives of war. In general it can be divided into an all out attack on all fronts and attacks on key points, which have specific direction and are more regional. It is one basic type of strategic action and is a major method of killing a large number of enemies and achieving victory.

Strategic offense has a very decisive impact in implementing the objectives of war. Engel’s said, “In general, it is believed that the offense will achieve bigger victory.” (1) Lenin said, “In the armed uprising of people, all victories achieved are the results of offensive actions.” Mao Ze-dong also said, “Although on many occasions during the war, they were mostly defense, the rest of the time, they are mostly offense. If we look at the war from its entirety, offense is still more important.” This is because the side implementing the strategic offense is taking the initiative in selecting the direction and time of the battle. They can make offensive deployment and preparation ahead of time based on their own intentions. Through a series of offensive actions they can impose their will on the enemy; obtain and maintain the strategic initiatives; and eventually implement the war and achieve strategic objectives.

Strategic offense can be implemented at the beginning of the war, it can also be implemented during the war, and it can serve different war and strategic objectives.

In view of the wars between different countries, some countries, which have expansion strategies, will, in order to obtain the world hegemony and regional hegemony, expand their territories. They will rob the resources of other countries; execute military interventions in foreign countries; overthrow the governments of other countries; achieve its rule over other countries; and would usually initiate armed offensives to other countries and start the wars. These countries which are invaded will generally implement strategic defense to counter the enemy’s attacks. By annihilating a large number of enemy forces, stunting the attacks of advancing enemy forces, forcing the enemy to turn the strategic offense into a strategic defense, and moving themselves from strategic defense into strategic offense will turn the war around.

In view of the domestic war within a country, there are many different situations of strategic offense. One of the antagonizing political forces can make the first move and take the strategic offense on the other political group for the purpose of grabbing and maintaining political power. The masses can hold armed uprisings and start the revolutionary war in the country because they object to the rule of the reactionary class. They can use strategic offense and overthrow the reactionary ruling class. Moreover, in order to protect national territory, the wholeness of sovereignty, the ruling class of the country can take anti-separatist measures against the separatists of some ethnic groups, which try to use arms and force to split the country. The ruling class can use strategic offense to smash the forces of ethnic separatists and their intention to split up the country.

# **Section One: The Objectives and Principles of Strategic Offense**

The objectives of strategic offense are the final results to be achieved by the strategic offensive actions. The principles of strategic offense are about the methods of determining the targets of offense and offensive actions for the sake of achieving the final results. Whether the strategic objectives and principles are correct or not can directly impact the smooth implementation of the war activities and winning victory.

The nature and scale of wars are different. The background and conditions on implementing strategic offense are different. The objectives and principles of strategic offense are also different. According to the theory of Clausewitze, “There is no limit in the use of violence.” The objective of the strategic offense of an all out war, is to overthrow the political rule and thoroughly conquer the opponent. For this, the principles of strategic offense are to thoroughly annihilate the enemy forces, to disarm them, and to occupy or liberate the territory. The strategic offense of the regional war is very different from an all out war. It is for achieving limited political objectives. If the objectives of the strategic offense are for the sake of occupying or recovering regional territory, the general principles are to destroy only part of the enemy forces. After occupying parts of the territory, military actions will be stopped to avoid the expansion of the war. If the strategic offense is for the purpose of achieving definite political intentions and not to occupy the territory, the principle is that, through destroying part of the military forces and damaging their war potential, one will force the opponent to surrender and allow the implementation of a political solution for the conflict.

In determining the objectives and principles of strategic offense, it is generally required to consider the following factors:

First, The political objectives of the war. The political objectives of the war are the most fundamental basis in determining the objectives and principles of the strategic offense. Based on the political objectives of the, one is required to regulate the target of attack of the strategic offense; the territory occupied; the forces mobilized; the weapons and facilities used, especially those strategic weapons. Emphasis must be placed on the implementation of the political objectives of the war and on obtaining special strategic interests. If the target, range, scale and intensity of strategic objectives depart from the need of political objectives and influence the realization of the political objectives, the objectives and principles of strategic offense must be revised. The target, range, scale, intensity, and even methods and modes of action of the strategic offense must also be revised so that the war can go back to the political orbit.

Second. The contrast of the military forces on both sides. The strategic defense is often inseparable from the inferior status of the military forces. The strategic offense is usually tied to the superior status of the military forces. Compared to strategic defense, the demand for superior military forces is higher for strategic offense. Even if it does not possess absolute overall superiority, it needs to have contrasting superior status on timing and space. Otherwise, a rash move can bring failure to the attack because of the lack of power. In 1941, German Fascists invaded Russia, and intended to defeat the Soviet troops in three months and occupy Moscow. These objectives of offense had far surpassed their own military capabilities and rendered final defeat to their “lightening strike.” During our revolutionary war, our army won a series of victories in strategic defense and counterattacks. We gradually gained superiority in quantity and quality compared to the Nationalist forces. When the conditions of strategic offense became ripe, our party decided to move into strategic offensiveness and implemented strategic offensive battles, such as: Liaochen, Huaihai, Beijing-Tianjin, and Cross the Yangtze River battles, etc. At the end, we defeated the Nationalist reactionaries. Therefore, the determination of the objectives and principles of strategic offense must be based on the military capabilities of both sides. In considering the problems of the major targets of offense, the basic method of offense, strategies, the use of tactical weapons, etc. we should focus on expressing one’s strengths and avoiding the shortcomings, criticizing the excess and attacking the falsehood, expressing one’s strategic superiority, and assuring the smooth implementation of strategic offense.

# Third. The possibility of economic power.Strategic offense is about using a large space and massive military to implement actions, which could determine the results of the war. It consumes more equipment and materials and needs the support of a larger economic power than strategic defense or strategic counter offense. Under the current conditions of advanced technology, the weapons and facilities are technologically intensive, the cost is prohibitive, and the consumption is immense. The fourth Middle East War, the Gulf War, and the War in Kosovo, for the side which formed the strategic offense, the daily cost were more than several hundred million dollars. Even the world’s large military countries found it too expensive and could not pay for them. Moreover, under the conditions of a strategic offense with advanced technology, in order to protect massive troops and military equipment on ground, sea, air, space, and each battlefield for war activities, one needs to rely on highly efficient production capabilities during war time. Modern transportation systems, and other economically based facilities must be depended upon so that the troops can be supplied in time with large amount of consumption goods needed for the livelihood and war activities. This suggests that, due to the changes of military technology and the development of war, modern warfare is no longer just a matter of competing military forces but more a competition of economic power. There is no question that the reliance of the strategic offense on economic power is increasing. When strategic commanders are determining the objectives and policies of strategic offense, they should consider carefully their own economic capabilities and the range, scale, style, process, and speed of strategic offense, and make sure that it is within the economic capabilities of their governments. Otherwise, they can run into trouble and fall into a passive role in the middle of the war.

Fourth. The benefits and drawbacks of strategic offense. Strategic offense cannot depart from the strategic situations, which are beneficial. First is that one’s own side is politically stable, strategic leadership is powerful and internally cohesive, people’s opinions are in unison, people are together, people have the same ideas about who is the enemy, and the morale is high. Second is that the enemy side is politically unstable, fractional strife is intense, many diverse opinions, people’s minds are not in unison, they are afraid of war, and morale is low. Third, is that international situations are favorable, one sees the cause is just, gets much international support, and forms a wide-spread international united front. On the enemy side, it is not with a just cause, so gets it gets no support, cannot form alliances with other countries, or the alliance is weak, what’s on their face is not necessarily what’s on their heart, and they receive many restrictions. If all three conditions are met, the determination of the objectives and policies of strategic offense have a definite basis. If all three conditions are not met, or only some conditions are met, strategic offense will become risky. Even if the situation is such that one cannot but take the strategic offense and attack, determining the objectives and policies of war they must proceed with extreme caution.

**Section Two: The Main Direction and Target of Strategic Offense**

# 

The important mission of strategy is correct selection of the major offensive direction and target of offense. Marx and Engel’s had discussed many times the important impact that the selection of major strategic direction would have on the processes and results of war. Stalin specifically emphasized, if the selection of basic offensive direction was correct, it could “determine ahead of time nine out of ten times the fate of the war.” If the major offensive direction and target of offense are selected well, they will have a reliable basis to determine strategic decisions. The deployment of forces and weapons will become the key points. Once the offensive gets underway, it will be easy to disturb the enemy’s deployment and obtain the desired effect of the strategy. If the selection of the basic offensive direction is incorrect, or is in error, one cannot realize the objectives of strategic offense but can even lose the strategic initiative. Therefore, the correct selection of major offensive direction and the target of offense are the keys to achieving the objectives of strategic offense**.**

The selection of major direction of strategic offense involves the following types:

**First. Aim the major offensive direction at the political controlling center of the enemy**. The purpose is to destroy the enemy’s basis of control in one quick sweep; shatter the people’s mind and their morale; make them lose the will to continue the war; and quickly end the war. Of course, sometimes, even if the attacker can grab the political controlling center, it does not necessarily achieve the objectives of strategic offense. Especially when the size of the country is large and there are large areas for them to turn to, even occupying the capital city may not have decisive influence of the results of the war. A good example is when Napoleon led the French troops to occupy the Russian capital of Moscow, but at the end, he lost.

**Second. Aim the major offensive direction at the major economic areas**. The purpose is to destroy the enemy’s economic foundation for war and its war potential; taking over the enemy’s strategic resources; strengthening one’s own war capabilities; and facilitate the progress of the war. For example, in the summer of 1942, the Germans’ major direction of strategic offense against the Soviets was aimed at the southern economic area of Russia. The Soviets, in the winter of 1944, selected a southwestern direction and implemented major attacks. These were also aimed at the economic area occupied by the Germans and reduced the war potential of the German troops.

**Third. Aim the major offensive direction to the enemy’s heavily concentrated forces.** This method usually means the side which is taking the offensive move has superior forces with superior weapons, and they are used under very advantageous strategic circumstances. Through the siege of the enemy’s concentrated forces, one fundamentally reduces or destroys the enemy’s war capabilities, which can impact decisively the entire war. In the war of the Far East in August of 1945, the Soviet forces in the Northeast of China took their strategic offense and aimed it at the Japanese Kanto military forces. They killed six hundred seventy thousand troops, the Japanese soon declared their surrender.

**Four. Aim the major direction of offense to an area of the enemy with poor geographical conditions**. Usually poor geographical conditions do not allow the movement of a large military force, thus it is often poorly defended or it is the joint area in the middle of defensive forces. To launch a strategic offense at this kind of place can best achieve the element of surprise. Once there is a breakthrough in this poor geographical area, the attacking forces can suddenly strike deeply and quickly into the enemy territory and achieve victory. The Germans, in May of 1940, invaded France and they selected the center area of the French and German fronts at the Ardon mountain as the major direction of their attacks. They achieved in one stroke the effectiveness of suddenness and shattered the French defensive system.

The above methods sometimes can be implemented in a connected manner or overlapped manner. Some countries’ political center can at the same time be the center of economics and transportation and guarded by heavy forces.

The requirements of selecting the major direction of the strategic offense are:

**First. Try to select the major direction of offense, which can also threaten several other strategic targets**. This approach allows strategic flexibility for the attackers. If the war situation changes, quick adjustments can be made to flexibly manage the situation. For the defenders, they will have difficulty judging the intentions of the attackers and fall into an awkward position; one in which they don’t know how to deal with. During World War II, the Germans invaded France. The major direction of offense covered from the east to west of France. At the same time, it also threatened the north and south of France. That made the French troops unable to judge whether the Germans would move north to encircle the allied forces of France and Britain after they had advanced westward, or they would advance southward to attack the capital of Paris when the French were not prepared. The French Headquarters were utterly confused, which led to the mistakes of strategic decisions.

**Second. Within a certain time period, try to select only one major direction of strategic offense.** There can be several directions for strategic offense, but there has to be only one major direction so that the attacking forces can be concentrated, which forms the fist of an attack, and effectively achieves the mission of strategic offense. Mao Ze-dong emphasized, “Under the conditions of the presence of large enemy military forces, no matter how many troops we have, though we can have two or more than two directions of offense, within the same time period, we should have only one major direction.” During World War I, when the Russians were attacking Germany, they selected west and southwest as the two major directions of offense. Because they divided the forces equally for these two directions, both advances were not successful and could not achieve the objectives of strategic offense.

**Third. Carefully deal with the adjustment issues of the major direction of strategic offense.** During the war, if the strategic situations did not have fundamental changes, we should firmly stick to the major direction of the established strategic offense and take resolute actions to implement it until the objectives of strategic offense are realized. The adjustment of the major direction of offense should be done with great care. It should be considered from the entire spectrum of the strategic situation and not influenced by any limited missions or the interests at hand, so that it will not bring disastrous results. When the Soviets were at war with the Germans, the Germans first aimed their attack at Minsk and Moscow as their major direction of offense. Then the Germans shifted their attacks to the north toward Leningrad and the south toward Ukraine. They were prepared to implement fork-like sudden attacks on Moscow from both northern and southern fronts. In October, when the Germans again aimed at Moscow as their major target of offense, the Soviets had already established strategic defense in the direction from Moscow. The Germans lost a fine opportunity and their attack was stunted. Of course, when the strategic situations have great changes, if another strategic direction can better achieve the strategic objectives, one can carefully make the necessary adjustment. For example, during the Liberation War, our major direction of strategic offense started in the Northeast of China. When the first combat of the final battle was victorious, the major direction of offense was shifted to the Eastern Chinese battlefields. Only by destroying the enemy forces in Eastern China, would it force the reactionary rule of the Nationalists to completely expose their political and economic centers. After the Red Army took over Eastern China, they again shifted their direction first to Guangdong and Guangxi and then to the Southwest of China. That way the Red Army could enclose the enemy forces and prevent them from escape. Our military had adjusted the major directions of attacks based on the development of war situations; aimed at the destruction of the enemy’s effective strength, and continuously attacked and advanced to victory.

After deciding the major direction of strategic offense, we should then decide on the major targets of attacks. The focuses of major direction of offense and major targets of attack can be the same and they can also be different. In general, they are the following:

Target selection:

* one, is to the major strategic group;
* two, is to the strategic locations, which have great significance to the military, politics, and economics for the entire situations;
* three, is to the core commanding institution or communication center;
* four, is to the strategic weapons and advanced weapon bases or the navy and air force bases;
* five, is to the bases in the hinterland or the center of the transportation system, etc.

Following the development of the war, the space military targets can become the major targets of the strategic offense in the future. During offensive action, generally there can be many targets of attack not just one target. In terms of the sequence of attacks, some will attack at the same time, some will arrange the targets into sequence. The offensive targets and the sequence of attacks are based on the values of the targets, especially as determined by their significance to the entire war. During the Gulf War, the allied forces attacked Iraq with the order of the command institutions, key communication links, anti-air defense systems, missiles bases, economic center, key transportation centers, and strategic groups, and won the war with little cost.

In the process of determining the major direction of strategic offense and targets of offense, whether one should first attack the strong points or the weak points, there are often two different versions; either to attack the stronger target first and the weaker one later, or the weaker one first and the stronger target later. Clausewitze looked at it from trench warfare, he advocated attacking the strong enemy first, because with the strong one gone, the weaker one would collapse without a fight. In the Chinese ancient military books, it advocated attacking the weak enemy first. Guang Zi said, “In using the troops, attacking the strong enemy will meet with stiff resistance but if attacking the weak, it will be quite easy. When attacking the strong enemy, the weak one can grow strength. If attacking the weak one first, the strong enemy could become meek.” Which means that, if attacking the strong enemy without success, the weak enemy can grow stronger; by successfully attacking the weak, it can make the strong enemy weaker. This viewpoint still can be quite meaningful to modern warfare. While Mao Ze-dong was leading the Chinese Revolutionary War, based on the concept of a people’s war, he always advocated striking the weak enemy and then the strong one. Only if our forces were in absolutely superior position and the enemy was absolutely weaker, would the Red Army then aim the offensive direction to the enemy’s heavily concentrated forces. The weakness, which Mao Ze-dong sought in the enemy, was the most vulnerable point of the enemy. It was both the key point and weakness and was not just an isolated weakness. In the final battle of the Liberation War, the first target was the Wei Li-Huang’s military corps. It was the main force of Chiang Kai-shek. This force was not the weakest. But the strategic situation at the time, indicated that his forces were isolated and were easy prey. If we destroyed them, it would allow the Red Army to encircle the Fu Zuo-yi’s military corps in the northeast thus this target became the strategic weakness.

**Section Three: The Major Patterns of Strategic Offense**.

The patterns of strategic offense are about the basic methods and modes of applying military forces in the strategic offensive moves so that the strategic objectives can be realized. Sun Zi said, “The troops do not maintain consistent forms and the water does not have consistent shape.” The patterns of strategic offense are quite varied and do not have a certain fixed manner. From the practice of war, strategic offense has the following major patterns:

**Subsection One. Single direction offense.**

It is an attack to the defender from one single strategic and combat direction. From a strategic and combat viewpoint, the attacker has only one major direction of attack and there is no other supportive direction. The single direction offense is usually relying on the ground forces as its main forces, supported by the Air force and Navy but it can rely solely on the independent ground forces. This pattern was widely used in the wars without firearms. In those days, the productivity was low, the transportation system was poor, population was small, the weapons and equipment were backward, the military forces were limited, the range of battlefield was limited, so the attacker mostly took single direction attack. For example, San Tang’s attack on Jieh, King Wu’s attack on Zhou, and many other invasive wars during the Chun-qiu warring states era, etc. With the development of military forces, weapons and facilities, modern warfare seldom relies on single direction offense. But under special circumstances, there are still examples of single direction offense. For example, the North African battlefield of World War II, due to the fact that the battlefield was restricted in a narrow strip of land near the sea, with one side next to the Mediterranean Ocean and one side next to the Sahara desert, only one approach was possible. During a long period, the German and Italian troops and the British troops engaged in strategic offense and defense along the seashore. It is easier for the attackers to organize, concentrate their forces, in a single direction offense, but due to the rigidity and inflexibility of this offensive pattern, it is easier for the defender to organize the defense.

**Subsection Two. Multi-direction offense**.

It is that the attackers implement attacks from two or more directions. The multi-direction offense usually relies on the ground forces as the major forces, coordinated with the Air force and Navy. The greatest advantage of this pattern is that the attackers can take the initiative and select the offensive directions and locations. For the defenders, it will be difficult for them to judge the enemy’s main direction of offense and have to make defensive preparations on many fronts, dividing their forces, paying uneven attention to those fronts, and failing to hold a decisive defense. Due to the above mentioned advantages, the multi-directions offense has been widely practiced in wars, and there are the following concrete patterns:

**Subsection A. Attack to the core.**

This is one pattern where the attackers start an all out strategic offense, which is an effective way to quickly destroy the opponent’s strategic group. This method usually has two to four directions advancing separately and attacks the enemy’s’ strategic defense together. The premise for such offensive pattern is that the national borderline or the war front has the shape, which is conducive to an attack from many directions. This requires the attackers have superior military forces and every military force in each direction has the capability to smash the concentrated defense of the enemy. The weakness of the strategy of attacking to the core is the exposure of the flank by each advancing troop. Once the troops enter deep into enemy territory, it is quite liable to be attacked. During our Land Revolutionary War, the Nationalists made four “circle and annihilate” campaigns to the central area of the Communists, they used superior forces to attack the core area, but were individually defeated by the Red Army.

**Subsection B. Fan-shape offense**.

This is a pattern of offense, which is just the opposite of the pattern of attacking to the core. This can be called an “attack to four different directions.” This is the pattern of strategic offense when, on each direction, the defenders are isolated, divided, and the defense is weak. Its functions are, in a very short time it can obtain many strategically important positions and largely expand the strategic area occupied by self, and create an advantageous strategic situation for the next military actions. In the early stage of the Pacific War, Japan attacked Pear Harbor, many countries in the southeast Pacific area, and many archipelagos of the southeast Pacific Ocean. This is a typical fan-shape offense. The greatest weakness of this offensive pattern is that it divided the forces of attack due to attacks on many strategic and combat directions and the rapid expansions of the occupied territories. If the defenders concentrated their forces and counter attacked, it would cause a threat to the attackers and subject them to attacks from all sides. The latter part of the history of the Pacific war has proven this point.

**Subsection C. Parallel offense**.

This pattern is to use two, or more than two, attacking forces simultaneously -- attacking deeply into enemy territory. This offensive pattern is usually used when the attackers’ strategic forces are superior, the defenders have a wide strategic front side, and the attacking forces can go in deep. The function of this pattern is to divide the enemy’s strategic front side, divide their strategic groups, shatter the defender’s defensive systems, and develop advantageous conditions for the future annihilation of a large amount of enemy forces and occupy the strategically important positions. During World War II, the Germans’ strategic attacks against the Soviets and later in the same war the Soviets’ attacks of the Germans used this offensive pattern.

**Subsection Three. Strategic Final Battle.**

This is the last competition that both sides use with their main forces. This is the war activity when attackers use all their forces to destroy the main forces of the enemy. This pattern of strategic offense is the most complex, tense, fierce battle of the war. This strategic final battle can decide the victory or defeat of the two antagonists. The strategic final battle could be implemented at the beginning of the war, it can also take place after the war has been taking place for a certain period. The strategic final battle at the beginning of the war usually happened in ancient wars. Victory or defeat could be decided by one or more than one, battles between the two antagonists. Under current conditions, due to the development of the methods of military combat and the expansion of the scale of combat, the final strategic battle usually take place after the war has gone on for a while. The modern strategic final battle is the three-dimensional fight between the ground, air and sea forces. During the process of a strategic final battle, the attackers have to make a series of attacks; the strategic defenders will also take counter moves. Both sides have to go through serious offensive and defensive competitions for the final decision to be determined.

**Subsection Four. Strategic pursuit**.

The strategic pursuit is the pattern of offense for the purpose of totally annihilating the enemy in retreat. Engle’s said, “The pursuit can totally destroy the defeated enemy.” In order to win the victory of strategic offense, it will not allow time for the enemy to grasp and for them to regroup their strategic defense. The attacker usually will use this offensive pattern after the war has progressed to a certain stage. Based on the concrete situations of the battlefield, the patterns of strategic pursuit mainly include: tailing pursuit, parallel pursuit, big siege, and big circuitous pursuit. In modern warfare, it commonly adopts the three dimensional pursuit to expand the results of the war. It will use the maneuvers of the Air force in the air, sudden attacks from the air, sudden air-drop of paratroopers, etc. If the defenders are withdrawing from the defensive positions of the seashore, or withdrawing their forces on the sea, the attackers can use amphibious landing or use the Navy to block them. At the end of our Liberation War, the People’s Liberation Army used the big siege and big circuitous pursuit to implement long distance strategic pursuit against the Nationalist troops. At the North African front during World War II, the British performed a strategic pursuit of the German forces for 2500 kilometers. During the end stage of the Gulf War, the multiple forces used air and ground three-dimensional pursuit against the retreating Iraqi troops.

**Subsection Five. Strategic blockade**.

This pattern of strategic offense is to interrupt the connections of the enemy government, the enemy’s strategic area, or its heavy concentration of military forces. The purpose is to isolate the enemy so it cannot receive support from outside, sink the enemy into a state of despair, and eventually defeat the enemy. Successful strategic blockade is a very important condition for grabbing the strategic initiative and winning victory in a strategic offense. The strategic blockade usually relies on military means, which can be coordinated with other means, such as, politics and economy, etc., so that it can completely cut off the enemy’s contact with the outside world through ground, sea, and air blockades. The military means for this include the siege of the enemy and the splitting of the enemy’s strategic alliances; occupying important strategic points, such as, residential areas, key transportation spots, airports, seaports, etc.. It may cut off the transportation routes of ground, sea, and air. For those places that can not be occupied by the troops, they can be controlled by firepower and other obstacles.

**Subsection Six. Air offense**

This pattern is mainly using the forces in the air and implementing a strategic offense toward the defenders. This is a “younger” pattern of the strategic offense. The Italian, Douhet, first proposed it in the 1920s as a theory. The implementation of air offense first appeared during World War II. At that time, the German used large-scale strategic air raids on Britain. Later the Allied Forces also used strategic air raids against the Germans and Japanese. During the Vietnam War, the Americans used strategic air offense with carpet-bombing against the Republic of Vietnam. In past wars, the air offense was usually coordinated with other patterns of strategic offense. But under the conditions of advanced technology, following the development of aerial weapons and facilities, the air offensive capabilities are increasingly strengthened. The patterns of air offense also continue to improve. The air offense has the tendency of becoming an independent pattern of strategic offense to solve war issues.

**Subsection Seven. Three-dimensional amphibious offense**

This is a pattern of strategic offense using the Navy and Air force to implement the attack on the ground, to deliver strategic power, and to occupy the enemy’s shore land or big islands. During World War II, the air and sea three-dimensional landing offenses were starting to be used as one of the patterns of strategic offense. The more famous one was the Allied Forces’ landing at Normandy and North Africa, both achieved the objectives of strategic offense. Under the current conditions, this pattern of strategic offense will continue to be valued. There are 80% of the countries in the world next to the ocean, the Navy and Air force bomb delivery strategic capabilities continue to increase, the possibilities of air and sea three-dimensional landing offense can only increase and not decrease.

**Subsection Eight. Strategic nuclear attack**

This pattern of strategic offense is to use nuclear weapons to suddenly attack the enemy’s strategic targets, such as their politics, economy, and military, etc. Near the end of World War II, the Americans dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The attacks caused more than one hundred thousand civilian casualties and huge property losses. Therefore, no matter the scale of strategic nuclear attack, it all belongs to big strategic offense. After the end of World War II, due to the formation of parity in nuclear weapons, it inhibited nuclear war. However, the nuclear threat continues to exist. After the war, there were several regional wars, which pushed the participants of the wars to the brink of using nuclear weapons. Due to the spread of nuclear weapons and the increase of countries with nuclear weapons, it cannot totally rule out the possibility that a country may decide to use nuclear weapons and implement this pattern of strategic offense under critically dangerous situations.

**Subsection Nine. Space offense**

This pattern is to use the weapon platform in space and deliver strategic power to ground, sea, and air, in attacking the strategic targets of the opponent. From the latter half of the 20th century, there has been great development of military power in outer space. Despite the fact that there is no country at the present which has deployed strategically offensive power in outer space, many countries continue to do research and development on weapons to be used in outer space and have quickened the steps to militarize outer space. In future wars, it will be inevitable to have war in space. The attack in space can become the future new pattern of strategic offense.

The practice of wars suggested that the above mentioned patterns of strategic offense usually cannot be applied individually. This is particularly true in modern war. In one important strategic offensive action, it is very likely that either simultaneously or sequentially more than two patterns of strategic offense will be used. For example, during World War II, the Allied Forces opened the second front in the west. First, they used the pattern of air and sea three-dimensional amphibious offense and conducted the Normandy landing. Later, they used the multi-directional pattern of offense to attack Germany and its occupied territories to initiate a strategic offense. At the same time, they continued to use air raids on the Germans. By using this multi-prone pattern of strategic offense, it obtained the great results of strategic offense.

Correct selection and application of the pattern of strategic offense usually requires doing the following three things:

**First. Meeting the basic objectives of strategic offense**

The pattern of strategic offense is the pattern of applying military forces under command to achieve the objectives of strategic offense. As to what pattern of strategic offense is to be used is solely determined by the needs of the objectives of strategic offense. It serves the purpose of the objectives of strategic offense. For example, if the objectives of strategic offense are to annihilate the enemy’s strategic groups, it generally uses multi-directional attack, strategic final battle, strategic pursuit, etc. If the objectives of the strategic offense are to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and potential of building a war economy, it generally uses the air offense and multi-direction offense. If the objectives of strategic offense are to grab the land under enemy control, the land near the ocean or big islands, it must adopt the pattern of strategic offense of sea and air three-dimensional landing attack. On land, it usually uses the multi-direction pattern of strategic offense. In short, the selection of the pattern of strategic offense must be based on the objectives of the strategic offense.

**Second. Meeting the reality of strategic power**

In determining the pattern of strategic offense, one must consider the need of strategic offense, moreover, it is important to consider the realistic possibility of strategic power. That is, one must analyze the comparative superiority of strategic capability of self and the opponent. One must focus on the largest limit of self in expressing one’s own superiority in order to determine what pattern of strategic offense to be used. For example, in the war of Kosovo, NATO was focusing on expressing its superiority in the air and adopted the pattern of air offense. They did not use the ground forces and avoided the possible casualties which could occur if there were direct ground confrontations with the Yugoslavian allied forces.

**Third. Meeting the realty of geographical conditions**

Under many conditions, the selection of the type of strategic offense is determined by the conditions of geographical and topographical conditions. For example, during the Gulf War, there was no hiding place in the desert area. The targets were well exposed, thus it was quite advantageous for the air superiority to show its power. For this, the United States of America had decided to use air offense as the major type of strategic offense and achieved the missions of their strategic offense.

In the history of warfare, following the continuous development of war methods and battle styles, the scale, speed, attacking front of the strategic offense, also went through continuous development and changes. In the cold-arms era and to the early stage of the hot-arms era, the productivity level was low, the military forces were limited in numbers, the scale of offense was not big, and the attacking front was limited. In 1882, Napoleon attacked Russia. Six hundred thousands French and Russian soldiers battled at Borodino**,** the front was 8 kilometers in width and the depth of the battlefield was 6 kilometers and the battle lasted only three days. Entering the 20th century, productivity rapidly increased, the amount of troops rapidly increased, the firepower strengthened, and the scale of the strategic offense was enhanced. In the early stage of World War I, the German offense to the western front was as wide as 340 kilometers. The Russian’s eastern front was as wide as 500 kilometers. In World War II, the strategic offense reached an unprecedented stage. During the German invasion of Russia, the front was as wide as 3000 kilometers, and the depth was 1200 kilometers. The speed of strategic offense during World War I was 4-6 kilometers per night, the maximum was about 18 kilometers. At the early stage of World War II, the foot soldiers’ on average advanced 15-25 kilometers per day. The tanks advanced every day and night about 30-40 kilometers. In the Gulf War, during the 100 hours of ground combat, the multi-forces advancing speed every day and night was about 60+ kilometers. The troops advanced 105 kilometers every day and night. The expansion of the scale of strategic offense and the quickening of its speed have prompted the development and improvement of the pattern of strategic offense.

**Section Four: The Art of Strategic Offense Guidance**

Implementing strategic offense not only requires advantageous objective conditions, it also requires correct subjective guidance. Under certain conditions the correctness of subjective guidance can have decisive functions.

**Subsection One. Careful about timing and assess the situations, correctly select and grasp good opportunities for strategic offense**.

The selection of the timing for a strategic offense is one of the keys in determining the success or failure of the strategic offense. Marx and Engle’s said, “If losing an opportune moment and not using a good opportunity to dispatch superior forces to deal with the enemy, it has committed the worst mistake of all the possible mistakes of the war.”(3). In general, the best time to launch a strategic offense is when the war gets started. Our own side has completed all kinds of mobilization and preparation for the strategic offense; the military situations are superior; the war materials and reserves are plentiful; the people are united together; the morale of officers and soldiers is high. While the enemy has not mobilized their forces and the preparation is not complete; their military situation is inferior. Our own side has made adequate and fundamental preparation for strategic offense and the military capabilities are in a superior position, the strategic offense has a good cause, the weather, geographical conditions, and international situations are all favorable. While the enemy’s allies are being restricted and have no time to care for their friends’ situations. Moreover, if our own side is not ready for the strategic offense, or if the military forces on both sides are relatively close in strength, or if only our own side is slightly superior but the enemy’s strategic decisions are in error, or the political situations are unstable with domestic disturbance, it is also an advantageous time to launch a strategic offense.

In the process of war, the best time to turn the strategic counter-attack into a strategic attack is: 1. The military capabilities of one’s own side have obtained a clear superior status and the opponent is preparing to move or moving into strategic defense. 2. The military capabilities of one’s own side are slightly superior than the enemy’s and has a better strategic maneuverability, situations are advantageous, the enemy’s forces are divided, and the strategic maneuverability has lessened. 3. Although both sides have about the same military capabilities, the enemy has been defeated repeatedly. When the enemy is at the end of the road, the enemy’s forces are divided and the rear is empty, morale is gone, and there is instability in the troops. On the other hand, our own side has great maneuverability, morale is high, the situations are advantageous, and the international situations are advantageous.

The timing of selecting the time for a strategic offense is not too soon but not too late, the timing must be just right. If it is too early, the conditions are premature. In that case, it will be difficult to achieve the objectives but could also sustain losses and strategically drop into a passive mode. If it is too late, the enemy has already become fully prepared, the opportunity is gone, and the difficulties of strategic offense increase. This requires the strategic commander to be careful about the timing, assess the situations, synthetically analyze and consider the conditions of politics, economy, military, international situations, natural environment, etc. and make an appropriate assessment of the total situation while selecting the timing of his strategic offense. There is no need to belittle the enemy or overestimate their capabilities. There is need of paying attention to the material capabilities as well as the spiritual capabilities. There is need to look at the advantageous and disadvantageous conditions. There is need to get big results of the war but it also requires considering the lessening of cost. One should look at the fact and ponder the true nature. It is good to tie all the factors together which caused the antagonism on both sides, and compare them; to assess the benefits and drawbacks; to find out the factors which control the situations, thus be able on our own side to pick the best time for us and the worst time for the enemy in making a strategic offense.

For example, when in the 1947 Liberation War, Chiang Kai-shek had yet to stop his attacks on key positions, the Nationalists still had sizeable troops. Mao Ze-dong was bright enough to predict that Chiang was near the end of his road. He could see that the situations in China had developed into a new stage, the military situations were developing in a direction which became favorable to the masses. Mao Ze-dong, with a bold and far-reaching vision, indicated that the Red Army should not wait until the total destruction of the offense of the enemy. He believed that the Red Army should not wait until they were far superior in manpower and equipment to move into strategic offense. They should grasp the opportune moment and not allow the enemy to rest, therefore, he timely implemented the strategic policy of “All out attack to rule the central plains of China.” In one sweep, he was able to make a strategic turn of the Liberation War and guided the entire nation into a large scale strategic offense and won the final victory.

**Subsection Two. Look at the whole situation, attack when the enemy is not ready, select well the target of offense**.

The main direction of strategic offense is the center of determination and plan of the strategic offense. If the direction of attack is well chosen, strategic offense is half won. Under normal circumstances, the selection of the main direction of offense must be determined on the strategic objectives, missions, the nature of the enemy’s defense, the strengths and deployment of both armies, the natural geographic conditions, etc. Looking at the examples of war history, when the directors of the war were selecting the directions of attacks, aside from considering the above factors, the emphasis was placed on selecting directions where the enemy least expected, thus achieving the results of surprise attacks.

In general, where the enemy is not expecting the attack coming form a certain direction, it is usually a place where geographical conditions are bad, where a big army, especially tanks or mechanized maneuvering, are not convenient. Picking such a place for a major offense requires boldness and superb art of command. Not that all poor geographical locations can be selected as the major directions of offense. Viewing the whole situation, it requires some special conditions. One is that despite the poor geographical conditions, after strengthening the protection, a large army can still pass it and the width and depth of the area is still large enough for a large force to maneuver. Second is that the enemy’s defense there is weak; it is where the enemy’s strategic groups are connected; thus, once penetrated, it can split up the enemy line and shatter the defense system from its roots. For example, in 1940, the Germans invaded France. They picked the major direction of attack from the Ardon forest area. In 1945, the Soviet strategic attack of the Japanese troops in the Far East was also the same in terms of selecting the major direction of attack.

**Subsection Three. Concentrate the forces and form strategic offense deployment with special focus**.

Concentrate the forces is a basic principle of strategic offense deployment. Marx indicated, “The intricacy of strategy is at the concentration of forces.” (4) Engel’s also indicated, “Concentration of forces is always the important thing.” Mao Ze-dong, during the strategic offense stage of the Chinese Liberation War, had listed the concentration of the forces as one of the ten most important principles of the military. In correctly selecting the major direction of offense, it requires that the commander is bold enough and capable enough to concentrate his forces in the major direction of attack. He should also use lesser but necessary amounts of troops in attacking less important directions or supplementary directions. This will accomplish the strategic offense deployment with special focus. This is a test of the strategic commanders’ art of command.

The strategic offense deployment with key focus first requires concentrating absolutely superior forces toward the major offensive direction. For example, during the Soviet strategic offense phase of the Soviet and German War, the manpower and weapon superiority of the Soviet troops reached 3-5:1, Tanks 3-4:1, artillery 6-8:1, thus it is like the situation of using a rock to crack an egg. While concentrating superior forces in the major direction of offense, it is necessary to use enough force in the lesser directions so that the enemy forces are divided, the line gets extended, they can feel the pinch in every direction, they cannot maneuver, and the major offensive forces can achieve a breakthrough. With the coordination of attacks in lesser directions, it can succeed in splitting the enemy’s strategic groups and encircle them. When our Red Army entered the phase of strategic offense during the Liberation War, based on Mao Ze-dong’s strategic policy, we used the Liu and Deng’s large strategic forces as the major forces at the central route, that is, the major offense direction, and deployed one regiment each at both flanks, and implemented a focused attack. Thus, the main direction and lesser directions of offenses were clearly defined; they supported each other; both flanks matched the powerful strategic deployment; and guaranteed the success of strategic offense.

Under modern conditions, the strategic defense has more depth. In order for the attackers to break through the deep defense, they must have the power to maintain continuous attack and break through the defensive lines. Therefore, when establishing attacking phases in depth, it is very important to have a strong strategic reserve in offensive deployment. It will guarantee that in the battle with depth, the attackers can move in fresh attacking forces, deal with various unexpected situations, and win the victory of strategic offense. The attackers in the direction of offense, usually establish two strategic attacking phases and one strategic reserve unit, and deploy into a deep phase attacking formation.

**Subsection Four. Grasp the key links, flexibly command the combats of strategic offense.**

Strategic offense needs each branch of the military and each strategic group to exercise coordinated combats. The strategic commanders need to correctly decide on the following matters before embarking on battles: the target of attack at each phase of strategic offense, the amount of troops needed, the target of offense, the basic combat methods that will be used, the transition of each strategic phase, and the coordination of each military branch and each strategic group. It needs to make different demands based on the special characteristics of the combat actions on the sea and air. It should make sure that each branch of the military, each strategic group, is coordinated such that it fully expresses the power of the battle of the whole group.

After the strategic offense gets underway, the battle situations are changing rapidly, all kinds of information and problems crop up like swarming bees. Facing these kinds of complex situations, the strategic commander cannot just passively respond. He should focus his energy and think about how to solve the key questions, which possess decisive meaning. The so-called key questions are those important questions which occur at critical moments and can have a decisive impact on the entire strategic offense. Just as Mao Ze-dong indicated, “Put the focus of attention on those questions or actions, which possess most importance and with most decisive meaning to the entire situations under his command.”( 5 ) It also means that, in dealing with general issues, let the people who have something to do with them or the institutions which are dealing with such issues, to handle them, but the key issues must be handled by oneself, once he grabs them he should not let go of them. Through various related factors, analyze and think about the issues in depth. Grasp the root cause and regulated nature of the issues; scientifically predict the progress and results of the war; timely and bravely make correct decisions; and guide the strategic offense toward the correct direction. After the outbreak of the Huaihai battle, the outstanding military specialist Liu Bocheng, based on the contrasting forces of the Red Army and the Nationalists in the southern front battlefield and the changes of battlefield situation predicted the developing trends of the strategic offense. He believed that cutting off the Xupu railroad line was the key point to assure victory of the Huahai battle. By cutting off the Xupu railroad line, the Red Army can cut off the south and north connection of the Nationalist forces in Eastern China and isolate Xuzhou. To prevent the enemy forces guarding Xuzhou from escaping to the south; stopping the south front enemy forces from moving up north; the situation became very favorable. This suggestion was approved by Mao Ze-dong and was implemented. It made an immediate impact on the development of the Huaihai battle and facilitated the process toward victory of the final battle. In 1940 when the Germans invaded France, the German tank forces led by **Gudeleon (**phonetic) directly and quickly advanced toward the English Channel, thus almost trapping several tens of thousands of British and French soldiers as if they were the soft-shell turtle in a vase. It was at this key moment, Hitler became concerned that the attacking forces had extended far too deep and was at tremendous risks. He ordered the advance to be stopped. As a result, three hundred ninety thousand British and French soldiers escaped from the tiger’s mouth. This example, from another perspective, indicated how important it was to grasp the key link and make a correct decision.

**Subsection Five. Grasp the opportune moments, decisively implement the strategic final battle**.

The strategic final battle is the fiercest, most complex, most difficult, the most decisive phase with significance during the process of strategic offense, it can best reflect the courage and wisdom of the strategic commanders. The key of a strategic final battle is to grasp the timing of final battle. The victory or defeat of war is not determined by a certain time or certain moment, but there often exists a moment which can be decisive of victory or defeat of the war. To be precise on this moment is very important and it is not an easy task. It requires the strategic commander to predict the trend of the war development through the “war fog,” timely grasp the opportunity, and decisively execute the final battle. In general, if the comparison of the forces on both sides and the strategic situations are advantageous to our own side, the enemy is making a wrong strategic policy or is indecisive; there is internal unrest, etc., it will be an opportune moment for the strategic final battle. During the third year of our Liberation War, Mao Ze-dong used his proletariat military expert’s great talent, courageously grasped the opportunity and decided to conduct the strategic final battle against the Nationalists who were in a turning point, and greatly quicken the process of the whole country’s Liberation War.

The strategic final battle depends on selecting the direction of the initial battle correctly. Only if the direction of the initial battle is correctly selected can one guarantee the victory of the initial battle and lay the foundation for the future series of final battle actions; and impact greatly the whole strategic situation. Mao Ze-dong at the final battle phase during the Liberation War, through analyzing the battle situations of the whole nation, he made the bright decision of starting the final battle in Northeastern China. Our army had superior forces against the enemy at the Northeast battlefield. If starting the final battle in the Northeast we could destroy the enemy forces there, we could then smash the enemy’s attempt at strategic shrinkage. It could allow the Liberation Army of the Northeast to become available and enter other battlefields in the whole country; and gradually, as a whole, change the contrasting forces of both sides. If at that time the direction was pointed to Northern China instead of Northeast China, the Liberation Army could have been attacked from both sides by the enemy forces: from Northeast and Northern China. Or it could have allowed two enemy forces to assemble into one group and give our future battles some difficulties. The development of the war proved that Mao Ze-dong made an absolutely correct decision.

In general, the strategic final battle consists of a series of combats. A large-scale war cannot be won with a single final battle. This requires the strategic commanders to have thoughts of depth and width, to meticulously deploy for the strategic final battle actions, to guarantee that the battle actions of the ground, sea, and air are mutually supportive and well coordinated, and to see that every battle action is connected like a strand of rings. These are connected to each other and will win the final victory of the strategic battle through a series of connected and organized combat actions.

## Chapter 12 Footnotes

1. “Marx and Engel’s Military Literatures” Volume 2, Soldiers’ Publishing. Published in 1981, Page 1.
2. “Mao Ze-dong Military Literature Selections” The General Staff Bureau Publishing. Published in 1961, Page 220.
3. “Marx and Engel’s Military Literatures” Volume 3, Page 569.
4. Marx “Indian Uprising.”
5. “Mao Ze-dong Selected Works” Volume 1, People’s Publishing, Published in 1991, Page 176

# **Chapter Thirteen**

# **Strategic Defense**

Strategic defense is a defensive operation adopted in the interest of war as a whole. It is one of the basic forms of strategic movements and at times a phase of a war. Defense and offense are a unity of opposites and they enjoy important status in the course of a war. Strategic defense, successful or not, has a bearing on whether defense can be smoothly transformed into offense and vise versa; whether the goal of a war can be satisfactorily achieved and whether a war can be won in the end. In an overwhelming number of wars, history attests to the fact that opposing sides could never totally detach themselves from defensive operations. Lenin once pointed out: “There never has been a war in which only victorious offensive is noted from the beginning to the end. If there is one, it is an exception.” (Note One) Therefore, it is significant that the status of, and the role of strategic defense, be rightly recognized and that the issue of strategic defense be solved with positive results.

## Section One: The Goals and Tasks of Strategic Defense

The goals of strategic defense are to block the enemy offense, put the enemy to rout, neutralize the enemy forces in large numbers and, in the meantime, preserve and build up one’s own strength so as to create conditions for the transition into a strategic offense. In essence, therefore, the goals of strategic defense are to create conditions for the transition into our own strategic offense by defeating the enemy’s strategic offense. However, goals of strategic defense vary from war to war and from different historical conditions.

States or nations that engage in wars against aggression or internal revolutionary wars often begin with a strategic defense and an inferior force. Due to a strong enemy offense, goals are primarily to effectively preserve their own strategic strength, protect strategically important locations and resources, minimize one’s own losses, constantly consume and eliminate the enemy, develop and expand one’s own strength in order to gradually reverse the situation in which the enemy is strong while one’s forces are weak with the aim of creating the conditions for a strategic offense.

(Note One: Page 230,Volume 42, “Collection of Lenin’s Works,” published by People’s Publishing House, 1987 Edition)

States unleashing wars of aggression--after having been crushed in their aggressive activities, are set back in their strategic offense. They loose their strategic initiative and become powerless in continuing their offense and often are compelled to adopt a strategic defense. Tasks in these cases are to consolidate the gains realized in the offense, stop and resist the opponents from transiting into offense, or strive to create conditions to renew a strategic offensive operation in an attempt to be victorious. Such strategic defense had been adopted by both Germany and Japan during World War II.

The following situations, however, also existed. In a war, after having contested fiercely for a certain time, the situation may develop into one in which the offensive side could not realize its intended goal, while the defense side was unable to create better conditions for an offense. As a result, both sides slipped into strategic defense, bringing about a stalemate. World War I and the Korean War in the Fifties of the 20th Century are the examples. The difference is that in the later years of World War I, member nations of the League of Nations, including Great Britain and France, launched a general offensive campaign, causing the Germans to retreat and finally to suffer a defeat. In the second year of the Korean War, on the other hand, the warring sides faced off in a strategic stalemate on the 38th Parallel, which lasted until the end of the conflict. These examples demonstrate that the primary tasks in the strategic defense are not to create conditions for strategic offense, but to maintain the existing strategic positions in an effort to prevent the opponents from regaining the strategic initiative.

In regional wars, particularly in the wars conducted in high-technology conditions, due to factors such as limitations in goals and means of operations as well as the existence of international sanctions, the offensive side may not use its full strength in an offense. Instead, by taking advantage of superior equipment and technology, it can first adopt non-contact operations such as strategic air raids or “surgical” operations and then, depending on the operational effectiveness and goals, adopt measures to end or escalate the war. Under this condition, the primary task for the defensive side is to set back the enemy offense by routing the enemy’s strategic air raids.

## Section Two: The Principal Modes of Strategic Defensive Operations

Strategic defense is one of the two basic kinds of strategic operations. It primarily includes the following concrete modes:

1. Fixed Position Defense

Executing active defensive measures in hardened positions or cities of various sizes aimed at resisting enemy high-speed, three-dimensional attacks is one form of a principal strategic defensive operation. In the annals of war, this has been a defense form frequently adopted by the defensive side to stop the enemy from making continued breakthroughs and to slow down enemy advances in an effort to stabilize and prolong the defense.

In contemporary warfare, with its advanced weaponry, the offensive side is good at executing rapid, successive attacks in different forms, from different directions and from air spaces at different altitudes. Such being the case, in order to succeed in fixed-position defense, it is necessary for the defensive side to correctly determine the direction from which the enemy will launch its major attack.

First we must know that the fixed-position defense is only a passive form of operation. In order to become active, it is necessary for the defensive side to rely on, to a great degree, its timely discovery of the signs of enemy attacks and correctly determine the major assault direction. Once this is done, it is necessary to quickly issue an operational resolution, muster troops and strengthen one’s defensive disposition. In the separate two defensive operations in 1942 and 1943, the Soviet military erred in determining the direction from which the German blitz would come, resulting in heavy losses in the early days of the war. In making preparations for the1943 summer defense, however, the Soviet military, drawing lessons from the previous mistakes, correctly discovered the German intention of launching principal assaults in Kursk two months before the campaign. They then made timely defense decisions and won the campaign in the end.

Second, it is necessary to deploy heavy troops in the principal direction of the enemy’s assault, properly arrange defense systems and, if necessary, use the strategic reserve to rebuild defense lines. It is necessary to fully mobilize and organize man and material power at important locations and urban areas to establish a strong defense system and make use of terrain features, sturdy buildings and underground facilities to form a circular defense system that has major troop concentrations, in a deep, three-dimensional and multiple-layered arrangement. In the early days of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, the former deployed troops along the national borders several thousand kilometers long in a thin line without giving consideration to operational depth or troop concentrations.

The result was that the Germans punctured the defense line at several locations, with each being as deep as 300 kilometers. Defending Moscow, the Soviet military gathered nearly one million men, arranged them in a 300-kilometer defense system with great depth and in multiple echelons along a rebuilt defensive line. In this way it resoundingly stopped the German assault and successfully switched to a strategic counterattack at a later date.

Third, one must execute an offensive defense by carrying through the principle of using offense in defense and of combining defense with offense. With regard to the fixed-position defense in regions and major urban areas that are ready for operation, while defending tenaciously and staging skirmishes repeatedly with persistence, it is necessary to assign a certain number of troops to carry out forceful counterattacks or even outright offensive campaigns, or engage in mobile warfare along both flanks of the enemy’s principal thrust and do so deeply in enemy territory. For example, in the course of the defense operations during the Summer/Fall period of 1941 and 1942, the Soviet military executed front-army-level campaigns toward different directions, including the main German strategic thrust, in the form of counterassaults and offensive operations on more than 30 occasions. These activities compelled the Germans to keep large numbers of troops to support the flanks as well as to fight off the oncoming Soviet attacks, thus greatly weakening the German assault units, slowing down the offense and, in the process, crushing the “blitzkrieg” plan.

1. Mobile Defense

Also known as flexible defense, mobile defense is a form of defense that calls for successive attacks against the enemy in a designated area, within a certain time frame and from different positions. In the war annals, this is a form of operation often adopted by the defensive side to consume, contain and impede the enemy so as to exchange space for time, or lure the enemy into making moves in an effort to create favorable conditions under which one can eliminate the enemy’s main body.

Mobile defense often is executed to stop the enemy from getting reinforcements, or from attacking us from behind. It is used to contain the enemy, provide cover for our main-body movements and lure the enemy into a deep trap. Organizing such mobile operations often faces difficulties, such as limited time for preparations in dealing with pressing tasks, exposed flanks vulnerable to enemy encirclement and dividing tactics, stringent requirements for handling defense contingencies caused by elusive battlefield situation changes, and the difficulty of maintaining stability in defense. Therefore, particular attention must be paid to the following issues in formulating a strategic guide for mobile operations:

a. Quickly judge the intentions of the enemy offense and lose no time in issuing defense resolutions. This is extremely significant to winning time, making deployment adjustments, establishing strategic defensive lines, strengthening defensive positions and striving for operational initiative.

b. Select favorable terrain to build a line of defense in depth, (beginning Page 316) deploy troops in multiple echelons with manpower emphases and keep the strategic reserve under control as well as use them in a flexible way. Mobile defense primarily relies on alternating defensive activities with pullbacks in exchanging space for time and in carrying out successive attacks to ensure flexibility in realizing defensive goals. However, at times there is limited time to establish a broad-front defensive line in great depth and there are not enough troops to form a strong defensive team. Under this circumstance, it is necessary to select favorable terrain features on which to construct two, three or even four lines of defense with depth. In the meantime, one must organize the available troops into several defense echelons and a strategic reserve force to be deployed with emphasis according to defensive tasks.

c. Be tenacious in defense and alternate counterassaults with pullbacks in a timely manner in order to realize defensive goals. It is necessary to give full play to the initiative and dynamic characteristics in mobile defensive operations and, by using counter-assaults and offensive operations, combine defense maneuvering and pullbacks with timely counter-offensive operations. During the Fourth Campaign in the War to Resist U.S. Imperialism and Aid Korea, the enemy, with air support, launched an all-out offense with 230,000 ground troops with Seoul as its primary assault direction. Guided by the principle “resist in the west and open up in the east,” our forces used part of our strength to impede the enemy’s main-body assault by engaging in resolute defense on the west front. On the east front, our side applied defensive maneuvering to lure the enemy into deep traps. In the nearly three months of defensive operations, after having experienced tenacious defensive operations on the south bank of the Han River, counter-assaults in the Hengcheng (1897/1004) areas as well as our mobile defense operations, our troops were able to successfully hit hard at the invading enemy and stop it from advancing further in areas near the “38th Parallel.” This triumphantly accomplished our defense tasks, winning time for our strategic reserve to assemble and deploy, and creating favorable conditions for waging the Fifth Campaign.

1. d. It is necessary to carefully plan and painstakingly organize defense coordination among all units. Mobile defense is a kinetic mode of defense that requires all defense echelons to alternately provide cover for others in launching successive attacks. This makes coordination ever so complex. The broad front and great depth of a defensive line makes the support for the flanks extremely difficult. In addition, the volatile battlefield situation demands high capability in dealing with contingencies. It is necessary, therefore, to attach importance to command, organization and coordination. It is necessary to keep in mind the locations of each and every defense echelon, the time frame of defense as well as the timing, methods, routes, cover arrangements and combat support available while transiting into new defensive positions. It is necessary to carefully devise plans for the control of the flanks and do a good job in coordinating actions among all units. Otherwise, any oversight may create serious consequences.
2. Strategic anti-air raid

Under present high technology conditions, strategic air attack is not only a major combat mode in modern warfare, but it has increasingly become an individual stage of warfare as well. Conducting air raids and anti air raids throughout the course of a war has become a focal point of operation in the contest between the warring parties in contemporary warfare. Anti-air raid is now established as an important combat mode in strategic defense operations.

In dealing with an enemy’s strategic air raid, it is necessary to combine defense with resistance and counteractions. Defense means to organize protection by taking advantage of favorable terrain features to build civil air defense and field works that are concealed and arranged in a dispersed way. If possible, build them underground so as to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy air raid to its minimum. Special attention must be paid to the protection against enemy precision-guided weapons of nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities. Measures must also be adopted to eliminate air raid after effects in a timely manner. Aimed at the enemy’s rising capabilities in reconnaissance and precision weaponry, it is necessary to have a unified plan under which to make comprehensive use of mobile protection and technical protection on a broad basis, and plant fake targets together with the comprehensive installation of strategic camouflage.

Resistance means to make full use of various air defense forces and, under full protection, positively organize all resources for civil defense and aerial combat to gradually hit at and eliminate enemy air power in order to effectively preserve strength and protect targets of importance. The principal force of resistance must be concentrated on the line of major strategic direction and on the strategically important targets, with emphasis placed on the safety of state, political and military command centers, major military deployments, nuclear weapons bases, airfields, ports, important industrial bases, major cities and communication centers.

Counteraction means to execute active counterassaults with the resources of all the military services and branches. The tasks are to carry out assaults on the enemy’s command, intelligence, and communications systems; its airfields and strategic weapons launch centers, and do so with emphasis and in a timely manner. One must, as well, disrupt enemy strategic air raid plans in order to weaken and impede its air power and strive to be victorious in counteractions.

Strategic air raid is more often than not launched together with surprise attacks of different types. In countering a strategic air raid, preparations must be made to hit back at the enemy’s surprise attacks coming from the land or from the sea. It is also necessary to organize various resources to resist and launch counterattacks to resolutely crush the enemy’s intention of winning a quick strategic battle in order for us to stabilize our defensive situation.

4. Anti strategic-blockade

Anti strategic-blockade is a defensive operation adopted by the defensive side to break up an enemy’s strategic blockade in an effort to maintain freedom of movement. During World War II, the British military imposed a marine blockade on the German forces, thus immobilizing German naval ships for a time. The Germans, however, attacked the British blockade force and airfields with air power and submarines, scoring breakthroughs in the blockade with concentrated force in pre-selected areas. Aimed at the German submarine blockade on the west side of the British Isles, the British, on the other hand, adopted measures to counter the blockade by attacking the German marine transportation routes, German submarines preying near the British shores and invaded German submarine bases as well as submarine manufacturing plants, thus puncturing the German naval blockade. In the regional wars after World War II, blockade and anti-blockade operations were also applied. In 1972, the United States laid mines in the waters around northern Vietnam to impede Vietnam’s marine transportation. In the Gulf War, the multi-national force paralyzed the Iraqi navy with a blockade along Iraq’s seashores.

In order to break up an enemy’s strategic blockade, it is necessary to resort to positive offense by hitting at enemy troops and destroying the blockade formation with a massive force. In the meantime, it is necessary to lay mines to control the waterways and navigation channels which the enemy forces must use as passages. It is necessary to selectively use attack submarines to go deeply behind the enemy lines and along the shipping lanes to set up ambushes and conduct hit-and-run operations so as to disrupt the enemy’s supply lines. It is also necessary to organize coordinated operations among all services to seize partial superiority in the air and on the sea in regions of importance, strengthen the defense of communication lines and strategic rear areas; and make comprehensive use of all resources to combine military counter measures with political, economic and diplomatic struggles in order to accomplish anti-blockade goals.

1. Guerilla warfare

Guerilla warfare is one of the strategic defensive operations in the people’s warfare that the enemy fears most. Guerilla warfare plays an important supporting role in the course of a strategic defense and is a combat mode that cannot be ignored. Mao Zedong was the one who elevated guerilla warfare to strategic status in the early days of the Chinese revolutionary wars. Guerilla warfare is a non-conventional combat mode that has no fixed frontlines. Compared with conventional warfare, it has greater initiative, is more flexible, more aggressive and quick to end as well as being itinerant. Under present conditions, with newer weapons and equipment available, and the firepower and mobility of troops which has increased at an unprecedented pace, have set new demands on guerilla warfare. Hence, the following points should be emphasized in the strategic guidance for guerilla warfare:

1. a. Strategically execute “protracted defensive war on the interior lines” with initiative, flexibility and in a planned manner; while in campaign battles, carry out “quick-decision offensive on the exterior lines.” It is necessary to make positive efforts to strive for and maintain the initiative in combat activities and use the troops and tactics flexibly in order to expand guerilla warfare in a systematic and well-planned manner.
2. b. Coordinate with and develop into conventional warfare. Guerilla warfare is primarily designed to weaken and impede the enemy in its rear so as to support conventional warfare strategically. Because of limited manpower and scattered combat activities, it is difficult for a guerilla war to solve all the war problems by itself. Therefore, it is necessary to make constant effort to expand the guerilla force quantitatively and qualitatively in order to gradually conventionalize its combat mode for winning.
3. c. Centralized command authority is for strategic activities, while dispersed command authority is for campaign battles. Due to the fact that guerilla warfare is characterized by dispersed activities, the method of command is required to follow the principle of making separate, individual decisions under general, centralized guidance. With regard to the method of command, it is necessary to follow the principle of independent decision making under unified, centralized guidance. The state will execute unified, centralized command over the guerilla warfare deployment as a whole, over the support between the guerilla warfare and conventional warfare in each and every zone of guerilla warfare, over the coordination among all guerilla bases and over the overall activities of a single guerilla base. As for the concrete armed activities, it is necessary for individual zones to make separate, independent command decisions depending on the actual situation in a resolute, arbitrary way.

6. Strategic retreat

Strategic retreat is to withdraw troops from their original defense lines or defense areas for a strategic purpose. It is a continuation of strategic defense and a form of strategic flexibility. “If one’s strength is apparently weak, then the most important defensive measure is to beat a retreat to the heartland.” (Note One) Strategic retreat should not be considered as being defeated or escaping in disorder. It is “a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force in the face of an offense by a superior force. It is due to the absence of a quick solution to break up the enemy’s offense in an effort to preserve oneself and wait for an opportune time to defeat the opponents. The goal of a strategic retreat is to preserve one’s strength in preparation for a counterattack.” (Note Two) Strategic retreat may be adopted subjectively or objectively. Generally speaking, it is carried out in the face of a strong enemy offensive and from an extremely disadvantageous position in which a continued fighting will jeopardize the preservation of one’s military strength, hence a retreat directly affects the security of the overall strategy and its orientation. It is possible that a retreat is carried out under enemy fire on the ground as well as from the air. It is necessary, therefore, to take the interests of the whole situation into consideration, make decisions cautiously, plan it painstakingly, organize it in detail and then proceed with necessary preparations.

Note One: Page 454, “Collection of Lenin’s Military Works” published by Fighters Publishing House, 1981 edition

Note Two: Pages 723 and 727, “Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Works,” Volume One, published by Military Science Publishing House, 1993 edition.

In ordinary situations, attention must be paid to the following points with regard to the organization and execution of a strategic retreat:

1. Carefully select retreat timing. The timing of the retreat not only plays a role in determining the success of a retreat, but also has a direct bearing on the primary strategic orientation and situation on the main battlefield. In general, it should be so selected that it does not affect the stability of the overall strategic situation. Under normal situations, it is advantageous to withdraw upon beating back an enemy offense or after having succeeded in a counterattack.
2. Plan painstakingly and organize thoughtfully. In order to avoid the situation in which retreat evolves into a run off or fleeing, plans must be made in advance
3. Under a unified leadership with regard to the beginning of a retreat, its routes, procedures, final destinations as well as the air, ground and sea covers for the troops on the move.
4. Make appropriate arrangements for the transfer of masses of people as well as for the moving of economic facilities. Not solely military in nature, a strategic retreat has a bearing on the security of the economy and the safety of the masses of people as well. Early mobilization and preparation are needed for moving and it must be carried out without revealing the strategic intentions. It is necessary to do a good job in providing cover for the movements in an effort to minimize property and human loses.

7. Strategic Counteroffensive

Strategic counteroffensive is an operation against an enemy’s strategic offensive activities. A part of the strategic defense, it is a decisive operation designed to deal with the invading enemy and an effective operational mode to thoroughly crush the aggressors as well. A pivotal point in the course of a war, strategic counteroffensive is an important stage of strategic defense, being most spirited and dynamic, and the key to the question of which of the opposing sides will become victorious.

From the annals of war, we learn that a strategic counteroffensive as part of the strategic defensive operations generally falls into two categories, namely: One is an all-out offense adopted by the defenders soon after the outbreak of an enemy offensive. The other is an overall counteroffensive opted by the defenders after having made gradual progress in localized counterattacks. Generally speaking, the former situation is likely to occur in regional wars, while the latter is most likely to occur in the event of a large-scale enemy invasion.

Strategic offense is “the most fierce, complex and volatile as well as the most difficult and arduous in the course of a war or a campaign. From the command point of view, it is the most trying time” (Note One), as not only objectively does it require the availability of material supplies, but also subjectively there is the need for correct guidance. In formulating the strategic guidance, special attention must be paid to the following points:

* First, correctly grasp the timing of the offense. In determining the timing, it is necessary to correctly analyze the strategic situation by combining the basic strategic criteria with the ever-changing present conditions in order to seize the major errors committed by the enemy in its command and actions, and make use of them in a timely manner. As war situations vary and the rationale behind an offense differs, the criteria for the offense would not be the same. Generally speaking, when the invading enemy becomes weak, its primary offensive thrust is blunted, the strength of its strategic first echelon is much reduced, its reserve is either being used or not yet organized, and its morale is low. This is the optimum time for the defensive side to launch a winning offensive operation. The counterattack by the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Stalingrad was launched at a time when the German forces had lost their strength to advance, began to adopt a defensive posture, yet were unsettled in the newly occupied positions. They were without a reserve force which was either used up or not yet established, thus giving the Soviet side a greater winning probability in offense.

Improved weapons and equipment and a favorable international environment also play an important role in a strategic offense. In his “On the Offensive Operations in the Anti-Japanese War,” Mao Zedong said: “To prepare for a strategic offense, it is necessary to elevate modern technology and build a new army. We must understand that without a good number of troops that are equipped with modern technology and equipment, it is impossible to carry out an offense or recover lost land.” (Note Two)

* Second, correctly select the direction of a strategic offense. Generally speaking, the primary direction of a strategic offense should be so selected that it will most probably bring a victory and will most probably impact the whole strategic situation significantly. It should not only be beneficial to breaking up an enemy’s offense, but it should remove the most serious enemy threat and also set up favorable conditions for a strategic offensive. The spearhead of a strategic offensive is generally directed at the weak, vulnerable points of the enemy’s overall deployment. In special situations--such as our forces are in a better position as they are stronger than the enemy or there is the need to quickly eliminate a grave threat—it may be directed at the enemy’s stronger points. In our liberation wars, we once selected the Dabie Mountain (1129/0446/1472), the strategically most sensitive area yet weakest of areas in the enemy region, as the direction of our strategic offensive,

(Note One: Page 736, “Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Works,” Volume One, published by Military Science Publishing House, 1993 Edition)

(Note Two: Page 168, “Selected Mao Zedong’s Military Works,” published by General Staff Department Publishing Bureau, 1961 Edition

to effectively pin down the enemy mobile forces deployed in depth to create favorable conditions for us to quickly switch into a strategic offense.

* Third, do a good job in handling the relations between the present defense operations and the future offensive operations. As a strategic offensive is often prepared under the situation where the defensive side is already under enemy attack, there is the need for courage as well as careful planning. Attention must be paid to hiding the intent of a counterattack while preparatory work is underway.
* Fourth, efforts must be made to win early battles and quickly expand the gains. The initial move must be in the form of a surprise attack, without giving the enemy time to adjust its development. Soon after the initial success, it is necessary to lose no time in expanding the results so as not to give the enemy breathing time until the aim of the attack is achieved. Also, at an opportune time, by making the best use of the situation, turn a strategic counteroffensive into a strategic offense.

1. Strategic nuclear retaliation

Strategic nuclear retaliation is an extremely special mode in strategic defense that would not be ignored by nuclear powers. As the world stores a large amount of nuclear weapons, a contemporary war is inescapably under the shadow of nuclear attacks from the beginning to the end. Albeit not being the first to strike with nuclear weapons, nuclear capable states must be prepared for enemy nuclear attacks. If the enemy is the first to use nuclear weapons, it is necessary to organize protection against such attack and adopt measures to eliminate the aftermath of such an attack. In the meantime, it is necessary to resort to nuclear retaliation resolutely. In strategic defense, nuclear retaliation against the enemy that has already struck is one of the means to crush such an enemy’s surprise attack, which is designed in a vain attempt to win quick results. Such retaliation can play havoc among enemy troops and weapons as well as in its economic centers. It can also send the enemy a tremendous mental shock if the retaliation is directed at enemy strategic targets, political centers and military installations.

As nuclear retaliation is a major strategic move, seizing the correct timing to use it is of extreme importance. Choosing to strike only after the enemy has struck does not signify taking a beating passively. It is necessary to lose no time in launching a nuclear retaliation within the first hour. It is necessary to correctly select targets according to practical needs and feasibility and carry it out with strength. The Supreme Command Headquarters directs nuclear retaliation under a unified plan. It coordinates nuclear power of all military services, the targets and timing, the support between the various nuclear forces and conventional forces and between nuclear retaliation on the one side, and the political and diplomatic struggles on the other.

## Section Three: Strategic Defense Systems

A strategic defense system is an integrated whole that deals with the overall arrangements of essential elements such as various military operational capabilities, operation installations, weapons systems and support systems of different kinds. It is an important material foundation for the defensive side to resist an enemy strategic offensive. A complete defensive system should include all operational support systems that are complete, effective, well coordinated and with both defensive and offensive functions. It should also be capable of organizing long-term operations against the enemy, spiritual preparation and the stockpiling of material supplies in order for the troops to effectively carry out omni-directional, multiple-mode, in-depth offense against the enemy. It should also be capable of dealing with all-out warfare as well as localized enemy incursions. A modern strategic defense system generally consists of the following basic components:

1. Sensitive, highly efficient command, communication and intelligence system.

(Note One: Page 76, “Selected Liu Po-cheng’s Military Works,” published by Fighters Publishing House, 1982 Edition.)

In contemporary warfare, the acquisition, discernment, transmission and control of information has become increasingly important.

The establishment of a strategic reconnaissance system that is omni-directional, long range and is capable of reaching space at different heights as well as a highly sensitive, reliable and well managed command and communications system are decisively significant in seizing the initiative in a war.

1. Close strategic air defense (anti-space) system.

Contemporary regional wars and surprise attacks often come in the form of air strikes, thus making strategic air defense (anti-space) a major phase of war. In an all-out war, space is an important battlefield and serves as a protecting shield for the ground and naval operations as well. The preservation of strategic locations, ground operations, movements, naval ship activities on the sea, wartime production, communications and transportation all need a reliable air cover and anti-spacecraft measures for protection.

It is necessary, therefore, to organize a tight strategic air defense (anti-space) system to deploy various air defense (anti-space) facilities aimed at building them into a system that incorporates long-, medium- and close-range weapons for use at high-, middle- and low altitudes, and is complete with anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-spacecraft, omni-directional, full depth capabilities.

1. Operation systems that integrates ground, sea and air operations, with both offense and defense capabilities.

Contemporary warfare has increasingly shown its nonlinear character. In strategic defense, it is necessary to be prepared for the enemy to invade from any direction. It is necessary, under unified leadership, to work out plans and deployment for the ground, sea and air operations as well as for the frontline, flank, border and in-depth operations. On the home land, (including territorial sea and air space), it is necessary to establish an operation system that integrates full-depth land positions with sea battlefields and air combat zones, together with emphasis and both offensive and defensive capabilities. Such an operations system must not only be powerful enough to become the first strategic echelon but also is attached with to a strong mobile force to be deployed in depth. Special attention must be paid to the building of multiple defense lines and defense zones along strategic defense directions, and to the building of a system that is capable of defensive, resistance and retaliation operations. With this system in place, not only can we resist the aggressors on our homeland (territorial sea and air space), but also can strike out strategically in self-defense.

4. Strategic weapons system with definite survivability and striking power.

The strategic guided missiles capability and the strategic striking capability of the air force and navy should form a close, complete strategic weapons system in which one complements another. Strategic weapons systems of different kinds must all have the dual capabilities of protection and retaliation. In the case of an enemy’s nuclear attack, the land-based, submarine launched and air launched strategic nuclear weapons should all be quick to react by launching effective nuclear retaliations either independently or in support of other systems by the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

5. Dependable strategic rear and transportation system

Aside from supporting the strategic operations with man- and material power, a strategic rear must be capable of self-defense in order to ensure smooth wartime production, the security of the local government organs and the masses of people in the rear. A modern war relies on a trouble-free, high-volume, tolerant transportation system

for the transport of large numbers of troops and operational supplies to the frontline, or from one area to another, in a timely manner. It is necessary to develop a multiple-mode transportation network of railroad, highways, air routes and waterways, together with appropriate command posts and support systems.

## Section Four: The Fundamental Principles and Criteria of Strategic Defense

In time of war, the first utterly complex, important issue to face nations and their military pursing a defense strategy is the issue of strategic defense. The following are the fundamental principles for organizing and executing a strategic defense.

1. Implement active defense, oppose passive defense

Essentially, active defense is offensive defense. As a whole, strategic defense is defense, passive in form. However, it is not defensive per se, not designed solely to wait passively for the enemy to attack. It is devised with positive requirements and practical measures as well. Strategic defense is designed not only to evolve into strategic counterattacks and offensive operations at an appropriate time, but also to actively transform itself to offensive actions whenever possible throughout the course of defense. The key to the growth and decline of the opposing forces and the shifting of the overall strategic situation lies in how flexible we are in taking the initiative to hit hard at the enemy. Only in this way can our strategic defense be lively, can we strive to be active in a passive situation and thoroughly beat back the enemy’s offense. Otherwise, stolidly taking a defensive posture and sitting idle awaiting enemy attack will, by no means, improve the war effort or attain goals in our strategic defensive endeavor.

Clausewitz once said: “Operations mode such as defense is definitely not a simple shield but a shield of ingenious strikes. To be serious in fighting war, it is necessary to hit back at the enemy.” (Note One) Jomini said: “Beyond doubt, passive defense will fail. Only active defense can make it possible to turn defeat into victory.” (Note Two) Engels emphasized repeatedly in his military essays: “The most effective defense remains to be active defense proceeded with offense.” (Note Three) Mao Zedong, too, pointed out incisively: “Passive defense is really sham defense. Only active defense is true defense, the mode aimed at counteroffensive and offensive.” (Note Four) These inferences profoundly demonstrate the essence of strategic defense. In the annals of war, those who pursued passive defense inevitably suffered serious consequences. The failures of the Maginot Line in World War II, the Fifth Counter “Encirclement” in our internal revolutionary war and the passive defense by the Kuomintang troops on the front battlefield during the anti-Japanese war explain it all.

Active defense emphasizes defense on interior lines strategically and offense on exterior lines in campaign operations.

Turning an overall disadvantageous war situation in strategic defense into an advantageous one basically relies on offensive campaign operations. In a situation that one side is inferior to the other and reacts passively, it is necessary to create new conditions with a concentrated force and proceed to establish localized superiority. From there, take the initiative to implement quick-decision offensive campaigns on exterior lines aimed at gaining the strategic initiative in a passive situation. For nations and their military, pursuing a defensive status strategically and waging operations on the exterior lines to hit at the enemy in a versatile way, can one break up the enemy’s strategic offense, reverse the situation and overcome the enemy in the end. Such campaign operations in a strategic defense should be carried out not only on land but also in the air and on the sea battlefields as well. Localized sea offensives are immensely significant to the sea battlefields themselves as well as to the overall strategic defense situation. Unfolding air attacks in a positive way to eliminate enemy air power and, if necessary, launching surprise air attacks on enemy bases, airfields and seaports are not only significant, but also instrumental in fulfilling strategic defense goals.

2. Concentrate the main force toward the principal direction, set up defenses with emphasis and guard them with emphasis.

It is a basic principle for strategic defense that it is necessary to deploy the main force toward the direction and in areas and around targets that have a definite impact on the war situation and build defenses and garrisons there with strength. The greater the defense space, the more emphasis is needed for defenses and troop strength. It is necessary to place a concentrated force toward the main direction and fewer troops toward the secondary directions. Without a concentrated force, offensive defense is out of question, let alone strategic initiative.

(Note One: Page 642, Volume 2, “On War,” published by General Staff Department

Publishing Bureau, 1964 Edition)

(Note Two: Page 52, “Art of War,” published by Fighters Publishing House, 1981 Edition)

(Note Three: Page 327, Volume 4, “Collection of Marx-Engels Military Works, published by Fighters Publishing House, 1982 Edition)

(Note Four: Page 719, Volume 1, “Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Works)

Mao Zedong pointed out: Our military “strove to be victorious in strategic defense and basically relied on a single stroke--concentrated force.” (Note One)

Under contemporary conditions, in order to effectively resist enemy multiple- domain, multiple-mode, three-dimensional ground, sea, air and electronic (magnetic) attacks, it is necessary to make omni-bearing, three-dimensional defense arrangements in great depth toward the main defense direction. In order to maintain the stability and reliability of strategic defense, it is necessary to greatly elevate the survivability and mobility of the defense forces. In order to deal with any contingency, it is necessary to pursue offense in defense, strive for strategic initiative, establish and maintain a strong strategic reserve, especially a mobile force capable of quick reactions.

1. Bring into play the prowess of the whole; implement a total defense.

Contemporary warfare is a contest of operations systems between the opposing

sides. It primarily shows:

a. The relationship between man on the one side and weapons and equipment on the other is closer than ever, while a high-technological force is a closely integrated whole of high technology and high-quality men;

b. A relationship of reliance exists between weapons and equipment, as a single equipment or equipment system cannot be operated without the effective support of other equipment or equipment systems;

c. The operational totality of the military services and branches has been strengthened without precedence. The operations platforms of all services and branches are interlocked and soon will be integrated; and

d. The battlefield space is now an organic whole. The ground battlefield, sea battlefield, air battlefield, space battlefield and electronic battlefield are integral parts of a whole with mutual support in operations and actions.

Under contemporary conditions, military operations heavily rely on the integration of warfare with operation systems. Therefore, in the strategic defense operations, the armed militia, military services and branches, battlefields in war zones, the front and the rear, the government, the armed forces, the masses of people carrying out strategic defensive tasks must all have a high level of the “totality concept.” All must take the initiative to support and closely coordinate with each other, harmoniously engage in operations under the guidance of a unified policy in a complete defense system in order to bring the power of a total war into play. This is an important assurance of a successful strategic defense.

(Note One: Page 121, “Selected Mao Zedong’s Military Works,” published by General Staff Department Publishing Bureau, 1961 Edition)

4. Attach importance to the establishment and control of a powerful strategic reserve, and use it in the critical direction and at an opportune time.

A strategic reserve is a powerful fighting force directly controlled by the Supreme Command. It is an integral part of the troop deployment in strategic defense to be used to accomplish pre-determined strategic defensive tasks or handle operational contingencies. It is an important force that ensures the stability and endurance of the war effort and helps strive for the initiative in changing the war situation. One of the important tasks in strategic guidance in defensive operations calls for the organization to build-up and make proper use of the strategic reserve. Whether a strategic reserve can be organized in a timely manner, whether its organization is reasonable and whether its deployment and employment are appropriate are issues that have a bearing on the seizing and maintaining of the strategic initiative, the progress of a war and its ending.

Lenin pointed out: “Whoever has more reserve will have more source of strength to win the war.” In the stage of strategic defense of the war to defend the country and in the face of a German blitzkrieg, the Soviet Supreme Command had organized and controlled a powerful strategic reserve and was good at employing it in vital directions at critical moments. Although the defense lines were punctured on numerous occasions, the Soviet forces were able to regain defense stability, stop the German forces from advancing, crush the “blitzkrieg” and, by relying on the engaged reserve, switch to an offensive operation and gradually win back the strategic initiative.

A strategic reserve ordinarily is a corps of fully equipped, well-trained troops with a high level of preparedness and mobility. It is deployed in depth in scattered concealment on the battlefield at locations of convenient mobility. In strategic defense, a strategic reserve often is used collectively on the strategically significant direction and with critical timing. It is used to neutralize enemy paratroops and landing forces, beat back enemy strategic breakthroughs in order to stabilize the war situation. The use of a strategic reserve with the wrong timing, either early or late, will affect the operations or war situation negatively. A strategic reserve must be reorganized after each employment.

(Note One: Page 121, “Selected Mao Zedong’s Military Works,” published by General Staff Department Publishing Bureau, 1961 Edition)

**Chapter Fourteen**

**Strategic Maneuvers**

Strategic maneuver is a military action carried out by the army in achieving certain strategic objectives which requires the moving of troops, weapons and diverting firepower. It is the basic condition for destroying large enemy armies, destroying enemy strategic targets, carrying out new strategic actions, shifting strategic postures, and winning the war.

**Section one: The Historic Development of Strategic Maneuvers**

Strategic maneuvers, like wars, are developed with the continuous development of human social production methods. The continued creation of maneuvering tools has provided key dynamics to the development of strategic maneuvers.

I. MANEUVERS RELY MAINLY ON MANPOWER AND ANNIMAL POWER.

During the primitive stage of wars, there was a strict distinction between arms and production tools. In wars, maneuvers were only advancing or retreating movements between barracks and battlefields by foot. The speed of maneuvers was very slow, distances were short, and the ranges were limited. With improved productivities, large animals such as horses, cows, and elephants were used in maneuvers, and combat maneuvers were carried out mostly by cavalry and infantry units. The frequency of maneuvers increased, the range of maneuvers were extended, and the speed of maneuvers were enhanced. During the war between Persia and Greece, the Long March of Alexander the Great, the War of Rome, and the wars during the Spring and Autumn Period of ancient China, were all the wars that had the significance of maneuvering matches, and maneuvers began to turn strategically significant. Cavalry units were the main symbol of animal power maneuvers. In China, dynasties such as the West Han, the East Han, the Southern and Northern, The Sui and the Tang had carried out large scale, long range group cavalry maneuvers in Northern China. The Yuan dynasty forces were mainly cavalry units and they carried out several long range expeditions, which optimized the deployment of manpower and animal power maneuvers represented by cavalry maneuvers.

II. MANEUVERS RELY MAINLY ON MACHINERY POWER

As a result of the emergence of the steam engine and internal combustion engine, considered to be the products of the industrial revolution, a great leap forward in the quality of maneuvers was triggered. In modern times, maneuvers began to separate from manpower, and moves toward the era of machinery power. Epoch-making changes had taken place on the range, speed, type, and frequency of maneuvers.

The mode of railroad maneuver was a significant revolution. In the mid 19th century, the U. S. Civil War was the first large scale war that used the railroads in carrying out strategic maneuvers. The troops were able to gain new and strong maneuverabilties through the railroads. The railroad can transport troops and materials to the frontlines quickly, and it was the most important factor in the Union’s final victory. During the war between Prussia and France, the Prussian side carried out strategic maneuvers through railroads and transported thousands of troops to the border areas quickly. This resulted in its being a key role during the stage of the forces’ deployment.

The industrial revolution also resulted in the navy’s separation from the wind-dependent era of sailboats. The Crimean war opened the era of steam engine powered naval ships. During that time, the joint forces of Great Britain, France, and Turkey with joint forces numbering about 60 thousand were transported to the beaches of the Crimean Peninsula by naval ships in their attacks against the Russian Army. During the American-Spanish War, the U. S. Asian Fleet destroyed the Spanish Far East Fleet after a long range sea maneuver, and seized the Philippines. In the Caribbean region, the U. S. expeditionary army sailed from the mainland and landed in Cuba and Puerto Rico separately through a sea maneuver, and eventually destroyed the Spanish Garrison. This signified the capability of carrying out continental crossing sea maneuvers of the U. S. During the Japanese and Russian War, in order to reinforce the Far East, Russia dispatched the Second Sub-Fleet of its Pacific Fleet from the Baltic Sea, and sailed about 30 thousand kilometers through Cape Horn in a sea maneuver. As most of the naval ships of that time were coal powered, the maneuver was restricted by bases, and distances, and the ships’ speed was slow. During WWI, most ships were using combustion engines powered by liquid fuels, thus, naval ships’ maneuvering capabilities were greatly improved. The 1.75 million U. S. expeditionary troops were sent to France to fight in the war through sea maneuvers.

After WWI, the army’s battlefield maneuverability was greatly enhanced by the widespread deployment of tanks, automobiles, and armored cars. Germany, with its superiority of a mechanized army, deployed the mode of “blitz” in launching WWII, and it was successful during the initial stages of the war. After WWII, mechanized maneuvers became the major mode of maneuvers in ground battlefields.

With the emergence of aircraft carriers, submarines, landing crafts, and various transports, sea maneuverability was greatly improved, and its position in war became increasingly important. During WWII, there were strategic sea maneuvers carried out for retreat such as the Dunkirk retreat, or the strategic maneuver in the Pacific theater that was carried out for sea attacks, or the sea strategic maneuver for the landing operations at Normandy carried out for ground attacks. In a number of local wars after WWII, sea strategic maneuvers were mainly naval force maneuvers with aircraft carrier battle groups as the main force, the amphibious troop maneuvers with transport ships as a main force, and the firepower maneuvers with ship based missiles as the main force.

Since aircraft emerged in the early 20th century, air maneuvers have been deployed and have developed from tactical maneuvers to strategic maneuvers. During WWII, The armies of all the Allies and the Axis countries carried out frequent air maneuvers. During the Normandy landing operations and the battles in the Far East, both sides carried out established divisional airborne units maneuvering operations. The two nuclear attacks the U. S. carried out against Japan resulted in unprecedented strategic effect of air firepower maneuvers.

III. NUCLEAR POWER AND ROCKETING POWER MANEUVERS

After WWII, the rapid development of nuclear technologies and astronautic technologies opened a new realm for maneuvers. Nuclear powered submarines and nuclear powered aircraft carriers have become the main tools for the navy to carry out strategic maneuvers. The development of rocket technologies has promoted the overall progress of military space technologies. Space powers such as the U. S. and Russia have developed a military space force system that primarily relies on military satellites, space ships, space stations, and space vehicles. Rocket powered space maneuvers have emerged; the frequent launching of spacecraft has demonstrated that space maneuvers, including manned space maneuvers and unmanned space maneuvers will become a brand new mode of strategic maneuvers, and space fire power maneuvers will become a possibility.

**Section Two: The Objectives and Roles of Strategic Maneuvers**

As an army strategic action, the objective of strategic maneuvers is to concentrate the armed forces to a designated area, establish a new strategic deployment, and form an advantageous strategic posture, in order to seize and maintain the strategic initiative. The roles for strategic maneuvers are mainly:

I. ADJUST STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT

In large scale, highly intensive and longer lasting wars, struggles between the two opposing sides are fierce, and the attrition of war is high. The original strategic deployment may be destroyed by the enemy or it could no longer fit the changing battlefield situations. Therefore, with the development and change of the war situation, the strategic deployment must be adjusted through strategic maneuvers, deploying strategic reserve units at an appropriate time, concentrating the troops and weapons at main strategic directions, maintain or form superiorities over the enemy troops and weapons, and lay the material foundation for victory. During the liberation war, the units under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping capitalized on the Kuomintang army’s weakness created while attacking the Communist Chinese bases in Northern Shaanxi province and Shandong province. They had left a defensive vacuum in Central China. Liu and Deng’s forces, with the support of both flanks, marched more than a thousand miles in carrying out a strategic deployment in the Dabieshan region, which resulted in a good example of a successful strategic maneuver.

II. CHANGE STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS

During a war, the situation of the battlefield changes frequently. In order to suit the changed battlefield situation sometimes it is necessary to change the strategic direction. Strategic maneuvers are basic methods in carrying out the main strategic direction adjustments. Through strategic maneuvers, the key strategic operation forces can be shifted to new directions, and form new key points. Maneuvers can turn passivity and defeat into activity and victory. For instance, during the second year of the Soviet-Germany war, the Soviet Army Headquarters began to determine that the German forces were continuing to carry out major offensives in the direction of Moscow; thus they made that direction the main direction of strategic defense. Later on, they discovered that the strategic intention of the Germans was to carry out a major attack from the South, in order to seize the Don River economic region and the oil resources in the Caucasus region. Therefore, the Soviet forces carried out quick maneuvers toward the Don River and the Stalingrad region, concentrated a large number of reserve units to form a new defensive line, and through the defensive battles of Stalingrad, German forces’ attacks were crushed.

III. SEIZE AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMBAT

It is very important to seize opportunities for combat in a war. Strategic maneuvers are an important approach in seizing opportunities for combat in a war. By going through strategic maneuvers, strategic forces can be deployed at key times and at key locations, and create favorable postures of attack for annihilating enemies. After all the three major battles of the Liberation War ended, the People’s Liberation Army seized the good opportunity of Kuomingtang army’s continued retreats and its empty depth. It took the action of strategic, long range, great encirclement and great outflanking in annihilating the Kuomingtang units quickly in south China and southwest China, which led to the complete liberation of China.

1. TURN PASSIVITY INTO INITIATIVE

War is an action carried out by two opposing sides in the seizing of initiative and in staying clear of being in a passive position. In a war, in an unfavorable situation and passive position, we still can break out from the encirclement, change our strategy, or carry out strategic retreat to solve the problems of temporary debacles, break away from passivity, and seize initiatives through strategic maneuvers or force reinforcement. The world renown 2,500 mile long march is a strategic shifting that was carried out by the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army without choice after the defeat of the fifth anti-“encircle and suppress” operation. After a period of two years, the Red Army finally reached northern Shaanxi province successfully, despite the attempt of encirclement and suppression by the half million Kuomingtang forces. This opened a new prospect for the Chinese Revolution and the revolutionary war.

V. CARRY OUT THE SWITCH OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Strategic maneuvers are the levers of strategic offense and defense. The action of switching from strategic offense to strategic defense or switching from strategic defense to strategic offense are mostly carried out through strategic maneuvers. Maneuvering troops and weapons to a strategic direction or region, and carrying out new operations in a new direction or region can lead the war to a new phase.

**Section Three: The Methods and Characteristics of Strategic Maneuvers**

I. THE METHODS OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERS

The main methods of strategic maneuvers include ground strategic maneuvers, air strategic maneuvers, sea strategic maneuvers, strategic fire power maneuvers, and space strategic maneuvers.

1. Ground Strategic Maneuvers

Ground strategic maneuvers are the basic method of military maneuvers of a majority of countries in the world, which include mainly highway maneuvers, railroad maneuvers, and maneuvers on foot.

Highway maneuvers are the movement of troops and weapons carried out with motor vehicles and roads; the merits of this type of maneuvers are simple organization, fast speed, established units, long duration of maneuver, and stronger, flexible responding ability. The weaknesses are heavy dependency on roads, limited maneuvering range, and complex maintenance.

Railroad maneuvers are the movement of troops, weapons and materials carried through railway cars. Railroad maneuvers are fast, long range, large scale and can be carried out day and night. They are not restricted by weather conditions, and relatively safe and dependable, however, they are heavily affected by the conditions of railways; the complex organizations, and the complex support needed.

Maneuvers on foot are a traditional form of ground maneuvers. The organization is simple, and it is not significantly restricted by terrains, roads, and weather conditions, however, it is slow, short-ranged, and shows poor durability.

(2)Air Strategic Maneuvers

Air strategic maneuvers are the movement of troops, weapons and materials that are carried out through aircraft. They are the key modes of strategic maneuvers and rapid deployment force delivery. Air strategic maneuvers are divided into strategic airlift, strategic air landing, and the air maneuvers of air operations forces. Air strategic maneuvers are provided with long-range capabilities, short time, fast speed and a certain scale. However, their support and organization are complex, easily threatened by enemy air forces, and limited by conditions such as airports and weather.

(3) Sea Strategic Maneuvers

Sea strategic maneuvers involve the movement of troops, weapons and materials carried out with naval ships. They are a key mode of strategic maneuvers, and a major approach of sea-crossing, island landing operations and landing operations. The ranges of sea strategic maneuvers are long, the ranges are large, and they are relatively dependable, however, their speed is slow, the time is long, the organization is complex, and they heavily rely on air superiority and sea superiority.

(4) Strategic Firepower Maneuvers

Strategic firepower maneuvers are the changes that are made to the range and direction of strategic weapons, and they are a unique mode of strategic maneuvers. These maneuvers are mainly comprised of land-based strategic firepower maneuvers, air strategic firepower maneuvers and sea based strategic firepower maneuvers. The ranges of strategic weapons firepower maneuvers are long, the speed is fast, the range is wide, the time is short, the concealment is good and fast, and they are simple and dependable, and can achieve the strategic objectives directly, and affect the process, or even the outcome of a war. Strategic firepower maneuvers can only be deployed under specially designated conditions.

(5) Space Strategic Maneuvers

Space strategic maneuvers are the movement of troops, weapons and materials that are carried out with space carriers in achieving strategic objectives. This is an emerging mode of strategic maneuvers, which mainly include military spacecraft maneuvers, military space station maneuvers, military space ship maneuvers, and military satellite maneuvers, etc.

In modern wars, strategic maneuvers are usually carried out through integrated use of various modes. Guiding strategists should seek the best combination of strategic maneuvering modes according to the strategic intentions and war practices in order to gain the maximum beneficial results of strategic maneuvers. During the Gulf War, the U. S. strategic maneuvers were carried out through the modes of air maneuvers, sea maneuvers and ground maneuvers. With the changing development of war patterns, new modes of strategic maneuvers may emerge. The struggles between the opposing sides in the realm of information will lead to changes in the mode of strategic maneuvers, and the strategic maneuvers of the information age may become the mode of strategic maneuvers in future wars.

I. THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN STRATEGIC MANEUVERS

(1) The Speed of Strategic Maneuvers is Fast

The continued improvement of strategic tools and the development of the mode of maneuvers have resulted in the enhancement of the speed of maneuvers. Maneuvers on foot and horse maneuvers in the early days were carried out in a speed of only several kilometers to a little more than ten kilometers an hour. The development of mechanized vehicles and railroads, especially the emergence of electric railways and super highways, prompted the speed of ground maneuvers to reach several ten’s of kilometers per hour, or even more than 100 kilometers. The usual speed of air maneuvers can reach several hundreds of kilometers, or even more than one thousand kilometers an hour.

(2) There Are Many Modes of Strategic Maneuvers

Modern strategic maneuvers are no longer limited by the two traditional modes of ground maneuvers and sea maneuvers, as air maneuvers, space maneuvers and firepower maneuvers have been deployed widely nowadays. The development of science, of technology and of weaponry has provided possibilities for carrying out multi-mode strategic maneuvers. At the same time, it has also provided guiding strategists with many choices of the combination of the mode of strategic maneuvers for their decision making, based on different battlefield situations.

(3) The Range of Strategic Maneuvers Is Very Extensive

The range of modern strategic maneuvers covers the entire earth, and it is being expanded into outer space. On land, highway nets and railroad nets are province, state, and even continent crossing, and connecting all places. Airports are located in places all over the world, air routes are dense, and the range of aircraft can reach several thousand kilometers, or even more than ten thousand kilometers with mid-air refueling. The booming maritime routes provide ships with a range of nearly ten thousand kilometers. Space powers already have space carriers and launching facilities that provided them with the conditions of outer-space maneuvers.

(4) The Beneficial Effects of Strategic Maneuvers Are High

The accelerating speed of strategic maneuvers, the increasing modes, and the expanding ranges have improved the beneficial effects of strategic maneuvers. Large scale, long-range, and high-speed strategic maneuvers are playing a key role in holding back wars, dealing with incidents, and enhancing rapid reaction capabilities. For instance, the U. S. Army requires that the time limits for delivering troops to an overseas theater are within four days for a light brigade, twelve days for a light division, fifteen days for a heavy division, 30 days for 2 heavy divisions, and 75 days for five divisions. The Air force requires seven days for two air wings and 30 days for 6 air wings to be deployed in an overseas theater.

**Section Four: The Principles and Requirements of Strategic Maneuvers**

I. CONTROL THE INITIATIVE

Maintaining the initiative of strategic maneuvers is the key to the wining or losing outcome of strategic maneuvers. The situations of modern wars are complicated and changing frequently, and the factors of restraining strategic maneuvers are increasing, thus, the goals of strategic maneuvers can only be achieved by seizing and maintaining the initiative of strategic maneuvers. In adhering to the principles of the initiative of strategic maneuvers in wars:

* + - 1. Be fully prepared. Carrying out successful preparation for maneuvering troops, sites, tools materials and equipment are the foundation of initiative maneuvers.
      2. Take the Enemy by Surprise. Carry out maneuvers at a timing beyond the enemy’s attention, with an approach the enemy is not aware of, and in a direction the enemy can not even imagine. In order to achieve the surprise element of strategic maneuvers, which the enemy does not have sufficient time to react to, our strategic maneuver must be well executed.
      3. Scientific Forecast. The entire complex situation that may emerge in strategic maneuvers should be analyzed scientifically, and dealt with positively, and avoid strategic maneuvers being trapped or sabotaged due to accidents.

II. QUICK ACTION

The pace of operations in modern wars is increasingly quick, situation changes are sharp, and carrying out quick strategic maneuvers is an effective way of winning war time and maintaining the strategic initiative. In order to ensure quick strategic maneuvers:

1.The whole process of maneuvers should be well planned in order to shorten the time of maneuvering preparation, and reduce the wasted time during the process of maneuvers.

2. Select a shorter route of maneuver and use a faster approach of maneuver in order to speed up the speed of the maneuver.

3. Improve the efficiency of maneuvers. Multi-mode, multi-route, multi-direction and multi-sortie maneuvers with a focusing point should be carried out. Different modes of operations are provided with different maneuvering scale bearing abilities, and efforts should be made to use the mode that has a better scale bearing ability.

III. FLEXIBLE MANEUVERS

Maintaining the flexibility of maneuvers is an objective requirement of modern wars. The flexibility of strategic maneuvers is demonstrated in:

1.The deployment of strategic maneuvers should be flexible. Troops and weapons involved in a strategic maneuver should be grouped scientifically, in order to make them not only easy to carry out, but also able to fit the changes of battlefield situations, and they must be capable of fighting while maneuvering.

2. The plan of a strategic maneuver must be flexible. Maneuvers are not rigidly adhered to a plan, as preparations for various approaches are needed, at an appropriate time the plan can be switched while an uninterrupted maneuver can be carried on.

3. The command of strategic maneuvers must be flexible. Before the situation takes a fundamental change, firmly carry through the decision of the maneuver, overcome all the difficulties and complete the duty of the maneuver. When it is certain that significant or fundamental changes have taken place, the decisions regarding the maneuver should be modified or changed, in order for the maneuver to suit the new situation.

VI. ENHANCE COORDINATION

Strategic maneuver is a complex and difficult system project in wars, and it is a structure comprised of different force modules, and a process crossing different times and spaces. In assuring that strategic maneuvers can be carried out with unity and coordination in the cruel environment of modern wars, we must carry out concentrated and unified command of strategic maneuvers in order to ensure the order of the whole strategic maneuvering force and the effective control of the process of strategic maneuvers. Under unified command, we must carry out good coordination work:

1. Coordination between the army and the local government. Establish an authoritative organization with participation by leading officers of both military and local government offices, and carry out overall mobilization, organization, support, and problem solving activities for strategic maneuvers.

2. Coordination of maneuvering troops and weapons. Carry out divisions and organizations of all the involved arms of the services, clarify the details, such as mode, time, direction, route (or air route) of the concerned maneuver.

3. Coordination between maneuvering units and support units, and coordination between the maneuvering units and other combat units. With the maneuver as the core, carry out priority protection of the security and smooth operation of roads and routes of the maneuvering units. Additionally, the operations of other combat units and the actions of strategic maneuvering units should also be coordinated to ensure mutual cooperation and mutual support.

V. COMBINE OPEN AND COVERT MANEUVERS

In normal conditions, strategic maneuvers should be carried out in a covert manner in order to achieve strategic suddenness. Under modern conditions, in order to prevent wars from happening, and hold back war escalation, sometimes open maneuvers are carried out intentionally to show the enemy the nation’s power. That is, show the strength and determination to the enemy through strategic maneuvers, so the enemy dares not to launch or expand a war at wish.

VI. COMBINE ADVANCED SETUP AND MANEUVERS

The duration of modern wars is relatively short, and war attritions are huge. In order to reduce the pressure of strategic maneuvers, and save the strategic maneuvering time, pre-war strategic advanced setups have become an auxiliary measure in strategic maneuvers in wartime. The so-called pre-war strategic advanced setups is to setup established stockpiles of weapons, equipment and material in advance in the areas that may become war zones according to strategic judgment. When the war takes place, these weapons, equipment and materials can be maneuvered to the war zone quickly. The pre-war strategic advance setups are especially significant to remote areas and strategic directions that are not suitable for maneuvers.

VII. COMBINE STRATEGIC MANEUVERS AND COMBAT OPERATIONS

In modern wars, maneuvers and combat operations have melted into one under many conditions. Forming certain significance, maneuvers are combat operations, and combat operations are also maneuvers. The combination of strategic maneuvers and combat operations is mainly demonstrated in the following two aspects:

1.The combination of strategic maneuvers and other combat operations will have a strong impact on the overall strategic situation. Strategic maneuvers can disturb enemy deployment, strongly support other combat operations. Other combat operations can also support or create conditions for strategic maneuvers, and make strategic maneuvers fully capitalize on the result, and move into the position quickly to carry out strategic intentions.

2. The combination of maneuvers and combat operations during the process of strategic maneuvers will enhance strategic maneuvers’ own antagonism. Depending on conditions, maneuvers can be carried out while carrying out combat operations, or shift from maneuvers to combat operations. Special attention should be paid to anti-air raid operations. An air defense system should be formed with priorities along the axis of strategic maneuvers and at key positions. According to conditions, one must organize air defense operations at an appropriate time. During the War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea, our volunteer army deployed a large number of anti-aircraft artillery units along the rail lines in “anti-strangling” operations, which provided effective covers for our strategic maneuvers.

**Chapter Fifteen**

**Strategic Air Attacks and Air Countermeasures**

Strategic air attack and anti-air attack are important modes of operations in modern technology, especially high-technology, local wars. Under specially designated war conditions, they may replace ground operations to lead the war and achieve the strategic objectives. The win or loss of strategic air attacks and air countermeasures directly affect and limit the process and the outcome of wars.

**Section One: The Position and Roles of Strategic Air Attacks and Air Countermeasures**

Strategic air attacks are large-scale attacks carried out from the air against an enemy’s political, economic and military strategic targets, and they are strategic offensive actions. The objectives and duties are: destroying and damaging enemy strategic targets; weakening enemy military strength and war potentialities; annihilating and suppressing the enemy’s heavy army groups or strategic weapons; and supporting our combat operations.

Strategic air countermeasures are resisting operations, counter-attacks and protective operations carried out wholly against an enemy’s strategic air attack, and they are strategic defensive actions against attacks from the air and space. The purpose is to crush the enemy’s intention of launching strategic air attacks, and to create conditions for shifting to strategic counter-attacks and offensive operations. The duties of strategic air countermeasures are: resisting attack, counter-attack, and protection from enemy strategic strikes, the important strategic objective of defending our country and military, protect the army’s freedom of movement, and protect the country to shift into wartime systems, and protect production and transportation in the rear areas.

I. STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS AND AIR COUNTERMEASURES ARE KEY MODES OF OPERATIONS OF HIGH-TECH LOCAL WARS, AND, UNDER SPECIALLY DESIGNATED WAR CONDIITONS, THEY MAY REPLACE GROUND OPERATIONS IN LEADING THE WAR

Air attacks were born and developed with the use of aircraft in wars. Using aircraft to carry out air attacks began in the 1911 Italian-Turkish War. During WWI, using aircraft to carry out air attacks had already become a usual combat action of the warring opponents; however, as limited by the number and performance of aircraft, the scale and force of air attacks were still limited. During WWII, the performance of aircraft was improved, and the number of aircraft was increased, and the warring opponents began to carry out large-scale air attacks to affect the process of war. After the war, the emergence and deployment of jet bombers, especially advanced airborne weapon systems, significantly enhanced the lethal and damaging results of air attacks. However, the roles of air attacks were still designed to support and coordinate ground operations. During the 90’s of the 20th century, the two high-tech local wars (the Gulf War and the Kosovo War) greatly raised the strategic standing of air attacks and anti-air attack. During these two wars, the time ratios of air attacks and air countermeasures, as well as ground operations, were 38:4 and 78:0 respectively. This showed that air attacks and air countermeasures have become major modes of operations of high-tech local wars, and under specially designated war conditions, they may replace ground operations in leading the war.

II. IN MODERN WARS, AIR ATTACKS AND AIR COUNTERMEASURES ARE INCREASINGLY STRATEGICALLY ORIENTED; THE RESULTS ARE DECISIVE FOR BOTH WARRING SIDES.

Modern technologies, especially under high-tech conditions, both warring sides concentrate elite troops and advanced weapons in an attempt to seize the war initiative through air attacks and air countermeasures. Therefore, air attacks and air countermeasures are provided with strategic characteristics, even the character of decisive operations. For instance, during the Kosovo war, NATO forces led by the U. S. carried out large scale, long duration, and high precision strategic air attacks. During the 78 days of air attacks, it carried out 32,000 sorties of air missions, fired more than 3000 missiles, and dropped 21,000 tons of bombs, the equivalent of four times the atomic bomb the U. S. dropped at Hiroshima. It also used a large number of cluster bombs, dirty bombs that are banned by international laws, and it also used high explosive new weapons such as electromagnetic pulse bombs against more than 1300 targets. This resulted in direct economic losses of more than several hundreds of billions of U. S. dollars. The U. S. used a large quantity of new and high-tech weapons in an attempt to achieve its war objectives through strategic air attacks at one blow. On the other hand, regardless if they are targets of strategic air attacks or targets of air countermeasures, they are all-important strategic targets of the country and its armed forces. They are also the focus of war, therefore, for the side of strategic air attacks, the initiative of war is seized by effective destruction or damage to these key targets, thus laying the foundation for victory. For the side of strategic air countermeasures, protecting these key targets effectively not only benefits the implementation of the objectives of defensive operations, it also benefits the enhancement of national unity, and consolidates and develops war potentialities. Therefore, the outcome of war is provided with strategic significance for both of the warring sides.

III. STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS AND AIR COUNTERMEASURES MAY ONLY BE INITIAL BATTLES, OR MAY CARRY THROUGH THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF WAR, AND DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OVERALL WAR OR THE ENTIRE WAR PROCESS

As modern air attack weapons are provided with capabilities of carrying out long-range precision attacks from outside the defense zone, local wars under high-tech conditions often begin with strategic air attacks. The first round of fighting between the two warring sides becomes the struggle of air attacks and air countermeasures. As the initial battle of the war, the position of strategic air attacks and air countermeasures are raised significantly, which has a strong impact on the entire process of war and the ensuing stages of war. Similarly, under the condition of high-tech local wars, strategic air attacks, while paying close attention to the first strike, also stress that continued multi-wave strikes should be carried out repeatedly during the entire war. This has determined that strategic air countermeasures are also provided the characteristics of continuation and long duration in the whole process of war. Strategic air countermeasures have become an issue of deep concern of guiding strategists in overall war planning and its entire process.

Additionally, due to the development of long-range strategic air attack weapons and space weapons, modern strategic air countermeasures have been extended to the defense of outer space. Air attacks and air surveillance measures have greatly enhanced the complexity and difficulties of strategic air countermeasures; thus, strategic air countermeasures will be carried out under very difficult and arduous conditions.

**Section Two: Strategic Air Attacks**

I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS

Strategic air attacks under modern technology, especially high technology conditions, are provided with the following characteristics:

(1)Concentrated use of high-tech weapons in carrying out joint air attacks of all the Arms and service branches.

The air force plays a major role in modern strategic air attack operations; all other forces are coordinated in carrying out integrated operations in order to crush the enemy at one blow. Air attack operations are increasingly paying attention to concentrated use of high-tech weapons in carrying out the joint operations of all the arms and service branches. For instance, during the Kosovo War, air attacks carried out by NATO forces led by the U. S. against Yugoslavian targets used all the high-tech weapon systems except nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and they turned Kosovo into the “probing ground” of U. S. high-tech weapons as well as the “exercise field” of joint air attack operations of all the arms and services branches.

(2) Using information warfare and electronic warfare as the lead, deploy multi-approach defense penetration.

First, before and during a strategic air attack, widespread electronic jamming should be carried out to blind the intelligence, communications and command systems of the defensive side, and make the latter’s guided weapons lose control, thus lose their normal resisting attack capabilities. Recent local wars demonstrated that under the condition that no information warfare or electronic warfare had been carried out, the probability of air attack aircraft being shot down was 8 to 10 percent. Under the condition that electronic warfare and information warfare were carried out, however, the shot-down probability was lowered to under 2 percent, even down to 0.03 percent. Long-range high powered electronic jamming suppression has become a key measure in successful strategic air attack penetration operations. Second we must consider the use of cruise missiles in carrying out precision attacks to destroy enemy air defense systems. In recent local wars, a large number of powerful precision guided weapons were launched from outside the defense zone against enemy radar stations, guided missile launching positions, airports, and command centers. Third, one must use stealth fighters in carrying out covered defense penetration. In air attacks against Yugoslavian targets, NATO forces deployed, in addition to F-117A stealth fighters, the B-2 strategic bombers for the first time in order to enhance their air attack and air defense penetration capabilities. Fourth is using “after dark launching” and “high altitude operations” as the key air attack and air defense penetration measures, carry out high altitude defense penetration at night.

(3) Stress integral paralysis, carry out non-stop air attacks, and weaken the enemy’s war strength and potentialities

Modern air attack operations are provided with a prominent non-linear characteristic. In order to paralyze the enemy at one blow, the traditional boundary between front line and depth, military targets and civilian targets, and between war strength and war potentialities are broken, the integrated operations, the entire line attacks and non-stop attacks are carried out, embracing designated political goals and strategic intentions, in order to weaken the enemy’s war strength and potentialities. During the war in Vietnam, the Gulf War, and in Kosovo, the U. S. strategic air attacks all showed this characteristic.

(4) Use advanced command measures, enhance command efficiency.

Modern air attacks are paying more attention to using the automated command system with modern information technologies as its core. For instance, NATO used, for the first time, its new C4ISR system of “Early Joint Air Attack Operations Central Capability System.” It also used the “NATO Integrated Data Transmission System,” and the “Sea Command and Control System,” in the combined off-theater long-range command and intra-theater maneuvering command approach in strengthening the coordinated operational capabilities of the air attack units.

II. THE PRINCIPLES AND REQUIREMENTS OF ORGANIZING AND CARRYING OUT AIR ATTACKS

1. Prepare and plan meticulously, make decisions carefully.

Strategic air attacks under the condition of high-tech local wars is restricted by national politics and diplomatic struggles. It is related to the overall strategy and it has a direct impact on the process and outcome of wars. Therefore, we must stand on the high plane of the overall strategy, prepare and plan meticulously, and make decisions carefully. We should analyze the enemy’s situation, our own situation, and the battlefield situation carefully. We must accurately understand strategic intentions; meticulously prepare and plan, and make the right decision; correctly select the direction of air attacks and targets of attack, accurately grasp the timing of air attacks and the shifting of air attack stages, and make every effort in carrying out the objective of war by paying a minimum price.

1. Carefully plan, fully prepare.

We must plan from an angle of the more complex and difficult situation, and prepare a number of ways in advance. We should not only have a basic plan for strategic air attacks, we should also prepare backup plans and emergency plans, and continue to modify and perfect them; strengthen troop adaptability training, familiarize ourselves with the plans, advanced plans, and battlefield surroundings; quickly and quietly complete all the preparation duties, in order to ensure the position of always holding the initiative.

1. Combine air and ground forces in rational disposition.

In strategic air attacks, established units and weapons are usually deployed to form a strong attacking force in the primary direction of air attacks for convenient integrated command and control. This approach can fully exploit the requirement of the attacking capabilities of all the arms and weapons. The units are organized into various combat groups, and form a favorable offensive posture. The ground disposition of air attacks requires easy dispersion, cover, maneuvers and concentration, and convenient organization, support and coordination. Air disposition is usually focused on the primary direction, with attacking units as the backbone, and the small groups as the foundation; so, the multi-layer and multi-echelon air disposition is convenient for air attacks and coordination.

(4) Covered and sudden: Defeat the enemy by striking first.

Take every effective measure, make every effort to carry out the element of a surprise, in order to win quickly, to win with surprise attacks, make decisions quickly, organize quickly, and take actions quickly. Organize air attack preparations strictly and stealthily: select the timing, direction and location of air attacks skillfully; fully use natural conditions such as weather and terrain, make careful assessment, use and shift the mode of operation flexibly, select and change the direction of operations and the target of attack at appropriate times in order to force the enemy into a passive position.

(5) Concentrate units, carry out attacks with priority.

One must concentrate the use of elite units and new and high-tech weapons on the main attacking direction and carry out duties that have a decisive impact on the overall situation in the initial, critical stage. Troop concentration is not only the concentration of size and numbers of troops and weapons, it should also stress the concentration of fire power and electronic warfare forces. One should select targets which may have a strong impact on the process of war, and may cause the entire target system to be paralyzed after they are destroyed, as the target of destructive attack, in order to defeat the enemy with superiority.

(6) Integrated command, close coordination.

One must establish a perfect command system, carrying out integrated use of the operational capabilities, and integrated command of operations of all the involved forces. Operational directions and operations must be coordinated. Units of all the services and arms branches and all the weapon systems should be organized and deployed scientifically according to the integrated strategic intentions designated in order to form an integrated joint force.

III. COMMAND AND SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS

1. Command of strategic attacks.

First, select the target of attack and the direction of attack. The main attacking direction of strategic air attack is the direction that troops and weapons are concentrated to penetrate the enemy’s air defense, in attacking the pre-selected target zone. Normally, the target is selected according to such factors as strategic intentions, strategic objectives, operational duties, enemy situation, weather and terrain, etc. The selected direction should be the direction that has the weakest enemy air defense fire power, easy to find cover, easy to concentrate air power, and has the shortest air route.

Second, work out strategic air attack plans. The strategic air attack plan is the basis for organizing and carrying out strategic air attacks. In working out a strategic air attack plan, we should start from the angle of the most difficult and complex situation, and make various preparations. A strategic air attack plan includes: the conclusion of enemy situation assessment; strategic intentions and objectives; air attack targets and orders; the duty of all the service and arms branches and the organization of involved units; the selection of the targets and primary directions of the air attack; organization of command and coordination; and strategic air attack support; etc.

Third, Organize strategic coordination. One must organize coordination with stress on the concentrated groups carrying out main combat duties. The coordination between concentrated groups relies on the attacking group. Primary clarification: the target, time, method, cover of the attacking and suppressing concentrated groups and the cover duties, area and methods for cover and air defense concentrated groups; support duties of support concentrated groups; coordination and contact of coordination activities between concentrated groups, etc. Coordination among the Air force, Army, Navy and Strategic Guided Missile Unit is carried out with the Air force as the primary organization. Primary clarification: The duty of all the service branches, target and scope of attacks, time and methods of attacks, and approaches and methods of communications and contact.

Fourth, organize and carry out defense penetration and sudden attacks. Defense penetration is combat operations of using missiles and aircraft to penetrate the interceptions of the enemy’s air defense systems in order to enter a pre-determined target area, and it is the most important link of air attacks. There will be no air attack if there is no defense penetration, and results of defense penetration have a direct impact on the process and outcome of air attack operations. Defense penetration under high-tech war conditions is relatively convenient for the side that has high-tech weaponry, especially those that are capable of seizing “three superiorities” (sea superiority, air superiority, and electromagnetic superiority). For the side with inferior weaponry, without the firm control of the “three superiorities,” the action will be difficult, complex and arduous. Judging from the air strike operations in the 80’s of the 20th century, most of the operations were led with electronic jamming, using cruise missiles for low-altitude defense penetration, stealth aircraft for stealthy defense penetration, and using night for carrying out continuous defense penetration.

Defense penetrations under modern technology, especially high-tech conditions, can not be carried out by a single branch of the services; it must be carried out through integrated planning, integrated organization, integrated operations, and joint operations of all the arms and services branches. To be successful one must use various defense penetration measures comprehensively and use defense penetration methods flexibly, carry out omni-directional and three dimensional joint defense penetration operations decisively. On air routes and combat formation, make every effort in using multi-sortie and small-formation approaches, use the enemy’s radar’s blind area in carrying out low-altitude defense penetration. On air cover, deploy fighter aircraft units to provide area cover, accompanied cover and blocking enemy air ports, etc, in destroying or pinning down enemy aircraft that may threaten our defense penetration operations. On electronic jamming, use measures such as fixed area jamming, accompanied jamming or self jamming, priority jamming of enemy warning radar, command system and firing system, and make every effort to make enemy radar blind, communications blackout, command malfunction, and missiles operate out of control. On feign operations, through feign targeting, feign air routing, feign altitude, feign radio transmissions to hide the truth and confuse the enemy, one can disperse enemy troops falsely. On firing attacks, efforts should be made to use precision guided weapons, such as heat radiation missiles to destroy and suppress enemy radar stations, ground air defense weapons, and airports, etc., in order to open an air defense penetration corridor for the main attacking force. On deployment of troops, the use of rapid landing teams or other kinds of special operation elements will carry out quick landing, or air landing, harassing attacks, and the destroying of enemy command posts, radar, communications air defense systems and airfields, in order to create favorable conditions for defense penetration operations. In addition, focus on carrying out continued firing attacks. The first attack is usually carried out by concentrating more than 70 percent of the attacking troops and high performance and most powerful weapons in launching surprise and fierce attacks against vital enemy targets. Afterwards, repeated attacks should be carried out against pre-selected targets that survived during the first attack, new targets, as well as targets that were attacked before, in order to thoroughly destroy all the targets, or prevent the enemy from repairing the destroyed targets.

Fifth, organize and carry out countermeasures against the enemy. Countermeasures against the enemy are defensive operations that are carried out during offensive operations. The objective is to maintain the stability of strategic air attack systems, the security of campaign forces, and the smooth implementation of battle operations. Generally speaking, this type of operation should be directed against enemy operational ideology and conditions of weaponry, in order to strengthen air defense of our key targets; use reconnaissance and intelligence measures comprehensively; keep abreast of enemy movements at all times; and make countermeasure decisions promptly. When the enemy deploys countermeasures before and during the pause of a strategic air attack, generally, the overall force should be deployed in organizing air interception, ground resisting attacks and priority defense, in order to defeat the enemy’s attempt to carry out countermeasures. When the enemy launches countermeasures during the process of war, by and large, while continuing to carry out its air attacks against the enemy, air defense forces should be organized and deployed actively to carry out resisting attacks, in order to reduce or eliminate the impact of enemy countermeasures, and support the smooth implementation of our strategic air attacks.

1. Support of strategic air attacks.

The success of strategic air attacks relies upon the active coordination of all support components and their non-stop support work. We must establish a scientific support system, use all support forces rationally, meticulously work out all support plans, and enhance the rapid reaction capabilities of support works. On the foundation of overall support, highlight the priorities, strengthen operational support for units that are carrying out attacking duties in the primary direction; strengthen support for works such as reconnaissance and intelligence, aerial navigation, radar, communications, weather, electronic countermeasures, aeronautic engineering, logistics, equipment technologies, and political works, etc.

**Section Three: Strategic Air Countermeasures**

I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR COUNTERMEASURES

1. Short early warning time, sudden combat actions.

Under modern conditions, the speed of strategic air attack weapons is very high, the space crossed is vast, stealth technology is enhanced, all-weather attack capability is provided, operational deployment is dispersed to areas far from the combat zone, thus, the signs of a coming air attack are hard to detect. Stealthy attacks have made strategic air countermeasures hard to catch the target with electronic surveillance systems, and the effectiveness of high-tech sensing measures is lowered.

1. Operational spaces are vast, air defense duties are strenuous.

Strategic air attack under high-tech conditions are provided with the capabilities of omni-direction, all-altitude, and all-depth. Therefore, strategic air countermeasures are usually three-dimensional operations carried out simultaneously in multi-direction, all altitude, and deep depth. The areas covered by these operations can reach hundreds of thousands and even several millions of square kilometers. The targets of air countermeasures vary. Attacking aircraft, attacking guided missiles, attacking command systems, anti-precision attack, anti-information attack, and anti-reconnaissance and surveillance are important duties of strategic air countermeasures. Not only do we need to carry out resisting attacks against enemy strategic air attacks in our own combat zones, we also need to carry out attacks against enemy weapons’ taking off and launching bases (or platforms), and our operational duties are very strenuous.

1. Operational intensity is increased, offensive and defensive confrontations are fierce

As soon as a war breaks out, the side that carries out air strikes usually can not wait to try to paralyze the enemy’s defense system, resisting wills, and war supporting potentialities, at one blow with sudden, concentrated, intensified attacks, air battles, air operations and electronic countermeasures. These are carried out in vast space frequently, the density of firepower is very high, the mode of operation is varied, the shift from offense to defense is quick, and antagonism is strong.

1. Information operations are launched earliest, and are carried through from beginning to end.

Electronic countermeasures are required in carrying out strategic air countermeasures in crushing the enemy’s intention of seizing electromagnetic superiority. In resisting operations, and counter-attack operations and defensive operations, effort should be made in struggles with the enemy over electronic reconnaissance, electronic jamming, and electronic destruction, in order to maintain the stability of our own operational systems.

1. A large number of units are involved in combat operations, thus, command and coordination is complicated.

Modern strategic air countermeasure operations are joint combat operations of all arms and branches of services, and the level of concentration of troops and weapons is raised prominently. In addition to the air force, the army, the navy, the strategic missile units and other armed organizations are also involved., thus, there are many involved forces; long-range, medium range, close range, high altitude, medium altitude and low altitude weapons are all used, various modes of operations, such as air battles, aerial operations, ground operations are used; resisting attack, counter-attack, and physical protection operations are employed; the front and the rear air countermeasures can be carried out simultaneously or at different times. We not only have coordination between theaters, we also have coordination between air defense zones within a theater, and coordination between combat operations.

II. STRATEGIC AIR COUNTERMEASURE SYSTEM

The strategic air countermeasure system is set up for dealing with enemy strategic air attacks. It forms an integrated body of closely combined strategic air countermeasure systems and the force disposition with all the air countermeasure forces within certain time frames and space limits, according to the integrated strategic intentions. The strategic air countermeasure system is a key integral part of the country’s complete defense system, and it is the foundation of carrying out air countermeasure operations. It mainly includes: the strategic early warning system, the command and control system, the resisting attack and counter-attack system, the strategic physical protection system, the operational support system, and the civil air defense system.

(1) Strategic early warning system

The establishment of a highly integrated and quick reaction strategic early warning system is the most important link in dealing effectively with attacks of all aircraft, missiles, and space weapons. Modern strategic early warning systems are comprised of several sub-systems, which primarily include: space, air early warning, ground radar warning, space sensing and surveillance, radio technology reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and ground to air observation, etc. sub-systems. It should be able to detect, identify, shadow, and monitor all air attack weapons. It is provided with ultra long range and multiple layer capabilities, and it can deal with simultaneous omni-directional attacks of all kind of weapons. Assurances should be given that there will be no gap and no blind spot in the primary direction, and it should also be able to keep abreast of and report on intelligence and air situations quickly, accurately and continuously in a situation when a part of the early warning system is damaged.

(2) Command and control system.

The Command and control system is the center of strategic air countermeasure systems. The deployment of all air countermeasure forces and measures, implementation of air countermeasure operations, and the control of air countermeasure weapons and coordination of all operations are carried out through the command and control system. With the development of the mode of operations and air countermeasures and air countermeasure weapons and equipment, the content of air countermeasure operations command, control and communications are becoming more complex and expanded. The requirements for the space, time and effectiveness of carrying out air countermeasures are also higher. Therefore, we must take the measure of command automation in order to improve the efficiency of command and control. Generally, the strategic air countermeasure system comprises the national strategic air countermeasure command organization, theater air countermeasure command organization, and air countermeasure unit command organization. The strategic air countermeasure system under high-tech conditions should be provided with three major functions of information offense, information defense, and information operations. (Including information collection, transmission, processing and storage, etc) Electronic struggles with the enemy that are carried out by using all kinds of electronic jamming and countermeasures have become one of the main contents of the command and control of modern strategic air countermeasure operations.

1. Resisting-attack and counter-attack system.

The resisting-attack and counter-attack system is formed with force deployment and firepower distribution, and it is the primary part of combat operations in the strategic air countermeasure system, and a force system which carries out interception, resisting attack and counter-attack operations directly. The basic duties for the resisting-attack and counter-attack system are: promptly detect, follow, and identify air attack targets, use corresponding strategic air countermeasure forces and weapons in carrying out resisting-attack and counter-attack operations, in order to crush the enemy’s intentions of launching air attacks. One of the trends of the development of the resisting-attack and counter-attack system of strategic air countermeasures is gradually dividing it into air defense resisting-attack and counter-attack systems and space defense resisting-attack and counter-attack systems. The air defense resisting-attack and counter-attack systems are comprised mainly of fighter aircraft, air defense missiles, anti-aircraft artilleries, and electronic countermeasure weapons, etc. Its primary duty is carrying out interception and attacks against incoming air weapons such as aircraft and guided missiles. The space resisting-attack and counter-attack system is comprised of anti-ballistic guided missile systems and anti-satellite systems. Its primary duty is carrying out interception and attacks against incoming enemy strategic and tactical guided missiles and enemy space vehicles such as satellites that may pose a threat to our country.

Strategic air countermeasure forces, by and large, are deployed with priorities in key theaters, strategic directions, enemy attacking directions, and other directions to form a multi-layer, deep echelon, and sufficient density deployment, in order to begin intercepting enemy air weapons at the longest possible range. Target groups that are formed by a number of targets should be treated as an integrated target in carrying out regional air countermeasure deployment.

The firepower of strategic air countermeasures usually uses ground to air missiles as the core in forming a long range to close range, omni-directional, deep depth, and multi-layer firepower system. The outer layer firepower is formed by fighter aircraft units and ground-to-air missile units which can intercept and attack the enemy’s high and medium altitude attacking weapons at the longest possible range. The inner layer firepower formed by ground-to-air missiles units and anti-aircraft artillery units are used in attacking the enemy’s medium and low altitude attacking weapons. Based on battlefield situations, sometimes maneuvering firepower groups can be organized with parts of ground-to-air missile units and anti-aircraft artillery units in carrying out maneuvering operations. If necessary, long-range ground-to-ground guided missiles can be used to attack enemy guided missile launching bases, naval bases and air force bases that may pose a threat.

1. Strategic physical protection system.

The Strategic physical protection system is formed with components of building construction, field defense works, civil air defense construction, dispersed area and cover and camouflage construction, and feint construction, etc., and it is an important system in carrying out strategic air countermeasures, maintaining effective strength and war potentialities. Its primary duty is carrying out cover and camouflage, strict protection, and feint and cheat. On the one hand, it preserves effective strength and war potentialities; on the other, it causes enemy attrition of air attack ammunitions, thus lowering its combat effectiveness. Special attention should be paid to developing good protection for command organizations, backbone airfields, air defense positions, and main radar stations that may become easy targets of enemy air attacks, in order to maintain the capability of sustained operations.

1. Operational support system.

The Operational support system is comprised of operational sub-systems, logistics sub-systems, and equipment technical support systems. It is a key material base and condition in the strategic air countermeasure system. Its primary duty is supporting strategic air countermeasure operations of all the arms of services and service branches and their security. The operational support sub-system mainly carries out the strict organization of intelligence, communications, weather, navigation, flight control, protective camouflage, warning protection, and support. Logistic support mainly organizes the acquisition, storage, management and supply of funds, materials, equipment, fuel, and supplies according to the requirement of air countermeasure operations, and it also carries out building construction, medical and emergency services, and transportation and communications, in order to ensure units of all the arms and service branches, and other armed forces, that they have the necessary living and operational conditions and maintaining continued and sustained operational capabilities. Equipment technical support is mainly organizing maintenance and repair of weapons, especially combat aircraft according to the operational requirement of strategic air countermeasures, in order to keep a higher level of failure-free and dispatch probabilities for strategic air countermeasure weapons.

1. Civil air defense system.

The Civil air defense system is comprised of civil air defense organizations, specialist units, and warning notification system and construction facilities. Its basic functions are: mobilize and organize people to prepare and prevent enemy air attacks, eliminate the aftermath of air attacks and join air defense operational support activities. Its objectives are protecting the safety of people’s life and property, reducing national economic losses, maintaining social stability, and preserving war potentialities. Its basic requirements are: establish a highly effective organizational command system, covered and solid protective construction system, flexible and dependable communications and warning system, elite and strong specialist team system, and people’s dispersing system with basic support conditions, vigorously improve the capability of civil air defense organization command, reconnaissance and early warning, communications and contacts, quick reaction, emergency rescue and integrated destruction resistance, and effectively protect national security and people’s life and property.

III. THE PRINCIPLES AND REQUIREMENTS OF ORGANIZING AND CARRYING OUT STRATEGIC AIR COUNTERMEASURES

(1) Integrated disposition, divisional defense.

Establish and complete an integrated national (or theater) strategic air countermeasure system, on the basis of an overall and thorough deployment, divide the whole country (or theater) into several air defense zones in carrying out the divisional defense system under integrated command. Use all air defense forces rationally, organically combine air defense, field hospitals, and civil air defense in key areas in establishing an integrated, complete and prioritized strategic air countermeasure system of all arms and branches of services and other armed organizations. Normally, the division of air defense zones and sub-zones should be corresponding basically with strategic zones and all the battle directions under their control. All the air defense zones and sub-zones should combine all the actual local situations, and, according to the overall war intentions, fully exploit the subjective initiative. They should carry out all the local air defense developments, including civil air defense development in peacetime, and in wartime, actively attack invading enemy air attack weapons and carry out coordinated operations with neighboring air defense zones or sub-zones.

(2) Always prepared, react quickly

In accordance with the characteristics of strategic air countermeasure operations, enemy situations, possible duties and battlefield conditions, they should formulate operational plans dealing with various situations, always maintaining a heightened state of readiness, and, once the marching order is received from a higher authority, and enemy activities have been detected, react quickly. In particular, the strategic early warning system, communications system, air defense force system, and command and control system should maintain heightened alert. Establish a strict war preparation system and maintain sufficient force on duty to ensure that once an order is issued, actions can be taken immediately.

1. Centralized command, close coordination

Establish a highly centralized, integrated command system and maintain close coordination of all the arms and branches of services, in order to win collectively under the integrated command and close coordination plan. At the same time, attention should also be paid to quick decision making and action in a unique situation. In a situation that the command system is out of order, commanders of all levels should deal with the situation actively and flexibly, and do their best to carry out the strategic intentions of overall air countermeasures.

1. Integrated resisting operations, win as a whole.

Adhere to active air defense and carry out offensive defense, the full advantage of integrated force. Key area air defense, field air defense, and civil air defense should be coordinated closely; while carefully organizing resisting attacks, no opportunities should be passed up in organizing counter-attacks, strengthening physical protection, and combining “resisting,” “Counter,” and “protecting” operations organically. When deploying forces, ground-to-air missile units, air units, air defense units, and electronic countermeasure forces, they should be organized and grouped scientifically to form a strong and multi-approach integrated attacking force. Pay attention to information warfare, carry out information offensive operations and firepower direct destruction operations, protect one’s own command automation system and air defense weapon system, and try hard to seize information superiority.

1. Active counter-attack, tight protection.

Create and seize favorable opportunities, lead interior line operations to exterior operations at appropriate times, launch counter-attacks against the enemy actively and positively, sabotage its air attack plans, delay its air attack operations, weaken and tie down its air attack forces, and use offensive operations to help out defense. At the same time, according to the category, character, location, position, function, and possible destructive effect, build protective defense works, with plans and priorities, use measures and approaches such as cover, dispersement, camouflage, and maneuvers to reduce damages caused by an enemy’s air attacks to a minimum, in order to maintain the stability of the strategic air countermeasure system and air safety of the target.

1. Combine centralization and decentralization, all-around support

Establish a joint services network of unified organization and integrated coordination, and take full advantage of its functions; carry out integrated deployment, integrated use of the support force of all arms and branches of services within the limit of all the theaters. For special-use materials, equipment, and special wounded or sick personnel, all arms and branches of services should supply, repair, and treat or cure separately; comprehensive use of support measures and rational use of support forces should be carried out for the overall good and prioritized support to all the operational directions, operational groups, and all operational stages, in order to ensure the stability of the strategic air countermeasure system and its sustained operational capability.

VI. STRATEGIC AIR COUNTERMEASURES COMMAND AND SUPPORT

(1) Strategic air countermeasure command

First, correctly determining key targets that require protection is a premise of rational use of air countermeasure forces and the carrying out of correct command. Targets that need protection are usually determined according to conditions such as the target’s standing and function, the enemy’s intention of carrying out air attacks, the performance of enemy weapons that may be used in air attacks, and our own air countermeasure capabilities. In order to distinguish the level of importance of targets easily, usually, after a target is selected, its level is determined, and corresponding protection deployment will be carried out according to the levels of the targets. With status changes, and situation changes of the targets themselves, the level and quantity of the protected targets should also be revised promptly.

Second, formulate strategic air countermeasure plans. Strategic air countermeasure coordination includes neighboring air defense zones, areas between key areas, between arms and branches of services, key areas air defense, field air defense, between civil air defense components, between air defense zones, and all forces in the strategic key areas. Strategic air countermeasure coordination can be arranged according to air defense zones, intercepting areas, and interception targets, with air defense zones as the core. When operational duties are carried out by a number of air countermeasure forces and weapons, coordination can be arranged according to airspace, targets, direction, and altitude, etc., with priority given to air space. Additionally, one should also organize the coordination between radar, electronic countermeasure units and fighter aircraft, ground-to-air missile, and anti-aircraft artillery units. In counter-attack operations, efforts should also be made to arrange coordination among involved air force, navy and strategic missile units, such distinguishing counter-attack targets, determining the time of force deployment and counter-attack, etc.

Fourth, organize new air countermeasure units.

Carry out sustained all-out operations against enemy air attacks with active resisting attacks as the core, combining tight protection and timely counter attacks. Aiming at the intensity and scale of the enemy’s air attacks, organize and carry out a series of air countermeasure battles. Take all the possible measures, support and recovery, to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the strategic air countermeasure system.

Fifth, establish new air countermeasure units. Establish and maintain a strong strategic air countermeasure reserve unit, usually deployed in the strategic depth area, or locations that are convenient for maneuvers. While determining the deployment of reserve units, consideration should be given to establishing new reserve units. Meanwhile, new strategic air countermeasure units should be established promptly according to the development of war situations, and the status of new equipment supplied by the rear areas, in order to maintain the sustained operational capabilities of strategic air countermeasures.

(2) Support of strategic air countermeasures

The operational support of strategic countermeasures. The focus is to carry out successfully the works of reconnaissance and intelligence, communications support, navigational support, radar support, meteorological support, battle camouflage, construction support, and battlefield management, etc. The logistic support for strategic air countermeasures is carrying out overall and focused material support, medical service support, transportation service support, logistic construction support, and logistic technical support, etc. Technical support of strategic air countermeasures is primarily to carry out direct operational service support of equipment, war damages repair support, technical support, and equipment supply and support, etc.

**Chapter Sixteen**

**Strategic Information Warfare**

Strategic information war is the strategic action in influencing the enemy’s information and information system by using information war weapons; protecting one’s own information and information system so that a superior position on the information battlefield can be obtained. Strategic information war by its nature is to use “information flow” to control the “energy flow” and “material flow” through the tactics of information war. By doing so we can deprive the superiority of the enemy’s information, maintain our own information superiority, and obtain the control of information right on the battlefield. In the future war of strategic information, obtaining information supremacy has become a prerequisite of obtaining the supremacy of the air, ground, and sea. It is key to take over and maintain the initiative of the entire battlefield, which can influence the progress and end results of the war.

**Section One: The Formation of Strategic Information War and Its Strategic Status**.

**Subsection One. The formation of strategic information war**.

The appearance of war and the style of battle are usually corresponding to the productivity level of the society when the war takes place and they also develop along the progress of the productivity of the society. Currently the society with fast and active development and wide applications of advanced technologies, which center on the information technology as its nucleus, have pushed the human society from industrial era into the information era. The strategic information war is a definite product of information technology when it has developed to a certain degree. The development of the advanced technologies, which center on information technology, is the power source for the formation and development of the information war.

Information has existed since there were wars amongst human beings and the information war is an organic element of the war, no matter whether it is ancient or recent. From the ancient past, the beacon fire towers, beating of the drums and gongs, carrier pigeons, and spies, etc. were the early war products of the information war. However, due to the restrictions of history and technological conditions, information occupied very limited functions in the wars. The information war truly becoming one of the important methods of war is due to the promotion of the results of information science and technology. In the 19th century, with the invention of telegraphs and telephones and their applications in the military, the earliest version of military electrical information equipments expanded the range of information transmission and produced the earliest version of the competition of radio communications. During World War II the wide applications of radios and radars allowed the coordination of war activities in the air on the ground and at sea. Air supremacy had become an important guarantee of the naval and ground supremacy, which also caused continuous development of the electronic opposition of the war. Entering 1970’s, information technologies, which were based on key technologies such as computers, micro-electronic technology, laser technology, communication technology, network technology, and artificial intelligence, made rapid development. It provided the battlefield with powerful technological support for the capabilities of information collection, information transmission, and information data processing. It provided the fundamental material conditions for the formation and development of the information war.

Represented by precision-guided weapons, smart weapons systems, and the C4I systems, many high-tech weapons and equipment came into being. These systems have broken through the traditional developmental mode and physical limits and realized the informational, intelligential, and integral mode of the information. In particular, the wide application of the C4I system, made intelligence surveillance, communication, command, control, and attack into an integral whole, which gave the status of information in a war a giant leap forward. Information has become an important factor in determining the victory and defeat of a war. In the Gulf War of 1990’s, the military of the United States of America used precision-guided weapons, which was only 7% of all the weapons, but they destroyed 80% of the important targets. In this war, the information war, a new style of battle had achieved certain magnitude, had significant impact to the victory and defeat of the war and promoted the changes of the form of war

In exploring information war theories and information war methods, the military of the United States of America established six war laboratories in 1992. The Navy has established the “Naval Information War Center” and the “Fleet Information War Center.” The Air force has established the “Air force Information War Center.” They formulated the construction plans for the “21st Century Troops,” actively preparing to develop the **quantitative troops and quantitative battlefield. (**phonetic) Russia is also paying a great deal of attention to information technology, information weapons, and information war. In recent years, the Russian military has engaged in intensive research in the military revolution, information technology, and information war, and adopted corresponding policies to face the challenges of an information war. Many European countries have started research into information war and the development of information war capabilities in the beginning of 1990’s. Their main focus is to develop information weapons and equipment and establish **quantitative troops and quantitative battlefield**. (phonetic) The theories of information war are gradually taking shape and improving after the Gulf War.

Following more in-depth research into information war theories, many countries have continuously come up with the rules of information war and rules of the combined information war, which provide the theoretical foundation to win future information wars. The military of the United State of America announced a series of “**The combined conception of the year 2010” and “The combined conception of the year 2020**”, etc. (phonetic), which are the documented outline for the three branches of the military for coordinated battle in this information era. The implementation of four principles of war proposed by these announcements, such as, **the initiative to control the enemy, precision attacks, assembled logistics, and total maintenance and protection**. (phonetic) will have to rely on the superiority of information. The information war has risen from the levels of battles and tactics to strategies.

**Subsection Two: The strategic status of a strategic information war**.

Recent wars have clearly demonstrated that the information war has become an important guarantee to achieve the war initiative. Information supremacy has become the main focus of war for the two antagonists in the modern battlefield. Whether one can win the information supremacy in the information war has become a very important measure of military fighting power. The information war can increase many times the fighting capabilities of modern weapons and equipments. It can also drastically reduce the fighting capabilities of these weapons, which affect the troops’ initiative and passiveness during the war. Information supremacy has become a prerequisite of supremacy in the air, on the ground and at sea and is the key to grab and maintain the initiative of the entire battlefield. The information war cannot avoid becoming an important fighting mode of modern warfare.

Under the conditions of advanced technology, the defeat or victory of war is not only determined by the resources, manpower, and technologies, which are invested in the battlefield, it is also determined by the extent of the control over the information on the battlefield. Information exists everywhere, is ever present, and has penetrated through the entire war process. The collection of information, transmission, and processing can directly impact the expression of the combat capabilities of the troops. Information organically connects the capabilities of every system and every level of the military and every weapon and equipment. Information has organically connected the entire battlefield into a close-knit battle network. The opposition of information has become the major form of war. On one hand the information war of grabbing and maintaining information supremacy can express fully the war efficiency of our own side; it can lay a strong foundation in facilitating the process of the war and achieving victory in the war. On the other hand, the information war of grabbing and maintaining information supremacy can rob the enemy’s initiative on the battlefield and accelerate its defeat. During the Gulf War, after losing its information supremacy, the Iraqi troops fell into a passive mode and took a beating. Modern warfare, to a large extent, is to use the information attack and counter-attack in paralyzing the information systems of the enemy, destroying its war efficiency in controlling the progress of the war and achieving the objectives of the war. The determining functions of information, especially the information supremacy, will have serious impact on the progress and end results of the war.

**Section Two: Characteristics of Strategic Information Warfare**

# **Subsection One: Information becomes the important strategic resource**

# **of war**

First, the information factor has become a decisive factor in the fighting power of modern weapons and equipment. The modern weapons and equipment can only rely on information systems to express their efficiency to the maximum. The level of the military’s equipment and applications of the informational weapons can determine the weakness and strength of war capabilities of a country. Second, all war activities and efficiencies on the battlefield of an information war are established on the foundation of information. Information can organically connect the capabilities of every system and every level, every weapon and equipment, to become an integrated whole; the accurate collection of information, full control, and effective utilization of the information, have become the central link of the modern warfare. To grab the information supremacy has become the priority mission of modern warfare.

**Subsection Two: Information war makes the levels and limits of the traditional war fuzzy**

The information war greatly alters the original form of the traditional war. The accuracy and power of the information weapons have provided effective means in quickly achieving the objectives of war. During the information war, a small-scale tactical activity sometimes can achieve the objectives of a strategy or battle, which result in increasing fuzziness of the traditional strategy, battle and tactical activity.

The development of information technology also reduces the traditional significance of geographical distance. Any place that can be reached with information can turn into a battlefield of information war. Strategically spread out targets and targets in the war zones can easily be subjected to attacks by the information war.

**Subsection Three: Targets of the information war developed changes**

In the traditional war, the contrast of military strengths is mainly the differences of the number of people and the firepower of weapons and equipment. To destroy the enemy’s effective strength, weapons and equipment are the major targets of attack in the war activities. Only through destroying the enemy’s effective strength can the contrasting strengths of the enemy be changed and eventually the victory won. In the information war, following the wide applications of information weapons and equipment, information has become the most determining factor of the troops’ battle capabilities. Intelligence, surveillance, communication, command, and control will connect the battlefield into an organic whole. Therefore, the information system of the enemy and the process of commanding decisions are increasingly becoming the most important targets of attacks in the information war. For example, during the Gulf War, the multi-national forces decided to attack the command and control systems of Iraq as the initial and most important targets of attacks. Through the implementation of destruction, opposition, control and interference of the enemy’s information systems and the commanding policy process, one can destroy the capabilities in its collection, transmission, processing, control and utilization of information. By doing so, it can paralyze the war activities of the enemy, better gasp the battlefield initiative and effectively achieve the objectives of the war.

**Subsection Four: The information war penetrates through the entire war process**.

The more recent regional wars have clearly demonstrated that the information war has infiltrated every battlefield and every sector of the battlefield of the modern warfare and penetrated the entire war process. Only active and effective use of the information war at every stage of the war and assured superiority on the battlefield at all times and space can create advantageous conditions for winning the victory of the war.

**Subsection Five: The raising of the level of integration of the strategic information war.**

The strategic information war is an integrated warfare, which implies that it is difficult for any military branch or unit to engage in war singularly. First, the battlefield information and information system will integrate the entire battlefield into an organic whole, so it can implement the integration of the combat capabilities and the coordinated activities of various combat capabilities in various battlefields. Next, the integration of the weapon systems relies on the information network to integrate the information weapons and equipment on the battlefield, so that combat efficiency can be maximized. Third, the integration of logistics protection is to integrate the military logistic capabilities and the regional logistic capabilities, the logistics of every military branch, the logistics of every specialty and express the protective functions of the organic whole.

**Subsection Six: The strategic information war involves a very large space but the troops’ density is small**.

The accurate attacks of the information weapons with their high precision, strong power, and long distance allow the information war to break through the range of traditional battlefield spaces. The battlefield of the information war has the tendency of continuously increasing its depth, width, breath and height while the troops’ density is continuously decreasing. First, the information technologies and equipment are widely used in every sector of the battlefield. All kinds of measures such as satellites surveillance systems, space early warning and control systems, combined surveillance and target attack systems, radars, sensors, etc. are connected by the communication network into a three dimensional whole plus the large coverage surveillance and supervision net; the entire battle space can be under surveillance. Thus, the information battlefield has expanded from ground, sea and air to ground, sea, air, space and electromagnetic field. Second, the fire-power attacking weapon system and information technology are combined, which increase the distance of fire-power attack which elevates the accuracy of fire-power attacks and the combat efficiency of the weapons and equipment. All these allow the number of personnel needed for the combat responsibilities to be decreased and the density of the forces in the battlefield to be decreased.

**Section Three: The Major Forms of the Strategic Information Warfare**

The forms of the strategic information war can generally be divided into five kinds based on the means of a war: the intelligence war, the command and control war, the electronic war, the war of computer network, and the war of information source destruction.

**Subsection One: The Intelligence War**.

Intelligence is an important protection to implement strategic decisions, formulate military plans, and plan the war guidance. The intelligence war is a kind of war that the two antagonists, in order to satisfy the needs of war, using various strategic methods to reconnoiter and use the important intelligence of the enemy. At the same time, the antagonists seek to prevent the discovery by the enemy of these actions and prevent the enemy from obtaining important intelligence from our side. The information war environment is the battlefield of information and the target of information war is the **quantified troops** (phonetic). In the information era, the intelligence war possesses an important strategic position.

The intelligence war can be divided into two kinds: the intelligence reconnaissance and intelligence protection. The intelligence reconnaissance is to provide support to the commanders to read the battlefield situations correctly and to the implementation of strategic decisions through various measures of reconnaissance, to collect the enemy information by processing, synthesizing, analyzing, evaluating, making conclusive judgments, and organizing them into effective intelligence.

The intelligence reconnaissance can be divided according to the space of war into: the ground intelligence reconnaissance, sea intelligence reconnaissance, air intelligence reconnaissance, space intelligence reconnaissance, and network intelligence reconnaissance. With the development of the information technology and the application of new intelligence reconnaissance measures, the intelligence reconnaissance has expanded from ground and lower altitude air to the high altitude air, and from the atmospheric boundary layer to beyond the atmospheric boundary layer. The range of intelligence reconnaissance also expanded from regional reconnaissance to global reconnaissance. During the Gulf War, the United States of America deployed 33 various reconnaissance satellites, launched the space shuttle 3 times, sent out continuously various reconnaissance airplanes, early warning planes, and various sensor devices, etc. From space, air, sea, and ground, the Americans conducted reconnaissance on the intelligence of Iraq’s strategies, battles, and tactics, from all directions, so the implementation of the war could be protected.

The intelligence protection is to protect intelligence information and the intelligence reconnaissance methods of our own side through various measures, makes sure the superiority of the intelligence for the own side, takes away the superiority of the enemy’s intelligence and grabs the initiative of the battlefield. The true nature of intelligence protection is the issue of the security of intelligence information. In the future intelligence war it is going to be a three dimensional intelligence battle, which includes the electronic intelligence war in the electro-magnetic field and the network intelligence war at a virtual information space.

Due to the continuous progress made on the information of the military and the weapons and equipment, the entire military system and war actions will have to increasingly rely on intelligence information. Thus, the intelligence war has an increasing function in war. The intelligence war is the scout for the information war and is an important warranty for winning the information war. In the information war, any one of the antagonists who masters the intelligence superiority will have a higher clarity of the battlefield and thus, will win the initiative of the battle actions, which can lead to victory.

**Subsection Two: The command and control war.**

The command and control war is that which, under the support of intelligence, combine the use of various information war measures to attack the enemy’s command and control system, destroy the enemy’s information flow and thus influence, reduce, or destroy the enemy’s command and control capabilities. At the same time the command and control war avoids the enemy’s attacks with similar measures to ours on our own command and control capabilities. In the information war, the command and control system is the heart of information collection, control, and application, on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield. By destroying the enemy’s command and control system only, it can paralyze the enemy’s entire information system and drastically reduce the enemy’s war capabilities. Therefore, to destroy the enemy’s command and control system is the most important mission in the information war. The command and control war becomes the nucleus of the information war. The true nature of the command and control war is to fight for the supremacy of command and control so that the initiative of the battlefield can be obtained.

The command and control war can be divided into offensive command and control war and the defensive command and control war, with equal importance on both. The goal of the offensive command and control war is, by attacking the enemy’s command and control systems, to cut off the contact between the enemy troops with the commanding institutions, so that its commanding capabilities will be reduced and the combat capabilities will be weakened. The goal of the defensive command and control war is, to the greatest extent, to reduce the weakness of our own command and control system, to raise the defensive capabilities and anti-interference capabilities, and to increase the secrecy of our own command and control system. Only by taking active and effective protective measures can we render the enemy’s attempts of influencing us, reducing and destroying our command and control measures, ineffective. This way, we can maintain an effective command and control of our own troops and assure the command and control system becoming our own troops’ “multiplier” of combat capabilities.

**Subsection Three: The electronic war.**

The electronic war is an electronic struggle to reduce and destroy the enemy’s electronic facilities and their effectiveness, meanwhile, protecting our own electronic facilities so that they can normally express their effectiveness. The essence of the electronic war is to grab the electronic supremacy on the battlefield.

The electronic war can be divided into three types: electronic offense, electronic protection, and electronic war support. The electronic offense is to use electronics in interfering, deceiving, and the **fixed direction energy weapons** (phonetic) to destroy, damage, or use, the enemy’s ability in using electronic frequencyspectrum. The electronic protection is to maintain our own ability to use the electronic frequency spectrum. Through the measures of electronic protection, we can conceal the true and display the false image, to deceive and puzzle the enemy, so that it can protect our own electronic equipment from disturbance and destruction. The electronic war support is to use relevant information to search, listen, and determine the electronic launching source, to ascertain the actions taken by the enemy, which can directly threaten us. Due to the continuous development of space technology, military satellites in space can provide great capabilities of command and control for future wars. However, military satellites can become direct targets of the electronic war and the space electronic war can become one of the new territories for the electronic war.

**Subsection Four: War of the computer networks**.

The war of computer networks is aimed at the computer systems and computer networks as the major targets, to crumble, ruin, damage, and destroy the key computers and computer networks and that information stored in them. The war of computer networks is the combined title of using advanced information technology as a mean to implement war on the entire network space. The war of computer networks is a brand new kind of war, which is generated and developed from the era of global information networking.

The war of the computer networks includes both offensive and defensive wars. The offense of computer networks includes the wars of computer virus and computer hackings. The computer virus war is the war activity that uses computer viruses as weapons to destroy or tamper with the enemy’s information on the computer systems, so that the computer system cannot operate properly. In the military field, the core facilities of military information system and the information weapons and equipment, which are controlled by the computers, can become the major targets of the computer virus. The war of computer hacking is a war action that has hackers using various means to invade the enemy’s computer network systems to cause destruction of the enemy’s computer network systems. When NATO was attacking the Yugoslavian forces, the Yugoslavian computer experts were able to invade the command and control systems of the American aircraft carrier “Roosevelt” and render it inoperative at one time. While the measures of computer network offense were rapidly developing, computer network protection has also increased in its importance. As the nucleus facilities of the modern warfare command and control system, protection of computer systems must be strengthen so that it can prevent attacks from hackers and guarantee normal operations of the war command and control systems. As a kind of war, the war of computer networks does not involve civilian computer networks that are not used for military purposes.

**Subsection Five: The war of information source destruction**.

The war of information source destruction is a kind of war that uses information weapons to implement precision attacks on the enemy’s information source. The information source is referring to the enemy’s military information facilities. For example, the C4ISR system and its related systems, which are the basic facilities that the enemy war system are relying on for its survival and is the enemy’s strategically very vulnerable point. If launching precise attacks to these basic information facilities, we can destroy and paralyze the enemy’s system of war and reduce their war capabilities, destroy the war potential of the enemy and achieve the objectives of intimidating the enemy. The war of information source destruction is a “**hard kill**” (phonetic) mode of war, which combines the information technology and the fire-power offensive systems. Under the guidance of information technology, the precision attack of information weapons is increasingly maneuverable and flexible. It can unleash very precise and intense firepower at unexpected times and places, with unexpected methods, to destroy the enemy and implement the intentions of the military strategy.

**Section Four: The Strategic Guidance Of Strategic Information Warfare**

**Subsection One: The information war is an important type of war in modern warfare. The strategic information war should establish the thought of “winning by information.”**

The capabilities of information war are an important factor in constituting the combat capabilities of the troops. With the quick development of information technology and its application to the military the combination of information technology and weapons systems became much closer. The military information system, which uses the C4ISR system as the main body and the fire-power offensive system and which uses the information weapons and equipment as the backbone, has continuously improved and renewed and has demonstrated bigger and bigger functions in the war. The key to win and maintain the initiative of the battlefield is that one must fully express the power of the information system and information weapons and equipment, maintain the information supremacy, and grab the information supremacy on the battlefield. For this, one must first obtain the supremacy of collection of information. If one cannot collect accurate information, one will not be able to make correct decisions and implement correct guidance. The real time and accurate information can guarantee the correct war actions by the troops. Information which is dated and inaccurate can render the troops into a passive mode and cause them to suffer attacks. Next, one must maintain reasonable right to use and control information. Only by reasonable control and application of information and adopting correct combat actions can one maintain information superiority on the battlefield and expand the superiority to the entire battlefield.

**Subsection Two: The information war is the oppositions of systems and systems. The strategic information war must firmly establish the thought of “integrated war.”**

First of all, one must firmly establish an integrated organization command system. The traditional ways of top to bottom hierarchical levels and vertical combat organization systems must be changed so that it can guarantee that all the available war resources on the entire battlefield can be used under unified distribution by the institution of coordinated battle command. According to the changing situations of the battlefield, one should adjust timely and command the war actions of the troops, timely implementation of supply and protection, and implement the integrated utilization of combat capabilities and war resources. Second, one must develop integrated information weapons systems and express the battle effectiveness of the combined weapon systems. Under the control of information flow, one should combine organically various battle capabilities through the battlefield C4ISR system to organically connect those battle capabilities and weapon systems and form an integrated war system. This will allow various information weapon platforms to increase many times the battle capabilities under the guidance of information. Third, strengthen the construction of an integrated logistic protection. We should destroy the borderline of each military branch, reorganize them, reduce the connecting links, use the strategic logistics as its backup, use the **battle composition logistic protection system** **(**phonetic) as its main body, use the high-tech as a guide for a coordinated warfare, use the society as a back up, build reasonably constructed, tightly formatted, integrated military branches into one body, and form a logistic protection system which is suitable for the military as well as civilians.

**Subsection Three: The information war is directly related to the gain and loss of war initiative. The strategic information war should firmly establish the thought of “Use offense as a main strategy but be prepared for both offense and defense**.”

First, we should use the strategy of the preemptive strike and seize the initiative. Actively launching an information offense with initiative is the key to seize the information superiority and the initiative at the battlefield. Due to the special characteristics of the information technology, the one side, which has faster development in information technology, tends to rely more on the information system. Implementing active offense, attacking the enemy’s center of information war, reducing the fighting effectiveness of the enemy’s information system and information weapons and equipments could greatly reduce the enemy’s information superiority, which would lead to the reduction of the entire war capabilities. Second, the emphasis should be placed on implementing effective information protection. Only by ensuring the strict protection of information in its entirety; guaranteeing that our information system and information weapons and equipments will not be attacked by the enemy can reduce, to a large extent, the effectiveness of the enemy’s information offense, better organize the implementation of information offense and provide advantageous conditions for the smooth implementation of information war. But the information protection cannot directly threaten the enemy’s information and information system and cannot fundamentally reduce the superiority of the enemy’s information. Only through an information offense that we can destroy, interfere, ruin the enemy’s information and information system and fundamentally reduce or weaken the enemy’s entire war capabilities. Therefore, only by actively integrating the information offensive battles and information protection battle, using offense as the main tactics, combining defense and offense can we fundamentally obtain the superiority of information.

**Subsection Four: The information war possesses a strong element of suddenness and the dual applications of weapons and equipment and military and civilian personnel. The preparation of the strategic information war should firmly establish the thought of “Peace and war combined, military and civilian combined.”**

The information war has strong characteristics in the element of suddenness, difficulties of pre-warning of the war, and difficulties of assessing the offense. Therefore, the effectiveness of an information offense and the end results of war, to a large extent, depend on the preparation for the war. First, we should develop the country and the basic facilities for national security information. Starting from the entire situations, plan in a unified manner, construct in a unified manner, and include the military information basic facilities into the entire plan for the national information basic facilities. It should be built and used by the military as well as civilians; guarantee that military and local information network construction are parallel in their development, thus to raising the capabilities of transition from peace time to war and vice versa. Second, it is important to cultivate talents of information war and establish information troops. In particular, based on the needs of an information war, combine the peace and war time, rely on the local superiority of information technology (together they cultivate military talents) form highly talented troops for information war so that it can satisfy the needs of future information war.

**Subsection Five: The information war is the opposition, which has many territories, comes from all directions, and possesses many methods. The implementation of strategic information war should establish the thought of “Use the soft tactics as the major tactics, but it should combine both the soft and hard tactics.”**

We should flexibly usethe means of an information war to express individual war effectiveness of both soft and hard killing methods. We should coordinate these two measures and fundamentally reduce or destroy the enemy’s combined information war capabilities. Despite the fact that the soft killing method may have the characteristics of wider applications, more deceitful capabilities, and larger disturbing and damaging capabilities, they can only render the enemy a temporary loss of war capabilities in their information system and information weapons and equipment. Only by the hard killing method can we totally paralyze the enemy’s information and information system, information weapons and equipment, and basic information facilities. Only by organically integrating both methods into one body, combining their utilities, using both soft and hard methods together can it more effectively ruin the enemy’s information and information systems. In so doing, we can smoothly obtain information superiority on the battlefield and firmly grasp the initiative of the information war.

**Chapter Seventeen**

**Strategic Protection**

Strategic protection is the general title of various protective measures and activities for the military to implement their strategic responsibilities. It mainly involves strategic battle protection, strategic logistics protection, and strategic equipment protection. The fundamental responsibility of strategic protection is to supply the necessary material conditions; protect the smooth implementation of strategic policies; protect the security of war capabilities; smoothly implement war preparation and proceed with strategic war responsibilities; and protect war capabilities so it can sustain battle capabilities. Due to the development of mode of the war and modern military technological improvement, modern warfare relies increasingly on strategic protection. Strategic protection expresses an increasing function when accomplishing every strategic responsibility and winning victory of the war.

**Section One: The Function of the Status of Strategic Protection**

Due to the development of the war, strategic protection is continuously developing. Chinese ancient logistical protection indicated, “The troops have yet to advance but the supplies are already moving ahead.” Build forts at strategic locations and build walls (great wall) to stop the cavalry.” These were large scale military protective engineering constructions of building castles, keeping the border area safe, and shoring up the defense. It includes such things as construct highways (straight road); open up river channels; and use cities as the centers for military transportation protection, etc. During the two World Wars, airplanes, tanks, radio communication equipment were used in the battlefield, the range of the strategic protection began to expand from the ground to three dimensional space and electro-magnetic fields. After World War II, due to the development of guided missiles and nuclear bombs and the wide application of electronic war, correspondingly the anti-nuclear, electronic protections, etc. became important issues of strategic protection.

Subsection One. Strategic protection is an important factor in determining the victory or defeat of the war.

Sun Zi said, “The military is in ruin without the supplies of military equipments. It will perish without food supplies. It will also perish without reserve of military supplies.” Mao Ze-dong concluded the war experiences and indicated, “The military specialists cannot expect to win the war going beyond the range of allowed materialistic conditions.” (1) Strategic protection is an important component of the materialistic foundation of the war. It determines the combat capabilities of the troops and can impact the progress and end results of the war. Viewed from the perspective of war implementation, the time the war gets started, the application of the purposes and measures of the war, the mode and scale of the war, the time the war lasts, etc., to a great extent, depends on the strategic protection capabilities, which are the degree of supplying war protection, logistic protection, and equipment protection. Many wars in history ended in defeat, aside from some fundamental reasons, such as, the nature of the war and the favorable or unfavorable attitudes of the people, etc., because of the lack of strategic protection capability. Napoleon created a series of glorious victories but at the end he lost in Waterloo, the weakening of his strategic protection was one crucial factor. After years of wars, Napoleon’s troops totally lost their fighting capabilities and protective capabilities. Thus, in 1815, when Napoleon returned to the throne and reorganized two hundred thousand troops, among them half did not have military uniforms and one third did not have weapons. So when the people at the occupied territories and those satellite countries protested, his logistic protection was increasingly weakened, which sealed the fate of failure for this military expert. The cruel and barbaric Japanese imperialists finally ended up in failure in the Chinese’ people’s war. Aside from their reactionary nature, it was also due to the lack of strategic resources, such as manpower, materials, etc., which failed to protect the needs of an invasion.

**Subsection Two. Strategic protection is an important factor for generating, expressing, and maintaining troops’ combat capabilities**.

Under current conditions, the two largest components of fighting capabilities are the troops’ combat capabilities and their protection capabilities. These two are mutually complementary and are indispensable to each other. Strategic protection capability is an important factor for generating, expressing, and maintaining troop combat capabilities. Through providing the troops with supplies, such as materials, information, energy, etc. the strategic protection allows the troops to fully express and maintain their combat capabilities during the tense and fierce strategic war process. Through providing the troops with the necessary supplies of weapons and equipment and maintenance; by assuring the weapons and equipment will achieve their normal tactical and technical functions; and by building the foundation to implement the organic combination of man and weapon so the troops can express their combat capabilities, one will assure success. Through the structuring and distribution of new weapons and equipment and war materials to the troops, it can develop new combat capabilities. Due to the continuous development and application of advanced technology weapons and equipment, information has increasingly become the “multiplier” of military combat capabilities. The modern strategic protective measures and practices increase the capabilities of information collection, transmission and applications, and they also supply the necessary conditions in realizing the function of “multiplier” of the information war capabilities. During the fourth Middle East War, the Israelis sent many technical experts from the factories of the hinterland directly to the front lines and increased the technical protective capabilities, which allowed 80 % of the tanks in the front lines to be repaired in time and reentered into combat. On the other hand, the Syrian troops had weak protection capabilities which rendered their 800 damaged tanks on the Golan Heights not repaired and inoperative, which greatly reduced its combat capabilities. The Israelis’ equipment protection capabilities turned the unfavorable situations around and made great impact in changing the course and the results of the war.

**Subsection Three. Strategic protection is the bridge connecting the national power and resources with the protection of battles or combats**.

The materialistic foundation of war includes the combined national power and resources, such as national security, economy, science, and technology, etc. In order to support the war with the national power and resources, it cannot depart from transitional mechanisms. Strategic protection can combine the national power and resources with the combat capabilities of the military through the intermediary and transitional functions within itself. It can turn the national economic power, science and technological capabilities, and industrial productivity, etc. into weapons and equipment, military materialistic supplies, etc., which are the realistic capabilities of the military. Through the links of planning, reserving, transporting, distributing, and technical services, etc., it can directly protect the needs of military activities. During the British and Argentine War in the Falkland Islands, the British Navy followed the plans and recruited the civilian and merchant ships to refit them for emergency purposes. They were able to quickly change their national war potential into war capabilities, strengthen their capabilities in transporting military supplies, and effectively support the war activities.

Strategic protection is very important support for the protection of battles and combats. The protection of battles and combats cannot depart from the support of strategic protection. Losing the support of strategic protection, it will be difficult to continue the protection of battles and combats. In the early stages of the Falkland Island War, the Argentine military provided sufficient supplies to their troops through the supply bases in the homeland, intermediate supply bases, and supply bases in the front. But after their supply lines on the sea were cut off by the British military, the supplies from air and sea got stopped, which rendered the supply to the Argentine troops impossible and directly impacted their combat missions.

**Section Two: The Protection of Strategic Warfare**

**Subsection One. The basic responsibilities of the protection of strategic war**

The protection of strategic war is the adoption of various measures of protection of war when the military is implementing their war responsibilities. It mainly involves the protection of strategic intelligence, strategic communication, electronic (information) opposition, the attacks of nuclear (bio-chemical) weapons, strategic camouflage, national security projects, military weather, military surveys, and battlefield management, etc. The basic responsibilities of strategic protection are: combined application of all the necessary and possible intelligence measures; timely, accurately, and continuously collect strategic intelligence, which is relevant to the entire strategic situation and the intelligence needed for the immediate strategic actions at hand adopting advanced communication technology, establishes and expands with various measures, large volume, strong anti-interference capabilities, highly automated, multiple channels and circuitous strategic communication nets, assuring timely, accurate, secretive and non-stop, communication.

* Following the policy of equal emphasis on both electronic offense and electronic defense, positively and resolutely develop electronic (information) opposition, disturb and damage the enemy’s command, control, communication, and intelligence systems to the maximum, so that our own electronic equipment and facilities can normally function.
* Closely supervise and try hard to detect the enemy’s signs of actions on the use of nuclear and bio-chemical weapons.
* Tightly organize the military and protect the masses and national strategic locations and important targets. Adopt positive measures to destroy and weaken the enemy’s capabilities of attacking with nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Meticulously organize and implement national security engineering construction projects and the engineering surveillance of military maneuvers; protect engineering projects and roads; assure the steady command of the military and smooth implementation of strategic maneuvers, and timely destroy and restrict the enemy’s strategic maneuvers. Positively use various strategic measures, hide the truth and display the false images; deceive and confuse the enemy; conceal the strategic targets, strategic deployments, strategic actions and intents of our own side; increase the overall capabilities in assessing the weather, (hydrology), observe and explore, and timely, accurately, supply the predictions and data of the weather and hydrology, which are relevant to the entire situations or directly impacting on strategic actions. Closely supervise and prevent the enemy’s possible implementation of war actions with the weather and prepare for possible altercation of regional weather pattern.
* Use the newest survey and mapping technologies to timely survey the strategic command and military actions, supply and prepare accurate and reliable military maps, remote sensor images, numerical data, and battlefield topographical data.
* Based on the needs of entire strategic situations, tightly organize and implement management of the air.

Using the above mention protective measures in the command and implementation of strategic actions, we can assure that we will provide the advantageous conditions for the initiative and victory of the entire strategic situations.

Subsection Two. The major characteristics of the protection of strategic war.

**Subsection A. The protection of higher level will have more content and the protection responsibilities will become more difficult.**

The basic responsibilities of the protection of strategic war determine the subjects of protection and they are the institutions of command, the resources of strategic preparation, all battle zones, and the strategic actions of all military branches. The items or content of protection almost involves all dimensions of war protection. Due to the development of the war, the content of the protection of strategic war has steadily increased, the needs of protection became more complicated, and the demand for the duration of validity of protection also steadily increased. During the Gulf War, the joint command, control, and communications systems of the multi-national forces involved more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 transmissions of telegraphic documents, and each day it required the management of 35,000 frequencies to assure the smooth communication flow. Due to the increasing difficulties and complexities of the protective responsibilities of the strategic war of modern warfare, the personnel needed in the protection of strategic war have proportionally increased gradually. In the Gulf War, the American troops dispatched three electronic combat intelligence brigades, nine electronic combat intelligence battalions, and three electronic combat intelligence regiments. All together, there were 11,500 people, which was 4.1 % of all the army forces participating in the war.

**Subsection B. Due to a large amount of advanced weapons and equipment being used in the battlefield, the dependence on the protection of strategic war increases.**

In modern warfare**,** many weapons and equipment are in themselves a single and whole system. Many weapons and equipment also become a “living chain” and connect to each other and become mutually dependent on each other. This indicates the heavy reliance of the strategic war actions on the protection of strategic war. From a certain perspective, if there is no stable and highly effective protection of strategic war, it will be extremely difficult to express fully the functions of high-tech weapons and equipment and even the combat capabilities of the troops. When the United States of America conducted air-raids on Libya in 1986, they used the advanced C4ISR system, which coordinated the Navy and Air force attacking teams. This allowed timely and accurate communication signals of the Libyan army to be read and accurately measured its electromagnetic frequencies of the air defense systems; applied intense electronic interference to all kinds of radars and communication facilities of the Libyan troops; and positively guided the American aircrafts to implement the attacks and assured the smooth operations of the American combat activities.

**Subsection C. The system for the protection of strategic war is complex, thus the organization and coordination are quite difficult.**

The protection of strategic war is a complex activity composed of several different protective items. All protection contents are connected but also are independent systems. For example, surveillance intelligence, hydrology and weather, communication, engineering programs, and deception, etc. all belong to the context of war protection but they each are the subjects of protection. Because each has its own unique characteristic, we cannot simply bundle them together. It suggests that if there are many items of protection, they should have equal numbers of protection systems. The coordination of war protection and war activities and all kinds of coordination amongst the war protection systems are very complex and difficult. If it is not handled well, not only will they have no protection to speak of, there is the possibility of mutually restricting each other and causing internal problems.

**Subsection D. Since both the enemy and us are fiercely struggling for strategic war protection, it is even more difficult to maintain steady protection.**

“Attack the vital and vulnerable points of the enemy,” is a general principle of war. Due to the development of high-tech war, the perspective of the selection of “vital points” or “vulnerable points” has gradually expanded from just the war capabilities to the war protection capabilities. To attack and destroy the key links of the enemy’s strategic war protection systems, for example the surveillance, intelligence, early warning, communication, command, control, etc. have become an important characteristic of the high-tech war. From a certain perspective, it can be said that the threat facing the strategic war protection system has increased.

**Subsection Three. The fundamental requirements of strategic war protection**.

**First. To mobilize all war protection forces and unify the planning and organizing the war protection actions**.

The expression of the effectiveness of a strategic war protection plan, to a great extent, is determined by the combined usage of various forces of war protection. Under current war conditions, the strategic war protection should select and concentrate the use of the sharpest protection forces from all sides and build a strong and potent system of war protection capabilities. Mobilizing all the national and regional forces to support the front lines, especially the scientific and technological support to the front lines, will increase the quality of science and technology of war protection capabilities. Unify the planning of the usage of war protection capabilities and the application of the protection methods and divide up the work according to different duties and specialties, separately organize them and implement them will also increase protection.

**Two. Let the key point stand out and focus the major forces on protecting major war actions**.

The protection of strategic war must grasp a basic contradiction. Since the responsibilities of strategic war protection are very heavy, it could relatively weaken the protection capabilities, thus, it is more significant to let the key points stand out and focus the major forces on the major war activities. Therefore, in using the forces of war protection, one should focus the best forces, which include the national or local science and technological forces, on major strategic areas. In terms of the major strategic direction, one should focus the best forces to protect the key points and protect the military branches or combat troops, which carry the responsibilities of fighting major war activities.

**Three. Combine the use of various methods to raise the efficiency of protection.**

The efficiency of protection to a certain degree determines the efficiency of the war. Combining the use of various protection methods is one important way to raise the efficiency of war protection and mend the differences in quality. While the strategic war protection is improving and renovating the protection measures, there is also the need to search for the point of breakthrough to raise the protection efficiency from the application of protective measures, to combine the troops and the local forces; to combine regular methods and off the cuff simple methods; to combine the “high” and “low;” to combine the ground, air, sea, space, and electromagnetic fields; avoid fighting “single handedly,” and express the effectiveness of the combined and multiple protection methods.

**Four. Positively adopt the counter measures to raise the reliability of protection.**

Under modern conditions, the systems of strategic war protection have increasingly become important targets for attack by the two antagonists. Therefore, to adopt positive counter measures and raise the reliability of protection has very great significance. Strategic war protection should pointedly strengthen the counter measures, which center around information systems and information technology. It should solidly build the counter-surveillance; maintain the secrecy and security of the information network; maintain the concealment and protection of strategic command institutions; exercise the security safeguard; and prevent the spies, and assure the protection of stability and continuity of the strategic command systems.

**Section Three: Protection of Strategic Logistics**

**Subsection One. The fundamental responsibilities of the protection of strategic logistics**

The protection of strategic logistics is for the sake of satisfying the smooth implementation of the military in their tasks of fulfilling various strategic responsibilities. It is the corresponding activities of the practices of various fields of specialized logistics and the implementation of various measures they adopted to protect them. It is a unified plan under the support of the national financial resources and material resources by using the forces of strategic logistic protection and the local forces to support the front lines. It also uses the manpower, material resources, financial resources, hygienic resources, and the logistics programming resources to support the war efforts, so that it maintains and raises the war capabilities of the armed forces, which are fighting the war, and wins the victory of the war.

The protection of strategic logistics includes the protection of finance, protection of materials, the protection of hygienic responsibilities, protection of transportation, protection of logistical programs, etc. Its main responsibilities are:

* to apply and plan for the budgets required for the war;
* set a plan to protect the budgets; divide, pay, and dispense the budgets; to provide the needed money for the armed forces, which are fighting the war.
* Prepare, reserve, supply, and manage vehicles, fuels, covers of the vehicles, supply of parts, and industrial production data, the barracks, materials and equipments, etc.
* Prepare the necessary conditions to satisfy the needs of food, clothing, livelihood, and transportation of the troops at war.
* Implement medical services for health maintenance and treating and curing sick people; hygienic prevention of epidemic and disease prevention; and the preparation, supply and management of medicine and medical equipments.
* Implement health inspection and supervision of meat products, and supply safe, healthy, and hygienic food and drinks for the armed forces at war in a timely manner and effectively treat and cure the sick soldiers.
* Provide the need of transportation, such as, organize and implement the important military transportation needs of highways, railroads, sea ports, airports, etc., which are facilities specially arranged for the use of the military, the construction, maintenance, and management of these facilities, and plan and reserve the materials and equipments needed for emergency repairs during the war.
* Organize and coordinate the forces of the strategic transportation for quick repairs, protection, and maintenance.
* Implement the protection of the transportation lines and be ready for quick repairs and quick constructions.
* Mobilize and recruit regional transportation equipment and provide transportation to the front lines.
* Prepare, reserve, supply, and manage the materials needed for living in the field.
* Organize the inspection and utilization of the conditions and resources of living at the battlefield.
* Coordinate relevant organizations to prepare for quick repairs and quick construction works for permanent engineering projects, such as, military sea ports, harbors, airports, and military positions, etc.

**Subsection Two. The major characteristics of strategic logistical protection**.

**Subsection A. The war consumptions are immense, thus the responsibilities of logistical protection become heavy**.

Due to the development of weapons and equipment, the change of the mode of the war, the continuous expansion of the scale of the war, the consumptions of materials and money continue to increase in modern warfare. The fourth Middle East War lasted 18 days, the Arabian side lost 2500 tanks, 440 airplanes, 15 naval ships, and the Israelis lost 840 tanks, 410 airplanes. Altogether it cost close to 5 billion dollars. The British and Argentine’s Falkland Island War lasted 45 days and both sides used close to 5 billion dollars. The Gulf War took 42 days and it cost 61 billion dollars, which is close to 1.5 billion dollars every day. This immense cost makes the responsibilities of strategic logistic protection extremely difficult and weighty, and makes the functions of logistical protection even more important. Modern warfare is not just the war of the militaries, it is the war of the financial powers. This fact makes high demand on the task of strategic protection.

**Subsection B. The subjects of protection multiplied, the needs of protection become varied, the structures of logistical protection become quite complex**.

The subjects of the protection of strategic logistics are the military forces at war, all of them need their specific logistical needs met. During the Gulf War, the United States of America requested material support from the host countries in twenty special service areas, such as living quarters, airports, facility construction, communication, fuel, hygiene, medical services, repair and maintenance, materials, seaports, guards, warning systems, logistical duties, special facilities, warehouses, foodstuffs, supplies, transportation, public facilities etc. On the American’s side, the reserve unit personnel of the Army and Air force had several hundred special duty protection services in computers, telephones, electronics, water purifying and supply, hygiene and medical services, engineering, transportation of loading, shipping, and unloading, ammunition supplies, fuel management, etc. The multi-dimensional and specialized logistical requirements have caused continuous changes in the consumption structures of various logistical materials. They also cause continuous specialization of logistical protection. The large amount of protection and the immense protection requirements, have greatly increased the complexities of the protection of strategic logistics.

**Subsection C. The diversifying protection measures and methods have increased the difficulties of organization and coordination**.

Due to the expansion of the field of war, the increase of the forces at war, the increase of the styles of strategic war, there is a trend for the measures and methods of the protection of the strategic logistics to become diversified. In terms of the measures of protection, one has to organize for the protection of the forces on the ground and in the sea and air. It also has to coordinate the relevant protection of each battlefield, electromagnetic field, and outer space. It has to organize the general protection for various military branches and it also is required to form the coordination of the special protection for various military branches. It has to organize the protection of the troops at war and organize the local forces to support the front lines. In terms of the protection methods, it has planned protection and the protection for suddenly changing situations. It has step by step protection or protection which can skip steps. It has formal channel protection and it also has special channel protection. It has protection with advanced means and it also has protection with traditional means. All these have increased the difficulties of organization and coordination of the protection of strategic logistics.

**Subsection D. The enemy’s threat on the systems of protection of strategic logistics becomes serious: the functions of the logistical protection stand out more**.

In modern warfare, attacking the enemy bases in the hinterland, blocking of the enemy transportation lines, paralyzing the logistical protection, reducing the combat capabilities of the troops, have all become very important components of the strategic thoughts for the two antagonists at war. During the Korean War, the Americans used large amounts of aircraft, they even used weapons with germs, and conducted the “strangling war” against the logistical supply lines and vehicles of the Chinese Volunteers Army. In future wars, due to the development of information technology, stealth technology, long distance attacking weapons, and precision-guided weapons, the increased clarity of the battlefield, and the elevation of the abilities of weapons to penetrate the enemy’s defense systems, the responsibilities of defensive wars of the logistical protection systems becomes even more burdensome.

**Subsection Three. The fundamental requirements of the protection of strategic logistics**.

The large volume of consumption and destructive powers of modern warfare demand more protection of strategic logistics. Whether it is a good or bad protection of strategic logistics, it directly impacts on the progress and end results of the war.

**Subsection A. Implement the overall planning, which focuses on the country’s fundamental interests and the entire strategic situation.**

The protection of strategic logistics should be based on the entire situation by unified planning and assembling of the logistical support power. This includes the logistical forces of every troop from every branch of the military, the regional governments, the economic institutions of the country, and the friendly countries’ powers, and implementing this integrated protection. The strategic commanders and the institutions of logistical protection should base decisions on national interests to execute reasonable preparation, appropriate reserve, and scientific management of the protection of strategic logistics. In order to have a unified logistical force to implement support, the borderlines of the military branches should be broken. One must rely on and apply the citizen’s economic power to implement support and establish a system of protective forces. This integrates the military and the civilians together. We must focus on the needs of strategic war, scientifically structure and deploy the forces of logistical protection; must flexibly apply various measures and methods of logistical protection; timely adjust the activities of the forces of logistical protection; and assure the coordinated and unified efforts of accomplishing the responsibilities of the protection of strategic logistics.

**Subsection B. Based on the responsibilities of strategic war, make the key points of strategic protection stand out**.

Speaking from the entirety, the focus and key links of the entire strategy are the key points of the protection of strategic logistics. From the perspective of space, generally, the key points are those major battlefields, major strategic directions, and major combat zones. From the perspective of time, generally, the key points are the major stages of war and major battle preparations. In terms of targets, generally the key points must be the military groups, which carry the major battle missions. From the perspective of content, generally, the key points are the urgently needed materials for the battles and necessary materials for livelihood. By paying attention to the above key points, the missions of the major strategic battle can be accomplished.

**Subsection C. Strengthen the planning, organization, and coordination of the logistical protection activities**.

The complexities of the protection of strategic logistics make newer and higher demands on the planning, organization, and coordination of protection. In order to assure the accomplishment of the missions of the protection of strategic logistics and the realization of the military strategic objectives, it demands the focus to be placed on the entire protection of strategic logistics. Using various measures and methods, one must implement the planning, organization, and coordination of the protection of strategic logistics; strengthen the broad vision regulating forces; combine the planning for the entire protection plans; and unify the arrangement and organization to implement the support of strategic logistics. From the perspective of the realistic needs of the war, one must adjust the protection forces of the logistical specialties of every level and the distribution of missions; improve the structure of logistical specialties; mend the weak links of the strategic protection; and assure that each system of logistical specialties can adjust within the balance in satisfying all the needs of the strategic war. It is required to strengthen the coordination of the logistics of all military branches, to timely adjust the scale of the forces and execute reasonable distribution of logistical responsibilities for each military branch; to timely establish the system of logistical protection, which is corresponding to the combined battle system. It is also required to establish the concept of socialized and opened big military logistical systems; strengthen the coordination between the relevant institutions of country and the regions; unify the dispatch and application of the forces of military logistical protection and the regional supporting forces; strengthen the protective capabilities of the entire strategic logistical network. Working together, they can accomplish the complex and difficult missions of the protection of strategic logistics.

**Section Four: The Protection of Strategic Equipment**

**Subsection One. The basic responsibilities of the protection of strategic equipment**

The protection of strategic equipment is to satisfy the troops’ implementation of their strategic responsibilities, they need such activities as: to set up the plans and decisions for protection of the military equipment, coordinate control, supervision and management, organize execution, etc.

The basic responsibilities of the protection of strategic equipment are:

* the issues of having a broad vision and planned decisions on the protection of equipment for the entire strategic situations.
* Organize and execute various levels of strategic equipment distributions, maintenance and management, and provide strategic support on the protection of equipments at various levels of war.
* >From the perspective of the subjects of protection, they include the protection of the Army strategic equipment, the protection of the Navy strategic equipment, the protection of the Air force strategic equipment, and the protection of the strategic equipment for other military branches.
* From the perspective of the protection content, it mainly involves the distribution and protection of the equipment, repair and maintenance, refitting, technical protection, and the protection of the bases for specialized weapons and equipments.

The major tasks include:

* the application of equipment, supplement, dispatch, supply, adjustment, transfer, retirement, storage, and report the loss or scrapping, etc.;
* to improve the weapons and equipment due to the changes of the technical conditions, functions, and applications of the original equipments;
* for the purpose of protection of the weapons for them to accomplish the missions, in order to fulfill the missions of weapons protection for the war, implement the command of equipment protection and execute the use, inspection, and repair and maintenance, etc. for the military position to proceed with equipment protection activities.

**Subsection Two. The major characteristics of the protection of strategic equipment**

Modern warfare is an integrated warfare, which assembles the best weapons and equipment of the ground, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic fields. The strategic war is highly intense, with fast rhythm, short duration. The consumption of strategic equipment is immense, damages are frequent, and the mission of the protection of equipment is weighty, the demands are enormous, and the difficulty levels are high.

**Subsection A. The oppositions of the systems are fierce, the consumption of the equipment is huge, and the mission of distribution and protection are weighty.**

First, due to the improvement of technical functions of the weapons and equipment, the degree of automation and intellectualization are increasing and the speed of consumption within the unit of time has greatly increased. The antagonists concentrate their forces and fight for the strategic initiatives, which cause increased consumption of materials. During the fourth Middle East War, the Egyptian troops shot 3,000 tons of ammunition during the first 50 minutes of the battle, which means they consumed 60 tons of ammunition per minute. During the war, due to the large increase in the consumption of equipment and materials, the quick speed of consumption, the quick reduction of reserves, the need of more supplies becomes more urgent, which will increase the intensity of supplements and supplies of the institutions of strategic equipment protection. Second, in defending against the attacks of high-tech weapons, protection of the strategic equipment needs to have reserves at the strategic bases away from the battle zones. Moreover, the storage of strategic materials is often spread out to many different locations and directions. These kinds of deep and multi-phase setups, increase the space for dispatching and moving of the materials during the war, increases the time required to transport these materials, which makes it more controversial because during the war the urgency of the needed strategic materialistic support may take longer to supply. Moreover, the military equipment, especially those large major war equipment pieces and materials are extremely costly and the large consumption during the war can increase the cost of the war. During World War II, the Americans’ average daily consumption was 70 million dollars; during the Korean war, the average was 140 million dollars per day. The Fourth Middle East War, both the Arab and Israeli forces average consumption per day was 278 million dollars. The Israeli invasion into Lebanon, during those 50 days they consumed 5 billion dollars, which was about 100 million dollars per day. During the Gulf War, the multi-national forces spent 61.1 billion dollars, which was about 1.5 billion dollars per day. The institutions in charge of the protection of strategic equipment can only use the budgets allocated by the country and supplied by the headquarters and use them for the necessary equipment and technical protection forces, so that there can be continuous protection for the needs of the war.

**Subsection B. The rate of equipment damage is high thus the difficulties of repair and maintenance are high**.

First, the degree of fierceness and destructiveness of modern strategic warfare has intensified, thus the rates of damages of the weapons and equipment have increased. This is particularly true in modern warfare, the technologically intense weapons and equipment rely heavily on technical protection and the repair and maintenance are increasingly complex. For example, when the airplane first came out, it had only about 1,000 pieces or parts, now the parts are in the numbers of 1 million pieces. In the 1950’s, a complex weapon system had less than 1,000 points of maintenance and inspection items, now the points of maintenance and inspection items have increased to more than 100,000. During the Gulf War, the American technical protection personnel that participated in the war were almost half of the number of soldiers that fought in the war. The practice of war proved that whether the quality of technical maintenance is good or bad, can directly impact the expression of the effectiveness of the weapons and equipment and impact the end results of the war. Second, the high-tech weapons and equipment requires very strict demands on the environment, this is true in such areas as having to be dust proof, rattle proof, moist proof, and weather proof, etc., the demands are higher. If the weather and geographical environment of the battlefield are very special, they could increase the difficulties for the repair and maintenance of the weapons and equipment. During the Gulf War, because of the special desert conditions of the battlefield, for the American troops’ M1A1 tank, the average need of repairs dropped from per distance of 200-300 kilometers to per distance of 100-200 kilometers. The American troops could only take emergency measures by installing the sand proof shields and other special devices to the tanks, thus reducing the rate of damages. Third, due to the large amount of application of advanced surveillance equipment, it has greatly enhanced the rate of discovering the enemy targets. Due to combat, it has greatly increased the rate of losses of weapons and equipment. At the same time, the causes of destruction have changed from the past single hard destruction to the combined soft and hard destruction, which are the combined destructions with various means and they have increased the complexities of the varieties of damages to the weapons and equipment. The technical protection not only needs to solve the hardware technical problems, it is also required to solve many difficult problems of the software. The recovery of damaged equipment obviously faces increasing difficulty.

**Subsection C. The rhythm of war has quickened and the intensity of war has increased. There is higher demand for mobilizing personnel for equipment protection**.

The mobilization of the protection of strategic equipment is to transfer the relevant potential of the economy, technology, and information of the country into direct service of the needed capabilities for the protection of strategic equipment. Modern warfare can occur suddenly, the durations are short, objectively, they demand to accomplish a great amount of mobilizing work for equipment protection in a rather short time. Moreover, due to the fierce opposition during the war, there is a large amount and variety of consumption and damage to the weapons, equipment, and materials. The mobilization of the protection of equipment has very strong synthesizing traits: it can implement the mobilization of the protection of equipments with a larger quantity and better quality at a larger range and more variety of career services.

**Subsection D. The war has a strong trait of wholeness, the situations can change quickly, and the organization and command of the equipment protection are complex.**

First, due to the diversification of the forces for strategic equipment protection, the increase of the varieties of protective missions and the space of protection is now three-dimensional: it has largely expanded the territory of command of strategic equipment protection. The difficulties of command in such areas as the strategic equipment protection decisions and plans, the control and processing of information, and the coordination and control of strategic activities, have increased. Second, the war occurs suddenly, the speed of the strategic war has quickened, the duration is short, thus it has apparently reduced the time limit of the command on strategic equipment protection. Third, due to the situations of the battlefield being complex and changing all the time, they cause a great amount of uncertainty to equipment protection. The decisions and plans prior to the war may no longer be suitable to the development of equipment protection in the war, and this phenomenon can occur frequently and in large quantities. Strategic equipment protection not only requires meticulous decisions and plans, it also has to grasp the situation changes during the entire war; be careful about the timing and assess the military situations; apply flexible measures, and continuously implement control over rather flux situations.

**Subsection Three. The basic requirements of strategic equipment protection**.

**Subsection A. Have a full understanding and grasp of the entire strategic situation and carefully plan the protection**.

In dealing with strategic equipment protection, one must have a full understanding of the issues of the entire strategic situation. Based on the strategic policies, strategic intentions, the missions of the war, the enemy’s thought of war, the war principles, and the standards of weapons and equipment, etc. one must estimate all the requirements of the equipment protection of the war. Based on all the strategic intentions, one must assemble, as a whole, and apply the forces of equipment protection. Organized in a unifying manner, the equipment protective forces of each military branch, the protective forces of military positions, the protective forces of each unit and each career service, must exhibit control and apply effective protection during the progress of the entire war process, and coordinate uniformly every protective activity.

**Subsection B. Fully prepared to assure quick reactions.**

Strategic equipment protection relates to the development and production of weapons and equipment, the storage of equipment and materials, repair and maintenance, protection of the construction of facilities, cultivation of the qualities of the protective service personnel, etc. They all require a long time to prepare. Modern war can suddenly occur, so the protection of equipment usually has to proceed in a very short time when the pre-warning arrives. In order to assure the synchronization of equipment protection and the war activities, the accumulation and maintenance of the protective forces for the war must be ready before the start of the war; otherwise, it will not be able to provide quick reaction for equipment protection. The establishment of a quick reaction system of equipment protection must rely on the full preparation at all times, so that when the war suddenly happens, one can obtain and maintain the strategic initiative of equipment protection. This requires timely collection and mastery of the war situations and the needs of equipment protection for military activities. One should quickly judge the situations and boldly make the decisions on equipment protection. It is also required to make scientific decisions on such things as the deployment of strategic equipment protection forces; the basic methods of protection; the standards of protecting the equipment and materials; the actions and demands of each stage of the war; protection coordination and defense, etc. In peaceful times, the plan must be matched with the war plan and command the protection troops to react in time. In peaceful times, the major strategic direction must be based on the strategic intentions and the needs of the war and match and reserve necessary in equipment and materials. While in war time, it must be based on the needs so that the reserve troops can be timely dispatched, and the supplying capabilities of the equipment and materials can be elevated. Based on the relevant laws and mobilizing plans, strategic protection must quickly recruit and utilize the regional technological specialists and relevant facilities and supplement the insufficiency of the troops’ strategic equipment protection capabilities.

**Subsection C. Let the protection key points stand out: elevate the effectiveness of protection**.

There are many varieties of modern military equipment, which are highly serialized and standardized, and the character of wholeness is strong. If the equipment varieties are not complete or the functions do not match, it can impact the expression of the entire battle effectiveness. One must know exactly the information with regard to the troops’ needs and use fulfilling the strategic responsibilities as the premise, based on the serial pairing requirements and standards of various equipment, and scientifically plan and organize the protection of the pairing. One must achieve the pairing of the war equipment and equipment protection, the pairing of common equipment and specialized equipment, the pairing of every equipment system and its corresponding materials and tools, which allows the old and new equipment to be matched. It allows the reasonable pairing of high, medium, and low, in a step-like structure. So that all kinds of equipment are fully available, the functions matched, the proportion is appropriate and with serial pairing, it can produce the best effectiveness in the war. The strategic war under modern conditions there exists an obvious contradiction of strategic equipment protection capabilities and the needs of a strategic war. Therefore, in organizing equipment protection, one must distinguish the importance and urgency, concentrate major forces of equipment protection on the priority protection items. One should make the equipment protection of the key troops, key directions, key timing, and key actions stand out. One should make the protection of major war equipment stand out and concentrate on resolving the major contradiction of equipment protection. One should be good at timely, accurately, grasping the changes of key points and adjusting the forces of equipment protection and form the protection of new key points.

**Subsection D. Closely organize the protection: try to obtain a safe protection environment.**

Preserving the war potential and elevating the country’s economic and troop survivability in the hinterland are important issues, which are closely related to the victory and defeat of the war. The offices in charge of strategic protection must closely organize all kinds of protective capabilities. They must actively adopt protective measures; defeat the attacks of the enemy by conducting blockades and destructions; assure the safety of equipment protection command institutions, equipment protection bases, and equipment protection military units, and create conditions for the smooth accomplishment of the missions of strategic equipment protection.

**Chapter 17. Footnote**.

1. “Mao Ze-dong Selected Works” Volume 1, The People’s Publishing, Published in 1991, Page 182.

**Chapter Eighteen**

**Wartime Political Work and Strategic Psychological Warfare**

Wartime political work is the ideological and organizational task done by military forces during fighting. Strategic psychological warfare, which is a component of wartime political work, is a strategic countermeasure based on psychological theory and is offensive for the purpose of spiritually disintegrating the morale of enemy armed forces and civilians and eliminating the results of enemy propaganda deception. Thoroughly doing political work well is the PLA’s unique political superiority and an essential guarantee to keeping the true political quality of the people’s armed forces, encouraging their will to fight, condensing their morale, uniting themselves and defeating the enemy to win victory in war.

**Section One: Wartime Political Work**

**I. Position of Wartime Political Work**

Wartime political work is an important way to bring the PLA’s unique political superiority into play. Political, military, economic and S&T factors are important factors constituting effective military strength. Decided by its advanced political property, the PLA has all along had political superiority, but it cannot naturally and necessarily transform its political superiority into victory. Political superiority needs political work to bring it into play and effective strength to demonstrate it. As attested by a lot of facts in the PLA’s war history, advanced political spirit can control and change all things on a certain material foundation. In future wars, in order to bring its political superiority into play and transform it into actual effective strength, the PLA needs to do it through political work, and wartime political work is an important way to materialize this transformation. On the one hand, through the development of wartime political work, it may constrain or eliminate negative political and spiritual factors existing in military forces so as to directly consolidate and improve its effective strength; on the other, through the development of wartime political work, it may amplify the political and spiritual factors in the enemy camp that are in the PLA’s favor in order to disintegrate the enemy’s fighting power and to indirectly consolidate and improve its effective strength.

Wartime political work is an important guarantee to bringing about the Party’s leadership over our combat actions. The Party organizations in all military levels are the core of unified leadership and unity of all troops. Not only an important aspect of fully developing the PLA’s political superiority, giving full play to the effect of all Party organizations’ unified leadership over combat actions is also a fundamental guarantee for the PLA to attain victory in war. The Party mainly goes through wartime political work to exercise its leadership over combat actions. Of course, to guarantee the Party’s leadership over fighting usually requires it to catch important matters and key points in its working contents and methods and strive to always place the center of its work on the most important and significant issues and links concerning the whole war situation.

Wartime political work is an essential guarantee to the conduct of a people’s war under modern conditions. Under modern conditions, we, to a large extent, rely on wartime political work to carry through the basic spirit and main principle of the theory of a people’s war, which is the essence of Mao Zedong Military Thinking, and to innovate and develop it and win victory in war based on the war’s reality. For example, in order to unite and organize all military forces, organically coordinate all types of combat actions and closely combine all forms of struggle to form a whole operational strength of a people’s war, we mainly depend on political work to extensively and penetratingly mobilize, organize and arm the people. Without wartime political work, it would be difficult to carry through the thinking of a people’s war.

Wartime political work is an important assurance of fully playing the efficacy of weapons and equipment, and the human factor is the decisive factor to this effect. Wartime political work is to move the enthusiasm and creativity of officers and men; make them know and master their arms in their hands, especially hi-tech weapons and equipment; encourage them to continuously upgrade their level of wisdom and trade craft; and combine their excellent weapons and equipment with their bravery and well-done skills and tactics to develop the full efficacy of weapons and equipment.

Wartime political work is an essential condition to give play to the human factor and compensate for the insufficiency of weapons and equipment. In all revolutionary wars, the reason that the PLA could use its inferior weapons and equipment to defeat its enemy with superior weapons and equipment was that its strong revolutionary political work played its essential part. In the future, it still needs to use its current equipment to conquer its better-equipped enemy. To reach this end, our army must bring its superior political work into play and fully move its human enthusiasm and subjective initiative in order to use its better-than-the-enemy bravery, intelligence and skills to offset the insufficiency of its weapons and equipment.

Wartime political work is an important assurance for improving and maintaining the capability of joint operations. In modern wars, massive application of hi-tech weapons and equipment in the battlefield, numerous participating services and branches, and various methods and means of command organically combine human brain and computer network and post a higher requirement of coordination and cohesion to military actions. Other than the effort of command organizations and commanders to improve military forces’ capability of joint operations, it requires wartime political work to use its huge and powerful political mobilization and organization and its meticulous and painstaking ideological and organizational work to ensure a tight link between the participating and non-participating personnel and among fighting units. This will foster in people an invincible concept of the overall situation and unity of ideas in order to unite thinking, will and action to accomplish the objective of doing everything just for winning the war.

Wartime political work is an important guarantee for the forces to maintain sustained combat capability to accomplish their operational missions. Under modern conditions, as the mass-kill and -destruction weapons make war more fierce and sharper, only by deepening wartime political work to take powerful measures against possible difficulties of the forces in action to overcome their psychological obstacles and specific problems can they keep their ability to maintain a high morale and continue their fighting.

**II. Main Contents and Specific Mission of Wartime Political Work**

Wartime political work has the basic mission of consolidating and improving the forces’ effective strength to guarantee their victory in operations. Its contents mainly include the following aspects:

*1. Operational Mobilization and Propaganda Instigation*

One of the basic forms of wartime political work is universally and deeply conducting operational mobilization and strongly and powerfully promoting battlefield propaganda instigation. The purpose is to unite our forces’ thinking, encourage the warmth of officers and men for fighting the enemy with common hatred, foster the confidence of daring to fight to ensure victory and enhance the courage and endurance needed to defeat the enemy and overcome all difficulties and ensure the completion of combat missions. Operational mobilization and propaganda instigation are usually done in three stages: before the war, during the war and after the war. Before the war, for the precondition of guarding military secrets, operational mobilization and battlefield propaganda instigation mainly include combining delivery of combat orders and deployment of combat missions to clarify the enemy’s and our situations, and attempts to define as well the meaning and nature of our combat actions to unveil the enemy’s crimes. By defining the relationship between accomplishment of missions in all aspects and attainment of whole victory and favorable and unfavorable elements for seizing victory and the methods to defeat the enemy; and unfolding the education on the PLA’s glorious traditions, patriotism, revolutionary heroism and battlefield policies and disciplines we advance our efforts. During the war, they stress instigating battlefield propaganda for the masses and carrying out brief and powerful mobilization for combat based on the features of the enemy’s and our weapons and equipment, switch of combat missions, change of enemy situations and the requirement for continuous fighting to ensure that our forces are able to attack, defend and move. After the war, based on the combat missions completed by the forces and the problems exposed during the war and subsequent movements, they mainly prepare the next round of mobilization for subsequent fighting or rest and replacement of troops or ending of the war.

*2. Timely Adjusting and Perfecting Organization, Transferring and Replacing Personnel and Recruiting Party and Youth League Members*

Ensuring the forces to be under uninterrupted command and able to sustain their fighting is the basic condition to attain victory in war. As weapons of mass destruction are applied in the battlefield, personnel casualty is inevitable; therefore, it is very easy to be in the grave situation that cadres and skeletons are short and organization is destroyed. For this reason, we must focus on the most different situation to establish, adjust and perfect the Party and Youth League and select, transfer and replace cadres of all levels at any time so as to guarantee an uninterrupted command of the forces. Other than preparing well before the war, such as designating surrogates and setting preliminary programs for replacement, most of the work should be done during the war. The work requires command organizations and commanders to know the situations of their organizations and cadres at any time. They must do well the inspection of fire lines, adjust well while fighting and organizing, recruit Party and Youth League members and organize a simple and strong life for them to ensure the forces will be under uninterrupted command and able to sustain their fighting. After war, their major work is to timely adjust organizations, replace cadres, recruit new Party and Youth League members based on the transfer of duties and change of personnel to enable the troops to restore their effective strength as soon as possible.

*3. Developing Military Democracy, Encouraging the Masses to Offer Stratagems and Studying and Revising Methods of Combat*

Implementing military democracy is a fine PLA tradition and the means of relying on the masses to defeat the enemy as well as an important substance of wartime political work compatible with the PLA nature. Due to the changes of battlefield situation complexity in organization and command and many tactical and technical problems, we need the masses’ wisdom and intelligence for solutions. Developing military democracy is a work stringing through the whole process of war. For example, before the war, we should aim at the enemy situation and mission to develop military democracy in military training based on the most difficult and most complicated situations and missions in order to determine the specific methods of combat against different enemies and under different conditions and solve all possible problems in fighting. In war, we should combine the key and difficult points in the process of war to develop military democracy by a timely improving of the methods of combat, overcoming hardships, reducing losses and turning passivity into activity. After the war, we should combine criticisms to develop military democracy by summarizing experiences to benefit the next round of fighting.

*4. Unfolding Campaign of Killing Enemy to Earn Merits, Publicizing Heroic Models and Disseminating News of Triumph*

It is an efficient way to encourage morale of the forces and move their enthusiasm for combat as well as a massive, routine and important substance of wartime political work. Before the war, it is mainly combining the teachings on patriotism and revolutionary heroism, organizing regulations of learning how to earn merits or drafting and setting plans of killing the enemy to earn merits, and encouraging everybody’s sense of responsibility and sense of honor. During the war, it is mainly based on the progress of fighting to timely report and approve merits for the pertinent individuals or groups who have performed outstandingly in the war and publicize heroic deeds and news of triumph through news media to stir up the campaign of killing the enemy to earn merits so as to make it a huge spiritual power to promote successful combat actions. After war, it is mainly to do well awarding and criticism of merits and further disseminate advanced models to deepen and continue the activity of earning merits and creating models.

*5. Protecting Battlefield Discipline and Mass Principle*

Iron discipline is an important assurance of enhancing and consolidating the PLA’s effective strength. Nothing in peacetime can compare with the hard and blood-shedding reality of war that severely tests military personnel’s physical and psychological endurance in wartime. Thus, there must be rigid discipline to highly concentrate and unify military personnel, tighten military-civilian relationships and solidify military effective strength to ensure victory in war. The PLA has had rigid battlefield discipline and mass discipline represented by “the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army” since the beginning of its founding. The orders and regulations promulgated in all historical periods during the revolutionary wars had the substance of this aspect. Supplementary rules were also added for different areas and different targets whenever needed, such as protection of urban installations, hubs of communications, industrial and mining enterprises, scenic spots and historical sites and cultural and charity organizations; and respect for local people’s national customs and religious beliefs. For this reason, the PLA has all along been enjoying the fame of a “civilized army” given by the masses

*6. Struggling with Hostile “Psycho Warfare,” Induced Defection, Stealing of Secrets and Other Destructive Activities to Ensure the PLA’s Purity, Solidity and Security*

When two belligerent sides are engaged in full confrontation on the battlefield, not only the fighting on the open frontier is fierce and cruel, the struggle on the hidden line is extremely sharp as well. We must include the work on this line in wartime political work and do it well in order to keep the PLA’s purity, solidity and security. We must watch the enemy situation closely and control the pattern, features and methods adopted by it to realistically set effective preventive measures and timely handle the problems thereof.

*7. Disintegrating Enemy Forces and Treating the PoWs Liberally*

Disintegrating enemy forces is one of the three PLA principles, which is its fine tradition as well as an important indispensable condition of supporting military attack to win victory. Millions of KMT forces transformed to be PLA fighters during the Chinese revolutionary war, and foreign soldiers captured by us in the Sino-Japanese and Korean Wars were motivated to join the PLA, which are very convincing facts. The PLA is a righteous army with a matchless political preponderance. So long as we pay attention to this work, we can effectively divide and disintegrate the enemy.

*8. Doing Well Political Work on Participating Militia and Civilian Workers in War and on the Masses in Theaters*

People’s support is the source of power for the PLA to defeat the enemy, and we still need the positive support and participation of the broad masses of people in modern warfare. Doing well political work on the participating militia and civilian workers as well as the masses in theaters mainly includes assisting local Party organizations and governments in initiating and encouraging the enthusiasm of militia and civilian workers to join the war and in educating the masses in theaters. When the PLA crosses the border to counterattack the enemy, it also needs to be based on the pertaining principles and policies to target our political work at local people to win over their sympathy and support.

*9. Handling Well the Wounded and Rehabilitating Martyrs‘ Families*

This job directly affects the PLA’s respect to the value of the lives of its officers and men and is related to its morale, to restoring the forces’ effective strength and keeping and improving their capability for sustained fighting. It also links to the forces’ long-term building and subsequent triumph; thus, we should never overlook it. It includes helping the wounded foster their optimism, urging the recovered commanders to return to their posts on the battlefield, registering and burying dead martyrs and assisting concerned local departments to compensate the disabled and families of the deceased.

*10. Doing Well the Work on Rear Personnel and Military Families*

It is also a component that must be included in wartime political work. Its specific contents contain educating rear personnel and military families to understand the importance of war and foster in them the thinking that everything is for the front and victory and urging their relatives to join the war to earn merits and kill the enemy. In wartime, the PLA and they should care and help each other to beat troubles and welcome triumph; after the war, the PLA should coach them on how to accurately treat awards, punishments, casualty and death.

**III. Main Features and Requirement of Wartime Political Work**

*1. Persisting in Principle and Stressing Key Points*

In its implementation, wartime political work resolutely carries through all important principles of the PLA political work and serves the righteous nature of war to ensure developing the power of a people’s war, materializing the goals of war and keeping the high class of political work and the PLA’s firm and accurate political direction. In the meantime, political work must concentrate on the links significant to the whole war situation and on urgently solving the problems that need answers to always be in keeping with the objectives of combat missions.

*2. Being Simple and Concise and Acquiring Actual Results*

Since war is a tense and fierce confrontation between two sides, wartime political work cannot be delayed and fatigued at all or formalistic and documented. It is a crime to waste precious time on wordy documentation in wartime. To unfold wartime political work, we must have a summary and a short list for details. We must carry through the standards of effective strength and base all work on actual results. We must have a sober mind, sharp thinking, tense style and quick action to be fully concentrated on the war situation and timely catch the forces’ ideological direction to positively and actively think and do its work first to improve its working methods and working efficiency.

*3. Losing No Opportunity and Rapidly Handling Contingencies*

Rapidity is precious to warring. Maneuver of troops, delivery of information and all factors related to speed have undergone revolutionary changes under the condition of hi-tech skills. As the situation on a battlefield changes instantly, it posts a higher requirement to wartime political work on the capability of handling contingencies. Only by grasping every opportunity, catching every link, enhancing the timeliness and directness of political work can we adapt ourselves to the changing battlefield situation, develop the teaching, organizing, encouraging and guiding effect of political work to consolidate and improve the forces’ effective strength. In order to lose no opportunity and rapidly handle contingencies, we must control and dispose of all information; thus, intensifying the collection, analysis, storage, delivery and treatment of battlefield information has become a key issue to wartime political work on improving the capability of handling contingencies.

*4. Being Undaunted by Repeated Setbacks and Keeping Tenacity and Firmness*

Under modern conditions, not only nuclear arms have the power of mass kill and destruction, conventional weapons are not any worse in that regard. Huge loss of lives and supplies will be inevitable whenever war happens. It requires that wartime political work keep high tenacity and firmness to use its fighting and unfailing spirit to move the work to the front line. The harder the environment and the crueler the fighting are, the more active and vigorous the work is. It should show up at the places where fighting is more wanted in order to make the troops keep their vivid heroism and strong will for suppressing the enemy instead of being suppressed by it.

*5. Mobilizing the Masses to Participate*

Wartime political work is the Party‘s wartime mass work in the armed forces. Since mass work cannot be done by a handful of people, we must mobilize the masses to participate to make it full of strength and bring its into play in all bearings. Whether combatants or commanders and whether full-time political cadres or non-full-time skeletons, everybody is both the force to unfold political work and the target to receive it. Not only does everybody work on others, he or she also has to accept the work from others. Particularly in high-tech wars in which the combat units are elite and the forces are highly dispersed, we must mobilize the masses to develop wartime political work and infiltrate it into every combat unit and post to form a crisscross network so that the units and posts can adapt to the needs of war and ensure victory.

*6. Planning closely and Predicting Scientifically*

Launch of modern warfare usually employs hi-tech weapons of large power, long range, quick speed and high precision to surprise attacks in the direction and place in a time unexpected by the enemy. This feature requires wartime political work to enhance its predictability and planning. Scientific prediction and close planning are the precondition and important guarantee for well-done political work and victory in wartime. Before the war, we must predict all complicated situations that might occur during the war and make preliminary programs and contingent measures to keep the initiative of wartime political work. The method of treating contingencies when the occasion arises will cause us to be unprepared at the critical moment and affect or reduce the effectiveness of wartime political work.

*7. Separating Situations and Guiding by Category*

Military application of high technique is changing the traditional concept of the battlefield. The modern battlefield has expanded from land, sea and air to space, underwater and electric magnetic space. The area of war is vast; the forms of war are diversified and so are the participating military services and branches and special units. To cope with this development, the contents, forms and demands of wartime political work will appear more in characterization. In order to better develop its effect of service and guarantee that it can infiltrate its huge power into all participating forces and personnel, wartime political work must pay attention and fulfill its common substances, forms and demands. In the meantime, it must aim at the features of different troops and personnel and their different missions and features to enhance guidance by category. It must tightly combine general call with individual guidance to distinguish different situations and do a good job of wartime political work for each level and each aspect with a set aim to prevent and overcome “one simple guidance” for all.

*8. Being Subordinate to Overall Situation and Stressing Policy*

War is a continuation of politics. Policy and stratagem are life to the Party and also the criteria of military combat actions. During war, all decisions and directives of political work and all slogans of mobilization must be subordinate to the need of the overall situation and comply with the Party’s policies to ensure their full implementation.

*9. Putting Talents in Important Positions and Cherishing Them*

Whether in the past or in the future, man is always the decisive factor to the outcome of war. This factor is important in both its quantity and its quality. It should have not only good body and bravery but should also be highly intelligent. In a battlefield competition of hi-tech arms, science and techniques are effective strengths and the development and exploitation of human wisdom and skills are promoted to a brand new phase. Fighting is not purely a competition of will between the two sides nor a contest between the number of their forces and the density of their fire. Instead, it is a race between talented people who can skillfully control and harness hi-tech weapons and equipment. Thus, wartime political work must steadfastly carry through the thinking of putting talents in important positions and cherishing them and creating a fine environment of respecting science, skill and quality personnel to boldly promote those military talents with knowledge, good conduct, wisdom and bravery to key posts. We should also make developing commanders’ intelligence and skills in war and heighten the combat capability under modern conditions as an important mission of our own.

*10. Being Ahead of Fighting Men and Showing Exemplary Role*

For political work, done is more important than said. It must rely on the broad masses of cadres and Party members and political workers must perform the work themselves. During war, cadres and Party members, and political workers in particular must demonstrate their leading role wherever the fighting is the sharpest and the environment is the hardest. Cadres and Party members moving and influencing the masses with their exemplary deeds is a fine tradition of the PLA’s political work. Under new historical conditions, to ensure that its forces do not change their color and that they win victory in fighting, the PLA must develop its fine practice and tradition of one class commanding and leading another class. It must use its pioneer exemplary role and its linking and bridging function as Party members to be closely connected with the masses to dispel dangers, solve problems and attain victory with one mind and one heart under the banner of our Party.

**Section Two: Strategic Psychological Warfare**

**I. Position and Function of Modern Psychological Warfare**

The history of psychological warfare is almost as long as mankind’s history of war, but psychological warfare has all along been restricted by experience and probability and cannot develop its huge power because of the immaturity of its theory and the limitation of its S&T conditions. It, therefore, has never risen to a strategic position. Along with the development and maturity of psychological theories, psychological warfare has developed to the strategic level since World War II. During the Cold War, the US made it a strategic means against the Soviet camp. Along with mass military application of modern S&T centered on information technology, psychological warfare has more and more shown its enormous function. The “Dictionary of Military Affairs and Related Terms” compiled by the US Department of Defense defines “strategy” as “an art and science that is based on the need of development and employs political, economic, psychological and military strength to maximize the support of policies in order to amplify the control and fruit of victory and reduce the risk of failure during peacetime and wartime.” This definition, therefore, includes modern psychology in the strategic scope and makes psychological warfare an essential component of modern strategy.

The target of modern psychological warfare is not limited to the enemy forces as it also includes all people of the hostile country. Meanwhile, it assumes the mission of educating our own military and civilians, condensing their morale and keeping their mentality stable. Its key target, however, is the enemy’s decision-making level, meaning it uses all kinds of means to attack the level’s thinking, conviction, will, feeling and identifying systems in order to cause wrong understandings, assessments and decisions, and shake its thinking and conviction and will of resistance to achieve the objective of defeating the enemy without fighting. It is implemented not only in wartime but also in a massive and continued scale in peacetime. Although also used in campaign and tactical levels, it is, instead of an isolated and incidental act, an organic component of a series of specific acts under overall strategic guidance. Modern psychological warfare is strongly political and strategic and its decision-making. Its direction and application have been totally considered and closely arranged. During the Cold War, the US had repeatedly planned and coordinated international psychological warfare among capitalist nations against socialist countries. In recent years, the psychological warfare in the American military actions against Haiti, Panama, Iraq and the Yugoslavian states was conducted upon the approval of the national highest authority.

**II. Main Features of Modern Psychological Warfare**

*1. The Scope of Modern Psychological Warfare Continues to Expand to Become an Omnibearing, Multilevel and All-time & space Strategic Action*

Traditional psychological warfare was conducted mainly in the military field. The modern one has exceeded the limit of military struggle to become an omnibearing strategic action involving political, economic, military, diplomatic, cultural and religious fields. For example, the psychological warfare that the Western world has unfolded against socialist countries for decades is an omnibearing one. Politically, it vigorously sells the Western political system and life style. Economically, it uses US aid as bait to conduct economic infiltration and control and force the recipients to submit. Ideologically and culturally, it utilizes various means and channels, such as broadcast, television, movie, newspaper and video and audio products and particularly online network, to push the so-called the concepts of Western value -- freedom, democracy and human rights.

Traditional psychological warfare was carried out in wartime. The modern one has bypassed the boundary of wartime and peacetime to become a routine invasive activity. For decades, the Western world has never stopped its psychological warfare against socialist countries. It has played an inspiring role in promoting the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the drastic change in Eastern Europe. It has become a new form of struggle at all times and in all spaces, always aggressively acting in all fields in peacetime and showing in a concentrated form in wartime.

Traditional psychological warfare is mainly aimed at military personnel. The modern one targets not only the enemy’s armed forces but also its masses as well as friendly and own civilians and comrades-in-arms. It is an overall invasive action. As stipulated by the US “Regulations of Psychological Warfare,” its whole objective is to instigate sentiment in foreign groups to affect their attitude or behavior for the support of the United States. Thus, psychological warfare has the aim of “influencing the setting of policies, making of decisions, ability of control and command, will of combat and obedience and determination of support.”

*2. Psychological Warfare Integrates with War by Military Forces*

First, military objectives and political and psychological goals are highly integrated. An outstanding feature of modern local war is that it more evidently displays its political and psychological objectives and relatively restricts its military actions and that its military actions mainly serve the realization of its political and psychological objectives. Many local wars that occurred since the 1980s are clearly based on political and psychological objectives. Second, military strength is its material foundation, especially deterrence and attack of hi-tech arms, which are an important condition to achieve the effect of psychological warfare. The stronger the fighting strength of the armed forces is, the better the effect of psychological warfare will be.

Two thousand years ago, China’s Weiliao Zi had already pointed out: “War has discipline as its decorative beam and humanity as its ridge pole, discipline as its surface and humanity as its lining and discipline as its exterior and humanity as its interior. If one can understand these three characteristics, he will immediately know the outcome of war.” Fighting war and psychological warfare go hand-in-hand; neither can be skipped. Only by integrating them can their effects be fully brought into play.

*3. Methods and Means of Psychological Warfare Are Getting Modernized*

The past “traditional psychological warfare” had broadcast, first-line calling, airborne drop, seaborne floating and land leaflets as the major forms of propaganda. They had a universal recognition and wide application and produced very important functions.

The development of modern S&T has provided a rich base for psychological warfare to expand its methods and means. Instruments for psychological warfare have become more intelligent, such as pilotless airplanes for delivering propaganda leaflets over battlefields. The vehicles for psychological warfare have also become more versatile, such as future propaganda leaflets will combine vision, hearing and speech in one so that the recipient can read the message, listen to the voice and see the image thereon to turn the warfare more pictorialized.

*4. The Information Field Has More and More Become an Important Battlefield of Psychological Warfare*

Wars in the 21st century will be wars of information. Psychological warfare will be embodied more in a concentrated way in the information field. First, it takes military attack and electronic strikes as the means to carry out “information deprivation” to confuse information and to reach the result of a human psychology in emptiness, tension, disorder and even collapse. Second, it uses computer viruses for special psychological warfare to make the enemy computer operators mentally bewildered. Third, it employs electronic information techniques to “make false real” by “planting” false and wrong information into the enemy command and control system of information to mislead enemy commanders to take false information for real and erroneously guide or unable to distinguish wrong from right. Fourth, it utilizes information networks to perform information infiltration. The wide extension of information highways and online networking techniques will extremely improve the flow, speed and radiating area of information. As long as the opposition’s information network can be invaded, one can infiltrate information into the terminals of the users of this network, from the highest decision-making organizations to the battlefield command and control centers and from military cases to each combat fengdui (company) or even each digitalized individual solider, to launch an omnibearing psychological assault. The information field will be the major battlefield of future psychological warfare.

*5. Psychological Warfare Will Be More Concealed*

Modern psychological warfare is discarding the form of open attack and abuse-reaping and is done in a more twisted and concealed way. First, making it like news, meaning: to merge the contents of psychological warfare into daily news reporting to influence the listeners‘ mind. Second, turning it into the form of art, meaning to infiltrate the contents of psychological warfare through cultural and art exchange to deliver its invisible informative influence. Third, converting it into literary work, meaning to add its impact thorough all types of “projects of exchange of international scholars” and all kinds of international academic exchange. Fourth, applying it to the civic circle, meaning to conduct psychological warfare through numerous contacts in the civic circle. Special psychological warfare can be done on concealed frontiers painstakingly planned by intelligence and spy agencies.

**III. Building of the Strength of Modern Psychological Warfare**

*1. Founding Scientific and Effective Organizing and Leadership Offices*

Under modern conditions, in order to effectively deal with the infiltration of foreign ideology and the conduct of psychological warfare, many countries have founded corresponding organizing systems for psychological warfare, such as the US, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Denmark, the Netherlands, Israel, Egypt, India and Thailand. The one in the US is comparatively typical. The top organization is composed of the psychological warfare advisor to the President, Office of Psychological Warfare under Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Psychological Warfare of the Office of the Department of Defense. The intermediate organizations consist of the pertaining departments for psychological warfare under Joint Commands and under Theater Commands. The lower organizations are formed by psychological warfare dadui (regiments), battalions and companies and psychological warfare task forces to unify, organize and coordinate psychological warfare. It serves not only wars but also international and domestic political struggles.

*2. Establishing Scientific Research Institutes and Thinking Tanks for Psychological Warfare*

Many countries pay much attention to the research of psychological warfare and have established research institutes in the state and the military for exclusive study. In the meantime, they also stress developing the function of “civic” thinking tanks. In the States, there are about 50 - 60 agencies directly studying the strategy of psychological warfare. Military institutes and schools and many local civilian colleges and schools in the US also have various research institutes and centers to serve the military and government authorities, such as Rand Co. has used the results of its strategic studies to influence the formation of the strategy of psychological warfare. Others like Brookings Institute and Mitter (phonetic) Co. of the US, Mitsubishi Comprehensive Institute of Japan, and London International Strategy Institute of Britain whose studies are often borrowed for the country‘s psychological warfare. These institutes are assigned by the government or the military to do the research or use their own studies on psychological warfare to serve the government or the military. l

*3. Forming Professional Psychological Warfare Forces*

Modern psychological warfare is an aggressive action at all times and places, which is continuously conducted whether in peacetime or in wartime and needs a lot of specialists and professionals to organize and implement it. Forming a professional force for psychological warfare is a natural tendency to cope with its development. At present, many countries have already formed such troops. The US has a unit of numerous members detached to its Army, Navy and Air force.The Army has 4 psychological warfare groups, 12 psychological warfare battalions and 22 psychological warfare companies; the Navy, one psychological warfare deception Dadui (regiment); the Air force, the 193 Special Operations Squadrons to support psychological warfare actions. In the Gulf War, the US psychological warfare plan was organized and implemented by the Fourth Psychological Warfare Operations Group. Based on the characteristics of China and the PLA, while developing our political superiority and glorious tradition, we should be based on the requirements of hi-tech wars and international psychological struggles to explore a way to enhance the building of our psychological warfare forces and form a set of methods and forms of combat for psychological warfare with the PLA characteristics. It is an objective requirement to ensure the PLA will win the strategic initiative in future hi-tech wars.

**Chapter Nineteen**

**Ending of a War**

Ending of war refers to the conduct by a war director based on fulfillment of war aim, development of war situation and change of strategic environment to kinetically lead war actions toward an end. It signifies a verdict of the gain and loss of both sides, involves postwar arrangements of international and domestic political relations and directions of war and peace.

**Section One: Conditions for Ending a War**

Conditions for ending of war are the strategic posture and basic situation that face the war director at the time when making his decision on ending the war, meaning the time when he may, should or is forced to conclude the war. They are closely linked to the degree of fulfillment of war aim, posture of political and military struggles and change of strategic environment.

**I. Fulfilling War Aim and Disabling the Other Side to Turn Around War Situation**

The degree of fulfillment of the war aim is an important condition for the war director to decide whether he should continue the war because war is a continuation of politics. “When politics develops to a certain stage and cannot proceed like before, war is exploded to clean the obstacles on the road of politics.... The obstacles are cleaned and politics aim is accomplished; then, the war is concluded. If the obstacles are not totally cleaned, the war must continue to make the cleaning complete.” (1)

*1. One Side Is Eliminated or Defeated*

When one side is eliminated or defeated, the other side can conclude the war by treating the problems aroused by war according to its own will. In an all-out war, since the aim pursued by both sides is to disarm the enemy or totally defeat it, the war can be concluded only when one side is eliminated or defeated by the other side or the war will never stop if otherwise. Most historical wars were like this, such as the division of Poland by Russia, Bruce and Austria in the 18th Century, the Napoleon War in the 19th Century, the two World Wars in the 20th Century and civil wars in many countries. There were many such examples in local wars as well. Like its attack of Granada in 1984 and invasion of Panama in 1990, the U.S. relied on its overwhelming superiority to rapidly eliminate or defeat the other side, controlled the situation and immediately concluded the wars.

*2. One Side Surrenders*

One side surrenders and gives up resistance indicates that it admits the fact of defeat and hands over the right of handling war-related matters to the other side.

(1)  “Selected Works of Ma Zedong” vol. II, People’s Press, 1991 edition, p. 479.

Surrender and defeat are always connected. Germany & Co.’s surrenders in both World Wars were because the Allies knocked them out. Here, surrender and defeat were not different in essence. In World War I, the terms for armistice proposed by the Allies actually meant unconditional surrender by Germany. In World War II, the Anti-Fascist Allies clearly suggested to the Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan unconditional surrender as the term to end the War. In local wars, however, surrender is a partial, not whole, surrender. For example, in the War of Malvinas, the surrender of the Argentine units on the island allowed the British forces to control the whole island. As they could not change the situation, the Argentine units stopped their military actions around Malvinas, while the British forces announced the ending of the war as soon as they had accomplished their aim.

*3. One Side Accepts the Other Side’s Terms*

Although not eliminated or defeated nor choosing formal surrender, one side agrees to accept the other side’s terms for ending the war as it might be scared by the high cost of war or think there is no need to keep on fighting. War may be ended this way, too. In the Vietnamese War, in consideration of saving the serious situation that its global strategy had deviated from its center and of reinforcing its stalemate with the Soviet Union in Europe, the U.S. was forced to accept Vietnam‘s terms to end the war. In the Gulf War, in order to preserve its main strength in the country, Iraq had to accept the conditions by multi-national forces to conclude the war in Kuwait.

Whether the war is an all-out or local war and absolute or controlled in nature, the conditions for ending it are already there so long as one side has fulfilled its war aim while the other side is unwilling to continue since it cannot turn the situation around or for other reasons.

**II. Being in Stalemate, Both Sides Cannot Change the War Situation**

There are many such occasions in wars that the two sides are in stalemate that neither can advance to obtain a decisive victory due to various reasons, causing the war to be dragged on without a decision and both sides to suffer huge losses. In order to avoid meaningless sacrifice, a war director often tries ways of compromise to end the war. Thus, when the war is at stalemate and both sides cannot break the dilemma, it can be treated as a condition for closing the war.

*1. Both Sides Being Well-Matched and Neither Can Win*

Although the two well-matched sides can keep the war on, the prospect of victory is very thin and their countries will suffer the disaster even more. In order to rid the dilemma and end the war, both would seek a truce or be willing to accept mediation by other countries. For example, in the Second Indian-Pakistani War, both fought fiercely and kept the war escalating, causing the conflict on Kashmir to become an all-out war between the two countries. Although the two sides claimed to obtain a decisive victory, they actually had both gains and losses and the war was in stalemate. Considering a drag-on of the war would not benefit either side, they were forced to accept the UN suggestion for ceasefire and concluded the war by signing the “Tashkent Communique.” The war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s and the War of Vietnam Invading Cambodia 1978-1989 were ended in the same fashion.

*2. Both Sides Are Tired Out and Unable to Keep Fighting*

A protracted war always causes extreme difficulty to the involved countries; thus, a war director often adopts the form of truce or accepts mediation by other countries to end the war. The lengthy and cruel “Thirty-Year War,” which marked the beginning of the history of the modern world, had exhausted all pertinent parties’ manpower and material resources and made them unable to continue on. As a result, the two belligerent sides began to talk peace and signed the “Peace of Westphalia.” The Seven-Year War in 1736-1763 was concluded likewise. At that time, Britain and France, fighting for hegemony, each organized a group of nations to fight many times in Europe and on their colonial lands and waters, but they did not reach a decisive conclusion. Until 1762 as the war had caused both sides to suffer from financial troubles and soldier shortage, they could not carry the burden of war any more and also faced the impact of an unstable economy at home. Exactly under such circumstances, they began to negotiate and finally signed the “Treaty of Paris.”

*3. Being in an Impasse*

As one side is defeated militarily and has lost its ability to resist, it cannot but accept the opponent’s terms to end the war. The defeated side in both World Wars took the form of surrender to conclude them. Some post-World War local wars were ended by submission.

Based on the aforementioned, there are three possible states at the end of wars; namely, favorable conditions, stalemate and unfavorable conditions. The war director must strive to end the war under favorable conditions and avoid stalemate or unfavorable conditions.

**Section Two: The Timing for Ending a War**

Timing of ending of war has two connotations: the subjective side and the objective side. Objectively, it means that when the war has developed to a certain degree and has the conditions for conclusion; subjectively, it means that the war director chooses the timing of concluding the war in accordance with the change of war conditions. To end a war, we need not only to have subjective conditions but also to accurately grasp the timing to make the two complement to each other and not miss either of them.

**I. Assessing the Timing for Ending of War**

To assess the timing for ending the war mainly depends on whether we have the conditions for ending the war ready in a certain time.

*1. Being Familiar with the Development of War*

The war director’s understanding that the war is no longer needed is based on his assessment of the posture of the war. When the posture is favorable, the war has most likely accomplished its aim or has caused the enemy to lose its ability to resist or the enemy has given up its attempt for war. The unfavorable posture is often a result from the lack of possibility of winning and the inability to get sufficient aids to keep the fighting on. For stalemate, the two sides would consider ending the war when they both feel no assurance of defeating the other side.

*2.* *Closely Observing the Change of Strategic Environment*

Change of strategic environment greatly affects the war, sometime the impact is decisive. Mao Zedong made a prediction of the trend of the development of the Sino-Japanese War in his “On Protracted War.” One important factor of his prediction was the change of strategic environment as he believed that the international situation would not isolate China in war. Strategic environment touches many factors, and the ones that a war director must notice are whether the international society will intervene and assist, whether the people are loyal, whether the state has the ability to support the war, whether all kinds of strategic resources can stand consumption, and whether the military is able to fight. Through observation of the strategic environment, the war director decides whether he should continue the war.

*3. Thoroughly Understanding the Other Side’s Attempt*

Thoroughly understanding the other side’s attempt is very important to a war director as to whether he should decide ending the war. Its substance includes: What is the other side’s war aim? What are its conditions for concluding the war? How much can it yield? What are the critical affecting factors to continue or cease fighting? It is much easier to reach a decision when all these problems are clearly understood. The key here is that we cannot be fooled by the other side’s false attempt. After the victory in the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT authority released a smoke of peace by inviting Mao Zedong to Chongqing for peace talk, but on the back it intensified military deployment in the attempt of annihilating the troops of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party employed two revolutionary ploys to deal with this conspiracy. It used peace talks to disclose the enemy to win over the people on the one hand and vigorously attacked the KMT military offensive on the other.

**II. Creating Timing for Ending of War**

The following are the most common methods and means to create favorable conditions for the ending of war:

*1. Enhancing or Weakening Military Striking Strength*

Enhancing military striking strength refers to ending the war by annihilating the enemy in a faster speed or forcing it to surrender as soon as possible. At the end of World War II, the U.S. used atomic bombs to destroy Japan’s strength for war and urge its surrender. Strong offensive can force an enemy to give up and guide the war to an end. During the Vietnamese War, the U.S. adopted the way of intensifying bombing to coerce North Vietnam to submit whenever their peace talk was in stalemate. Weakening military striking strength can also deliver the wish and create the condition for concluding war.

*2. Applying Political and Diplomatic Means to Support Military Struggle*

Applying political and diplomatic means to create conditions for ending of war. The most common form is negotiation. When a war is about to end, negotiation can always play an irreplaceable role of balancing the aims of both belligerent sides. Through peace talks, the two sides may directly and fully exchange information, clarify facts and expound viewpoints to enhance mutual understanding and trust, and then explore ways to solve their contradictions and conflicts. In addition, negotiation can totally develop the functions of the UN and all other international organizations; reveal the stand to pertinent countries and seek their assistance; reach agreements on aids with certain countries and country groups, request their help or supplies; and explain the pros and cons to some countries to stop their nominal or positive involvement. In short, through political and diplomatic activities to change strategic environments in our favor, not in the enemy’s, so that the enemy will give up its plan of continuing to fight and end the war early.

**III. Assurance of the Timing for ending of war**

We must prevent from losing the timing for ending the war too soon, meaning to make decisions and take actions on concluding the war when the conditions are not yet ripe. In some wars, immature conditions for conclusion often bring syndromes or cause wars to recur and catastrophe to fall on our side. For example, in the Napoleon War, the Anti-France Alliance ended its war against France at an improper time on several occasions and resulted in rekindling the war. On the other hand, we should avoid losing the timing too late. It is because a wrong judgment of the war situation or a deviated understanding of the degree of achievement of the war aim could drag on the war that should be ended. Taking the Iranian-Iraqi War for example, when they were in stalemate, the international society tried to mediate and Iraq was the first one expressing the wish of ending the war. Iran, on the contrary, thought it was a sign of Iraq’s weakness and took the opportunity to raise its terms and caused the war to be prolonged. As indicated at the end of the war, Iran not only failed to get what it wanted but also caused the country to be in a longer state of war and suffer more losses.

The following points must be taken into consideration to correctly grasp the timing of concluding a war:

First, actively ending it when the conditions are in our favor. In October 1962, the PRC border defense forces were ordered to simultaneously launch a self-defense counterattack against the invading Indian troops on both eastern and western sides of the Sino-Indian borderline. After two stages of fighting, the Chinese units attained an important triumph, closing in the traditional legal borderline on the eastern side and recovering the occupied territory on the western side. At that time, China had the initiative to decide whether to continue fighting or to stop it. In order to peacefully settle border disputes, China indicated its consistent stand and significant sincerity of not changing the status quo of the border by force. The Chinese Government issued an announcement on unilateral and active ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. This way it created favorable conditions for the two countries to solve their border problems through negotiation.

Second, creating conditions under unfavorable situations to end war. In wars, it is quite often that one side is first placed in unfavorable situations and then forced to accept the other side’s terms for ending the war. However, the side in unfavorable conditions may have other than the only choice of passively accepting the other side’s terms as it could completely try to create conditions to improve its position before the war is concluded. For example, when in militarily unfavorable conditions, the side can create and utilize the international political environment to create powerful international political pressure on the other side to force it to end the war. When the whole military situation is not in its favor, the side may strive to make local military gains to create relatively favorable conditions for ending the war.

Third, seeking peace talks to end the war when in stalemate. Judged from the angle of mutual benefits to both belligerent sides, in order to avoid more losses, the smart choice usually is to negotiate for ceasefire and then end the war when two well-matched sides are still unable to accomplish their war aims after a lengthy fighting and when the future chance of winning is very slim.

**Section Three: Forms of Ending a War**

Forms of ending of war are determined by the objective results of the two sides’ military and political struggles and by the subjective choice of a war director

Forms to end a war are various and are roughly divided into the following types:

*1. By Fighting to the End*

The so-called “fighting to the end” has three ways: First, not to stop fighting until victory is obtained, meaning to strive to transform military victory into fruit of war aim in accordance with the wish of the victorious country. Second, to fight to the end as the other side wants to. The fighting will go on as long as the other side wants to until it is willing to stop. Third, to fight until there is no hope for victory. Fighting to the end as “rather to have a broken piece of jade than an unbroken piece of pottery,” (rather to die with honor than to survive with dishonor.)

*2. By Surrender*

The form of “surrender” is usually recognized internationally as the method of ending war passively when one side is conquered. It indicates that the surrendering side has lost its independence politically and must satisfy all the terms raised by the winning side. Surrender can be divided into two types: unconditional and conditional. In order to make the other side accept unconditional surrender, the side must have obtained a thorough military victory and can force it to give up the terms for surrender only by depriving it of the very last opportunity for survival. Surrender can be done between or among countries, or between armed forces. In an all-out war, surrender is mainly done in the form of country vs. country, while in a local war, it is mostly done in the form of military forces vs. military forces.

*3. By Mutual Compromise*

This form means that the two belligerent sides reach a political agreement through negotiation to end the war based on mutual compromise on their dispute. The practical conditions are that the compromise can satisfy the minimum demands of both sides. Compromise can be reciprocal or non-reciprocal, which is determined by the war posture and foreign and domestic political and economic situations of the two sides. Usually, the side that is stronger on the ratio of strength compromises less or vice versa. There are various forms of compromise: First, compromise to solve problems. Through competitions on the battlefield and at conference table, the two sides have mutually found solutions for settling their dispute to end the war. Generally speaking, this form of conclusion often binds and recognizes the ending of war by a treaty or agreement. For example, the Vietnamese War had gone through fighting and talking for years and at last the two sides signed an agreement for the U.S. troops to pull out from Vietnam and end the war. Second, compromise to put off disputes. Through battlefield fighting or fighting plus negotiation, the two sides still cannot find solutions acceptable to both and either is unable to change the statue quo. In order to avoid meaningless sacrifice, the two sides, under the no win-or-loss situation, temporarily suspend their hostile military actions. It is the form of compromise adopted by the two sides when either side has no hope for victory, no exit by keeping fighting and no settlement of contradictions or disputes without winning. Ceasefire can be all-out or local and long-term or short-term, or even indefinite. Third, compromise for future fighting. In wars, when both sides cannot change the battlefield posture in a short time, they, forced by the pressure from within and without, must temporarily suspend their act of war to make compromise in order to properly restore their strength for future fighting. For example, India and Pakistan have had two wars on Kashmir, but it is possible for them to fight again in the future.

*4. By Sleeping on Concluding*

Under the condition that they have not yet concluded a treaty or signed any truce agreement, the two sides automatically stop fighting to end the war. This form generally results from the following situations: First, one side has already achieved its war aim while the other side is unwilling to pay a larger price or temporarily unable to bail itself out of failure. For example, the U.S. air raid of Libya in 1986. Libya did not protest or condemn the U.S. since it could not retaliate. Both sides did not mention the start and the ending of their conflict. Second, as both sides feel hopeless to accomplish their aims and unwilling to pay a price for nothing, they each withdraw their forces from the theater to “gesture“ for ceasefire or accept the UN resolution for truce or withdrawal to immediately end the war without signing any agreement.

There are other forms of ending a war. For example, on November 9, 1917, the Second Congress of Delegates of All-Russia Soviet passed the “Decree of Peace“ drafted by Lenin which proposed “immediately bringing about peace of no territory ceded and no indemnity paid” and “immediately signing peace treaty to end this war.” It could be summarized as ending the war in the form of “ceding no territory and paying no indemnity.” In modern local wars, there have been more examples of ending the war by stopping fighting, such as the Korean War, the Vietnamese War, the Palestine War, and the Indian-Pakistani War. Although truce does not mean the end of war in a legal sense, it, however, often leads to the conclusion of war. In short, in which form to end the war is often decided by those conditions for ending the war and the war director’s strategic attempt. Different conditions often lead to different forms, and the difference of strategic attempt can also cause the form of concluding a war to vary. The mutual effect of the forms and the conditions often result in diversifying the forms of conclusion of war.

.

**Section Four: The Post War Arrangements for Ending a War**

Post-war arrangements for ending of war refer to the adjustments of future international relationships, mainly international order, made by all belligerent parties and pertinent countries based on the political and military conditions at the end of a war to ensure fulfillment and development of peace. They are highly related to the post-war interests of all countries, the trend of international relations and the relations among nations on protection of peace. Post-war arrangements involve many problems which are summarized to the following major aspects; namely, division of interest, restoration of order, establishment of peace mechanism and punishment of war crimes and war criminals.

**I. Division of Post-War Interests**

War starts and ends by interest, and the foremost important question after war is also interest. If this issue is well settled, the post-war peace will have a firm foundation; otherwise, the foundation will be very fragile. After World War I, the victorious countries crazily looted the defeated nations, not only having unsettled the issue of interest that caused the war, but also having intensified the contradictions between the two groups to make a new war inevitable. Lenin had pointed out that “The Treaty of Versailles is an horrifying and predatory peace treaty ..........It placed millions of people, including the most civilized ones, in the position of slaves.” (1) Thus, the conclusion of this treaty was only an armistice among imperialistic countries.

To settle the issue of post-war interests, the main thing is to divide them, including change of territory, war reparations and distribution of other related interests.

*1. Division of Interests between Victorious and Defeated Countries*

Division of interests between victorious and defeated countries is usually included in the treaty or agreement for ending the war. In modern wars, there have been numerous examples of this type of treaty or agreement. Almost all treaties or agreements concluded after the end of the wars contain change of territory, war reparations and alteration of other related interests.

*2. Division of Interests Among Victorious Countries*

If the victor is a country group instead of a single country, there will still be a further division of interests among those countries. They get the interests obtained from the defeated countries based on the size of their strength and of their contribution to the war. For example, in the “Treaty of Versailles” concluded after World War I, the victorious countries got a large amount of indemnity from Germany and divided its territory and overseas colonies. After World War II, the Allies decided to “allot war reparations according to the size of contribution and sacrifice.” As to division of colonies

and territories, the usual practice is that the country which first occupies them holds the right of distribution. Those places which have not been occupied are usually placed under the UN as trust territories.

*3. Division of Interests among the Countries Negotiating to End War*

In a war in which its outcome is not yet determined, the two sides can also decide

(1) “The Complete Works of Lenin” vol,. 39, People’s Press, 1986 edition, p. 357

to divide interests in peace talks. For example, for the Thirty-Year War, the “Peace of Westphalia” clearly carried the clauses for the two sides to divide post-war interests, adjust the territories of the German states among the victorious countries and handle the religious relationship of the Roman Empire and the national system of Germany.

Division of interests greatly affects post-war peace. Contradictions after the war will be less if the division is done right, otherwise, there will be more or even intensified contradictions. After the conclusion of several large wars in recent years, there have been profound contradictions to cause international turmoil and instability, all because of an unfair division of interests. After the Napoleon War, according to the “balanced” and “orthodox” principle, the great powers “divided loots and awards .. .nations being bought sold or ceded as long as the acts are fully in line with the rulers’ interest and wishes.” (1)  The division failed to look after the interests of small countries. Small countries joined the war for their independence, but their wish was mercilessly forgotten by big countries. Thus, they pointed the spearhead of struggle toward the great powers to turn the issue of nationalism into an essential political problem in Europe in the 19th century. The division of interest after World War I was most unreasonable, not only causing the international organization built for consolidating the outcome of war to be unable to operate but also leading the world to the outbreak of World War II.

**II. Restoration of Post-War Order**

In order to normally develop international relationships, the belligerent countries usually adopt a series of measures to restore its damage during the war and return it to normalcy as soon as possible. Judged by recent wars, the belligerent countries adopted the following methods:

First, re-establishing international relationships. Countries would suspend their normal contacts once they are in the state of war. After the war is ended, the two sides often conclude a treaty to terminate the state of war and restore normal relationships. Though having not concluded a treaty, some countries may use communique or other forms to announce the ending of such a state. For example, after World War II, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a joint communique on October 19, 1972 to end the state of war between them. The PRC and Japan issued a joint communique on September 29, 1973 to terminate their abnormal relationship. As undeclaration of war was very popular in modern local wars, most countries could easily restore their post-war order if they had not suspended their diplomatic relations even they were in the state of war. If the belligerent countries conclude a treaty before the war, they could be based on the impact of the war on their countries relationship to restore or revise it or sign a treaty.

1. “The Complete Works of Marx and Engels” vol. 2, People’s Press, 1957 edition, p. 641

Second, canceling the pertinent restrictive measures enacted during the war. In order to weaken the enemy, the two sides, when in the state of war, often adopt such measures as blockade, embargo and sanction between them to restrict the contacts in the other side’s favor. These measures include restricting the other side’s contacts with other related countries, freezing its deposits and fixed assets in the country’s banks, etc. When the war is concluded, these measures become meaningless and the two sides often actively cancel them.

Third, withdrawing military occupation of other countries. For example, in the Bruce-France War, in order to ensure that France timely paid reparations, Germany occupied part of France and withdrew from it when France had paid off the indemnity to normalize their relationship. After World War II, the Allied forces occupied Germany and Japan entirely. When the occupying countries and the occupied countries conclude a treaty to end the war or announce the ending of the state of war, the former either withdraw their forces or leave the troops behind as stationed forces.

**III. Establishing of International Mechanism**

Almost after all big wars, the involved parties would try to establish some kind of international mechanism to ensure that the ending of war is maintained. For example, after the Napoleon War, there was the Vienna System centered on “coordination of Europe” and characterized by the principle of “balanced” and “orthodox.” After World War I, there was the Versailles-Washington System characterized by protecting the interests of the victorious countries and dividing their spheres of influence. After World War II, there was the Yalta System characterized by dividing the spheres of influence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After the Korean War, in order to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement by all sides, the Commission of Military Armistice was established. It comprises ten senior officers from both Koreas to supervise the said implementation and negotiate the handling of violations. The most central substance of the systems maintaining post-war international peace has two points: One is establishing a related international organization, such as the League of Nations and the UN, by victorious countries to consolidate their fruits of triumph.. The other is arms control like the Treaty of Versailles restricting German arms. During and after World War II, in the agreements reached and treaties signed after a series of international conferences, the Allies restricted the arms of Fascist nations. In modern local wars, the concept of no-fly zones and security zones has emerged. To check the other side, some countries designate the no-fly zone to forbid the flight of airplanes or the security zone to prohibit the entry of armed forces in the war zone or its adjacent areas to prevent the belligerent troops from any approach or entering.

The international mechanism featuring the maintenance of the outcome of war is built upon the ratio of strength of all sides at the time when the war is ended and also reflects all sides’ demands for interests. Along with the change of the said ratio and the demands for adjustment brought by the change, the international mechanism will alter as well.

**IV. Punishment of War Crimes and War Criminals**

The so-called war crimes are the behaviors of war directors and conductors in violation of the publicly recognized law and rules, including the crime of war, crime of anti-humanity and genocide. Not only violating international law, these behaviors also run against the criminal law of the offenders‘ own country. The slaughter of the Jews and the people in the occupied areas by the Nazi Germans and the bloody killings of the Chinese people, including the Nanjing slaughter, by the Japanese militarists were examples of severe war crimes. All war crimes must be investigated and accounted for. As early as after the ending of World War I, the people of the victimized countries demanded to punish war crimes and the Treaty of Versailles called for investigating and affixing the responsibility of war criminals. After World War II, the international society is genuinely taking actions against war criminals.

The so-called war criminals are the war directors or conductors who had violated the law and rules of war. They can be individuals or governments or pertinent military or administrative departments. Punishment of war criminals is an important component of post-war arrangements as well as an essential measure to stop war and promote peace. After World War II, the Allies organized separate international criminal courts at Nuremberg, Germany and Tokyo, Japan to successively try and punish criminals of serious war crimes. .

**Section Five: The Guiding Principles for Ending a War**

**I. Gaining Favorable Conclusion and Avoiding Unfavorable Ending**

The basic basis for determining whether the conditions for ending of war are favorable or not is whether the war aim is protected or not. As long as the conditions are favorable to the war aim, the conclusion is considered favorable even after the war is ended but the war aim is not fully achieved. Thus, we should first clearly understand what is the war aim that we pursue and pay attention to the change of war aim along with the development of the war situation. Change of interest is the reason causing war to occur so that we must correctly control the time for ending the war. When we have had the conditions for closing the war, we should try to find out the other side’s attempt and conditions for ending the war so as to accurately assess the situation and bring a timely end to the war. Second, we should select the right form to conclude the war. We need to be based on the reality of the war to choose which form is in our favor -- to end the war by holding peace talks or by defeating the enemy. If our decision to solve disputes or contradictions is resolute and the posture is in our favor, winning is always the right form to conclude the war. However, while there is a leeway in the war, peace talk is always a better choice.

**II. Acquiring Large Interests with a Small Price**

Since war’s own development is uncertain and floating, whether we can accomplish our set aim with the expected price is also uncertain. Sometimes, we have to pay even a larger price for the set aim. The price, however, is not unlimited and any country or country group must consider the problem of being unable to carry the price tag, the ratio of effect and cost. We must watch out for two extremes when doing it. One is we are unwilling to pay the price, thereby causing us to fear or avoid fighting to start and end the war in unfavorable conditions. As there is no free lunch, it is impossible not to pay a certain price when taking the form of war to settle conflict of interest. Once we have decided to enter a war, we must be prepared to pay a price and force the other side to pay the same or a larger price as well. In a certain degree, whether we can end the war under the conditions in our favor is determined by whether a war director is willing to pay a higher price. The other is that we do not care about the amount of the price we have to pay. “At all prices” is merely a way of saying our determination for war, but in practice it is very unusual not to consider the cost. Nuclear arms have been used in war only once after their birth. Their categories and numbers have been doubled and redoubled in the past half century, but the restriction for employing them is also set higher and higher, which proves that a war director cannot but conscientiously consider the issue of cost.

**III. Coordinating Political Contention and Military Struggle to Create Favorable Strategic Posture for Ending of War**

Coordination of political contention and military struggle on the issue of the ending of war is to handle well the relationship between “fight” and “talk.” Without “fight” to lay the foundation, “talk” cannot be successful; without “talk” to set the goal, “fight” is aimless. “Fight“ is the foundation of “talk“ with the function of promoting “talk.“ ”Talk“ is to make “fight“ better and end “fight.” To conclude a war, “talk” is the goal and “fight” is the means. For a certain political need, we must sometimes give up a certain military victory or strive for an opportunity to gain a larger victory. Military affairs, however, have their own law of pursuing a triumphant future and could cause a contrary consequence to politics if not handled well. When selecting a political choice, we must leave a leeway for military struggle by developing military actions toward the direction that helps get political solutions and never abandon any favorable opportunity that can create conditions for political solutions. We should create an international environment in our favor and isolate the enemy to the maximum and weaken its position in political negotiation. By so doing, not only can we shorten the duration of war and reduce losses, we can also place ourselves in an active position to get a larger interest with a smaller price. At the time when the war enters its last stage, the enemy will often find ways to conduct diplomatic deception to conceal its real attempt and preserve and store up strength, or at a time suddenly launch military actions to create a posture in its favor. Thus, in political and diplomatic contentions, we must be good at identifying them and disclosing the enemy’s conspiracy to avoid being fooled.

**IV. Paying Attention to the Restrictive Effect of International Organization and International Regulations**

First, international organization, the UN in particular, is playing a growing, larger role in international security affairs.Protecting international peace and security to prevent mankind from the catastrophe of war is the purpose of the UN. The forms that it applies to stopping war usually include the following: The Security Council or the General Assembly appeals for ceasefire and passing resolution for stopping fighting; dispatches envoys for mediation; deploys peace-keeping troops; and conducts sanction, arms embargo or military suppressing actions. For example, the UN played an important role in ending Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Second, the International Law that represents the UN Charter is the essential legal foundation for ending wars. We must apply this law well and accept its restrictions. In the meantime, we must try to make the ending of war a result of legal significance. To change our own military victory as a fruit of legal effect and force the enemy to officially recognize it is an indispensable step to the victorious side.

**V. Preventing New Problems**

The so-called cropping up of new problems means the situations unexpected in the process of war-ending. For example, the enemy does not comply with the agreement and rekindles the war, and there is new international intervention or other surprises. To prevent these situations from happening and ensure the war situation in our favor, we usually need vigilance and deterrence to guard against the recurrence of unfavorable war situations. Truce does not mean the end of war. During truce talk, the enemy could regroup its forces and launch a new attack in an attempt to change the ending of the war. Hence, in order to guarantee a successful negotiation to end the war, on the one hand, we must keep vigilance to deal with the enemy’s military actions; on the other, in order to stabilize the state of truce, we must maintain deterrence to pressure the enemy to realize that it would be unprofitable to restart fighting. We must be well-prepared for possible international intervention as well. International intervention is often seen in wars. We must take it into consideration not only at the beginning and middle course of the war, but also at its end to prevent a reverse turn in war situation. For example, when the War of Liberation was about to end, Ma Zedong had fully estimated that the American and British forces might intervene so he “planned countermeasures and deployment against imperialism’s armed intervention.” Because we were prepared, the U.S. had scruples and withheld its intervention, which guaranteed our War of Liberation a triumphant ending.

**PART III**

**HIGH-TECH LOCAL WAR AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE**

**Chapter Twenty**

**Rise and Historical Position of High-Tech Local Wars**

Hi-tech local war is a brand new form of war, and it is a new stage in the development of the history of war. To correctly guide modern war, we should not only understand the general rules of war, but also know well the new characteristics and new rules of hi-tech local wars. It is very important to track down the history of war evolution, sum up and study the inner logic from the angle of historical connection of war development to form an accurate and concrete concept of a hi-tech local war, comprehensively understanding the historical inevitability of the rising of hi-tech local war today and its historical position, understanding systematically and profoundly the characteristics and rules of hi-tech local war, and implementing correct war guidance.

# **Section One: Historical Logic of the Evolution of the Form of War**

The form of war is the military expression of the movement of production method of human society, and war development is the inevitable result of the movement of contradiction in war. Generally speaking, a war in a complete sense has both the attributes of politics and economy and the attributes of military and technology. The two attributes of war constitute the basic contradiction in war. As the movement of contraction between productivity and production in relation to the means of production pushes forward, the development of the form of human society, the movement of contradiction between the attributes of politics and economy and the attributes of military and technology pushes forward the evolution of the form of war.

The development history of war of human beings shows that local war has developed and evolved from violent conflict in the earliest time of human existence. In late primitive society, because of the limitation of the level of productive technology, there was no strict distinction between weapon and production tool. The two sides in conflict mainly used stone-made cold weapons, as the history books describe “using stone as weapon.” After entering the slavery society, private ownership was established, classes came into form, and there came states. The formal and professional armed group of country, armed forces were born. The combat tool was also separated from the production tool, developing into special weaponry and equipment. Military action was put into national politics, becoming the “big issue of country” that needs careful preparation of decision-making institutes of a country and has its organization and plan, becoming a war with the attributes of politics and economy and the attributes of military and technology. From violent conflict to war, the process was from gradual change to sudden change, and this process completed the historic change from the violent conflict of the early time of human beings to the present.

As the technical means of war developed more and more, the scope of war gradually expanded, and the violence and destruction of war also increased day by day. The Thirty-year War in Europe (1618 to 1648) scattered to the whole of Europe. From the end of the Thirty-year War in Europe to the time before the explosion of the French Revolution in the 18th Century, because of the balance of forces maintained among the powers in Europe, plus the limitation of the system of mercenary and other social and political conditions of the time, the wars in Europe of this time were mainly local wars with limited sizes. In the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War in the 19th Century, as capitalist economy made its initial development and the sense of nationalism was strengthened, war became an action of the masses. Meanwhile, rifles and cannons that were easy to move were widely used, the means of combat were greatly improved with the industrial revolution, and so the size of local war was further expanded. After the Napoleonic Wars, until the explosion of the First World War, all the wars were local wars with different sizes and forms, such as the U.S.-Spain War (1898), the Japan-Russia War (1904-1905), the Britain-Boer War (1899-1902), and the Balkan War (1912-1913), etc. Generally speaking, before the 20th Century, in the long development process of war, though firearms replaced knives and spears, and the battlefield expanded from land to ocean and sky, because of the limitation of the level of social productivity, the social economy could not provide powerful material support for a war of world scale, yet, and economic systems and commercial trade did not part with its regional attributes. Therefore, war could not surpass the old regional boundary, and the scope of human war was limited to a local area.

The constant development of the attributes of politics and economy and the attributes of military and technology of war finally broke its regional boundary in the 20th Century and got into the door of world war. The historical track of war of human beings that had always extended to the track of local wars jumped to the new coordinate of the world war.

From the 60s and 70s of the 19th Century to the middle of the 20th Century, the capitalist world had two industrial revolutions, which greatly promoted the development of productivity. And the latest results were applied in the military field, bringing about huge improvements in weapons and equipment. Especially the birth of the tank, submarine, plane, airplane carrier, and chemical weapons and the appearance of new services and branches such as an aviation force, armored force, air-born force, and chemical force, etc.. The development of a railway transportation network and ocean navigation technology brought about motorization and mechanization to the battlefield mobility form of armed forces, and the brand-new combat form (lightning war) was born because of these developments. These had coordination among infantry, tank, and artillery, the coordination among army, navy, and air force, and rapid attack into deep areas. The battlefield developed from a flat battlefield to a multi-dimensional battlefield and the length and depth of the battlefront reached several hundred, even several thousand kilometers, and the size and scope of war expanded greatly because of this. Wired telephone, telegram, and wireless telephone and wireless telegram greatly enhanced the telecommunication level of the armed forces, pushing the level of combat command of armed forces onto a new stage. The development of productivity, the improvement of material technical conditions, and the great increase in population made it possible to draft larger armed forces. To the 30s and 40s of the 20th Century, the European large countries had already had several million and tens of millions of troops, accounting for 10 to 20% of the population. The largest establishment of army developed from group corps to army group (front army), even front army group. All these provided sufficient conditions for the war of human beings to leap from local scope to world scope. Those imperialist powers that had a conflict of interest in dividing the world could break the restriction of regional conditions and fight a comprehensive world war over the other side of an ocean or on another continent. In the process of foreign expansion, plundering colonies, and dividing the scopes of power, the imperial powers constituted a network of interest covering the whole world and huge camps with mutual threat, and they were prepared to launch an unprecedented war in the world. Therefore, two world wars that were unprecedented in size and fierceness broke out in the first part of the 20th Century. In the First World War, the factors such as political, economic, and scientific and technologic factors, were closely combined with military factors, and the war showed the unprecedented characteristic of comprehensiveness. The Second World War further pushed this comprehensiveness to the climax.

After the Second World War, as the international strategic pattern changed, the world war was gradually replaced by local war again. As far as the political and economic attribute of war is concerned, generally there are five developmental stages of local war, namely, the local war of fighting for the middle area under the Yalta mechanism, the local war under the circumstance of the confrontation of two major camps, the agent war during the time of the United States and the Soviet Union fighting for hegemony, the local war when the Cold War was going to end and East Europe collapsed, and the local war after the Cold War. During this process, as the economic globalization of the world developed, the mutual reliance of different countries and interest groups was further strengthened. The political and economic content of war developed towards limitation, and the size of war changed from local war with clear world war background in the 70s of the 20th Century to separating from world war in the 70s and 80s.

In the confrontation of the two major camps, the east and the west, in nearly half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union both made preventing the escalation of military confrontation the basic requirement for war guidance. The local war that had the attribute of confrontation of the east and the west showed the characteristics of limitation.

Though most wars had the background of comprehensive war, even nuclear war, they did not change into comprehensive wars. This is because both sides had huge weapon machines, they both developed nuclear weapons that were capable of destroying the other side, forming the nuclear war system of mutual assurance of destruction. Considering their own security, the United States and the Soviet Union both made preventing the escalation of war and nuclear war as the guiding principle of war, trying to avoid the nuclear war that would lead to perish together and establish the security mechanism of avoiding nuclear war. From 1971 to 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an “Agreement on Decreasing the Risk of Nuclear War,” an “Agreement on Preventing Nuclear War,” and other agreements and treaties. These agreements and treaties in the form of legal clause reflected the common demand of both the United States and the Soviet Union against nuclear adventure and preventing the out of control war after the Cuban missile crises in 1962.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibility of world war with the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union as the background in the pattern of the two poles was further lowered. The foundation of global confrontation of the two major military groups led by the United States and the Soviet Union is gone, the contradiction between the United States and Russia that had the strength and qualification to launch and conduct a world war, though they still have fierce contradiction and competition, does not have the attribute of comprehensive confrontation in the Cold War era any more. The fighting and competition of the powers have changed from the comprehensive confrontation in political, economic, military, ideological, and cultural fields between the east and the west in the time of two poles to the competition of comprehensive national strength led with science and technology and based on economy. The international political shock when the pattern of the two poles turned to a multi-pole pattern shows that they are partly out of control of the situation, namely, a series of domestic and local regional wars. The local wars after the Cold War were mostly civil wars and border territorial disputes. Their influence was limited to small sizes and low intensity and they were clearly limited. Some were just small-scale armed conflicts. According to statistics, these wars were mostly the civil wars in the Third World countries, accounting for over 80% of the total local wars after the Cold War. And the causes of the civil wars were mainly the result of intensification of contradiction of ethnic groups, tribes, and religions. Generally speaking, either the civil wars in the Third World countries or the border conflicts among them, though they raised wide concern of the international community, even the intervention of the forces of the large countries, compared with the similar wars in the Cold War era, they did not have world significance.

# **Section Two: Basic Causes of the Rise of High-Tech Local Wars**

Since the 70s of the 20th Century, the rising of a series of high and new technological groups with information technology as the core and their wide application in the military field have brought hi-tech attributes to local wars after the Second World War. The happening and development of hi-tech local wars after the Second World War produces a movement with clear color of time and reflects the change of civilization and the formation of today’s society. The development of world science and technology has brought about profound influence over war and reflects the adjustment and change of international competition methods and the development tendency of war becoming more and more controllable, small, and efficient.

**One, Development of Multi-pole International Strategic Pattern Produces Mutual Reliance and Control among Strategic Forces**

After the Second World War, the world strategic pattern has experienced three major changes. The first was the formal establishment of the two-pole pattern in the middle of the 1950s. The second time was in the late 60s and early 70s when the confrontation pattern of the two major camps of the east and the west turned into the pattern of confrontation of the two poles and the co-existence of three worlds. The third time was in late 80s when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had drastic changes, the pattern of the two-poles disappeared, and the world transformed to the pattern of multi-poles. As the two-pole pattern broke up and the end of the Cold War began, the international strategic forces accelerated its speed to split up and reorganize, becoming more and more diversified and scattered. International strategic patterns have more restriction over war. Though various contradictions covered in the two-pole pattern broke out suddenly after the Cold War, such as racial contradictions, religious contradictions, and territorial disputes, they spread all over the world and caused constant armed conflicts and wars. But because there is no background of fighting for hegemony by the superpowers, these armed conflicts and wars were usually conducted within a country or a region with low intensification, and their influence and scales were limited. Even if it is a war participated in by some large countries, because of unbalance of the opponent, they could hardly expand high intensification and engage the whole world. Besides, the tendency of economic integration of the world further deepens the mutual reliance among countries. The United Nations and regional security institutions play more and more important roles in restricting and controlling war, and the factors of controlling war are strengthened, and war is developing more clearly in the direction of limited goal and controllable scale.

**Two, Change of Today’s World Economy Changes Form of Seeking Interest of a Country, Leading War towards Small Scale**

After entering the industrial time, because the heavy dependence on energy and resources, the capitalist countries in Europe competed to divide and fight for colonies through military hegemony in order to plunder the resources and wealth of the colonial countries, to realize the possession of industrial resources and to control raw material markets and rapidly expand national strength. This is the important method to seek national interest and conduct international competition by the western countries in the industrial time. From the end of the Second World War to the 60s, this characteristic of international politics was still going on. Because of the development of oil and chemical industry and automobile and aviation industries, the fight and control over oil and other resources became intensified. The United States and the Soviet Union used their powerful military forces as the foundation of claiming hegemony in the world, and the international community still had the characteristic of modern times when hegemony powers controlled the world. In the pattern of two-poles, the arms race among the world powers had never ceased, and military force and the means of war were the important controlling forces to decide the international positions of different countries.

The information technology revolution arose since the middle 1970s and has gradually changed the foundation of national strength and profoundly changed the realizing method of national interest. As the information technology revolution greatly enhanced the efficiency of energy and resources, the importance of the fight over resources in international relationships decreased relatively. The world economic structure has made major adjustment and change. The electronic industry, new energy industry, space industry, and other hi-tech industries rise and develop vigorously. The ratio of the traditional first and second industries lowers the economic globalization tendency and is constantly strengthened. The globalization of production has become an important production means; the structure of international trade changes greatly with the percentage of primary products decreasing and the position of hi-tech products going up. Meanwhile, the technology trade has developed rapidly, with high technology transfer as the main content, and its speed of increasing is higher than product trade, becoming one of the important forms of international trade. Under the social economic condition where the information industry develops rapidly, the countries with advanced information technology, using developing countries’ dependence on their technology, export out-of-date technology in exchange for the raw materials and primary products from developing countries, seeking economic interest in an unbalanced way. So, economic and technologic ways become effective means for the powerful countries to exploit and enslave other countries and to seek huge interest, and have more and more influence over the development of comprehensive national strength, eventually leading to the major transfer of the center of national strength. In the new international environment, the risk and limitation of solving international problems with the means of war alone has become clearer and clearer. Under the social circumstance of rapidly rising information economies, the military and political cost of seeking comprehensive military victory and the cost of delaying economic, scientific, and technologic development have far exceeded the gain of comprehensive military victory. Under the new social economic circumstance, the foundation of national real strength is built on the real strength of economy and technology; and the threat and damage to the economic and technologic system of an enemy country can also have the effect of launching war. Compared with the means of war, scientific and technologic war, economic war, trade war, and talent war sometimes are more flexible and highly efficient in solving international contradictions and fighting for economic interests, showing more advantage. Therefore, in the local wars after the 80s, especially in the local wars after the end of the Cold War, some countries tried to use hi-tech means to get high-efficient goals with medium or low military confrontation.

**Three, Today’s Science and Technology Get into War Field, Pushes Weapon and Equipment and Combat Method to Make Periodic Breakthrough, Changing War Form Fundamentally**

After the Second World War, with the great impact of two scientific and technologic revolutions, a series of high technologies led by information technology developed rapidly. This included precision guiding technology, space technology, new material technology, and stealth technology, etc.. They are widely used in the military field, pushing weapon and equipment and combat methods to weed through the old to bring forth the new in confrontation on a battlefield. And to leap forward constantly from one stage to another, pushing mechanized firepower war to hi-tech information war.

In the early days of the birth of nuclear weapons and missiles, because their technologies were not mature, yet, their applied fields were limited, so the wars of human being were still the mechanized wars under ordinary technologic conditions. Under the formation of the Cold War pattern of the two major camps of the east and the west and the development of nuclear technology, the war got into the stage of conventional wars under the condition of nuclear deterrence. Because of the mutual nuclear deterrence, both side tried hard to avoid direct fighting and constantly put forward various strategies of nuclear deterrence. With the background of intensification of a nuclear arms race, the projection technologies of nuclear weapons made constant progress, including the technologies of solid fuel rockets, engines, high-power nuclear warheads, coasting guiding systems, electronic parts, reentry technology, and multiple warhead technology, etc. All kinds of missiles were developed and equipped for troops, preparing rich material and conditions for missiles to become the leader on a battlefield. In the fourth Middle East War in 1973, missile weapons were massively used, becoming the main firepower attacking means of controlling the sky, the sea, and attacking tanks. Meanwhile, information technology became mature day by day, pushing the application of information in ammunition and combat platforms, while preparing conditions for the information application in command and control. In the 60s and 70s, computer technology developed rapidly, the huge computers were made and they quickly became integrated and networked. Photoelectric technology represented by laser came into being and was applied. The rise of satellite and remote sensing technologies helped the communication means have new breakthroughs. The military powers began to establish automated command systems to enhance the comprehensive efficiency of various combat forces. After entering the 1980s, the development of military information technology and automated command systems went further. In the field of military detection technology, there came detection equipment controlled by computer and the informational single combat platform and weapon system. The informational platform can not only detect and track targets, but also use long-range missile or guided torpedoes to conduct out-of-vision attacks at targets. In the military telecommunication field, there came command, control, telecommunication, and intelligence systems, predicting that after the informational ammunition and combat platforms, the traditional battlefield command and control method would have profound revolution. The C4ISR system has got into every corner of war, becoming the head and center for controlling the use of war forces and the multiplier of war forces. To attack an enemy’s informational command system became a new combat method, pushing war to expand into the field of the confrontation of C4ISR. The previous struggle in electromagnetic fields with missile attacks and defense as the main content developed to the command and control war based on C4ISR. The appearance of information weapons and the informational battlefield not only changed war form fundamentally, but also enhanced combat efficiency greatly, laying material technological foundations for the control and minimization of war.

**Four, Contradiction Movement of War Goal and War Means Pushes forward Birth of High-efficient War Form, Causing Fundamental Change of War Form**

War is the highest means to seek interest. In the process of fitting in political goals and interest demands, the means of war turn out more and more new means that have higher ratios of cost and effect. The contradiction movement of interest goal and the means of war and the efficiency principle of war decide the development direction of war and the evolution of war, moving the wars after the Second World War towards hi-tech constantly.

After the Second World War, the super destructive power of nuclear weapons made its use limited. The former United States President Truman believed that if the Cuban missile crisis escalated to a nuclear war, in the first 18 hours of the war, that West Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States would have 150 million people killed. Though the United States was superior to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons at that time, if a nuclear war broke out, no country could avoid the destiny of destruction. There is sharp conflict between the super destructive power of the means of war and the thinking of the war launcher who wants to get his interest on one hand, but fears destruction on the other. It requires both sides of war to restrict the escalation of war and avoid nuclear war. Therefore, the war of human beings is forced to choose conventional war under the threat of nuclear weapon.

But in the practices of conventional wars after the Second World War, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War launched by the United States, and the Afghan War when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, all of them had huge political and military costs and all of them ended in failure. These results showed that conventional war continued from history still faced strategic crisis and the means of war that make military occupation as the goal can hardly achieve its war goal with efficiency, even with conventional means. Especially in the international environment that the focus of international competition is continuously turning to economic and technologic fields, the contradiction between war goals and the means of war is particularly shown in the contradiction between the high strategic cost of the means of war and the political goal of serving the competition of national strength. So in a war, people pay more attention to the ratio of cost and effect, trying to gain the comprehensive strategic effect in political, diplomatic, economic, and psychological fields with possibly less cost and investment. The new technology revolution represented by information technology brings the great development of military technology and the new breakthrough of combat means. The war of hi-tech attack based on informational weapons and equipment has stepped onto the stage of war. When Israel bombed the Iraqis’ nuclear reactor, the United States attacked Libya, the multi-nation forces in the Gulf War attacked the vital points of the command and control system of Iraq, and when NATO launched air raids on Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War, it showed that hi-tech is providing more effective means for realizing military goals, and it was possible to avoid the major political and military cost that traditional military occupation had to pay. High efficiency brings the war of hi-tech attack. From the “surgical” attack in the 80s to the remote precision attack based on informational command and control networks and the confrontation in command and control fielding the 90s, it marks the essential change of the war of mechanized firepower to the hi-tech war led by information technology.

## Section Three: Strategic Position of High-Tech Local Wars

**One, the Rise of Hi-tech Local War Is a Historic Leap of Development over Current War.**

The half century after the Second World War is the period of great change that is most dramatic in the development history of war. In merely 50 years or so, the war of human beings made its historic turn and breakthrough. In this period of time, the possibility of a local war turning into a world war was decreasing all the time. Local war became smaller in scale, and the war of human beings changed from approaching world war to getting away from world war. Meanwhile, under nuclear threat, conventional weapons became popular, again, and they were improved rapidly, realizing the essential breakthrough to the development of informational weapons and bringing about essential change to combat means, methods, and ways. The hi-tech war led by information technology became the basic means for military powers to use force, initially realizing another epic leap in the development history of war.

After the Second World War, the newly born nuclear weapon, the initial informational weapon, and the mature mechanized weapon all appeared on the stage of war. As today’s world makes its transition from industrial time to information time, in the practice of war, the positions of three weapons had major changes. In the local wars of the 50s and 60s, mechanized conventional weapon took the leading position. Though the missile weapon with information-restricted energy release had appeared, they were only used in small range and small scale. The form of war was of mechanized firepower. Nevertheless, at that time, hi-tech local war had started to form. The form of war in the 70s and 80s was in the embryonic stage of hi-tech local war. In the fourth Middle East War in the middle of the 70s, missile weapons became the leading weapons on the battlefield, changing the combat method of mechanized war; and tactical missile forces became an important part of combat formation. This was a local essential change of the war of mechanized firepower. Later on, in the Israel-Lebanon War in the early 80s, improved information and destructive weapons began to be the leading weapons, making another local essential change in the war of conventional firepower. In the Gulf War in the early 90s, the information weapon system with C4ISR at its core was widely applied in war. The integral combat based on computer networks became more mature, and the emphasis and focus of war were conducted around fighting for the control of information rights, achieving the essential leap from the mechanized war of firepower to the hi-tech war with information technology at its core.

**The rise of hi-tech local war is completed on the background of nuclear threat.**

Since the Korean War, war got into the new phase of war under the circumstance of nuclear threat. This is the first revolution in the development history of the contemporary world. Under the cloud of nuclear war, war began to leave the world war and get onto the track of local war to come back to conventional war and finally got into the door of hi-tech local war with the help of information technology. This was realizing the second revolution in the development of the contemporary world. As information technology develops and it has more influence on the function of nuclear weapons, the discharge of nuclear energy will also be included into information control and applied in the struggle over the control of information rights (such as the electromagnetic pulse weapon being developed). Nuclear weapons may walk out of deterrence and be used in actual combat. But this kind of nuclear war is the nuclear war included in hi-tech local wars, and its essence is hi-tech local war. All in all, the first revolution of war after the Second World War is the foundation of the second revolution, and the second revolution consolidates and develops the results of the first revolution, being more fundamental. The most historic turn of the track of war after the Second World War is concentrated on the leap from war under industrial technologic circumstances to hi-tech local war.

**Two, Rise of Hi-tech Local War Is a Reflection of Historical Logic of War Development in Contemporary Times**

The rise of hi-tech local war after the Second World War shows clear characteristics of the time. Looking back at the development of war, it is not hard to see that the development of war after the Second World War showed the major historic turn: from getting closer and closer to world war to gradual staying away from world war. This is mainly based on actual combat to the confrontation of comprehensive national strength, stressing both actual combat and deterrence. From the war of plundering and dividing spheres of influence by imperialist countries to the war of hegemony countries, to seeking influence and control, and from the war of higher and higher battlefield destructive capability to the war that stresses strategic efficiency. Their development personality is shown particularly in the developing cycle shortened; stressing limited political goals, controllable war size, small size, and the integral application of war forces while seeking comprehensive strategic efficient goals, informational combat means, etc.

These major turns and characteristics of the development of war after the Second World War comprehensively showed the new demands of international struggle when the global integration process was sped up and the mutual dependence in international relations was deepened further, and reflected the new change of the form of war under hi-tech circumstances, the new adjustment of strategic values, and the new development of war guidance. This embodied with concentration the inner logic of the development of war. The war history several thousand years shows that war is the means of seeking interest, and in the process of fitting for political goal and interest demand, the form of war constantly practices the principle of survival of the fittest, producing the new form of war with a higher ratio of cost and effect. The contradictory movement of interest goals and the means of war and the efficiency principle of war decides the evolution of the form of war and the development direction of war. After the Second World War, local war becomes more and more small-sized, highly-efficient, and hi-tech. This reflects the inner logic of war.

The rise of hi-tech local war after the Second World War is the natural result of the basic contradictory movement of today’s world, and it is the product of mutual functions of various factors of international politics, economy, science and technology, and the military after the Second World War. The evolution of the international political and economic pattern constantly caused war and controlled the size and level of war at the same time. The progress of science and technology materialized into new military means and molded the war according to political requirements. The contradictory movement of the means of war and war goals brought about the birth of the highly-efficient form of war, causing essential changes in the form of war. The rise of hi-tech local war reflects the historic change the war makes in accordance with the development of the times under the social and historical circumstances of the rise of today’s high technology and the progress of production. The process of the rise of hi-tech local war is the process of different countries and peoples seeking to use force to expand or defend national interests on the international stage that changes dramatically. It is the process of war fitting into the changing political scene with the help of the latest scientific and technologic results and new means continuously. It is the process of war getting away from the world war, developing towards small size and controllability. It is the process of the mechanized war in industrial times turning to the hi-tech local war in information times constantly. And it is the process of constant renewal of destructive means on a battlefield, constant expansion of confrontation fields, and the renewal of, and extension of war.

**Three, Hi-tech Local War Is an Important Phase that Links the Chain of the History of War**

Looking at the development history of war, we can see that the form of war has always changed from lower phase to higher phase along with the constant progress of politics, economy, science and technology, and culture of human beings. It has experienced the cold weapon time, hot weapon time, hot nuclear weapon time, and now the time of hi-tech local war with information technology at its core. After the Second World War, led by two scientific and technologic revolutions, the international economy, politics, and social life constantly changing dramatically, making the international interdependent relationships going deeper and the process of global integration developing rapidly. Any conflict and war may cause fierce response and shaking of the international community, and no country can hurt the national interest of other countries all the way and benefit itself. The form of war that tries to achieve its goal of war at all costs and seeks unlimited destructive effect is going into a dead end, contrary to the progress of the civilization of mankind, and it will certainly be replaced by more controllable and smaller wars. The rise and development of hi-tech local wars after the Second World War is the product that matches the characteristics of this social and historical condition and time, and it is the form of war that matches the phase of the development of human society.

Looking at it from the social and historical condition in which the hi-tech local war rises, the hi-tech local war is a war of a new type that is different from any other local war in history. It is the military struggle and form that human rationality controls the scale of war when the military capability of human beings is enhanced at an unprecedented level. It is a war with the comprehensive characteristics of limited goals. The space of war is expanded without limit, and borders between front and rear areas are blurred. The military and non-military is blended into one, the whole enemy side is within the scope of attack, and war has become a contest of high rhythm of all time and the competition of minutes and seconds in time. It is the war conducted with all-new informational war means, and the control of information rights has become the decisive factor for the result of war.

Hi-tech local war is an important phase that connects the chain of war for mankind. As one of the links that connects the chain in the history track of human war, one end of it connects the traditional war which appeared after the birth of a country, the other end links the war of a new kind with all-new intentions and extensions on the background of human social civilization that has had fundamental change. The several wars that have happened from the early 90s of the 20th Century to the turn of the new century showed that the form of hi-tech war with contemporary high and new technology, especially the new information technology at its core, has stepped onto the stage of war. Hi-tech local war is a war when human society has major changes, and it traces its evolution as it predicts the developmental direction of future wars. We should know that the major turn of contemporary war has not been completed, and there will be more profound change. From now on, as hi-tech develops rapidly, information production develops, the process of global integration goes deeper, the political content and violent form of war, even the intention of war will have brand new content, and there will be newer forms of comprehensive informational war.

**Four, Hi-tech Local War Is a Military Reflection of Production Means Changing from Industrial Times to Information Times.**

Hi-tech local war is the natural reflection of the historical transition of the civilization form of human society in the military field. The foundation of happening, development, and form evolution of local war after the Second World War lies in the change from the production of industrial times to the production of information times.

The production of industrial times changes to the production means of information times, it intensified the unbalanced development of world politics and economy, creating the environment for the happening and development of contemporary local war, providing new means for military struggle, and promoting the major development of contemporary war. After the Second World War, new technology revolutions came one after another; the world faced a brand new change, and some countries rose rapidly because of rapid development of their economy and technology. Some countries missed the opportunities, and their national strength went down drastically. In particular, because of the difficulties in economic development and the chaotic situation in domestic reform, the Soviet Union collapsed, breaking up the pattern of two-poles, and causing a new unbalance and turmoil of international forces. The development of productive, new kinds of management pounded the old management system and means, and intensified the contradiction and turmoil of some underdeveloped regions. Meanwhile, new productivity provided new violent means for military struggle, and the change of human production means brought about the change of the form of war after the Second World War. On one hand, in the development of an international community, the contradiction intensified, causing war and putting up demand for small-size, controllability, and efficiency of war. On the other hand, new military means provided material and technologic possibilities for the new demand that matched the military struggle of the times. The new form of war was produced under the mutual function of politics, economy, and military of the times. It is the product of the transition from an industrial civilization to an information civilization, and reflects the transition and change from the war under industrial technologic conditions to war under information technologic conditions. This change is especially shown in: (1), war changes from constantly seeking increased destructive capability to seeking enhancement of war effect. In the development history of war, until the 40s of the 20th Century, war had been developing on the track of constantly seeking increased destructive capability. In the late period of the Second World War, nuclear weapons appeared, the super destructive capability of war back-lashed and denied itself, forcing the trace of war to make a turn, starting to develop in a controllable direction. People demanded to get the comprehensive strategic effect in political, diplomatic, economic, and psychological fields at minimum cost and investment, bringing about a development stage of war that began to be small and efficient. (2), the confrontation means on the battlefield changed from mainly destruction to the combination of soft and hard destruction, and soft destruction became more and more prominent. In war history before the Second World War, the destructive means on the battlefield was mainly shown as the hard destruction of the struggle of blood and fire. As the information technology that is used on conventional weapons and equipment improved and upgraded, the form of soft destruction rose on the battlefield and became more and more mature. Electronic warfare and information suppression became the destructive form that became as important as hard destruction. After entering the 90s, the fight over the control of information became the focus of confrontation on the battlefield, the soft destructive confrontation of reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, sabotage and anti-sabotage, control and anti-control became the focus of victory on the battlefield, and soft destruction played a more and more important role in war. (3), the form of war changed from military occupation to sheer attacking. As war develops in the direction of efficiency, the form of war of military occupation develops towards the form of war of hi-tech military attacking. In 1981, Israel used 14 F-16 and F-15 fighter jets and “smart bombs” to successfully attack the Iraqi nuclear reactor. In 1985, Israel sent 8 F-15 fighters and air-raided the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, after flying over 2,400 kilometers. In 1986, the United States used the latest electronic confrontation means and out-of-sight precision attack capability to attack Libya twice. In 1991, the multi-national forces led by the United States troops launched the Gulf War with massive strategic air raids. In 1999, NATO conducted strategic air raids against Yugoslavia for 78 days. The development of hi-tech military means enhances the strategic efficiency of military attacking forms. After the Cold War, the form of war of military attack that has the help of high transparency on the battlefield and remote precision attack capability has very much replaced the form of war of military occupation and become the first choice of war. (4), contemporary combat forces move into integral and informational directions. Along with the rapid development of space technology and information technology and their application in the military field, the battlefield of local war is gradually moving from ground, air, water surface, under water to electromagnetic field and outer space, showing the characteristics of multi-dimensions of land, sea, air, sky, and electromagnetic fields. The coordinated application of combat forces constantly becomes joint and integral. As the military information technology develops rapidly, C4ISR systems provides material guarantee for the integral application of pluralistic combat forces, developing the integral combat further based on informational systems.

**Chapter Twenty-One**

**Characteristics of Modern High-Tech Local Wars**

The basic characteristics by which the local war under hi-tech circumstances differentiates from the war under general technological circumstances and the world war are “hi-tech” and “local.” The former is shown in the high technology in the material and technical foundation of war, including massive application of hi-tech and new weapons and equipment and widely using hi-tech and new technology to upgrade the old military systems. The latter is shown in that war is limited in local areas, and the goal, scale, means, and the time and space of direct conflict of war are all pretty limited. These two basic characteristics decide the basic direction of the future development of modern hi-tech local war.

**Section One: Goal of War is More Limited by Political and Economic and Other Factors, and Controllability of Local War under High-Tech Circumstances is Increased**

One of the important characteristics of local war under hi-tech circumstance is that its controllable tendency is more and more increased.

The controllability of hi-tech local war comes mainly from the limited goal of war and hi-tech means of war. As for limited goals of war, in a hi-tech local war, the connection between military and politics, economy and diplomacy is closer. Any corner on the earth has a war, it will immediately draw the concern and response from the whole world. The development of war and the evolution of international political patterns are closely connected. Once regional crisis and armed conflict lose control, it is very easy to lead to an internationally complicated situation, forming multiple restrictions on war. Even if military powers and military allies have power, military strength and economic strength, they cannot use the means of war without restriction and at their free will. It is already hard to conquer the opponent completely by simply relying on military force and technological privilege. Military action has become a bargaining counter in politics and diplomacy, and it can hardly exceed the limit of political goals. The result of military action is usually a stage towards the destination of political resolution. And military confrontation will eventually return to the way of political resolution. As the world economic integration develops rapidly, the mutual dependence of economic interests of the nations goes deeper. The international cooperation of manufacturing, the transnational transaction of capital, and the global exchange of goods push forward the mutual infiltration and merge the economic interests of the nations, and the countries related with war have to consider the historical trend of the evolution of international political, economic, and military patterns, and they have to consider the increase and decrease of the strategic interests of all parties during the war and after wartime. The high investment, high cost, and high risk of war do not permit a long-drawn-out war to go on or expand and escalate freely. No party is willing to let war burn down its economy and to get stuck in “the mud of war.” As far as the nature of hi-tech means of war is concerned, the precision attack on important military targets has replaced the attack and occupation of cities and areas and carpet bombing; to gain the control of information on the battlefield is more important than massively destroying energetic forces of the enemy. To destroy the resistance will of the enemy is more important than comprehensively stripping the military capability of the enemy; and the great enhancement of the capability of joint operation and command and control has greatly enhanced the controllability of the operation on the battlefield.

Besides, the system of international law is perfected more and more and the mechanism of crisis control and preventing the proliferation of massive destructive weapons of the international community is becoming more mature. These have increased the restriction over war. Although international law, especially the law of war, has limited function in front of power, both parties of war will use it as an important tool for achieving the intention of war and controlling the escalation of war. Though some war launchers used force on other countries without the approval of the United Nations, the legal function, dialogue function, peacekeeping function, and arms control function of the United Nations in resolving international disputes cannot be replaced by any other international organization. The rapid development of modern media technology has greatly increased the social transparency of war, and the opinion of people and international opinion have clearly increased its restriction on war.

The controllability of hi-tech local war is relative. Under certain circumstances, it is possible that local war gets out of control and escalates. In a long period of time in the future, the history of war, like the two world wars, may be out of sight. Nevertheless, because the enhancement of effect of the means of war and destructive power stimulate the application of the means of war, a war with considerable scale and intensity will not be out of sight.

**Section Two: Massive Application of High and New Technology Weapons and Equipment has Brought about and is bringing about a Series of Profound Changes in Ways and Methods of Operation**

The rapid development of new and high technology in the world gave birth to a large group of new and high technology groups, providing material and technological foundation for the armed forces of countries to develop new and hi-tech weapons and speed up the upgrading of weapons and equipment. The massive application of new and hi-tech weapons and equipment has greatly enhanced the capabilities of the armed forces in comprehensive monitoring, remote dimensional mobility, precision attack in great depth, high-efficient comprehensive protection, comprehensive and rapid safeguarding, and automated command and control, and has powerfully promoted the upgrading of combat ways and methods.

The break-through progress of modern reconnaissance and monitoring has greatly expanded the time range, air space, and frequency range of reconnaissance, the knowledge and sensing effect of the integral reconnaissance detection system for outer space, air, land, sea, and underwater which has been enhanced greatly. The main combat platform is compatible with universal high technology, effectively enhancing the mobile capability, rapid response capability, survival capability, and all-weather and all-time attacking capability of the main combat weapons and equipment. The fourth-generation fighter plane and other air platforms with the main characteristics of stealth, supersonic cruise, and non-conventional power, as well as the sea combat platform represented by stealth warships and submarines of new types, and other combat platforms of new generations mostly have comprehensive sensors, computers, high-efficient ammunition, stealth materials, electromagnetic armor, infrared detectors, and navigation positioning equipment, and their combat effects have largely exceeded the past. The development of hi-tech aviation weapons has made the military aviation field a “rendezvous place” of hi-tech weapons. For example, in the 56 weapons of the hi-tech weapons of the United States troops in the Gulf War, the air weapons or the weapons functioning through air accounted for 44, accounting for 78%, promoting the “air operation” of war. Air and outer space forces are becoming the main forces on the future battlefield and taking more and more strategic tasks concerning the overall situation, and the air and outer space battlefields are confirming their new leading positions. The development of jumbo long-range transportation planes and air refueling planes makes it possible to timely transport rapid response troops at trans-continental distances. The precision guiding weapons led by cruise missiles and other weapons that are launched out of defense range, and the aviation weapons with satellite navigation systems are gradually developing towards multi-function, self-reliant, flexible, small sized, and intelligent, capable of destroying the key targets in enemy deep areas, even strategic deep areas with high precision. They have become the basic attacking means and main attacking weapons in future hi-tech local wars, making remote non-contact combat, especially missile combat, the main combat means and method. In the air raid of NATO against Yugoslavia, in the first 3 days only, the warships, submarines, and B-52H strategic bombers launched over 400 cruise missiles. Advanced dim-light night vision equipment and infrared heat-vision equipment was widely used, and night operation was paid great attention. Automated command systems achieved a pretty high extent of real-time intelligence collection, computerized information processing, intellectualized command decision-making, and digital telecommunication networks, greatly enhancing the automation of combat command, intelligence collection and processing, battlefield telecommunication, and weapons control, etc. and becoming the “cohesive” factor of various weapons and equipment and “multiplier” of various combat capabilities. The weapons of new concepts represented by strong laser weapons, high-energy microwave weapons, energetic destructive “zero-missing” weapons and gene weapons have developed rapidly and are being applied into combat gradually. They will also provide new combat means and models for air defense, anti-missile operations, ground offensive and defense, electronic warfare, and information warfare.

In the operation that uses large amounts of new and hi-tech weapons and equipment, there is a tendency of change from linear combat as the main format to non-linear combat. This tendency of change from the format of mainly relying on ground combat to reach the final victory to the format of mainly relying on informational attack and air attack to rapidly end the war, is a tendency of change from the thinking based on concentrating forces and seeking local quantitative superiority to the thinking of concentrating firepower, gathering energy, and seeking qualitative superiority and overall operational effectiveness. A tendency of change from stressing the massive destroying of enemy energetic forces to focusing on attacking enemy key points and paralyzing the overall combat system of the enemy. There is a tendency of change from the operational procedure of achieving statistic, campaign, and strategic operational goals of three layers to the more and more blurring, even blending, of the borders of the operational goals of three layers, etc. These development tendencies are all the major changes in combat methods and ways after the massive application of hi-tech weapons and equipment.

**Section Three: Factors of War Become More and More Informational, and Informational War Will Become the Basic Form of Local War under High-Tech Circumstances**

Information technology is the general comprehensive technology with electronic technology and micro-electronic technology as foundation and combining computer technology, telecommunication technology, and control technology. It is the grand total of all the technologies for realizing the functions of gaining, exchanging, processing, and applying information. As information technology develops rapidly and is widely applied in the military field, the level of information of the factors of war is higher and higher. Compared with combat platforms, as a strategic resource, information has a higher and higher position in war.

The informationalization of the factors of hi-tech local wars is first embodied in weapons and equipment, especially in the informationalization of the main weapons. Modern hi-tech weapons and equipment all rely on computers to enhance their controllability, response speed, precision level, and destructive capability. We can say that every piece of new and hi-tech weaponry is supported and relies on information technology. There are as many as 30 computers in a M1A1 main tank; and there are as many as over 60 computers on an F-15 fighter plane. The United States Armed Forces have installed 70% of over 600 kinds of electronic warfare equipment they developed on planes, and the cost of electronic equipment on their aviation combat weapons accounts for 50% to 70% of their total cost.

Secondly, it is embodied in the informationalization on the battlefield. People use digitalized technology to change various information of battle into digital information and connect the multi-dimensional battlefield into an information system through radio stations, fiber-optic telecommunication, and satellite communication, etc. realizing the integration of the telecommunication system, command and control system, intelligence transmission system, computer stations, databases on all levels, and all the end users in the whole battlefield. In “the Desert Fox” operation, the supreme commanding institute of the United States almost realized the real-time knowledge of the basic situation of the battlefield, though separated from the Persian Gulf by 8 time zones, about 20,000 kilometers away. Digitalized soldiers have micro-telephone and earphones on their helmets, and they can get the superior’s instructions and report to their superiors at any time, and they have computer monitors in front of their eyes, and they can tell single soldiers his accurate position on the ground and new situations on the battlefield.

Thirdly, it is embodied in the informationalization in command and decision-making. The military information system with computers at its core installs some human intelligence in computer chips. It can not only rapidly collect and process various intelligence and information, automatically transmit order and report situations, and make high speed calculations, but it can also help commanders and staff members to make combat plans, simulate combat processes, select the best plan, automatically guide combat troops and attacking systems to detect targets, track targets, select attacking targets, and conduct destruction evaluation.

Besides, it is also embodied in the informationalization of participating in war. The informationalization of war changes the way of participating in a war, and battlefield space and non-battlefield space merge together. Even non-professional soldiers can participate in Internet war, hacker war, and computer virus war by moving mice and typing in the computer rooms far away from the combat battlefield.

The future hi-tech local war will be prepared and conducted around the collection, processing, distribution, and protection of information, and seizing and maintaining control of information will become the center and focus of operation. Information is not only the foundation of command and decision-making, but also the precondition for the effect of weapon systems to fully function, and it is a means of directly attacking enemy information targets and an important resource of influencing the overall situation of war. Information superiority will become an important factor of the result of combat, and informational combat changes into an important combat model, from the original auxiliary means, and it is in the whole process of war. The party that possesses information superiority will have the initiative of operation, while the party that loses information superiority can hardly avoid being defeated. The capacity of information warfare will become the core factor of the armed forces, and the level of digitalization of the armed forces has vital influence over the level of combat capacity.

**Section Four: The Imbalance of the Development of Military Forces and Technology Level of Two Sides of a Conflict Makes Non-Symmetrical Combat the Basic Model of Local War under High-Tech Circumstances**

As the distance of science and technology, economy and comprehensive national strength between developed countries and developing countries increases, the unbalanced military forces will exist for a long time. Some military powers constantly expand their military forces. The strong become stronger, and the weak become weaker. Their distance of military strength is larger and larger. There is even “generation difference” of times. For example, in the Kosovo War, one side of the war was the most powerful military group in the world consisting of 19 developed countries, with NATO led by the United States. Its total economic strength was 700 times that of Yugoslavia, and its total military strength was 400 times that of its enemy. It used all the new and hi-tech weapons except for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It conducted 78 days of high intensity remote air attacks on Yugoslavia, and the hi-tech weapons used accounted for over 50% of its total equipment. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia had only a population of little over 10,000,000, with 100,000 troops, and its total quality of weapons and equipment were backward by at least one to two generations compared with its opponent, and its number was far less than its opponents’, too. This was a non-symmetrical war in which a strong military group went against a weak and small sovereign country, hi-tech against middle- and low-tech, air raids mainly using aviation forces and missiles against the air defense operation mainly using ordinary weapons. To study the winning method for the future war, one has to find out the way in this real, developing, and changed rules of war.

In recent years, the theory and views of non-symmetrical combat get more and more attention of the armed forces of the countries. The meaning of non-symmetry is not limited to combat forces, but also includes operational field, combat weapons, combat forms, and combat methods, etc. “Joint Operation Guideline” of the United States Armed Forces requires the commander of the joint forces “to seize the opportunity of conducting non-symmetrical action” to use different services and all combat means to conduct non-symmetrical combat at different times and in different forms to try to get the initiative, lower damage, and rapidly collapse and defeat the enemy.

In this non-symmetrical combat in hi-tech local war, the stronger side will pay more attention to applying its advantage, comprehensively mobilizing and applying all non-symmetrical combat strength, technical means, and combat forms to try to avoid getting into passiveness and try to lower the casualties of its troops and the damage to its equipment -- trying to defeat the opponent with one blow and rapidly achieving its strategic intention. Meanwhile, the weak side will also face the reality, avoid the enemy’s advantage and attack the enemy’s weak point, apply its unique advantage, and try to gain the battlefield initiative with non-symmetrical means and combat methods. The relations between the strong and the weak, the good and the bad, and the high and the low are relative. New and hi-tech weapons and equipment have their limitation, and the strong enemy has its weak side, too. The weak force can certainly apply its advantage against enemy’s weak point, use tactics and strategies, improve combat methods to lower damage and win the victory.

In the afterwards review report of “Alliance Force” operations, the United States Department of Defense said, Yugoslavia mainly used non-symmetrical means to fight. “These methods caused a lot of serious difficulties for our troops, and one of the lessons that we can take is, in the future, conflict, we should think beforehand that we may face similar non-symmetrical challenges.” As we can see, the strong is also afraid of the non-symmetrical means from the weak to limit or sabotage its application of its advantage and to use its weak points. This is the reason why non-symmetrical combat is paid great attention by both the strong and the weak.

**Section Five: Direct Combat Space of War Decreases Gradually while Related Space of War Expands Constantly**

The so-called space of war is the objective environment of preparing and conducting war. Space of war is also divided into the combat space of direct offensive and defensive actions and the related space of conduction of war. Compared with wars in the past, the direct combat space of the local war under hi-tech circumstance is decreasing gradually, while the related space of war is expanding constantly. The campaign space of war is decreasing, while strategic space is expanding.

Looking at several local wars under hi-tech circumstances which recently happened in the world, the precision and destructive effect of weapons are greatly enhanced, the target area of direct attack of military force is more and more shown in spotted form, and the attacking targets of a war are usually concentrated in a country, a region, or certain key location, some key targets, even a single target within a specific range. The attack on planned targets also changes the “comprehensive coverage” and “carpet bombing” in the past; instead, it is to carefully select the vital part to conduct precision attacks.

The decreasing of combat space like this is the important display of the limitation of the local war under hi-tech circumstances. There are many reasons, such as, war usually does not make occupying the opponent’s territory as the goal. Limited political goals control the unlimited extension of military attack ranges. Rather intriguing international relations and world economic integration bring about related interests which help to control the escalation and expansion of war. The international community’s reaction, especially the people of a concerned country, appeal for the morality of war restricts more and more the random bombing on civilian targets by the war launcher. A hi-tech war means it’s possible for military attacks to concentrate on the planned key targets more accurately; and the high cost and high risk of the local war under hi-tech circumstance also restricts the unlimited expansion of the war’s scale.

Meanwhile, the related space of the local war under hi-tech circumstance is expanding constantly. This is mainly out of the development of military technology and the enhancement of the combat capability of the armed forces. The development of navigation and aviation technology expands the sea battlefield from near coast to near sea and deep sea; the massive military application of planes, missiles, and submarines makes the integration of the battlefield greater and greater. The birth of hi-tech weapons such as military satellites, space shuttles, and laser weapons expands war into outer space; the rapid development of today’s information technology opens the omnipresent electromagnetic battlefield. The space of local war develops from visible space to invisible space with land, all the complicated battlefield spaces such as sea, air, outer space, and electromagnet space are connected together, help each other, overlap each other, and radiate outward, forming an omni-directional, high-dimensional, all-field, multi-level hi-tech battlefield space. War may start from an electromagnetic field, from air battlefield, from combat in deep area, and military action may quickly scatter to the whole land and sea battlefields, even outer space, unfolding in all-dimensional space and there is no clear border between the front and rear area. This tendency of all-dimensional battlefields will develop constantly in future.

In the local war under hi-tech circumstances, what is to be noticed in particular is that the leading position of air and outer space battlefields becomes more and more obvious. The great development of air and space technical equipment provides material and technical foundation for the confirmation of the leading position of air and outer space battlefields; the struggle in air and outer space leads the fight over the control of air, the control over sea, and the control of electromagnetic fields in the local war under hi-tech circumstances; and the development of the theory of air and outer space struggle is an important aspect of the development of the theory of the local war under hi-tech circumstances.

**Section Six: Direct Combat Space of War Decreases Gradually while Related Space of War Expands Constantly**

Time is an important objective factor of all military activities. In past wars, the concentration and release of war energy was limited by the productivity levels of the times, especially by the conditions of science and technology. Be it the concentration of combat forces and the transportation of combat supplies, or the switching of operational phases and the conduction of operational action, it was impossible to have high time-efficiency. Quite often, it was to fight without preparation, to be fast without success, and to stop without stopping. There should be a gradual process to change the balance of force on a battlefield and to switch war phases. The victory of war needs the accumulation of many “small victories” into “big victory.” So the rhythm of war was slow and the process was long. The Second World War lasted from the 30s of the 20th Century to the mid-40s; the Korean War lasted for 4 years; the Vietnam War lasted for 14 years, and the Iran-Iraq War lasted for 8 years.

As the productivity is greatly enhanced and military science and technology develop rapidly, in a local war under hi-tech circumstances, the concentration and release of war energy can relatively rapidly be realized, and efficiency of combat doubles and redoubles, and war is more firm and quickly decisive. The side that possesses hi-tech superiority usually concentrates large amount of hi-tech weapons from the very beginning of war to conduct all-direction and all-depth fierce attacks constantly, trying to defeat the opponent with one blow. The rhythm of war is sped up obviously, and the process of war is greatly shortened. “To make the victory in one fight” has become the motto of war launchers. It is much harder for defenders to trade space for time to achieve the gradual transition from war potential to war strength through protracted ground combats to fight with the enemy repeatedly. The gain of a war goal does not have to have the accumulation of operational victories. A war can be condensed to one campaign, even one fight. The first fight could be the final fight, and the victory in the first fight could end the war, eliminating the difference between the early period of war and later period of war for some wars. War is very likely to be conducted with rare speed continuously. Combat action has quick response. The situation on the battlefield changes drastically. And it is no longer a “miracle” to decide the result of war in a short period of time. For example, when Israel stealthily attacked the nuclear reactor of Iraq, the actual combat action was only 3 minutes long. The United States invasion into Grenada lasted only 7 days, including 4 days to end the main fighting on the island and to gain control of the capital, Saint George. Israel used only 6 minutes to destroy 19 Sam-6 missile batteries deployed in the Beka Valley by Syria. When the United States attacked Libya, the combat action lasted for 15 hours. In the action, the second air raid attacked the key targets such as Qaddafi’s residence and the supreme command of the Libyan armed forces, etc. with four waves of bombing of 100 tons of bombs that lasted less than 12 minutes. The large-scale Gulf War and Kosovo War only used 42 days and 78 days respectively.

In the local war under hi-tech circumstances, complementing the shortened direct combat time are the relative prolonged time for war preparation and the relative prolonged time of the military confrontation or the confrontation situation (or called “quasi-war situation”) maintained before and after war. The local war under hi-tech circumstances does not “break out at any moment.” Even if it is a local war with limited scale, it needs careful planning and full preparation on all the levels of strategy, campaign, and tactics. We should take all the combat factors into a whole, with all the forms of struggle closely coordinating and all the conduction phases connected organically. From the confirmation of the war goal to the completion of the strategy unfolding, usually it needs several months to one year, or even longer time. The “deterrence-and-anti-deterence before war, non-contact military confrontation,” “preventive strategic action,” the frequent low-intensity crossfire during military occupation, and the “peacekeeping operation” after war, etc. the time for these is far more than the time used for direct combat. After the cease fire of the Gulf War, the United States continued to enforce a non-fly and embargo on Iraq, making many interceptions and bombing actions, and the military confrontation situation did not end with the end of the war.

**Section Seven: War Preparation Becomes Clearly Open while Launching of War Still has Its Suddenness**

The preparation for local war under hi-tech circumstances is more transparent, there are reasons in many aspects. First, the side that prepares to launch a local war pays more and more attention to using the strategy of “equal importance of deterrence and actual fight,” trying “to defeat the enemy without fighting,” with openly showing military force and the resolve of winning the victory to force the opponent to yield to its will. Therefore, during the preparation of war, it will certainly purposely and more openly show its movement of military deployment. Second, as the world economic globalization develops, the connection among the members of the “earth village” is closer, the real-time transmission of information on the Internet is possible, the international community shows unprecedented concern over the war and military conflict in local regions, and it will be timely exposed and reported by the media. It is almost impossible for any side to blind the outside world while preparing a war. Third, the integral modern reconnaissance system of land, sea, air, outer space, and electromagnet space has gained great development; strategic early warning systems are more sensitive and highly effective; military powers strengthen their reconnaissance on the military movement of other countries, especially their expected enemy countries; and the transparency of battlefield is greatly enhanced and large-scale war preparation, especially the concentration and transportation of large amounts of war supplies, the long-range delivery of strategic mobile forces, and the abnormal telecommunication activities, etc. can hardly deceive hi-tech “farsighted eye” and “sharp ears.” Moreover, the local war under hi-tech circumstance usually goes through the evolutionary steps of crisis-breeding, international mediation, intensification of confrontation, break-out of war, negotiation and “peacekeeping,” etc. and there will always be some trace and sign before the war breaks out, and this provides foundation for people to predict the coming of war.

But, in the local war under hi-tech circumstances, both strategic openness and suddenness of operation and fighting exist at the same time. Because the armed forces greatly enhanced their information warfare capability, remote attacking capability, air mobile capability, modern camouflage and deception capability, and command and control capability, the side that launches a war often has more freedom in selecting attacking time and location, etc.. It can concentrate and release war energy to a decisive region with very fast speed, maintaining the suddenness of launching a war operation. The operational guideline of the United States Armed Forces says that “suddenness does not necessarily mean that the enemy does not know, it means that even the enemy knows it, and it cannot make an appropriate response,” stressing “launching air raids on the enemy at selected times, locations, and ways under the circumstance that the enemy does not have preparation and expectation.”

Looking at the practice of the local war under hi-tech circumstances, under the circumstance that the war preparation becomes more and more open, the war-launching side is emphasizing more and more the advantage of hi-tech weapons and equipment to achieve the effect of suddenness, apart from taking various deceptive and confidential measures to cover operational intentions, in order to achieve the strategic goal rapidly. The preemptive strategic air raid has become a popular way of first choice to start a war. In the Gulf War, when the planes of the multi-national troops arrived over Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, to launch the first round air raid, Baghdad was brightly lit. After the Gulf War, the United States launched many air raids on the Serbs of Bosnia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, and Yugoslavia, etc., and most of the air raids achieved the effect of suddenness. The measures taken by the United States included diplomatic deception to cover the surprise attack; using force against sovereign countries without the authorization of the United Nations; using hi-tech weapons that are easy to break through defense, such as stealth fighter bombers and cruise missiles, to conduct remote precision attacks; and selecting the holidays and nights to launch an air raid suddenly when the other side war not ready to defend itself.

Under modern circumstances, to launch a war in night can still enhance the suddenness. In recent years, the first round of hi-tech air raids were basically conducted during night of local time. For example, the United States’ air raid on Libya started at two o’clock in the morning; the air raid of the United States invasion of Panama was at one o’clock in the morning; the air raid on Baghdad by the United States troops in the Gulf War was at three o’clock in the morning; “Desert Fox” operationd started at zero hour 49 minutes in the morning; the air raid on Yugoslavia began at 8 o’clock in the evening; and the air raid on Afghanistan by the United States and Britain on October 7th, 2001 started at 9 o’clock in the evening.

**Section Eight: Integration of War Forces and Systematization of Confrontation on the Battlefield Make Joint Operations the Basic Model of Combat Action**

Under hi-tech circumstanced, the result of war depends on the overall confrontational capability of the operation system. The constitution of war forces tends to be systematized, stressing on organic combination of all the factors of force, seeking new ways to enhance combat capability in “integral formation” and “integral application” of forces. The operation of singular service is disappearing, the traditional assignments of the army, navy, and air force is blurring. The mutual relation of all the combat forces is becoming closer, and the operation shows great collective effort. Even very small-size combat will have the nature of a joint operation. The confrontation of systems is more and more obvious, the combat forces can only show their huge effect in their combination, integral joint operations becomes the basic model of the local war under hi-tech circumstances, and “system confrontation” and “overall attack” become more important principles for “independent fighting.” Sometimes, we need to use strategic means to attack tactical targets. Sometimes, we only need tactical forces to attack strategic targets. All the services and branches, all the functional formations, and all the operational factors will combine into one body under the support of information technology, making joint operations a natural conflict model, and the capability of joint operations becomes the basic mark of the combat capability of the armed forces. In the Gulf War, when the multi-national troops conducted air raid operations against Iraq, apart from sending out large amounts of fighter jets, attackers, and bombers, they also used many army attack helicopters, air-born early warning command planes, transportation planes, refueling planes, and ambulance planes, etc., and Tomahawk cruise missiles of the navy, and many space weapons such as the space precision positioning system which consisted of various satellites. When making its air raids, it is commanded by air-born early warning command reconnaissance satellites and reconnaissance planes provide various combat intelligence and information. Fighter planes cover the action; electronic interference planes conduct electronic suppression; refueling plans and other planes are responsible for safeguarding, and bombers and fighter bombers conduct attacks on ground targets. Under unified command, all the combat forces of services and branches constitute a highly joint combat group with reconnaissance, interference, attacking, covering, command, and safeguarding functions. It assigns works according to tasks. Meanwhile, it conducts multi-layer and multi-directional operational tasks, fully applying the overall power of modern operations.

**Section Nine: Consumption of War Becomes Bigger and Bigger, So War Depends More on Rich Economic Foundations and Powerful Comprehensive Safeguarding**

Ever since there was war, no country or military group dared to ignore the huge consumption of war, and could not expand or extend war unlimitedly without being restricted by this basic restricting condition. Quite often, some belligerent countries or groups had to withdraw out of the war or stopped the war, even when forced to accept the result of failure because they could not bear the economic burden brought about by the consumption of war. Under hi-tech circumstances, along with the constant enhancement of the war’s effect, the consumption of war also increases greatly by geometric progression, reaching astonishing levels. Simply looking at the consumption of supplies, the Gulf War consumed more than 20 times that of the Second World War, 10 times that of the Korean War, 7.5 times that of the Vietnam War, 4.2 times that of the Fourth Middle East War, and 3.5 times that of the War of Falkland Island. According to statistics, during the Gulf War, the average consumption per head of the ground troops of the United States was over 200 kilograms; the average consumption per head of airplane carrier groups was 1,100 to 1,380 kilograms. The United States troops consumed altogether 170,000 kinds of supplies amounting to over 30,000,000 tons, almost equal to half of the 66,000,000 tons of supplies consumed by 10 million Soviet Union troops during 4 years of the War of Defending the Motherland. In the Gulf War, the multi-national forces spent altogether over $60 billion dollars, more than one year’s GDP of most countries in the world. Even the United States could not pay for it independently. In the Kosovo War, in order to achieve the goal of war, NATO used 1,200 planes with 38,000 sorties, launched over 1,500 cruise missiles, and dropped and fired 13,000 tons of various ammunitions. The cost of war was as high as $100 billion dollars. On the other hand, under the air raids by NATO, many military facilities, military supplies, especially strategic supply depots of Yugoslavia were destroyed, command centers and telecommunication pivots were sabotaged, transportation lines were cut off, and large amounts of civilian facilities, factories and mines were randomly bombed, suffering the economic loss of several hundred billion dollars.

The increase of consumption of the local war under hi-tech circumstances cannot be separated from the upgrade of weapons and equipment, the improvement of the means of war, the increase of the intensification of war, the expansion of war space, and the pursuit after the time effectiveness of war. Hi-tech weapons concentrate advanced science and technology and high-quality work, and the research cost of weapons, purchasing cost, and maintenance costs are startling high. According to calculation, whenever the main performance of a plane is enhanced one to two times, its research cost increases 4.4 times. Compared with the Second World War, in the Gulf War, the unit price of weapons rose all the way high. The price of a tank rose from $50,000 dollars to 2 million to 4.4 million dollars; the price of a fighter plane rose from $100,000 dollars to 35.9 million to 4.25 hundred million dollars; the price of an airplane carrier rose from 7 million dollars to 3 billion to 3.5 billion dollars. The fastest delivery of combat forces is air transportation. But the cost of air transportation is tens of times the cost of sea transportation. As for the use of multiple spaces, the highest is the outer space battlefield, but the cost of developing space weapon systems will be an enormous figure.

**Chapter Twenty-Two**

**The Strategic Guidance of High-Tech Regional Wars**

The advanced technologies involved in the measures of war in high-tech regional warfare and the form of the war becoming regionalized would definitely bring corresponding changes to the regulations of the war and the guidance regulations. The application methods of a high-tech regional war, the grasping of the nucleus of the war, and the structures of the systems of war, are all facing a series of new situations and new problems that were never faced by past wars under general technical conditions and all out war. Accurately grasping these new issues will definitely be very important to maintain the planning, initiative, and flexibility, of the strategic war guidance of the high-tech regional war.

**Section One: Political and Military Goals**

War always demands that the political and military goals be consistent. This demand on the special content of high-tech regional war is that the limited nature of the political goals to a large extent determines the limited nature of the military goals. This limited nature is a natural consequence of the development of economy and politics of the modern international societies. After the Cold War, due to the increasing complexities and intertwining of the interests between nations, the elevation of the “clarity” of the political decisions of the modern societies and the war processes, the establishment of the political goals and the implementation of war are receiving more supervision and restrictions. First, the requirements of the peace and the time on the development have laid political foundations for further restricting the objectives of war. Second, the competitions of the combined national powers, which are based on the economics of the international societies and their technologies are the leading forces, and are increasing daily. The trends of globalization of the economy have quickened; the reliance and restriction on other countries has continuously deepened, thus the war decisions have received further restrictions. Third, the use of high tech-weapons and equipment for the implementation of limited political goals have provided low risks and high yield measures. The cost of the war has increased in geometric progression and has reduced the capabilities of many countries to fight wars. Thus, it simultaneously increases the necessity and possibility of controlling the war. Fourth, the modern information technology has increased the clarity of wars and it has apparently increased the restrictions on war due to the people’s attitudes, which can be favorable or otherwise. The advanced communication satellites, televisions, network broadcasting technologies can provide faster, broader, and more effective measures of propaganda, which increase the restrictions on the foreign policies and war decisions of all countries. Therefore, it can strictly control the military actions within the range of limited political goals and become important content of the strategic guidance of the modern high-tech regional war. Under this background, the war is tending toward more destruction of the enemy’s will and grab and maintain the strategic initiative of their own side and less on trying to attack and grab the enemy territories as the direct objectives of the war. The old concepts of “You die and I live.” or “If not me, who else.” are gradually becoming out of fashion. The political goals cannot continuously pursue absoluteness and thoroughness and have moved toward contrast, limitedness, and controllability. In the Gulf War, the Americans possessed military superiority; quickly developed the victorious posture; took the initiative on military attacks, the focus was on politics not military because, by that time, the Americans basically had achieved the strategic objectives of controlling the situation in the Gulf area and the strategic resources. If they pursued the “ultimate victory,” it could have caused a new unbalance on the strategic forces of the Gulf area causing the Americans to face challenges of the American “strategic interests.”

In the high-tech regional war, there is more emphasis on the combined usage of various measures and methods of the military, politics, economy, and diplomacy, etc. The political solution is the ultimate selection of all concerned. The military actions are important measures to match the political solution or to create conditions for political solutions. Of course, politics should also consider the nature and characteristics of the war measures. Contrasting other measures, the war measures have clear characteristics of violence and special regulations on applications. It could cause a definite opposite effect by promoting the achievement of political goals. If there is consistency of the political goals and the nature and effectiveness of the war measures, the functions of the decisiveness can push the war toward a favorable direction. If it is not the case, the war can move toward an unfavorable direction. In truth, “The mission and authority of the art of the military is to prevent making mistakes when the politics is using this tool but does not understand the effectiveness of this tool.” (1)

The consistency of the military goals and political goals is an accurate reflection of the inherent relationship between the strategy and the basic interests of the nation. It is an important regulation of the planning, preparation, and application of the military struggle. By violating this objective regulation, even a good strategy will be difficult to implement. Not only will military goals not be realized, the political goals can be disturbed and destroyed. In conclusion, in the modern high-tech regional war, the principle of the consistency of the political goals and military goals not only will continue to be valid it will also become more significant. The two warring parties will still “Only use the necessary forces for the achievement of the political goals and assure the necessary forces for achieving the political goals.” (2)

**Section Two: Act Upon the Enemy’s Action, Defeat the Enemy, and Seize the Early Opportunity**

The so-called ‘Act upon the enemy’s action and defeat the enemy,’ is that under the situations of strategic defense, after the enemy initiated the attack, our side should grab the opportunity and use offense to defeat the enemy. This is a commonly used principle of strategic war guidance for the side which is conducting strategic defense or the side which has inferior military forces than the enemy’s. “Act upon the enemy’s action and defeat the enemy,” appears to be passive in form, but it possesses the content of positive initiative. It is a planned war method, when the strategic commander estimates that our own side is not going to be able to defeat the enemy quickly, for the sake of preserving military forces, waiting for the right opportunity to defeat the enemy. In terms of the method of war, our side takes the defensive posture at the beginning of the strong enemy’s attack, upon seeing the enemy is getting tired, we then use the positive offensive actions to attack and defeat the enemy. Under the general technical conditions or an all out war, this method of war, due to its long duration, the wide area of the war zone, the effectiveness of the war measures is relatively limited. Therefore, the ‘Act upon the enemy’s action and defeat the enemy,’ has more space to use this method and has more space to turn around. But under high-tech conditions, because of the limited space for war, the greatly elevated effectiveness of war methods, the short duration of a war, thus, in the entire defense posture, how to grab the early opportunity becomes the important link of winning the high-tech regional war.

The so-called ‘Grab the early opportunity’ is that when two forces are at war, our side will try to grab the advantageous opportunity earlier than the enemy and initiate the offensive move and defeat the enemy. It usually uses the enemy’s illusion and when they are not alert enough, implement the sudden attack. It has the effect of acting when the enemy is unaware and attacking when the enemy is unprepared. It is an effective war method of grabbing the initiative and avoiding the passiveness. The requirements of this method are: correctly judge the situations; meticulous, secretively, and quickly prepare for implementing the war; delicately use disguise and take feigning actions; wait until the enemy is tired and relaxed in their guards and attack at the time and the location that they do not expect; adopt new weapons, new methods of war, and defeat the enemy with the unexpected measure. Once the initial battle is won, use that win to firm up and expand the results of the war. Under high-tech conditions, grab the opportunities, which can disappear at any moment, and it will have particularly great significance in grabbing the initiative of the war. For the military with inferior forces, it is important to grab the advantageous war opportunities before the enemy’s attack with fire-power or major sneak attacks or before the enemy is still at the stage of transporting their forces to the front and that they are not entirely assembled; adopt various effective ways of attacks, destroy the enemy’s preparation for offensive moves and their high-tech war systems. This as a whole, quickly reduces the enemy’s superiority and their offensive capabilities, so that it can be called an effective method of war by defeating the stronger enemy with inferior forces.

Under a high-tech war, it is the competition of speed. It is the struggle for the effective time by the two antagonists. All depends upon who has the faster speed, who will occupy more effective time and will possibly grab more initiatives. For the side with high-tech, they have faster speed of maneuvering, more destructive power, and they can quickly obtain the superiority in a very short duration and cause great destruction. Thus, the side with inferior forces must strategically take the posture of ‘Attack upon the enemy’s action and defeat the enemy,’ and win the initiative. They must effectively use the strategy; the military forces; the selection of the method of war; coordination of various measures of war; the application of conditions of terrains and the weather, etc. and carefully plan; positively create advantageous war opportunity; and establish situations that are advantageous for our own side but bad for the enemy. We must use new characteristics of fighting under high-tech conditions, create and grab the advantageous war opportunity; ‘Use the early opportunity to defeat the enemy,’ in the battles and combats, and grab the status of having initiative from a state of passiveness.

Under high-tech conditions, to the side which is implementing the strategic defense, the strategy of ‘Act upon the enemy’s action and defeat the enemy’ is not just passively wait for a beating. The strategic ‘Act upon the enemy’s action’ is based on the “Early victory” of the construction of the entire national security. The ‘Act upon the enemy’s action’ is a means for grabbing the initiative of politics and just cause. The purpose of ‘Defeat the enemy’ is to destroy the enemy’s invasion or intention of attacks. The ‘Act upon the enemy’s actions’ insists on the principle that our side will “Not fire the first shot.” It does not equate with giving up the ‘Benefit of the early opportunity’ in the battle and tactics. The ‘First shot’ in politics or strategy is different from the ‘First shot’ in tactics. A country, which invades the territorial land and territorial water of another country, the hostile forces, such as, religious extremist, ethnic separatists, international terrorists, who challenge the sovereignty of a country, can be considered as firing the ‘First shot’ in politics or strategy. The other side can have the right to implement self-defense and counter-attack, as to when and where, using what measures to counter-attack must be decided on the judgment of the strategic decision-makers. It can be said that once a country invades another country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, this country has given the right to hand over the tactical right of ‘Fire the first shot’ to the opponent. This kind of military counter-attack can force the invader out of the territory; they can also conduct equivalent strikes against the invading country; they can attack the overseas military bases or the targets in the air or on the sea. Of course, the side of ‘Act upon the enemy’s action’ when they make the first strike against the enemy, they should also prepare for the enemy’s second strike. This way, one can achieve the maximum effect of obtaining “Early victory,” and “Defeat the enemy” from a disadvantageous situation of “Act upon the enemy’s action.”

**Section Three: Regional War and the Stability of the Entire Situation**

The regional war under modern conditions appear to be regional matter from the surface, however, viewing it from its true nature, it carries the nature of the whole situation. First, from the perspective of the world and the regional war, the regional war could be regional issues, but to a certain country, it is a matter of the entirety. For example, the Vietnam War was a regional war from the viewpoint of the United States of America, but it is the all out war for Vietnam. >From the world perspective, the war in Kosovo occurred as a regional war in the Balkans, however, from the perspective of the Yugoslavian alliances, it is an all out war, which involved the entire nation. Second, even if it is a regional war for a country, its impact could affect the entire situation. Sometimes, one battle and combat activity could have strategic significance. One defeat during the battle can lead to “all out defeat” and make it into the country’s turning point of prosperity or peril, existence or nonexistence. Therefore, a regional war may have occurred in a limited time and at a limited area, but its impact has to do with the entire situation. This is particularly true due to the development of high-tech weapons; they tend to blur the borderlines of the front and rear. The attacker can strike deep to the defenders’ rear with long distance precision-guided weapons. The defender can implement similar types of counter-attack. Therefore, the limits of modern warfare still have the possibility to become “limitless.” Moreover, the entire situation affected by the regional war displays the influence of the possessed or more or less possessed international background and international characteristics. The domestic regional war in a country often has many ties to that particular region, to the ethnic groups, religions, and some super powers of the entire world. It can be interfered with and restricted by external political forces, so the war may be occurring in a region in the country or one area but the influence can be international. Therefore, the strategic commander must possess a concept of the entire situation; take good care of each and every aspect of the politics, economy, the domestic and international strategic environments; take good care of the regional matters as well as the entire situation; take good care of each direction of the war processes; and combine the consideration of every condition and factor of the international and domestic politics, economy, military, diplomacy, science and technology, culture, etc.. One should always put the entire need of national interests on top priority; consider the influence of the regional war on the interests of the entire nation, which include the influences of the entire developmental situation of the economic construction and development of the country; the total security of the country; the entire nation’s political stability; and the international status and reputation of the country. It is best to try to maintain the stability of the entire strategic situation when a country achieves the objectives of the regional war. It is best to get rid of or reduce the abnormal interference of external forces, especially the intervention of the international armed forces. It is also best to try to reduce the passive impact that the regional war can bring to the country’s political and economic lives, to the regional security environment, and to the world security environment. It is absolutely necessary to keep the regional war under control and avoid its further escalation.

**Section Four: The Protracted War and the Quick War to Destroy the Enemy**

In a traditional war, the measures of war were correspondingly backward. Both antagonists always won big victories through accumulative small victories; turned the quantitative accumulation gradually into qualitative changes, which made the duration of the war rather lengthy. After the introduction of high-tech regional war, the side which possess superior high-tech weapons can defeat the enemy in a rather short time and largely quicken the progress of the war. This is due to the revolution of military technology and the measures of war, which greatly raise the effectiveness of war and makes the purposes of the strategy, battle, and tactics, similar. It obviously reduces the command hierarchies; there is combined usage of the measures of strategy, battle, and tactics; there is even the emergence of achieving strategic goals through combat activities, i.e., a phenomenon that the initial battle becomes the final battle, thus, strategic decisions — battle command — tactical actions become a new mode of war. In achieving the objectives of the war, it does not necessarily have to go through organization and implementation of several battles. In implementing the objectives of the war, it does not necessarily have to go through the accumulation of victories of several battles. One war can be just one battle action. Moreover, the high efficiency of the high-tech war is established on the basis of great consumption. Although the time of high-tech regional war has been reduced, the intensity of the opposition from both antagonists and the extent of destruction have gradually increased. The high consumption of a high-tech regional war make them hard for the antagonists to handle. This forces both the antagonists to try to reduce the duration of the war and seek a quick solution in a quick war.

Under high-tech conditions, despite the fact that both antagonists are seeking quick solutions in a quick war, they do not exclude the necessity to fight a protracted war in achieving the possibility of reaching their military goals. In a high–tech regional war, the side with technical inferiority and weaker often does not have the conditions to have a quick solution in a quick war. If they are in a hurry to enter the final battle with the enemy, it is easy to sustain heavy losses and even defeat. Therefore, the weak side should have strategic preparation and plan to protract the war; adopt flexible and maneuverable war actions; resist the enemy’s vicious attacks; destroy the enemy’s attempt to have a quick solution, which includes the organization of the quick actions of battle and tactics when the opportunities present themselves; largely consume the enemy’s powers, delay the enemy’s attacks; use the relationship of the mutual exchanges of the time and space, correspondingly prolong the duration of the war; gradually change the contrast of the enemy forces and the forces on our side; use the protracted strategy and the quick solution during the battles and combats; implement the turn around of the inferior and superior situations; implement strategic counter offense under the permissible circumstances and eventually defeat the enemy. Of course, under the conditions of high-tech, the difficulties of prolonging the war and winning victory have apparently increased. The wide application of high-tech weapons is more advantageous for the side with superior forces to have a quick solution with a quick war. The possibility of turning around the time and space of the regional war has been relatively reduced and the strategic selection of the weaker side also gets reduced as a result. Under such circumstance, the importance of the strategic command for the weaker side becomes more obvious. The weaker side is very likely to seek the expression of more subjective initiative of people and use the “cost disparity” to counter the tough enemy’s “technical disparity”.

**Section Five: Concentrate the Military Forces and Concentrate the Firepower**

In traditional wars, the components of the military technology were relatively lower. By concentrating the military forces, to a certain degree, supplemented the lack of firepower. The concentration of firepower depends on the concentration of military forces. Thus, to concentrate the superior military forces and annihilate the enemy naturally became the bible of the principle to victory. Under high-tech conditions, due to the development of the war measures and methods, the connotation of concentrating the military forces have made some changes. The concentration of military forces and the concentration of firepower can be divided in some ways, the concentration of firepower does not necessarily rely on the concentration of military forces. First, due to the continuously increasing destructive power of the war measures, the density of the military forces at the battlefields have been gradually reduced to avoid the destructive firepower. According to statistics, during World War I, the two fighting forces deployed 404 soldiers per every square kilometer. During World War II, it dropped to 36 soldiers. During the Gulf War, it dropped to 2.34 people. Our famous military officer Su Yu indicated, in order to disperse the deployment of the military forces and weapons, we should concentrate the firepower and the targets, and it is more important to calculate the contrast of the firepower. Second, the application of high-tech provides the possibility of scattering the deployment of the systems of attack. For example, the cruise missiles can be launched from the aircraft carrier, submarine, or bomber from a far away distance. The Army’s tactical missiles can be scattered in deployment at the battlefields. The armed helicopter can go in deep in the combat to implement its maneuverability. The combination of long distance precision attack weapons, advanced surveillance and supervision, and the systems of command available to the strategic commander can accomplish the concentration of firepower without the conditions of concentrating the military forces. The Strategic Commander can, at the decisive time and place, implement the simultaneous attacks with firepower on any important targets of the battlefield. Under these conditions, in general, the concentration of firepower is more important than the concentration of military forces and concentrating the war effectiveness is more important than concentration of firepower. The focus on timing is more important than the focus of space. Based on the concrete needs of combined actions, concentrate a large amount of long distance precision attack systems and crack troops and launch a big attack to the enemy from all directions at a prescribed time have become the basic model of high-tech regional wars. The Army of the United States of American published in 1998 (The Outline Of Battle) has clearly listed one basic battle principle of the “concentrated effectiveness.” The Russian military indicated in their revision of the principles of combined battle that the past principle of concentrating the military forces has changed. In short, concentration of the war effectiveness to a large extent reflects the special characteristics and requirements of the high-tech regional war.

The true nature of the concentration of military forces and concentration of the firepower is a relationship of quantity and quality. If under the conditions where the technical components of the troops are relatively lower, it is a matter of quantitative concentration of the troops in concentrating a superior force. Under the conditions that the technical components of the troops have greatly enhanced, then the concentration of a superior force is an emphasis on the concentration of the quality of the troops. During the several wars in the Middle East, despite the quantitative superiority on the Arab side in many respects, the Israelis could fully express their superior effectiveness by concentrating their military forces and firepower at decisive moments and places and implemented long distance sudden attacks and won repeated victories.

**Section Six: “Use Advanced Technologies to Defeat Advanced Technologies, Use General Technologies to Defeat Advanced Technologies**”

“Use advanced technologies to defeat the advanced technologies,” means to use high-tech measures and methods to fight the high-tech of the enemy. “Use general technology to defeat advanced technologies,” means to use general technical measures and methods to fight advanced technologies. The continuous upgrade of weapons and equipment with advanced technologies brings a series of changes to the types of war, the war methods, and the systems of organizations. Both the antagonists have tried to use several technical measures to reduce or inhibit the technical superiority of the opponent and fully express their own technical superiority. Under normal conditions, the side with the high-tech superiority, has more initiative in their hands in the battle. The side with the inferior high-tech weapons will be in a more passive mode. Therefore, under the conditions of high-tech, we try to use advanced technologies to defeat the advanced technologies, which is the basic principle to winning victory. This is particularly true when there is a “generation gap” in technical equipment and the qualitative difference of the technical equipment is very difficult to be compensated for by sheer quantity. This will allow the side with the superior high-tech equipment to have more fighting capabilities and more possibilities to win the war. However, with high-tech, how ‘high’ is relative and not absolute. Under certain conditions, high-tech does not always produce high effectiveness, and low-tech does not mean that they are completely useless. For example, the precision-guided weapons usually rely on the instruments with visible light, infrared light, microwaves, millimeter waves, and laser, etc., to obtain target signals, but all these guided systems using the electromagnetic wave lengths are subject to interference. During the Gulf War, the Iraqi’s “skud” guided missiles were under the close surveillance and destruction that their conditions for survival were terrible. But the Iraqis adopted many protective measures, including the use of plywood, hard plastic, fake launching pads made with iron plate, installed radio transponders in these fake launching pads, metallic reflectors, and heat sources, and successfully attracted many guided bombs of the American and multi-national forces. They used the gaps of the coverage of the American surveillance satellites and organized the maneuvers and evacuations of the real missiles and effectively raised their survivability. Under the electronic interferences of the multi-national forces, the Iraqis used the regular anti-aircraft guns of middle and small calibers, which were not influenced by the electromagnetic fields, and shot down as much as 84% of the total aircraft lost by the allied forces. Moreover, the war effectiveness of high-tech weapons does not come naturally. Even a very advanced weapon requires the correct usage and correct tactical strategy. The military strategy can be distinguished in “regular vs. irregular.” If one uses the “regular” confrontation, the general technical weapons are no match for the high-tech weapons. However, the “irregular” approach can express unexpected results for the general technical weapons. During the Falkland War between the British and Argentine, the Argentine Air force realized their fighter planes were older but they also knew the blind spots of the British radars on the war ships and the vulnerabilities of the British anti air measures. Thus, they used low flying approaches and the method of close fighting to defeat the enemy and, in one stroke, they succeeded in sinking the British guided missiles destroyer “Sheffield.” The general weapons can be used in usual manners under many different circumstances. For example, the anti-tank weapons can be used against the helicopters at certain advantageous terrain. The anti-aircraft guns can be used against targets on the ground and in the water, etc. The high efficiency of high-tech weapons and equipment basically relies on the entire functionality of the system and it is not just the summation of one or two high-tech weapons. Sometimes, the “high-tech plus high-tech” measure may not multiply the battle effectiveness. Sometimes, the “high tech plus low tech” measure, on the contrary, can produce more effectiveness. Therefore, only by organically combining the high-tech, which possesses more scientific inner structures and realizing the mutual complement and coupling, even if each factor has correspondingly poorer single functionality, it can provide the entire battle system the effect of “1+1>2” and achieve higher battle effectiveness.

Of course, the war under modern conditions, especially under high-tech conditions, must thoroughly consider the special characteristics of high-tech. “The better forces win and the inferior forces perish” is the basic principle of the war. “If one is backward, you get beaten,” has repeatedly been proven by historical facts. The strategic commanders, while constructing the military and preparing for war, must diligently remember the famous quote of Engel’s, “The basis for the victory of violence is the production of weapons.” The guidance of Mao Ze-dong allows that, “The military specialists cannot attempt to win victory of war beyond the range of the promise of materialistic conditions.” We should try hard to obtain “advanced technologies against the advanced technologies” by concentrating manpower, financial power, and materials to research and produce some “high-tech, precise, and sharp” weapons and equipment, and follow the principle that the war must be directed and adjustable to have some Shashoujian (Ultimate weapons, which can deliver deadly blows to the enemy),” to win the initiative of the war. At the same time, the research of war methods should be based on the current equipment and prepare to “Use low tech against high-tech and use inferior forces to defeat superior forces.” and look at the situations from the worst possible conditions and diligently advance toward the best direction.” The “superior forces” or “inferior forces” are merely the unity of dialectic. The “superior forces” does not equate with the superiority of the “all frequency spectrum” or “**all time phases**”. (phonetics) There is inferiority in superiority and there is also strength in weakness. Especially, the objective facts of the “inferiority” or “superiority” can be interchangeable under special circumstances. This condition is the subjective initiative. First, we should develop advanced weapons and equipment, especially those, which can effectively defeat the enemy, the “ultimate weapons.” This has great significance to win the high-tech regional war. Second, as a whole, if one is at a disadvantageous situation of “using low-tech against the high-tech,” he must regionally uses the postures of “Using high-tech against the low tech.” and “Using superior forces against the inferior forces.” Third, one must be good at combining the high and low-tech and search for the best technical combination and fully express the potential effectiveness of low-tech equipment against high-tech equipment, so that he can realize the objectives of using low-tech to defeat the high-tech.

**Section Seven: The Long Distance Attack and The War at Close Distance to Annihilate the Enemy**

The long distance firepower attack is the kind of battle method which does not require direct confrontation with the enemy forces and beyond the sighting distance to engage firearms restrictions or firepower sudden attacks. The emergence and development of this kind of battle method is due to the wide application of equipment for technical surveillance and supervision and the increase of the distance and accuracy of the projectile weapons. Due to the characteristics of new generation weapons having longer shooting distances (flying time), stronger power, higher accuracy, faster speed of launching (projection), etc., they can provide deep penetrating attacks in the battle, obtain apparent results, and make the long distance firepower attack one of the major methods of the war activities. For the side which engages in the strategic offense, the attacking activities are no longer just the traditional and general coordination of the air and sea with the ground forces in a large-scale attack, but often adopt the war method, which engages the enemy with sudden attacks with the combined firearms. For example, one should try to use the strong fire power from the air and strike from a long distance to reduce the strength of the enemy with great consumption; shaken and paralyze the strategic defense systems of the enemy; destroy the will of the enemy to fight, and then use the maneuvers of the forces of the air, sea, and ground to attack the enemy from the front, side, and rear with a series of integrated air and sea, integrated air and ground attacks and achieve the objectives of the strategic offense. For the side of strategic defense, they should also consume from a long distance, delay the attackers’ advancement, organize the maneuvering forces to advance to the prescribed battle areas and engage the enemy forces and defeat the enemy’s attempt of strategic offense. Therefore, under high-tech conditions, the past method of close distance fighting to annihilate the enemy becomes increasingly harder. But it does not mean that “The war at close distance and annihilate the enemy” is no longer able to survive on the stage of war. Under high-tech conditions, if the long distance attack method is in a rather inferior status, one can still get close to the enemy and reduce the superiority of long distance attack. The weakness inherent in the long distance firearms attack and advanced technology can provide conditions for implementing close distance battle. First, one can fully utilize the complex terrains, weather and climate conditions to deal with the enemy’s high-tech surveillance and reduce the effectiveness of long distance firepower attacks; express the characteristics of flexibility, toughness, and less restriction by the terrains; and get close to the enemy and fight in closer distance. Second, one should implement maneuvers with multi-prone advances, multi-directions, multi-phases, multi-methods, leap frog type advances with shorter distances and divide and minimize the goals of actions and achieve the objectives of close distance fighting in annihilating the enemy.

In conclusion, under high-tech conditions, it demands the great attention of the new characteristics of “avoid contact and attack indirectly” under high-tech conditions; accept the trend that close distance battle reduces daily. When planning the strategy, one should base decisions on the changed conditions; put large efforts in developing long distance weapons and long distance projectiles; continuously raise the capability of attacking suddenly from a distance to targets deep inside enemy territory, and use the crack troops to implement the capabilities of deep pursuits, sudden attacks, and sneak attacks. At the same time, one should be adept at looking for opportune moments; try their best to get close to and annihilate the enemy; boldly but meticulously organize the broad and flexible maneuvers; get close to the enemy quickly; try best to fight the enemy within the effective distances of the weapons and equipment of our own side, and to a great extent, reduce the superiority of the enemy’s long distance weapons and equipment.

Chapter 22. Footnotes.

1. (The Theory Of War) Volume 1, Page 326.
2. (The Theory Of War) Volume 1, Page 64.

**Chapter Twenty-Three**

**The High-Tech Regional War That Our Country Could Face in the Future.**

Due to the development of the modern international strategic structure and the obvious increase of our country’s combined national power, which includes the power of national defense, the contrast of the world strategic forces has positive developments, which are favorable for us to maintain and defend our national security. In the early 21st century, our security environment will make even greater improvement. Unless there is a significant and unexpected crisis, we can avoid an all out war in the foreseeable future which might require the participation by all sectors of the country, or any world war. We can also resolve most of the realistic threats to the survival of our country with some efforts. But, the root cause of the modern war still exists, and various potential explosive points, which could cause armed conflicts, still remain. We cannot neglect various destructive factors, which increasingly endanger our national development, and we cannot completely rule out the possibilities of high-tech regional wars, which could endanger the security of our national development.

**Section One: The International Strategic Situation and Its Impact on Our National Security**

The beginning of the 21st century is an important turning and developing period of human history. All significant historical trends, such as society becoming information based, the integration of a global economy, the multi-polarization of international politics, and the incorporation of advanced technologies in the military field, will determine the basic direction of society. It will also influence and determine the basic nature and form of our country’s future security environment.

Subsection One. The trend of the form of society is information-based and it’s impact on our national security.

The information age is an important strategic resource for social development. In the 1990s, due to the quick development of modern information technology, the wave of information swept through the whole world. The information networks have expanded exponentially; the network economy has grown in a similar explosion; the production activities and social activities have gradually become communicational, computerized, and intelligence based. The revolutionary breakthrough of modern information technology has followed the agricultural civilization, industrial civilization, and advanced society into a new phase of an informational civilization. The antennas of the information technology have been extended to all corners of the world. It not only deeply changes the living modes of human beings, but also changes the society’s security protection measures. On one hand, the shapeless information network provides a carrier, for the first time, connecting the international societies closely into an indivisible and integrated body, and forcefully promotes the common development, common security, and common progress of all societies. The mutual dependency, clarity, and predictability of societal security have increased daily. This is undoubtedly meaningful to the entire society’s security and stability. But on the other hand, at the time when information technology is accelerating the integration processes of the world, it also intensifies the information divisiveness and information struggle of every country in the world, which sharply and increasingly brings out the issues of “informational security.” First, since the information itself has become an important component of national interests, the standards of information technology have become an important reference to measure the combined national power of a country. Therefore, the development, control, and application of information resources has increasingly become the new field of fierce contention between nations, and this competition has become a serious problem, which could impact the national security and the stability of society. Second, due to the unbalance of the development of information technology and the information industry, it will cause a big numerical divide and informational divide between countries with superior information technology and inferior information technology and form a new strategic “informational status disparity.” Some countries with superior informational status are likely to utilize the superiority of their information technology to control the world order of information; use their information superiority to conduct export and infiltration of their value systems and ideologies and bring unprecedented shocks to the national political security, economic security, military security, and cultural security of those countries with inferior informational status. Third, due to the fact that information surpasses the concept of time and space, the territory of information is no longer divided by traditional geography, such as, ground territory, territorial water, and territorial air space but divided by the information radiation space with the most political influence, which poses a great challenge to the traditional sovereignty of a nation. Thus, to strengthen an “informational borderland” and to construct a “spiritual defensive line” becomes the gravest strategic issues of a country’s existence and prosperity for the modern informational era. Under the informational impact, our country’s information technology and information industry have made great progress, but as a developing nation, our general level of information technology and information industry are inferior compared to those countries with strong information technology. It will be difficult to make fundamental changes to this “West is stronger and we are weak.” situation of the information field in a short time. Our basic information industry is relatively weak and a large amount of basic facilities, to a certain degree, will have to rely on imports for a relatively long time. Some nucleus chips and xi tong nei he luo ji bian cheng (phonetic)( system nucleus logic edition programs?) are in others’ hands, so it will be hard to guarantee its secure use and effective supervision and control. Our protection capabilities of the information and network security are relatively weak. Some applied systems are in a state of no protection and impose rather great risks and dangers. In this complex international environment, it is likely to be attacked by some foreign powers and endanger our national security and strategic stability.

Subsection 2. The trend of economic globalization and its’ impact to our national security.

At the turn of the century, due to internationalization of commercial products that were characterized in free trade, allowed monetary internationalization, which was characterized by capital and cash moving across countries. The rise and expansion of internationalized production, which was characterized by those multi-national companies, has greatly facilitated the historical trend of a world economy becoming one integrated body. The economic globalization has become an important factor in impacting the process of modern history. The economic globalization possesses duplicity from the very beginning. On the one hand, it is established on the objective demand of the development of commercial products on the basis of a highly socialized production effort and it is a natural consequence of the development of productivity in human society. Due to the elevation of the productivity in society, the territory of human economic activities will definitely overcome the geographical obstacles. There will be correspondingly stable and prosperous interactions between different areas, nations, and countries, which is a display of the continuous maturing and progress of society. On the other hand, up to the present, the economic globalization was guided more by the international monopoly and global capital expansion of a few. The process of economic globalization follows the production relationships of the capitalism and the expansion process of the international monopolization of global capitals. The duplicity of the economic globalization determines that it is a “double-edged sward.” On one hand, it promotes the development of global productivity, which has benefited the free flowing and superior distribution of production elements in the world. From the perspective of national security, the penetrating development of the economic globalization allows a degree of mutual connection, mutual infiltration, mutual integration, and mutual reliance to be increased for every country’s economy. It creates a situation that there is me in you; you in me, one’s loss is everybody’s loss, and one’s gain is everybody’s gain. This has made peaceful coexistence an external condition for economic development of every country. It also has gradually increased the inhibitive function of large-scale destructive wars for those countries which are mutually co-existing with the cords of economic connections. But on the other hand, in the process of globalization, the expansion of global international monopolized capitals has created and intensified the political, economic, and military conflicts and caused serious challenges to the national sovereignty and security of those economically backward and developing countries. In the case of our country, due to the need of more time for the development and maturing of the market economy of socialism, our economic systems and economic structures are not quite ready and the economic foundation is not that strong. We are easily shocked by the expansion of the global international monopolization of capitals. Our economic sovereignty can easily be invaded, and it can even endanger the economic security, financial security, and social security of our country. Due to the development of economic globalization, while our economy is quickly increasing, our reliance on other countries has also increased. Our correlation demands of the economic structures of capitals, technologies, resources, and markets of the outside world are also increasing. This has posed some risks of contamination by the outside economic situation and the control and restrictions by foreign powers on our citizens’ economic existence. Due to the increased international economic exchange, we are likely to experience more economic friction with the outside world. This is particularly true if the internationally monopolized capitals, while expanding markets and places for investment, maintain their strategic passages and control strategic resources, and can use armed forces to open the path for their economic activities. All these can affect our country and cause direct and indirect loss to our national security interests.

Subsection Three. The multi-polarization trend of the international strategic structure and its’ influence on our national security.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s’, the bi-polar structure, which lasted more than half a century collapsed. The international strategic structure began to move on to the new era of multi-polarization. The development of a new strategic structure and re-working on the map of the strategic territory, for example, the realization of the establishment and changes of Westerfaria (phonetic) system, Vienna system, Versailles-Washington system, Yalta system, had gone through big wars. The strategic structural change at the turn of the century is mainly through the realization of a “cold war” and not the “hot war.” The collapse of the bi-polar structure, due to the development of the world’s geopolitics and Di-yuan-jing-ji (phonetic) (geoeconomics?), Europe has moved towards an alliance for self-strengthening. The emergence of Asian nations is formidable, and the world has moved into a new three-legged structure of Asia, Europe, and America. This multi-polarization trend will move the contrast of the combined forces of a country or an alliance toward the correspondingly balanced situations, which is beneficial to form a mechanism of mutual coordination and mutual checks and balances for each strategic force. It is beneficial for the development of democratization of international relationships. It is beneficial for establishing a just and reasonable international political and economic new order. It is helpful for the independence and economic growth of every country. It is beneficial for supplying necessary protection for the diversifying development of different cultures and value systems of the world. It is also beneficial for the negotiation and cooperation needed to resolve international conflicts and prevent world war from happening. But, we should also notice that it is quite a long historical process to change from the bi-polar structure to the multi-polar structure. The dangerous period, due to the collapse of the bi-polar structure, which led to the sudden loss of balance of the strategic forces, will not quickly pass. The transitional situations that one polar gaining strength and many countries in conflict will cause such conditions of uncertainty, instability, and unpredictability in the international economic environment for a long time. In the process of moving toward a multi-polar structure, the rise and fall of the contrasting strategic forces can easily cause mutual frictions and conflicts. It is particularly true when a leading strategic force does not like to see the emergence and growth of new forces and tries to inhibit them before their emergence can lead to tense situations. After China concluded the one hundred years of shameful history, she has stepped onto the great path of national revival in the 21st century. Even though the development and strengthening of China is parallel to and not in conflict with other countries in the world, her development is a great contribution to world peace and human civilization and she does not pose any challenge to the normal interests of any other country. But there are some anti-Chinese forces which do not like to see the prospering of China. The so-called “Theory of Chinese Threat,” a deceitful propaganda, can illustrate this point. The possibility that these anti-Chinese forces will try their best to promote the use of various methods, including military actions, to restrict, inhibit, and destroy the development of China, will always be there. This negative factor, which can impact the national security of China in the 21st century, cannot be ignored.

Subsection Four. The trend of a high-tech military and its impact on our national security.

The development of a series of new advanced technologies, which are represented by information technology, not only cause great changes to the form of society, they also cause revolutionary changes to the measures and methods of war in the military field. The application of advanced technologies into the weapons and equipments in the military resulted in the emergence of informational military and informational war. Modern information technology is widely used in the battlefield and it has made an unprecedented increase in the perception and clarity of the battlefield. It has increased the precision of the attacking capabilities in war measures; it has increased controllability of modern warfare from the technological side, and it can reduce the additional losses of the war. However, due to the elevation of effectiveness of high-tech war measures and the additional losses that can be reduced, under some situations, it can have the possibility of stimulating further abuse with these high-tech war measures. One thing needs special attention: that there is unbalance in the development of high-tech in the military of every country in the world. Some countries with advanced military high-tech can lead the way in changing their military forces to become informational and realize the revolutionary changes of the informational troops and informational war. Some countries with relatively backward military technologies are weak and can still be struggling in the early and middle mechanical war era, thus, it is very likely to form a “generational gap” in military technologies. Those countries with superior military technologies can utilize their corresponding superiorities in unilateral clarity, aerial supremacy, naval supremacy, and informational supremacy and their highly efficient war measures to promote gun-boat diplomacy and force other countries to submit to their will and expand their interests of their mighty power. In worldwide changes of military technologies, our country is still in the mechanized, half mechanized, plus part informational phase. Even with more investments into military technologies and equipments, it will still be limited after a long period. The gap between our military technologies and equipment and the militarily advanced countries is not likely to dissipate in a short time. These situations can lead some hostile forces to make miscalculations and underestimate the Chinese citizens’ and military’s strong determination and capabilities of objecting to foreign invasions, of maintaining our national sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and risk recklessly provoking us militarily.

**Section Two: Our Geographical Environment and National Security**

A country’s geographical environment is an important basis for determining national security strategy and military strategy and is a basic and permanent factor which influences national security. The complexity of our geographical environment determines the multifaceted problems of our national security.

Subsection One. Our country is situated at the crossroads of big countries’ geographical strategic interests. Our national security is influenced by big countries’ strategic competitions.

China is located in the eastern edge of the European and Asian continents and the west shore of the Pacific Ocean. It’s back is into the European and Asian mainland and facing the huge Pacific Ocean. It is the pivot of northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle Asia. It is also the connecting point of the European and Asian mainland’s geographic strategic area and ocean geographic strategic area and it is the one piece that boarders on a large chessboard at the world’s geopolitical center, the European and Asian mainland. China and its surrounding countries have the densest populations and the most concentration of large countries. There are seven out of ten countries with populations over 100 million congregated in this area. Aside from China, there are India, Indonesia, Russia, Japan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. There are the largest amount of the world’s hot spots and potential hot spots in this area, such as the Korean peninsula, Kuril Islands, Taiwan Strait, Spratly Islands, Kashmir, etc are all situated in this area. The world’s recognized five power centers, aside from Europe, America, China, Russia, and Japan are all intersecting here. In terms of the major members of the world’s nuclear clubs, the areas surrounding China have become the world’s densest nuclear distribution ring by those countries with nuclear weapons and those countries near the entrance into the nuclear club. China, being situated at the connecting area of the world’s ocean geographical strategic area and European and Asia mainland geographical strategic area, has become the most coveted area for every strategic force. The school of Bianyuan (phonetic) (Borderline) Strategy has designated China as the core area of takeover as a strategic base. The school of Oceanic Strategy has designated China as the beachhead to move armed forces toward the mainland. The school of Continental Strategy has designated China as the strategic pivot for occupying Europe and Asia. Since the Opium War, several strong western powers have invaded China and engaged in mutual combat on our land so they could divide up China. The Japanese feudal warlords since the Toyotomi Hideyoshi era have made repeated attempts to land on the Chinese mainland and realize their generation-after-generations’ dreams of getting away from being an island country and becoming a “Mainland country.” During the Cold War, China was the “eastern frontline sentry” for the opposition of the East and West, two big camps. The main strategic forces held their struggles on China for close to half a century. Thus, China’s unique position at the world’s geographical strategic structure, to a large degree, has made China’s security restricted by the postures and conclusions of the strategic intention and strategic competition of each big strategic force in this area.

Subsection Two. The Chinese landmass is large and it occupies both land and sea. The strategic pressures can come from both sea and land -- two directions simultaneously.

China is a country with a big landmass and is also a big country next to the ocean. China has 9,600,000 square kilometers in landmass and 3,000,000 square kilometers of territorial water. The big land affords large strategic turn around space. “The east is lit but not the west.” “The north turns dark but we have the south.” It is also beneficial to reasonably disperse the national security forces and elevate the survivability and durability to fight during a war. Our territories are surrounded by mountains on four sides, they are the natural shield and relatively isolate us from other countries, and form a relatively independent and secure area. Although under the current conditions, due to the development of long distance attack weapons, the isolating function of the geography has been lowered, but the geographical factor is still one of the factors which impacts modern warfare. This is particularly the case for the side engaging in strategic defense, the endlessly stretched plateau and the precipitous mountains are still natural barriers to stop the invasion of foreign enemies. As a big country next to the sea, the wide ocean territory with islands scattered all over the place provides open space for the defense of the sea. This kind of geographic characteristic, with both sea and land, allows us the benefits of using the land and sea as barriers; it affords us the requirements and opportunities to develop in both directions of land and sea. But, at the same time, they give our country the heavier defense responsibilities of both land and sea. This is particularly true due to the development of modern oceanic technology, the development of the sea and the activities on the sea are increasingly frequent, which add to the increasing burden for our defense of the sea. Although we are a big country next to the ocean, the ocean area where we are is a closed and half-closed ocean area. The outer edge of the ocean area, starting from the Aleutian archipelagos, Japanese island chain, and Philippine islands, consist of the longest island chain in the world. Passing through the Korean strait, the water passage of Okinawa, Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, Malaca Strait, Sunda Strait, is the connection to the outside world. This is an important link of the world’s sea routes and it is the transportation line as well as the lifeline for China to be connected to the outside world. It has increased the strategic pressure on China from the sea and increases the difficulties and complexities of the Chinese defense of the sea.

Subsection Three. China has many neighboring countries. The contradictions of nationalities, religions, and territories are intertwined. The security environment is complex.

Our territorial land border is 2,280,000 kilometers long. There are 15 countries attached to our borders. Our continental seashore is 18,000 kilometers long and there are 6 countries neighboring us on the sea. Aside from Russia, we have the largest amount of neighboring countries. Despite the fact that we have long traditional friendships with our neighboring countries, we have similar historical experiences and we have the same aspirations to maintain peace and develop our economy. In general, we have maintained friendly and cooperative relationships with our neighboring countries. However, we cannot deny the fact that, in our border area, the scattering and composition of the nationalities are different. The economic developments have great disparities. The religions, beliefs, and cultural traditions are all different. There exist great differences and complex contradictions in the regions and between the regions. The conflicts due to these contradictions cannot avoid bringing negative impacts to our national security. These impacts are becoming more obvious due to the following factors: First, we are a nation with many nationalities and religions. Some nationalities and religions even have ties across the border. Under the international strategic structural changes of recent years as the big background, in our border areas all kinds of forces of extreme nationalists and radical religious groups are spreading. They have infiltrated into our country and have direct impact on the security and stability of our border areas. They are also tied to the international anti-Chinese forces, and the destructive activities of the three groups: the radical religious extremists, nationality separatists, and the international terrorists. Each are causing great threat to our social stability and the unity of our different nationalities. Second, due to historical reasons, some parts of our border areas on land have not been clearly defined. One of the largest areas to still have territorial disputes covers 120,000 square kilometers. Third, our eastern ocean, aside from Pohai (phonetic) is within our inner sea area. Other waterways, such as the Yellow Sea, China Sea, and South China Sea, are common waters shared with some neighboring countries. Due to the history, geographic strategy, and the contentions over resources, our ocean areas are divided, the resources plundered, islands invaded, and these problems are quite serious. This is particularly true in the South China Sea, which has rich oil reserves that can be comparable to the Middle East, and it also possesses geographical strategic value, which makes the disputes over this ocean area more acute. The disputed ocean areas with our neighboring countries cover more than 1,000,000 square kilometers, which is equivalent to 1/9 of the total area of our landmass. No matter whether it is the numbers of countries involved in the disputes or the areas in disputes, China is one of the countries in the world to stand out. All these are issues that our country cannot ignore and must resolutely deal with.

Subsection Four. The issue of Taiwan is the key link of our national security strategic issue. It has to do with our national survival and development as a whole.

Taiwan has been a part of China’s sacred territory since ancient times. As long as there are historical documents, the opening and development of Taiwan, and the integrity of our territories have been the condensation of the blood and sweat of generation after generation of Chinese nationalities. It has combined the national spirit of our Chinese ancestors’ exertion and strife with persistence. The ancestors of the Chinese mainland opening up Taiwan can be traced back to more than 30,000 years ago toward the end of the Gengxin (phonetic) century. In the ancient past, Taiwan was connected to the Chinese mainland and it is the shore area of China. But due to the movement of the earth’s crust, the connecting part sank into the strait. In 230 A.C. the King of Wu, Sun Quan dispatched Wei Wen and Zhu Ge Zhi to lead more than ten thousand troops to Taiwan, this was 1200 years ahead of the discovery of America by Columbus. In 1335 A.D. the Yuan Dynasty installed the “Patrol and Policing Bureau” to manage Pescadores and Taiwan, which was two and half centuries ahead of the first colony established in north America by European settlers. Although in recent years, the Japanese Imperialists used war measures and forced the government of the Qing dynasty, which humiliated the nation and forfeited its sovereignty, to sign the “Maguan Treaty,” they forcefully took over Taiwan and Pescadores and forced the Taiwanese to endure half a century of colonial rule. But the Chinese people and the other people in the world had completely defeated the Japanese imperialists during the anti-Fascist World War. On December 25th, 1945, Taiwan and Pescadores were returned to the Chinese territories. The fact that Taiwan is a part of undivided Chinese territories has been acknowledged by international societies. On October 1st, 1949, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China declared its formal establishment. This is merely a change of government administration within the country and it is not an establishment of another country. A sovereign country’s change of government administration does not impact on the country’s sovereignty over its entire territories and it does not affect the country’s main qualification in international law. The status of Taiwan as an undivided part of the Chinese territories does not change only because of the changes of government administration. The formation and development of Taiwan issue has its very complex international background and the interference of external forces, but it is basically an internal affair of China. The reunification of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland is not only related to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China, it has a lot do with our national dignity and has to do with the complete political independence of China. It has to do with the survival and development of the Chinese nationalities and the great revival of Chinese nationalities in this century. Taiwan is located at the ocean area of southeast China. It occupies the central role of many islands along the Chinese coast and controls the shipping lanes of the western Pacific Ocean. It is historically called the “The key of our southeast” and “The fence for the seven mainland provinces.” It is a required ocean passage from the China Sea to the South China Sea, Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, the western Pacific Ocean to the Middle East and many oceans of Europe and Asia. It connects Shanghai, Hong Kong, Okinawa, Manila, Yokosuka, and Kamram Bay, the Okhotsk Sea, and Malacca Strait, etc. and these are key links as if they are the throat-like passage of strategic importance. It is a strategic puncture point of the first island chain for China to cross into the western Pacific Ocean. It is our country’s important strategic position and the shield for ocean defense, which gathers both offensive and defensive utilities. If we allow Taiwan to split from the Chinese territories, not only our deep ocean strategic defense will be lost and our door to the ocean becomes wide opened, but it would also allow large territorial waters and resources in the ocean to be taken over by others. Our opening to the outside world and the passages for trade with the outside world, which is the lifeline of our economic development, the transportation lines to the outside, will all be under the supervision, control, and threat, of the forces of division and hostile foreign powers. We will forever be blocked to the west of the first island chain in the western Pacific Ocean. Therefore, Chinese national security is not only under grave threat, the indispensable strategic space for national revival will also be strangled. The Chinese people and government have no ground for negotiation because this issue is related to Chinese national existence, prosperity, and honor. If a peaceful solution is blocked, there is only one way: by arms. There are two choices, but we have to go for only one. “Taiwanese Independence” means that there is a revival of war and the split means there is no peace between the two sides. Despite the fact that this is not what we wanted, it is also not something we want to face. This is the greatest and final obstacle on the path to Chinese national revival in the 21st century that we should get rid of and it is the gravest of the most important national security strategy issues of the 21st century.

**Section Three: Our National Security Interests and Security Objectives**

The 21st century is a great century for the Chinese to fundamentally realize socialism, modernization, and Chinese national revival. We can provide reliable security protection to modernization construction of socialism and Chinese national revival. We can positively create the strategy, which is beneficial to the far reaching development of the country, to maintain the big task of modernization of socialism and realizing the big task of national revival. These are the most important national security interests and the most important responsibilities of national security. These responsibilities can effectively stop and shatter any attempt to invade our country. It will assure the long-term stability for the entire socialism constructions; effectively support the enjoyment of international dignity, status, and influence of what are the rights for China, a socialistic big country in the international strategic structure. It can effectively protect strategic spaces, such as, ground territory, territorial water and space, etc., which are legally granted to our country by international laws. It can maintain national sovereignty and interests so that they will not be invaded and the national resources not be plundered. It can effectively support our country to develop economic activities, which are on the footing of equality and mutual benefit. It can assure the stability of the national economic order. It can effectively support our country through untiring peaceful diplomatic efforts and fairly, reasonably, negotiate to solve the problems left by history. It can effectively stop any possible damage by the activities of the national separatists, radical religious groups, and international terrorists, to our national unity, political stability, and the solidarity of different nationalities.

Subsection One. Protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

To protect the independence of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of survival and development of the people, we cannot be threatened by external forces. It is the most important and fundamental interests of a nation. The country cannot be separated from its sovereignty. The sovereignty is the special characteristic which distinguishes a country from other social groups. The sovereignty means that the country has the right to be independent and autonomous in dealing with its own internal and external affairs. In terms of the relationships with the outside, every country is independent and equal. In terms of internal affairs, the country has the highest authority. The national sovereignty is the concentrated realization of the people’s right to exist and the right to develop. The sovereignty is indispensable for every independent country. Losing national sovereignty is as if the country has lost its independence. If the people’s right cannot be effectively protected, it is totally useless to even talk about national development and other enterprises. Therefore, every sovereign country must put its sovereignty protection on its priority list.

The territorial integrity is the basic sign of an independent sovereign country. The territory is the carrier of the country and the nation’s survival and development. Effectively using national sovereignty; protect the territorial integrity; protect the national resources from being robbed, -- these are the basic requirements of national interests. Based on current international laws, the legal concept of a territory includes the territories of ground, water, and air. Amongst them, the ground territory is the most important part, the territorial water is next, and the territorial air space and the underground are next to the territorial ground and water.

The Chinese nation has been repeatedly invaded, oppressed, and bullied by imperialists and some powerful countries in recent generations. The Chinese people have fought long and hard and made heroic struggles to obtain national independence and national liberation, thus we value the rights of independence and autonomy very much, which did not come easily. China always put the protection of national sovereignty, unification, and territorial integrity and security on the first spot. China will use every means, including military measures, to protect national sovereignty so it will not get invaded. It will protect the national territory so it will not be divided and protect the national resources so it will not be robbed. All these are the sacred rights of the Chinese government and Chinese people. Anybody will definitely get clobbered if he intends to invade China. Anybody is asking for self-destruction if he intends to divide the Chinese territories. Today, the largest island of China, Taiwan and other islands, such as, Pescdores, Kingman and Matsu, etc. are separated from the Chinese mainland in a realistic sense. After Hong Kong, Macaw’s return to China, realizing the complete unification of the country is where the basic national interests lie. To protect the fatherland, oppose invasion, protect unification, these are the sacred missions of every sovereign nation.

On the Taiwan issue, the Chinese government has always insisted on a “One China” principle. The basic policy of the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan issue is “Peaceful reunification. One country with two systems.” When it relates to the basic issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese government and Chinese people’s stance are never going to be moved. The change of Taiwan’s internal government will never alter the fact that Taiwan is part of China. To resolve the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair of China. The Chinese government resolutely objects to the sale of arms to Taiwan from any nation and objects to any military alliance of any form with Taiwan, and objects to any form of external interference. The Chinese government will try its best to seek peaceful reunification. Through the basis of a “One China” principle, it advocates to engage in dialogues and negotiations to resolve the differences. But, if there is the emergence of such a critical incident that Taiwan got divided from China by any shape or form, if any foreign power invaded Taiwan, or if Taiwan authority indefinitely refuses peaceful resolution through negotiations on the reunification issue, the Chinese government will be forced to take any possible arbitrary measure, including the use of arms, to protect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and realize the big task of unifying the country. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army will resolutely use the nation’s will as its own will, with complete determination, confidence, capabilities, and means to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It will not tolerate, not appease, sit and watch any conspiracy to succeed in dividing our fatherland.

Subsection Two. Protect national economic development and prosperity.

Since the establishment of the New China fifty years ago, the economic constructions of the country have made large progress in development. Since the reforms and opening of the past 20 years, our nations’ economy has displayed rapid increases and achieved great results, which have stunned the world. But we are still at the early stage of socialism, with large populations, a poor foundation, uneven area developments, and poorly developed productions. These conditions will last for a long time. To realize the national strategic missions on economic constructions in becoming a mid-level advanced country in the mid-21st century is still a formidable task. It is the basic needs of our national security to protect the smooth progression of the modernization constructions of socialism.

First, we should thoroughly protect our economic resources and protect the continuous development of our economy. The resources are the materialistic foundation of what human society relies on for survival and development, and they are also the historical roots for all the killings and wars. The history of human society is a history full of fighting for the resources and right for survival. Even now some strong powers are sill frequently using their armed forces to control the world’s supplying areas of important resources. Due to the rapid increase of economic development, the consumption of these natural resources also increase rapidly. According to the statistics of the United Nations, the world’s natural resources can afford comfortable living for a population of 1 billion people and is called the “Golden 1 billion.” The current world population has reached 70 or 80 billions, the world resources have emerged into a situation of “There are more monks than the porridge available to them.” The lack of resources has become the inhibiting factor of many countries’ economic development.

China is a country with large populations and the average resource per person is not rich. To protect our limited natural resources; reasonably and efficiently develop and apply the resources; realizing the best allocations of our natural resources, are crucial issues related to the possibility of continuous development of our economy. At the same time, thoroughly protecting our economic rights and interests; effectively protect our eco-resources and ocean resources; and protecting the strategic energy supply lines of our nation, are also related to the crucial interests of our country’s extended development.

Second, protecting the social order of our country and protecting the peaceful labor of our people is important. Political stability is the basic protection for economic development. To protect the stability of social order and the right of peaceful labor are important components of China’s national interests. To protect the stability of our social environment, not only do we have to smash all open armed invasions of hostile forces and military interference, but we also require firmly smashing all the conspiracies of hostile forces using “peaceful” means to implement political infiltrations and economic destructions. Not only do we have to defend ourselves against external hostile forces from engaging in destructive activities, but we also require preventing illegal domestic activities, which are anti-people, anti-society, and seriously damaging social stability. In fact, many destructive activities of the internal and external reactionaries are often tied together and planned together. Only by punishing these illegal activities with laws and smashing these destructive forces, can we maintain society’s political stability and economic development.

Third, based on the will of the people and the conditions of our country, we can independently and autonomously select the model and path, which are suitable for our economic development. In selecting the social system suitable for our country’s conditions and developing the mode of strategy and living styles, can the basic rights of a sovereign country be protected and no country has the right to interfere. To take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and develop a socialism market economy with Chinese characteristics, are the autonomously selected right paths for enriching the people and strengthening the country with long revolutionary struggles and economic constructions by the Chinese people. Nobody can forcefully impose his favorite social system, ideology, and value system on the Chinese people. We should be highly vigilant for conspiracies by external forces’ attempts to dictate to the Chinese on the direction of development, divide, westernize, and weaken China and their attempts by force to alter the path of China’s development, the structures of our politics and economy.

Subsection Three. Protect the dignity of our country and equal and independent international status.

National interests are largely reflected in international interactions. In protecting national interests, we will have to protect the equal status of our country in international interactions. The country’s interactions with the outside include: based on the relevant treaties and agreements between nations not to damage other countries’ interests and not to pose threats on other nations as the premise, we will engage in the exchanges of politics, economy, science and technology, culture, human resources, and military. The sovereign country being the most important main acting body in international relationships will make all kinds of contacts with other countries. Today, with the globalization of the economy, these kinds of contacts are getting much closer than in the past and also bring much more impact to our national interests. To protect the security and equality of the international environment and the freedom of interactions we have, increasingly becomes the common responsibility of every nation. When one country is seeking self-interests, it must also pay attention to the interests of other countries. Any country while trying to improve the interests of its own citizens, should also respect the right of other countries’ to improve their citizens’ interests. This is not just following the ethical and moral concept and people’s common desires, its basic cause is more due to the characteristics of mutual dependence of the current international societies and the objective principles of social development.

The future development of China needs an extended peaceful international environment, especially a good surrounding environment, which is the important content of Chinese security goals. For this, China positively promotes establishing a new security concept based on the nucleus of mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality, cooperation, and developing friendly relationships with neighboring countries. Based on equality and mutual benefits, we should develop the cooperation of every country in the same region on trade, science and technology, culture, and other fields and actively participate in the economic cooperation of the region; actively participate in multilateral security dialogues and cooperation; insist on peaceful solutions to solve conflicts between countries, and fairly, reasonably, solve the existing arguments on the rights of territories and territorial waters with surrounding countries. China supports the Asian-Pacific area to establish a healthy group security system, which promotes bilateral or multilateral security dialogues. We also support each Asian-Pacific country to adopt all activities which are beneficial for maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region.

China has never ceased in implementing independent, autonomous, and peaceful foreign policies. We have not allied with any big country or group of countries. We advocate basing decisions on the right or wrong of the matter itself and the basic interests of the Chinese people and the people of the world to handle international affairs. We independently and autonomously judge and determine our own stance and policies.

China has been making efforts in establishing stable and cooperative relationships with big countries and actively participates and promotes international cooperation. China advocates, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, establishing fair and reasonable international political and economical new order; advocates the United Nations to express more positive functions on resolving international affairs on politics, economy, and security. We object to the hegemonies and strong-power politics, gunboat diplomacy, the trends of regional militarization and strengthening of military alliances.

**Section Four: The Characteristics of Regional Wars that We Will Face in the Future**

Various forms of threat to our national interests determine that we may face various types of regional wars. From the perspective of war, in the foreseeable future, we are likely to fight two kinds of wars, one is implementing war to counter the invasion of some regions by external hostile forces, and the other kind is a war to protect the unification of our country. Our chances to face nuclear war are not great, but the nuclear threat remains. Under certain circumstances we cannot rule out the possibilities that the enemy may use tactical nuclear weapons. The future wars are mainly regular high-tech wars under the threats of nuclear and bio-chemical wars. From the perspective of the development of the types of wars, these kinds of wars will be the informational war under the threats of nuclear and bio-chemical wars. In general, we are not likely to get involved in an all out war, but we cannot rule out the possibility that regional war may escalate into an all out war or similar to an all out war.

The future regional war that our country may face, aside from the general characteristics of possessing high-tech conditions, will also possess the following concrete characteristics:

Subsection One. The nature of war with defensive characteristics.

No matter if it is anti-invasion, anti-separation, or anti-interference, we will be in a passive situation when war happens in the future. It is an action which we are completely forced to take when the sovereignty and territory of the country, the rights of the sea, and the grand task of reunification, are under serious threat. The war we implement will be defensive, just, and for self-protection. China does not have the societal ground to use arms for radical reasons, absolutist’s use, unlimited use, and unjust use. The societal characteristics of China, the highest national interests of China, the Chinese strategic cultural tradition, and national characteristics of “Pease is most precious,” do not allow China to expand our military to overseas and take the road to become one of the hegemonies. We will not allow the violation of desire and interests of the entire Chinese people and consume the limited resources on unending military competitions. In past history, the competitive relationship of a newly arrived big country and the existing big country are different. China, being a newly arrived big country and great revival of Chinese nationalities, is not necessarily waging challenges to the existing big country’s proper interests. No matter from the perspective of geographical structure, economic structure, or cultural structure, China is not in opposing relationships with other big countries.

Subsection Two. The complexities of battlefield environment.

In the past, under the threat of an all out war, we would fight deep final battles and the major battlefields were selected in the internal area. The future regional wars are likely to take place mainly in the strategic frontal areas. The possibilities that wars extending deep into our land are not great. Our ground border, sea near the seashore, air space, are most likely to become the battlefields of the high-tech regional future wars, which we are going to encounter. These areas are the front edges opened for our country’s reforms, they are also the first shields of our national security. They are also the points of contacts with our neighboring countries and the intersecting points of many contradictory interests. Compared to the deep battlefields, the battles on lands near the shores or borders have some differences and some disadvantages. First, the border areas and seashores are far away from our nation’s important central areas, some areas are as far as several hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. It will be quite difficult to send the troops out, support the battles, and protect the logistics. Second, the volume of the battlefield is smaller, it is difficult to fully express the traditional battle superiority because of the difficulties of assembling a large force, spreading out the troops, lacking the turn around space, and exchanging time for space, etc. Third, war situations are complex and battle activities will be more affected and restricted by natural conditions. The ground border areas are mostly having special terrains, such as, high and cold mountainous areas, tropical mountains and jungles, desert, gobies, grass lands, etc. Along the seashores, oceans and straits, the hydrology, weather, islands and reefs, etc., these environments are so different, complex, and changeable, which restricted greatly earlier battle activities. Fourth, the problems of nationalities and religions of the border areas are so intertwined, some nationalities are spread out and live in different countries, which add to the complexities and sensitivities of war activities. Some areas of the oceans are next to international waters and related to the interests of many countries. These are related closely to foreign policies and can easily bring troubles to the war activities if not careful.

Subsection Three. Mutual movement of strategic direction.

Due to the multiplicity and complexity of our national security problems, the threat that our national security may face in the future is not likely to be singular but more likely to be in multiple directions. Each direction of strategy, especially between the major direction and important direction, there exists an obvious relationship of mutual movement. In the future, when we are being restricted to one strategic direction, the hostile forces will use all kinds of means to search for and create opportunities to cause troubles in other strategic directions.

At the present, in terms of the range of the world, aside from the contentions of national interests which lead to military conflicts or regional wars, the activities of the national separatists, radical religious fanatics, and international terrorists have become important factors of the destructive forces on the peace and stability of countries and regions. These three forces have shown the developmental trends of more arms, violence, and are internationalized. They have brought some relevant countries and regions grave threats on their securities. Because these three forces appear without the form and organization of a country, and they are being supported and protected by some other countries, thus, their ability to hide is strong; their destructive power is strong, and has increasingly become a security problem for the world. These three forces are quite active within our country. When our country faces the threat of regional war or military conflict, these forces will definitely respond and use that opportunity to challenge or conduct armed destructive activities. Therefore, when our military concentrates the forces on a major direction and executes the decisive battle, we should also be prepared at any time to implement necessary defensive battles or controlling battles in other directions and assure the stability and initiative of the entire situation.

Subsection Four. The multiplicity of the war opponents.

In our future regional wars, we may not be facing only one hostile country’s challenge, but the challenges from several forces. We can even encounter the military alliance system of a hostile force. These forces may get together due to the need of temporary interests and it can be a more permanent military alliance. We have to maintain vigilance on this.

Subsection Five. The multiplicity of the types of war.

Our country’s landmass is big, the terrains are complex, the differences of the battlefield environments of each strategic direction are huge. This determines the multiplicity of the types of war for our military. In certain strategic directions, our military can coordinate all military branches and implement defensive war with offensive activities as its major war under high-tech conditions. The war space can be related to each field, such as ground, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic, etc. This is particularly true on the sea, air, and electromagnetic battlefields, on which, the battles are going to be fierce. In certain strategic directions, it is possible to implement a coordinated battle with defensive actions as the major type. At the ground border area, there will be coordinated counter attacks by the ground and air forces. Near the ocean, it will be a fight for air supremacy, naval supremacy, and coordinated battles by the navy and air forces. There will be anti-aircraft battles in some important military positions. There will be various forms and measures of cross the border self-defense counter attacks, special warfare, battles to squelch the rebellions, directly and indirectly support the war in major direction with various types of war activities.

Subsection Six. The maneuverability of war capabilities.

Our country has several strategic directions. Each strategic direction has long distance and big differences. Maybe the battlefields will be located at the strategic front lines, which are far away from the central belly area. The natural environment is complex. The missions of constructing the battlefields are very difficult. The transportation and communication systems are inconvenient. In order to assure winning the regional war in each direction, we need to adjust the strategic deployment of regular troops, move crack troops with good weapons from all over the country to the battle zones. The mobility and fluidity of the war must be strong. The maneuvers and the defensive and offensive wars and other attacking activities must be integrated. It requires that our military be equipped with stronger transportation capabilities to move forces, communication capabilities, and maneuvering battle capabilities.

Subsection Seven. The lack of symmetry on our technological

levels.

In many decades, our military weapons and equipment has made big progress in modernization. But even now, we are still in the mechanized and semi-mechanized state. Our informational weapons and equipment is just taking the initial steps. Our levels of modernization as a whole is still pretty low. In future wars, there are three possible situations between the technological levels of our weapons and equipment with the enemy forces: one is the enemy is stronger than us, second is the enemy and us are equal, and the third is that the enemy is inferior to us. Even if the enemy forces are weaker than us, we cannot rule out the possibility of the interference and support from a strong enemy. Thus, our military strategy must stand on the footing that we will use inferior equipments to win victory over the enemy with superior equipment. We will express the tradition of “beat the superior with the inferior” and search for “use low to defeat the high” measure to defeat the enemy.

Subsection Eight. The people’s war under modern conditions.

The wars we have to fight in the future are still the people’s wars and this fundamental characteristic is not going to change. But, the future people’s wars are possible in regional areas, which are far from the deep central area of the country and are at areas near the sea and in the air and proceed under high-tech conditions with information technology as its major form. The situations are going to have a big change from the past superior ways of mobilizing of all the people, face the enemy by the whole country, and rely on the deep strategy of a protracted war. The troops as the backbone in the war will be increasingly strengthened. The masses will use the measures and methods of economy, technology, culture, and justice to support the wars. The people’s war under modern conditions will penetrate through all the processes of war preparation and implementation. The masses’ uniformed support and the same animosity against the enemy are still the determining factor to winning the victory of the war. The deepest source of the strong power of war is forever resting in the hands of the masses.

**Chapter Twenty Four**

**Strategic Guidance for Future High-Tech Local Wars of Our Country**

The strategic guidance for local wars under high-tech conditions of our country should not only follow the general rules of modern wars, especially local wars under high-tech conditions, it should also follow the unique rules of high-tech local wars under our actual military conditions. These focus on the search of strategic guiding rules regarding how to carry out the people’s wars under modern conditions. This is done with the backdrop that our military technologies are relatively lagging behind, and we question how to properly use our military forces and other forces to defeat enemies who have superior high-tech weapons and equipment. We should make every effort in combining closely the general conclusions of the practical analysis of the impact of historical experiences of our strategic guidance on the strategic environment, and the characteristics of future wars, which will provide a theoretical basis for carrying out correct war decisions and strategic guidance.

**Section One: You Fight Yours, I Fight Mine, Make Every Effort in Seizing the Complete Initiative**

You fight yours and I fight mine, and do all we can to gain the initiative. This is the soul and the quintessence of our national and military strategic guidance; it is the most accurate and lively theoretical outline of the guiding rules of the people’s war; and it is of the highest level of war guidance of all times, which is provided with prominent Chinese characteristics and the characteristics of the era.

Mao Zedong was the first creator and successful practitioner of this core ideology. In 1947, he raised it for the first time in a telegram to the Field Army Corps of Shanxi, Chahaer, and Hebei and the Field Army Corps of Eastern China, “you fight yours, I fight mine (Each fights his own way).” This strategic guiding principle requires “carrying out complete active operations.” After New China was founded, Mao Zedong again clarified this very profound thought with brilliant language on a number of occasions, focusing on strategic environment changes in various times. He said, there is no mystery in fighting wars; one will fight if he thinks he can win, if he can not win, he will just walk away; you fight yours and I fight mine. What are strategy and tactics? The answer is these four words, regardless of endless discussions. He also said, our approaches are: “If I can swallow you, I will do it; if I can not swallow you, I will not let you swallow me as well. When the opportunity is not ripe, our main force will not fight you head-on, instead, it will stay clear of the engagement; I will wait until I can swallow you, then I begin to eat you up gradually.” The core requirement of this thought is to maintain the freedom of war guidance and combat operations, using our strong points to defeat the enemy’s shortcomings. No mater what kind of enemy we are facing, or what time and location the war will take place, we should make full use of our strong points, attack the enemy’s weaknesses, as this principle will never change. Adhering to the principle of war guidance “your fight yours, and I fight mine,” we must master the following three points:

First, stress that daring to win is a premise of carrying out correct guidance, so no powerful enemy can intimidate us. As evidenced by our war history, no matter at any time or under what circumstances, the most important issues the leaders of a war may face are maintaining a correct understanding of the enemy as well as our own situations of war. Never flinch when the enemy is strong, never fall to the influence of transient enemy initiatives, fully assess our own superiority and advantageous conditions, firmly believe that through our own subjective efforts, on the basis of certain war materials, we can carry out the strength of war and shift from passive to active, and finally win the war.

Second, stress that leading strategists must act on their own, and never become controlled by the enemy. We must gain the freedom of movement and battlefield initiative for our army. We must sustain the right of making our own decisions on war guidance and strategic thinking. When deliberating issues on strategic guidance, war leaders must adhere to the principle of viewing ourselves as the core; select whatever target to attack that is advantageous to us; attack at whatever time and location that is suitable to us; use whatever mode and approaches of attack that are easy to achieve the objective, and never attack the enemy at an expected time, place, or mode of operation. Only by so doing, we can focus the strategic guidance on fully exercising our own superiority, on issues that are most important, decisive and significant to the overall situation, thus, we can convert our inferiority into superiority and passivity into activity, in order to force the enemy to act on our terms.

Third, stress that our superiority should be fully exploited in order to attack the enemy’s weaknesses with our strong points. War is a match of forces, and it is also a match of feelings of the people. Good or bad, weaknesses or strong points, false or true, and strong or weak are objective existence of continued development and change that is always a form of inter-antagonism and inter-dependency. Regardless of how the technical conditions of war will develop, how advanced the enemy’s weapons will be, or how strong are they, they must have weaknesses. The “you fight yours and I fight mine” approach is an overall dialectical understanding of the weaknesses or strong points, good or bad, true or false, strong or weak of both sides, in order to try to catch, make, expand, or use the enemy’s weak points and mistakes, and make every effort to conceal, make up and overcome our own shortcomings, falseness and weaknesses. At the same time, we should try our best to seize the best opportunity and location, use the most effective mode of operations to attack the enemy’s weak points, falseness, and weaknesses. We can never conceal our weaknesses with passive approaches. Only by taking positive and active actions, can we truly exploit the force of making the best use of advantages and bypassing disadvantages, and using strong points to attack weak points, in order to force the enemy into a passive and perilous position.

You fight yours and I fight mine is provided with different concrete forms and contents in different historical periods and under different war conditions, and it requires changes according to the changes of time, location, target, and conditions. For instance, our army used “the sixteen-character formula” of guerrilla warfare to defeat several of Kuomintang’s “encircling and suppressing operations;” using widespread behind-the- enemy guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare under advantageous conditions to deal with front line attacks of Japanese invading forces and its large scale “mopping-up operations;” deploying striding along back and forth mobile warfare in crushing Kuomintang army’s all-out attacks and key point attacks, then, annihilated Chiang Kai-shek’s main force with large scale regular operations, and seized the political power of the entire country. On the Korean battlefield, we first pushed back “U.N. force’s invasion” with continued mobile warfare, then, with the strong position of defense with tunnels as its backbone, we deployed “bit by bit” position offensive attacks to destroy a large number of enemy troops. The enemy was forced to accept the conclusion of peace talks; during the Sino-Indian border self-defense counter-attack in1962. We created the extraordinary example of a war of crossing border counter-attack, withdrawing after a big victory, and annihilating the enemy and returning enemy prisoners of war. In high-tech local wars that our country may face in the future, we still have to use “making every effort to gain complete initiative” as the goal, combine firm decision making and carry out determination flexibly, based on new historical conditions and new characteristics of war. We must boldly deploy operational approaches and modes of operation that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to the enemy, in order to create the glory of war guidance again.

**Section Two: Fully Deploy the Overall Might of the People’s War Under Modern Conditions**

The people’s war is the foundation of strategic guidance of the People’s Liberation Army. The people’s war, being an organized form of war, the levels of its roles and military technologies are not necessarily connected. The people’s war is by no means a conception that corresponds only to low tech-tech wars. The position and roles of the people’s war are closely connected to the political factors of war and the organizational power of war leaders. No matter if it is the past, the present, or the future, our army always wins the foothold of victory in wars of justice with the support of the masses, the political awareness and the spirit of bravery of the entire military personnel, as well as existing weapons and equipment, and flexible and maneuvering strategies and tactics. We firmly believe in “the militia is the foundation of victory,” and we never believe in technologies and modern weapons alone determining the outcome of wars.

In local wars under high-tech conditions that our country will face in the future, the masses’ role as the principal of war will be realized through the country, and the might of the people’s war is released through the combination of the comprehensive national strength and manufacturing products for both peacetime and wartime use. In addition to direct participation in the local areas of war in support of combat operations, the masses will primarily use political, economic, scientific and technological, cultural and moral approaches and measures to support the war. The people’s power will be reflected massively in the process of war preparation, and expressed as the accumulation of war strength and the building of the foundation of war. During the process of carrying out a war, however, it is mainly reflected in the unified will of the country and the people, united heart and mind of the people, and in war support, it is expressed as political organizational power, economic and technological power, public opinion and cultural power, and the comprehensive release of war strengths such as necessary human resources, material, war power and war participating and front line support.

Focusing on these new characteristics, guiding the people’s war under modern conditions requires “solving two fundamental problems,” embracing “one central task.” The one central task is how to mobilize, organize, and arm the masses according to the requirement of high-tech local wars. The two fundamental problems, one is the rapid mobilization and transformation of national defense potentialities; the other one is the coordination of irregular warfare and regular warfare. The basic goal is still supporting the operations of the people’s army in order to gain the final victory.

Mobilizing, organizing and arming the masses are basic approaches of transforming war potentialities into war strength. Under the condition of high-tech local wars, the mobilization of the masses is a limited mobilization on the basis of long-term preparation. In most cases, every effort should be made to avoid the overall national economic and social developments from being affected. The organization of the masses is carried out through state administrative mechanisms, legal mechanisms, educational mechanisms, and military mechanisms, in the form of the mobilization of the people’s armed forces, national economy, civil air defense, transportation war preparation, medical health, science and technology, etc.. The arming of the masses is mainly carried out through the form of organizing established units or deploying militia, reserve units (or elements), etc.

The rapid mobilization and transformation of war potentialities is usually determined by four key links. First, the strong and powerful unified mobilization leadership. Focus on smooth relationship, sound organization, clarified leadership and command functions of all kinds of mobilization at every level from central to local in peacetime and wartime. Second, the formulation of complete laws and regulations of national defense mobilization, and carry out mobilization works according to law. Change the national defense mobilization works from administrative actions of the party committee and the government into the track of law, and form an army and the government combined, unified as well as separated, and a flexible and effective national defense mobilization operating mechanism, in order to ensure that personnel mobilization can be carried out, equipment can be transferred and assembled quickly, results can be transformed promptly, and facilities can be used quickly as soon as they are required. Third, carry out a nationwide layout with focus on emergency reaction. Generally speaking, it is a nationwide game of chess. The mobilization development should be focused on all the strategic directions and the comprehensive need for dealing with all kinds of wars. At the same time, the focus should also be placed on the most seriously threatened areas. Emergency mobilization, in order to ensure that the strength embodied in material development and spiritual and cultural development, and from the people’s support of the war should be mobilized and released fully, orderly, in a short time. Fourth, prioritize science and technology mobilization and army operational special requirement mobilization. Starting from the characteristics of the people’s war under socialist market and high-tech conditions and based on the objective requirement of troops operating in different strategic directions, with new and high technologies, make trades that are badly required by combat units as the key points, establish a mobilization data base on the nationwide internet; ensure an operational setup of suiting the requirements of actual combat operations making up for regular units, and use flexible and multi-modes to continue to improve the scientific content and quality of war mobilization, and strengthen the capability of the people’s support of the front line and war participation with science and technology.

The key of the partnership of regular warfare and the irregular warfare is to put the best use of the creative power of the masses and the military personnel on the basis of inheriting the glorious tradition of the people’s war, developing new forms of the people’s war under modern conditions, according to actual combat operations in different strategic directions. The “five combinations” are the key issues to be resolved: 1. The combination of regular units and the force of the masses that participates in wars. The focus is organizing the masses in supporting defensive naval operations or border counter attacks in coastal, inland and border areas, using local science and technology resources to carry out various forms of attacks, and all kinds of support duties. 2. Combining regular naval warfare and sea guerrilla warfare. Fully understand the important roles of irregular sea warfare, carefully search for the mode of operations such as “sparrow warfare,” “maritime sabotage operations,” “sea ambush operations,” and “maritime convoy operations,” in order to develop the people’s sea war strategies and tactics. 3. Combining the “killer’s mace” and flexible maneuvering strategies and tactics. Use the people’s war approach of “killer’s mace,” play a “hide and seek” game with the enemy, attack the enemy from an unexpected direction and location when the enemy is unprepared, attack the enemy’s vital parts, and disturb the enemy’s network and system. You attack your “inferior technology” and I attack my “inferior mode of operation.” With the “killer’s mace’s” approach of defeating the enemy by surprise moves, create new strategies and tactics of the people’s war, and maximize the integrated power of these two. 4. The combination of high-tech weapons and regular weapons. The co-existence of multi-generation weapons is a long-term phenomenon. Therefore, we should use the approach of the “Tian Ji horse race” that combines tall ones and short ones, local ones and imported ones; combine different weapons skillfully for better use, integrate and use technical approaches of defeating the enemy and approaches of mode of operation of the enemy, in order to form an integrated attacking force. 5. Combine military warfare, political warfare, and economic warfare. Rely on the most widespread united front of struggles against the enemy in carrying out multi-approach struggles against the enemy in order to tie down the enemy’s strategic strength, split the enemy’s military alliance, shake the enemy’s fighting will, divide the enemy’s internal unity, weaken the enemy’s economic foundation, disintegrate the enemy’s operational systems, continue to expand strategic recourses and strength in our match with the enemy, and make high-tech irregular warfare a strong backing and indispensable strategic measure for the armed forces.

**Section Three: Determine a Limited Objective and Fight No Battle Unless Victory Is Sure**

The objective of wars is the final result that the wars are trying to achieve. The starting point and the end result of the entire war plan and actions are carrying out the objectives of wars by paying a minimum price, which is also the fundamental basis for strategic guidance.

The character of local wars under high-tech conditions our country will face belong to anti-aggression or anti-secessionism self-defense wars. The objective of war is maintaining a state’s political unity and territorial integrity, and counter-attacking armed interference and local invasion of hostile states. Unless our national survival is threatened, and an all-out war must be fought by the entire country, the objective and scope of wars must be strictly restricted by subjective guidance, and wars can be carried out in a situation that there will be only minimum impact on our overall national economic development. In comparison with past wars, this is a significant change. The series of changes of wars and their guidance are directly or indirectly related to the changes of the objectives of wars.

The objective of our future local wars under high-tech conditions will limit the scale, approaches, time, space and process of wars. The strategic guidance of our future high-tech local wars must obey and serve the limited objective of war. Determined limited objective is not only reflected in correctly determined general objective of war, it must also be carried through in operational actions from the start to the end. In strategic guidance and campaign and battle command, the selection of operational targets must be corresponding to subject and objective conditions, and it can not exceed the scope permitted by subjective conditions. The selected objective must be achieved through trying great efforts, then, it is possible to achieve the operational goals of war objectives, in order to ensure that we will fight no battle unless victory is sure.

After the New China was founded, our country fought anti-U.S. Aggression and Aid to Korea War, Anti-U. S. Aggression and Aid to Vietnam War, and a number of self-defense battles in the border area. Under the general objective of maintaining national security, sovereignty and territory integrity, we fought every battle with determined proper objectives according to the objective situation at that time, and we were successful in we would fight no battle unless victory is sure. During the Anti-U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea War, the opponent we faced in the battlefield was strong and the risk was high. Our objective was not to drive the enemy out of the Asian Pacific region, nor did we want to conquer the opponent fundamentally, what we wanted was an attempt to aid neighboring countries that are in a perilous situation, resist foreign invasions, and consolidate our national defense. Therefore, after we entered Korea, our volunteering army continued to launch mobile warfare in annihilating enemy troops in large numbers. We helped Korea to recover its lost territories; stabilize the frontline behind the “38” (38ºN) line, and moved into positional defense at an appropriate time, thus gradually balanced the battlefield forces of the two hostile sides. When the enemy failed to break through our defense lines, and could not expand the war, it had to sign the cease fire agreement. In achieving this objective of war, our fundamental interest, our strength, and the international situation at that time were all tallied. The war resisting U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea not only did not affect our domestic development, it also inspired the people’s sense of patriotism, consolidated the new born people’s government, improved new China’s international standings, and created good domestic and international conditions for carrying out socialist development. The 1958 bombardment of Jinmen Islands was not carried out for recovering Jinmen and Mazu Islands, it was an operation to test the “Mutual Defense Agreement” signed by the U. S. and Chiang Kai-shek, which defeated a U. S. attempt to force Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu, so, the conspiracy of “two countries separated by the strait” can be realized. We employed the operational plan of “attacking but not landing, cut off but not but keeping it alive,” in “allying with Chiang Kai-shek to deny the U. S.,” that is, helping Chiang to keep Jinmen and Mazu, in order to maintain the unity of our motherland. Mao Zedong pointed out: we attack Jinmen and Mazu in order to help Chiang Kai-shek, because the U. S. tried to hand Jinmen and Mazu over to us, so it could occupy Taiwan. We therefore gave up Jinmen and Mazu and gave them to Chiang Kai-shek. Whenever Chiang was in trouble, we would attack Jinmen and Mazu, and the U. S. had to let Chiang continue his presidency. The extraordinary strategic guidance of this match had achieved all its anticipated objectives. In 1962, the advance objectives of the self-defense resisting operations along the common border between India and China was not to recover by force the territories that were occupied by India illegally, actually, we were forced to use the approach of war to create the conditions for peaceful talks in resolving the border conflict. Therefore, after a two-stage operation, under the condition that our army had reached the traditional border line, we took the initiative of pulling back to 20 kilometers behind the actual control line, which fully reflected the justifiable and self-defense characters of our military actions, and we declared to the world our sincerity of resolving the border conflict by peaceful means.

**Section Four: Use Active Strategic Exterior Line Counterattack to Achieve the Objective of Strategic Defense**

Active defense is the essential characteristics of our military strategy, and it is the corner-stone of our theories of strategic guidance. In future wars, our army will always be in an overall defensive position. This strategic defensive position refers mainly to the self-defense character of maintaining our national unity, territorial and sovereignty integrity, and maritime interests. Our goal is peace, not war. Our principle is “We will not attack unless we are attacked, if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”

Carrying out the defensive strategic policy is a firm and consistent endeavor, our requirements of strategic actions, however, are active and flexible. It is the integration of the efforts of preventing wars and the preparation of winning self-defense wars in peacetime, and the integration of strategic defense and campaign and battle offensive actions in wartime.

During a long period of time following the founding of our country, we had been under constant threat of an all-out war. We had to carry out the active defense policy, focusing on luring the enemy into our depth, and fought our decisive battles in the inland depth. The policy of “Preventing war before it breaks out, winning the war when it occurs, defending strategically, and attacking in campaign and battle,” is provided with clear boundaries and stages, and it is easy to operate and control. After the cold war ended, the strategic environment, war patterns and strategic missions we faced underwent significant changes, high-tech local wars are increasingly becoming the main threat and mode of operation we are facing, so, there are a series of new issues raised for strategic guidance.

1. In past wars we were fighting for our national survival, we were in an inferior position and we had to fight all-out wars on our whole territories to deal with the enemy in vast strategic space. Currently, however, we have gone through scores of years of development and building up, and we have accumulated considerable resources; we have not only to win local wars that occur mostly in the border area, coastal area and over their air spaces, we also need to maintain our overall national strategic stability, and we can not afford to lose either of them. The past approach of using space to trade for time is no longer an easy task.

2. In the past, the distance between us and the enemy was close under general technological conditions, the outcome of wars were often determined by close-range fights. Currently, due to rapid development of high technologies and their applications in the military field, wars are gradually shifting toward the direction of non-contact and non-linear. Both the warring sides are trying their best to carry out long-range attacks outside the defense perimeters. In an “invisible” non-symmetry war, the result will be very poor for launching exterior line counterattacks of campaign and battles in a strategic interior line posture.

3. In an all-out war situation of the past, in the early period of the war and the ensuing period, and the three stages of the defense stage, the stalemate stage, and the counterattack stage, the levels of strategy, campaign, and battle were clear and complete, and the programming of strategic guidance was strong. Modern wars, however, are characterized by quick process and short duration, no division of early period of war or its ensuing periods, no clear defense, stalemate or counterattack stages shifting, and the distinction between strategy, campaign and battle is increasingly smaller. Strategic decisions, campaign command, battle actions are gradually integrated, sometimes, a war is a campaign, a battle or a campaign may have strategic significance, and achieve strategic objectives. In local wars, placing the hopes on dealing with the enemy calmly after the war breaks out, turning small victories into big victories, and shifting defensive and offensive postures gradually is increasingly impossible in terms of time.

The above situation has provided us with considerable difficulties in handling strategic defense and campaign and battle offense. Thus, in carrying out active defense strategy of the new era one must start from characteristics and rules of modern local wars, make adjustment to our train of thoughts, enrich time connotation of active defense; while adhering to the strategic defense character. Emphasis should be placed on achieving the objectives of strategic defense through active strategic exterior line counterattacks. The so-called active strategic exterior line counterattack contains the following meaning:

First, it is not the exterior line operation of campaign and battle; it is an exterior line operation at the strategic level.

Second, it is not the operation of the stage of strategic counterattack in all-out wars; it is a strategic combat operation that is carried out at the very beginning of the war.

Third, it is not an integral part of the extrovert type of expanding offensive strategy; it is an active self-defense counterattack operation of strategic defense character, and a part of active defense strategy.

Carrying out strategic exterior line counterattack operations is an inevitable choice of countries that are carrying out defensive strategy under high-tech local war conditions; it is the maximum release of initiatives in defense strategy, and an inevitable choice and effective mode of operations for a weak army to deal with a strong army.

On the timing of operation, adhere to the approach that active strategic exterior line counterattack operations should be carried out through making every effort in gaining the initiative and attack first in order to control the enemy. Once the enemy has entered our territory, and violated our national interest, it means that the enemy has fired the first shot strategically. The enemy has crossed the border of our strategic defense, and we have gained the complete freedom of military defense combat operations. In the area of operation, we are not just staying in our border, coastal areas or related air space passively, waiting for the invading enemy to show up, we should attack the enemy from the longest range possible when the war breaks out, make every effort to lead the enemy toward its operational bases, even to the area where the war was planned and started out, in order to attack actively with all the effective strength that form the enemy’s war system. On the mode of operation, it is not the passive and reaction type of protection and resisting attack, it is a completely self-controlled operation. Just like what Mao Zedong pointed out in April, 1965 on the possible invasion of joint forces of foreign powers, that kind of situation is also “Nothing serious. Just some people walk around on the earth, you come to our place and I go to your place.” You can fight your way in, but I can fight my way out too; firmly control the freedom of combat operations, select the time, place and approach that the enemy could not imagine, unwilling and difficult to deal with in attacking the enemy.

**Section Five: Concentrate Elite Forces and Lethal Weapons, and Form Relative Superiority at a Critical Time and Location**

The secret of strategy lies in the concentration of forces. This rule is provided with a perpetual vitality. Concentration of forces is a basic way in forming superiority, and it is a basic condition of creating advantageous postures and gaining war victories. Although the gigantic development of the material and technical conditions of war has continued to change the form of implementation and the concrete content of concentration of forces, however, the essential relationship between concentration of forces and establishing superiority has never been changed.

On strategic guidance, concentration of forces contains two meanings: 1. correctly select the main strategic direction; 2. Form a strategic disposition with priorities that embrace the main strategic direction. The main strategic direction should aim at the main operational target and the direction that poses the greatest threat to our country. In a given time frame, not two, but only one strategic direction is allowed. According to strategic situations and the degree of threats, we can divide other strategic directions into primary strategic directions and secondary strategic directions. Determined strategic disposition must be corresponding with the selected strategic direction; that is, concentrating the main force in the main direction, deploying required forces in the primary and secondary directions, controlling strong strategic reserve units at a position that is close to the main direction and the primary direction, which is convenient for maneuvers; establish an overall and focused, interior and exterior line fitted to a depth of three-dimensional strategic operational systems, in order to ensure that the decisive timing and directions concentrate superior armed forces to attack the enemy decisively. Under the conditions of generally being in an inferior position, make every effort in forming a superiority over the enemy at a time and location with decisive significance, and this is the only way to defeat the enemy and win the war.

In high-tech local wars, with significantly enhanced transparency, troop maneuverability, ranges of maneuvers, shooting range, and lethality, the balance of battlefield forces and the shift of passive and active situations are mush faster. The contradiction of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy is more prominent, and the approach of carrying out the concentration of forces has become the concentration of operational force and operational effectiveness. This concentration places emphasis on flexible and light operational organization, covert and dispersed operational deployment, a high degree of integration of operations and operational capability of all the arms and branch services, thus, it will be provided with a superiority of a higher degree of concentration and stronger force. This new characteristic requires guiding strategists to handle the relative dispersion or scattering of troops as a normal state of force deployment, and treat the concentration of operational forces as a special state of fixed timing, fixed direction and limited scope. In operations, concentration refers mainly to the concentration of elite units and advanced weapons. It is the concentration of all kinds of weapons and equipment, the collective force of units of all the arms and branch services at a critical time and location, and it is the concentration with an objective of destroying the enemy’s operational structures, disturbing the enemy’s operational procedures, weakening the enemy’s operational capabilities, and aiming at the enemy’s vital parts and weaknesses. The force superiority established by concentration not only out-match the enemy by quality and quantity, it also depends on the enemy’s weakening superiority or collapse, and it is carried out through putting the full play of subjective initiatives and carrying out correct maneuvers in an environment full of confrontations and changes. Once the objective of operation is accomplished, concentration must be switched to dispersion or scattering, and preparations must be made to maneuver toward new targets and directions at anytime, in order to carry out the next concentration of operational forces.

While concentrating forces in a main strategic direction, guiding strategists should also pay close attention to the coordination of all strategic directions, in order to make the military struggle victory at a single direction an advantageous condition for stabilizing the overall situation and solving problems in other directions. China is a big country, which faces myriad forms of threats and numerous opponents, thus, a number of strategic directions are formed. Between strategic directions, especially between the main direction and important directions, a prominent strategic interactive relationship is in existence. Within the same time, we can only concentrate the force dealing with a main enemy. This situation objectively pushes the struggles of strategic diversion and counter-diversion to a focal point. Therefore, we should pay attention to the main direction strategically and never become distracted by losses and difficulties in secondary directions, always place the focal point of turning around the overall war on the main direction and major problem solving. At the same time, we should determine priorities according to the strategic relations between the main direction and other directions, in order to adopt different policies and plans of struggle, reduce pressures and stabilize situations as soon as possible, in order to create conditions for resolving problems in the main direction. We must combine the relative stability of the main and secondary strategic directions and the flexibility of switching the focal points of military struggles properly, in order to enhance our strategic maneuvering capability and strengthen our ability in controlling war escalations and carrying out overall operations.

**Section Six: Crush the Network, Fight Continuously, and Insist on Weakening the Enemy Before Launching Active Annihilating Attacks**

The typical mode of operations under modern high-tech conditions is using beyond defense-zone joint attacking weapon systems to carry out non-symmetry, non-contact, and non-linear precision attacks. Using networks to form a whole and establishing a three-dimensional system of technological superiority is the key foundation of giving the rein to fighting capacity. In wars that may take place in the future, one of the overall issues our army must solve in operations is how to break up the enemy’s operations’ system in overall confrontations.

In order to win future local wars under high-tech conditions, we need to use “war of annihilation” that is also called “war of paralyzing annihilation” as the overall and basic form of our military operations. The so-called “war of annihilation” is using various approaches to destroy the integrity of the enemy’s operational systems, and the order of the enemy’s military operations; using measures that may make the enemy lose its overall fighting capacity to tip the battlefield force balance, create postures and conditions that are advantageous of defending ourselves, annihilating enemy forces, and win the initiative. The essentials are: weaken the enemy’s capabilities first, gain the initiative, then, based on the enemy’s situation, destroy enemy targets that may expedite the process of achieving the objective of war. This form of warfare, in comparison with traditional mobile warfare, position warfare, and guerrilla warfare, or other recently developed types of warfare, is more suitable for our army and actual future wars, and it is a logical choice in confrontations between systems. Regardless of directions, opponents and their level of technologies, and the character of their military operations, this form of warfare will be generally suitable for our army in future wars, and its content and mode will be enriched with the development of wars.

In a war of annihilation, we must attack the nodal point and break up the network, and carry out both annihilation and attrition. In the past, an operational system relies on the direct combination of personnel and weapons, and depends mainly on troop maneuvers to bring about firing maneuvers, if the enemy’s effective strength is not annihilated, the situation of war will not change. Currently, the bond of maintaining operational systems has changed. In comparison with the step-by-step dismembering of the enemy’s body, destroying the enemy’s brain and central nervous system is more significant in expediting the process of war. Shaking up the stability of the enemy’s war system in order to paralyze its fighting capacity has become the focal point of modern high-tech local wars. Therefore, we should focus more on carrying out annihilating attacks against the structures and procedures of the enemy’s operational systems. Carefully select and attack with full force, destroy nodal points that sustain the enemy’s war system, especially those weak parts that are hard to replace or regenerate, in order to cause serious malfunctions of the enemy’s war system that may result in the loss of the initiative in unstoppable chaos; capitalizing on the opportunities provided by the enemy’s losing of operational system balance, deploy a number of operational measures to destroy the enemy’s effective strength, and at the same time, aid this effort with active defense and widespread harassing attacks and operations of attrition, in order to stop the enemy from getting out of being passive, until it is defeated by us.

Attacking the enemy’s operational system requires the control of operational focus, and correct selection of the target and order of attack. Therefore, we need to arrange the enemy’s comprehensive weaknesses selectively into operational targets, according to the degree of their impact on the entire operational system and operational procedures, and form an order of structural destruction, in order for us to carry out combat operations in a firm, precise, and coordinated manner. Under high-tech conditions, technological superiority is supported by the integrity and stability of the information system, attack system, and support system. Paralyzing the enemy’s information system may make the enemy lose it “brain” and “nerve;” the damaged enemy support system may result in other systems loss of material backing and energy sources. Therefore, the focus of future wars should not be placed in direct confrontation with the enemy’s system of attack, and we should always insist on making information systems and support systems the targets of first choice. Generally speaking, the information system and support system should be attacked first, then the weapon system and strength system; among the systems, generally, exposed, fixed, and weak targets should be attacked first, and then covert, moving and stronger targets. For information systems, first, we should firmly destroy its ground facilities, jam and cut off the enemy’s information transmission return circuit, then, every effort should be made to destroy its perception platform, destroy the enemy’s capability of forming information flow to the maximum in order to have a “decapitation and tendon severing” effect. On support systems, efforts should be made to attack the enemy on the round, cut of its flow of materials that are the sources of efficacy, in order to gain the effect of taking away the firewood from under the cauldron. For the attacking system, effort should be made to first attack the enemy’s operations support platforms, and information devices in all kinds of platforms; then, attack the main battle platform that has been weakened; finally, destroy the individual strength system that has been isolated and has lost its protection, and destroy its flow of energy, in order to gain the effect of crushing one by one. As long as this rule can be handled properly, the fatal weak point of the enemy can be grasped tightly, which forms the focus of operations under high-tech conditions, turn the enemy’s fighting capacity from strong to weak and our superiority can be exploited and strengthened fully during this transformation.

Another distinction between war of annihilation and our traditional war of annihilation is the degree of destruction and annihilation against enemy targets. In attacking the nodal points and breaking up the networks, generally, it requires complete destruction of information systems and command and control systems to the maximum, destruction of the support system, and a part of the strength and firing system. Emphasis should be placed on destructive attacks, but not denying war of annihilation under advantageous conditions, as everything must be changed with changes of time, location and conditions. Annihilating the enemy’s effective strength will inflict the enemy with significant political, public opinion, psychological and spiritual pressures, and shake up its will to fight, thus, it is still an effective mode of operation.

The system confrontation between us and the enemy is a motional process. Whether we can carry out our objective of war eventually will depend on if we can grasp the enemy’s weakness and hold it, attack it quickly, attack fiercely, and attack it precisely. For superior enemies, we must start from effective use of forces, organize the operations into a coherent process, prompt the enemy to reach the peak of using its superiority as quick as possible, which may result in a situation of turning from rise to fall, and eventually to an effect of avalanche. We must coordinate continued penetrating attacks against the depth, continued resisting attacks in the front, continued attacks in the flanks and rear, and continued annihilating attacks in the decisive battles. In offense and defense, efforts should be made to carry out multi-wave, focused, omni-directional, around-the-clock, and all depth operations in order to deprive the enemy’s freedom of maneuvers and operations, never leave the enemy any chances of a breather or recovering its fighting capabilities.

**Section Seven: Strive for a Quick End But Prepare for Protracted War**

In future high-tech local wars, we should do all we can for a quick ending strategically, in order to ensure the normal operation of our national economic development, and reduce the destruction and attrition of war. When conditions are not good for fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision, we should use the best of the situation, confine the actions of war in a local area and lead it to a relatively protracted war. In strategically decisive battles that involve fundamental national interest and national survival, in particular, if our objective forces balance can not win with quick battles, we must prepare mentally and materially for a protracted war. We do not mind fighting the enemy to the end with maximum national sacrifices, and firm perseverance. We will never stop if we can not win completely.

Guiding strategists should make correct judgments on whether we can carry out a quick ending of the war strategically according to the strength balance of the enemy and our own and the overall war situation, in order to take corresponding strategic measures. By and large, there are three necessary conditions of carrying out strategically quick war decisions: 1.The objective of both warring parties is limited, and both have no plan to fight a protracted war. 2. The paces of war are well-knit, and strategically decisive battles that determine the process and ending of war can be carried out rather quickly. 3. The side that may have an overwhelming superiority can deprive the other side’s capabilities and chances of continued combat operations in a relatively short time; or a better strategic guidance can manage or use all strategic resources skillfully, and suppress the opponent’s strength from being used effectively, thus forcing the enemy’s hand. As our geographic environment is quite complex, our strategic judgment must fully assess the possible situation of an enemy that is stronger and superior than us, and fully evaluate the possibility that the enemy may have allies to gang up against us. Our strategic decisions must fit the objective realities of the enemy and our own, in order to lay it on a stable and dependable foundation. For so doing, we must properly handle the follow three issues.

1. On guiding ideology, we must discard all illusions. We should place the footing of planning and implementation of war firmly on effective dealing with possible strong enemies. As expressed in the dialectic of war, if you truly make preparations for dealing with the most complex and difficult situations, and set the footing on defeating strong enemies, the development of war will be more smooth than expected.

2. Despise the enemy strategically, and take the enemy seriously tactically. On the basis of continued and expanded traditional modes of operations, focus on the characteristics and development of wars, aim at the weakness of the enemy’s war system, equipment system, and operational system, and make every effort in bringing forth the mode of operations of our armed forces in local wars under high-tech conditions. We should not only clearly understand that our level of modernization is still not good enough, we should also be fully aware where our superiority lies. No matter whether future defensive operations are in large or small scales, the opponents are strong or weak, we must plan meticulously, guide carefully, and firmly focus the attention of operational guidance on continued attacks against the enemy’s weak and vital nodal points, create and grasp advantageous opportunities of war from the intensive environment of confrontations, continue to create and expand the enemy’s misconceptions and disorders, and attack the enemy at our own will, and so accomplish the objectives of war.

3. Adhere to operations with planning, preparation, and confidence. Our principle is: “never fight a war without preparation, never fight a war without confidence, and every war should be prepared with the best efforts, and with the full confidence of winning under the balanced conditions of the enemy and our own.” In future wars, regardless of quick ending or protracted, we must make careful preparation as early as possible. In the past, we relied on the two strategic superiorities of deep national territories and protracted war; under high-tech conditions, however, these two major superiorities may find difficulties in playing their past role of changing the situations of war. War and operational preparation should pay more attention to naval, air, and electronic information operations, and prioritize depth, three-dimensional, precision, and long-range operations, as well as operations in emergencies or with insufficient preparation. From a certain significance, plans, preparations and confidence under high-tech conditions are provided with more uncertainties and higher requirements for the quality of guiding strategists than those in the past. Therefore, war and operations with plans, preparations and confidence will pay more attention to focus, main contradictions, and operations with decisive significance to the overall strategy, the good vision, judgment and decisive actions of guiding strategists.

**Section Eight: Handle the Relationship among War Deliberation, War Preparation and War Implementation Properly; Create an Advantageous Situation and Strategic Posture**

For a long time, our military experts have been advocating war deliberation, which steels ourselves through actual wars, develops the practice of paying equal attention to both stopping and winning wars, and makes every effort in upholding the principle of strategic guidance of winning a war without fighting a battle. This is one of the treasures of the military science of the Chinese nation.

Emphasizing war deliberation means dealing with wars with a cautious attitude, and all moves should be made only after prudent planning. War and social progress have been enjoying a dual relationship over the years. We have always believed in resolving all conflicts through peaceful means, and we will not use force unless we are forced to do so. At the same time, high-tech local wars differ significantly from past wars; the destructive force and impact is no match for that of traditional wars. Therefore, risky and unruly wars are strictly prohibited. We must be fully prepared before we can take any action with confidence. War deliberation is not war-phobia, but it is what Master Sun Wu called “winning before challenging for fight.” The key to war deliberation is assessing the situation carefully, and on the basis of objectively analyzing the balance of forces, find out the conditions for changes of superior and inferior situations and ways of gaining the final victory.

Active war preparation is carrying out continued and deep war preparation according to the correct assessment of war threats. The army is in existence only for preventing war and winning wars. Preparation for wars and winning wars is the basic rule of developing and managing the army. We would rather not fight a single war in a hundred years, than go through a single day without preparation, as there is no end for war preparation. As long as there are still wars in the world, making preparations for war will continue forever. Whether a country and an army can be war ready or can respond to a war often lies closely in whether war preparations have been made properly. The more war preparation is made, the more active war deliberation and war implementation with more confidence and power will be. Based on our unique security environment, war preparation not only requires aiming at the main threats and maintaining strategic stability, it also needs to take consideration of other directions and different forms of threats, in order to enhance its strategic flexibility. As a result, we need to combine the long-term development of the army and war preparations in different historic periods, combine the situation developing in peacetime and effective actions in wartime, and combine strategic general guiding principles and actual practices in all the individual strategic directions.

Proper war implementation is good because of the approach of using the force according to the assessment result of the enemy, thus it can control the war actions strictly within the scope permitted by political goals. This is a common rule of current local wars. Proper war implementation requires guiding strategists correctly control the degree of military threats and war behaviors, appropriately select military measures that can express our own political will; before the war breaks out or in the initial stage of the war, an overall consideration and a clear general rule have already been made concerning issues such as “fight with whom, when to fight, and fight in what space, use what approaches or methods to fight, fight to what degree, and end the war under what conditions.” War deliberation and war preparation will eventually end at war implementation. Only by adhering to rational and proper war implementation, can we fully and effectively use the advantageous postures created by war deliberation and war preparation, win the war, and enter a new round of benign circle of situation developing.

During the 50’s of the 20th century, our party’s planning and preparing of the War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea is a model of correctly handling relations among war deliberation, war preparation and war implementation. At that time, the national strength and military power between the U. S. and us was extremely imbalanced; the U. S. had air superiority and sea superiority, in addition to atomic bombs and other most advanced weapons and equipment in the world. The U. S. was so strong that the Soviet Union led by Stalin did not want to run the risk of going into war with the U. S. However, Mao Zedong and the Party Central believed that the characteristic of the U. S. forces was “two strong points and three shortcomings.” The strong points were lots of iron, and knew how to run, the shortcomings were that their combat line was too long, transportation line was too far, and combat effectiveness was too low, infantry units, in particular, were the weakest. The strategic focus of the U. S. was in Europe, the U. S. was not prepared for the Third World War, the conditions of its armed forces and economy made it not possible to fight a world war, its dependent countries were all afraid of fighting another world war, and the people’s democratic forces had exceeded the forces of launching a war of aggression, so, China could race against time in preventing a new world war. As the U. S. had fought its way to our door steps, forced us to fight, so, we would concentrate our forces in the main strategic direction to fight the enemy head-on actively, rather than waiting for the U. S. to come near the Northeast border, and “release Chiang Kai-shek from the cage” in the southeast, so they could attack us from both directions. It is better to assist neighboring countries in order to stop the enemy from coming near the border, than “if a country falls, the other will be in danger too.” It is better to be in pain for a short time, than in pain for a long time; and it is better to fight early, than fight late, so we can start to rebuild in peace after the fight is over. Based on the above scientific assessments, Mao Zedong and the Party Central believed “the benefit of sending forces is extremely great and the damage of not sending forces is extremely great.” Mao Zedong and the Party Central led our country and our army in carrying out a careful overall preparation, and took a series of correct flexible maneuvering strategies and tactics. Such struggles for strategically advantageous positions, prudent initial battles, targeted the puppet’s forces and isolated U. S. forces, seized battle opportunities, change combat approaches at appropriate times, and destroy and waste the enemy’s war strength, etc., all wrote glorious new chapters of strategic guidance.

**Section Nine: Organize and Carry out Preventive, Controlled and Decisive Combat Operations at Appropriate Times According to Different Situations**

In our future local wars, unless a small number of isolated high-tech attacks take place, the process of war may include stages such as deterrent and counter-deterrent, small scale military clashes, and large scale operations, etc. The actual situation of these stages will change with different war situations.

Start from the characteristics of high-tech local war and the practice of our military preparations, draw on the historic experience of our numerous defensive operations since the founding of the new China, we can divide our future military operations (including deterrence) strategically into three categories of preventive strategic operations or actions, controlled operations and decisive operations.

Preventive strategic operations or actions are military deterrent operations or combat operations that are carried out by our armed forces to prevent events being developed toward the direction of troubles and stop crisis from deteriorating in strategic directions where war crisis may occur or has already taken place. This type of operation is generally characterized as significant non-war military actions and small scale and low intensity combat operations, which include maneuvers between two units, border security alerts, emergency war preparation, establishing no-fly (or no-navigation) zones, special operations, small scale joint operations, etc.

Controlled operations is carried out by our armed forces to recover or stabilize the situation and effectively control or improve the front situation in the strategic direction that war crisis has emerged or is still escalating. It is generally characterized as medium scale and medium to low intensity combat operations, which include regional blockades, guided missile attacks, air attacks, islands offense and defense, border counterattacks, medium scale or large scale joint operations under special conditions, etc.

Decisive operations are operations carried out by our armed forces in maintaining our national basic interests in the main strategic direction where serious war threat may endanger our national security has emerged. These operations are characterized generally as large or medium and medium and high intensity combat operations next to an all-out war. This type of operation has a decisive character; we will not fight unless victory is sure. Its form is similar to that of the War Resisting U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea in the 50’s of the 20th century.

In dividing up our military operations into the three above-mentioned categories it will be beneficial to carrying out the strategic thought of equally important war prevention and war victory, beneficial to properly dealing with the relations among prudent wars, preparing war and fighting the war, and beneficial to carrying out categorized guidance with priorities according to different war threats and strategic requirements. This division is able to overcome uncertainties of war to a certain degree, and provide a relatively regulated and measurable model for our deployment of forces according to the enemy’s strength, carrying mobilization because of war, and training according to actual operational requirements.

Under high-tech local war conditions, our armed forces should first prepare and carry out preventive, controlled and strategic actions or operations in order to prevent the eruption of wars or escalation of wars. As long as problems can be resolved through military deterrence, we will not resort to force; if problems can be resolved through small scale wars, we will not allow small wars to develop into medium or large scale wars. In order to deal with complex and difficult situations, and defend our basic national interest, the basic point of our war preparation must be placed firmly on carrying out decisive battles at any time. We should pay close attention to carrying out operational duties in two strategic directions simultaneously, that is, while carrying out decisive battles in the main direction, preventive and controlled strategic actions or combat operations should be carried out in another strategic direction.

Organizing the above-mentioned three categories of operations should not only be flexible according to enemy situations, strategic timings should also be selected properly in order to seize the key position easily, and deal with issues of strategic hot points decisively, and maintain the overall stability and the strategic initiative. Based on our socialist character and the strategic military policy of active defense, in selecting strategic timing, we should not only focus on the military, but also the political aspect, not only benefit our gaining of the initiative, but also reflect our justice and self defense oriented operations, in order to win the masses’ support of the war objectives and sympathy of the international community.

**Section Ten: Carry Out Effective Military Political Warfare and Political Military Warfare**

War is the continuation of politics, our future high-tech local war will be the continuation of the most basic political needs of maintaining our national sovereignty, security, and interest, and it is also the continuation of our country and our foreign policy. The objective, approaches, process and ending of wars are under more political restraints, and they are not simple military operations, but military political wars or political military wars.

Future high-tech local wars will not only be military matches, they are the overall matches of political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural forces. Non-military struggles such as political, economic and cultural struggles are directly or indirectly working with military struggles. In wars, if there is no military victory, struggles in the other fronts will lose conditions of backing and development; without powerful support and coordination of other fronts, it will be hard for simple military struggles to be won. Carrying out close coordination between military struggles and non-military struggles is the objective requirement for achieving the goal of complete victory, and a part of the overall people’s war.

The key to political struggles in a war is to fully expose, divide and crush the enemy, unite with all the peace loving, national sovereignty and dignity maintaining countries and people in the world, and oppose all forms of hegemony and wars of injustice. We must focus on the situations and the structures of war systems in the enemy’s camp, use contradictions to defeat enemies individually, use all the schemes to destroy the enemy’s allies of aggression, crush the enemy’s plan of organizing international sanctions and invasion of allied forces; use all kinds of approaches to restrain the enemy’s war decisions and combat operations, promote anti-war forces within the enemy to form war obstructions; effectively use international laws as a weapon, expose the enemy’s war crimes and crimes of human right violations, and find a legal basis for our military operations in order to gain widespread international sympathy and support.

Economic struggles in a war are mainly using the market and the conditions of resources resulting from economic globalization, and the interest pattern of “you are among us and we are among you, so we will prosper together and lose together,” to restrain the enemy, reduce the damages to our national economy resulting from the enemy’s fire attacks, maintain ability of obtaining science and technology strategic resources through international channels and multi-approaches, and take various counter-measures to weaken the enemy’s economic strength and war potentialities.

The coordination between military struggles and diplomatic struggles demonstrates the integration of military operations and political negotiations, in order to maintain the position of military and political initiatives and win the war. Zhao Enlai once pointed out: “When talking about wars, Chinese people are experienced, and they too, are experienced in negotiations.” Our approach of “talk while continue to fight” has become a well-known term in the world. “Combining fight and negotiation” must adhere to the high degree of integration of principle and flexibility. The key here is, taking off the edge of the enemy’s spirit in the battlefield in order to gain the leading right in negotiations. The basic focus of carrying out combining fight and negotiation is under the premise of military advantages, gaining political initiative through negotiation, securing our maximum basic interests, and making arrangement for post-war peace. We must control the pace of military attacks, use political requirements in determining military attacks, pause, advance, or withdraw; use military victory in creating advantageous conditions for political solutions, and be flexible, skillful, rational, advantageous, and moderate, so the enemy will lose not only militarily, but also rationally.

In the new Chinese’ past military struggles, we skillfully use the principle of attack and negotiation combined tactics, often under the condition of gaining battlefield superiority, suggested or accepted suggestion of negotiation on our own initiative, which resulted in significantly expanded effects. 1. On our own initiative, declare to the world our desire of resolving all conflicts through peaceful means, in order to establish our image of peace and gain popular support of the international community; 2. Make political arrangements for sustained peace and mutual acknowledgement of the obligation of maintaining peace; 3. Under the conditions of protecting our basic national interests, end the war as soon as possible in order to reduce losses and damages resulting from war. The cease-fire talks during the Korean War were initiated by the U. S. in a situation that we had controlled the battlefield initiative, and the agreement was finally reached when we were gaining momentum in holding the initiative. It not only protected the basic interest of both China and Korea to the maximum, it reduced war losses, and it also won a victory of morality and justice. After we won the first stage of the Sino-Indian border counter-attack operations, we made an announcement in reiterating our position of resolving the Sino-Indian border disputes through peaceful negotiations, and suggested ceasing armed clashes and reopening peace talks. After we won a bigger victory in the second stage of operations, we again carried out cease fire and pull out our troops, and again proposed to settle the border issues through negotiations. Our approach not only achieved the objective of easing up the tense situation on the Sino-Indian border, it also showed our force of morality and justice fully.

If we want to negotiate a result, the most important thing is that we must gain relative military superiority. The War Resisting U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea was fought for three years, and negotiated for two years, finally, the U. S. had to sign the cease fire agreement because it could not make a break-through of the deadlock militarily, under the heavy overseas and domestic political and economic pressures, it had to accept the fact of losing the war in Korea. As evidenced by facts, if we did not show our abundant strength and firm determination, the negotiation would have been futile.

In negotiations, we will not make any concession if important principles concerning our basic national interests are involved, we do not care even if the negotiation may fail; under the premise of not hurting our basic national interests, we can make some concessions on certain concrete issues, in order to reflect our sincerity of making peace, and avoid the negotiation being broken down due to our inflexible attitude. The cease fire talk of the war in Korea had been carried out through the struggles around the two issues of a military demarcation line and the repatriation of prisoners of war. During the first stage of the negotiation, we firmly denied the unreasonable U. S. proposal to move the demarcation line scores of kilometers north, and it did not get the result it could not get in the battlefield. During the second stage, we continued to insist on the principle and position of repatriation of all the prisoners of war as soon as the war ended, and firmly denied a U. S. conspiracy of detaining the prisoners of war in the name of so-called “voluntary repatriation.” At that time, as the prisoner of war issue had become the only obstacle of the cease-fire in Korea, so we also made some adjustment to our position. On behalf of China and Korea, Zhou Enlai raised, on March 20, 1953: “The two sides of negotiation should ensure that after the cease-fire goes into effect, all the house prisoners who insisted on repatriation must be repatriated immediately, the rest should be handed over to a neutral country in order to ensure the fair settlement of their repatriation problem.” By so doing, we had adhered to our principle and position, as well as showing our profound art of guidance in response to the calls of the international community for an early cease fire, which is, to this day, still provided with strong practical significance.

**Bibliography**

1. ((Abstracts of Military Works of Marx, Engles, Lenin, and Stalin)), People’s Liberation Army Press, 1983 Edition.
2. ((Collected Military Works of Mao Zedong)), Miltiary Science Press, 1993 Edition.
3. ((Science of Strategy)), Military Academy of Sciences, Miltiary Science Press, 1987 edition.
4. ((An Outline of Military Strategy)), Peng Guangqian, et el, People’s Liberation Army Press, 1989 Edition.
5. ((An Introduction to Military Strategy)), Huang Yuzhang, National Defense University Press, 1991 Edition.
6. ((The Science of Strategy)), Wang Wenrong, National Defense University Press, 1999 Edition.
7. ((An Outline of Mao Zedong’s Military Strategy)), Wang Pufeng, Military Science Press, 1994 Edition.
8. ((The Strategic Thought of Deng Xiaoping)), Peng Guangqian, Yao Youzhi, Military Science Press, 1994 Edition.
9. ((Military Strategic Thinking)), Li Jijun, Military Science Press, 1997 Edition
10. ((Military Encyclopedia of China, Book of War and Strategy)), Military Science Press, 1993 Edition.
11. ((The Art of War)), Klauciwiz, Commercial Press, 1979 Edition.
12. ((An Introduction to the Art of War, Rhomini, People’s Liberation Army Press, 1986 Edition.
13. ((On the Art of Strategy)), Leder, Hart, Warrior Press, 1980 Edition.
14. ((Military Strategy)), (Soviet Union) Sokolovski, Warrior Press, 1980 Edition.
15. ((Military Strategy)), (U.S.), U. S. Army Staff College, military Science Press, 1986 Edition.
16. ((Elementary Strategy)), (France) Andrea Bofeur, Military Science Press, !989 Edition.
17. ((Great Strategy)), (U.S.) John Collins, Military Science Press.
18. ((Selected Chinese Military Master Pieces)), Miltiary Science Press, 2001 Edition.
19. ((Selected Foreign Miltiary Master Pieces), Miltiary Science Press, 2000 Edition.
20. The Making of Strategy, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
21. The Makers of modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1986.

**Brief Introduction of Authors of The Science of Strategy (2001 Edition)**

Yao Youzhi Director, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences, Major General, Tutor of doctoral candidates

Peng Guangqian Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences, Tutor of doctoral candidates

(Follow names are listed by stroke order)

Yu Rubo Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences, Tutor of doctoral candidates

Wang Shengrong Deputy Editor, ((Military Sciences of China)) Magazine, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Wang Xinsheng Deputy Divisional Commander Level Fellow, Department of Scientific research Guidance, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Wang Feng Master of Military Sciences, Department of Scientific Research Guidance, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Wang Huiqing Deputy Director, Ph.D., Science of Strategy, Research Institute of Military Operational Analysis, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Liu Yichang Former Director, Fellow, Miltiary Science Press, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Cong Wensheng Doctor of Laws, Department of Military System Research, Academy of Sciences

Sun Dangen Master of Miltiary Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Ye Xiongbing Post Graduate Fellow, Research Institute of Military Operational Analysis, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Feng Haiming Doctor of Strategic Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Ren Xiangqiong Doctoral Fellow pf Strategic Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of military Sciences

Shen Fangwu Doctor of Strategic Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, academy of military Sciences

Du Rubo Fellow (special guest) Peace and Development Research Center

Li Qiang Doctor of Strategic Sciences Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Li Zhishun Deputy Divisional Commander Level Fellow, Department of Miltiary System Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Chen Bojiang Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Chen Zhengzhong Doctor of Strategic Science Fellow, Department of Strategic Research,

Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Zhang Shiping Fellow, Academic Investigation and Research Office, Department of Scientific Research Guidance, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Zhang Peigao Assistant Fellow, Department of Campaign and Battle Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Luo Yuan Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Gong Yuzhen Doctor of Military Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Hu Guangzheng Fellow, Doctoral Tutor, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Hong Bing Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Hao Zhihui Military student studying overseas, Master of Strategic Science, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Zhao Zhiyin Doctor of Strategic Sciences Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Zhao Dexi Master of Miltiary Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Xu Hong Managing Editor, Editor, Military Academic Magazine, Academy of Military Sciences

Guo Wujun Post Graduate Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Liang Xiaoqiu Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Huang Yingxu Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Huang Xing Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Zeng Yan Assistant Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Military Sciences

Xiong Yuxiang Doctor of Strategic Sciences Fellow, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Xiong Mingfeng Master of Strategic Sciences, Department of Strategic Research, Academy of Miltiary Sciences

Cai Huatang Doctorate Candidate, Military Sciences

**Postcript**

Deputy Commandant Gao Rui was in charge of compiling and publishing the first ((Science of Strategy)) of the People’s Liberation Army in 1987. Since that time, a series of historic changes with far-reaching impact have taken place. The informational social forms, multi-polar strategic structures, integrated global economy, and the world’s high-tech military have been increasingly affecting and changing all the sectors of human society, including the outlook and process of the military domain, as a logical result of international economic, political and military technology development. High-tech local wars have taken the stage of modern wars, and become the main form of modern wars. The unfolding world military revolution is bringing powerful impact to a series of traditional concepts and modes of operations in the military domain. The rapid development of war practices urgently requires new theoretical interpretations of new issues, new situations and new characteristics that have emerged in the military domain, and a new summation for the rule of war and the rule of war guidance.

In order to suit the developments and changes of strategic situations, in 1996, the Department of Strategic Research of the Academy of Military Science decided to carry out the project of researching and compiling the new edition of ((The Science of Strategy)). This project was listed as a priority project of the Academy of Military Sciences, as well as a priority project of the “Ninth Five-Year Plan” of the entire Chinese People’s Liberation Army. On the basis of four-years of academic preparation and preliminary research works, the overall compiling work began in July, 2000. The book was finished after a whole year of collective efforts of the Project Group.

During the process of compilation, the Project Group made every effort in following the guidance of Marxism’s scientific view of war and its view of strategy, setting our foot on our own national situation and the situation of our armed forces, and combining inheriting and developing, as well as creating and drawing on the experience of others in working out a book of strategic theories with Chinese and time characteristics, which has a practical guiding significance for carrying out military strategic policies in the new era. During the compiling process, the following three points were highlighted: 1. Paid attention to write around the war, grasped the essence and connotation of wars, in order to avoid over generalization of the connotations of war and strategy; 2. paid attention to try great efforts in searching for rules, including the general rules of wars and strategy, and special rules for high-tech local war and its strategic guidance; 3. paid attention to the need of developing academic disciplines that are suitable for strategic sciences, made every effort in building up and completing the development and progresses made to our strategic theoretical systems. We hope that through our efforts, we can win local wars under modern, especially high-tech, conditions, in order to provide useful theoretical deep thought for military development and military school teaching in the new era.

The Project Group was led by Director Yao Youzhi, Peng Guangqian was responsible for frame design, organization and implementation, the group members were mainly drawn from fellows of the Department of Strategic Research of the Academy of Military Sciences, and experts from both inside and outside the academy were also invited to carry out this project. There were more than 40 experts who participated in various compiling stages of this book. Among them, there were 4 tutors of doctorate candidates, 8 fellows, 10 assistant fellows, 12 doctors, and 9 masters. After the initial draft was completed, Peng Guangqian, Liang Xiaoqiu, and Huang Xing worked on the initial editing, and Peng Guangqian made the final editing and approval. Before his passing, Deputy Director Dai Yifang paid close attention to the work of this book. Yu Qifen, the former Director of Strategic Research Department, led the academic preparation work in the early stages. Fu Liqun, the Deputy Director of the Department of Strategic Research and Yin Bing, the chief of the First Office of the Department participated in organizational leadership work in the early compiling stage. Mao Zhengfa, Wang Xuhe, Liu Hongsong, and Miao Xiaoping participated in the early stage of preliminary research and prepared part of the first draft. Wang Zengquan, former chief of the Second Office, Zhang Shiping, Chief of Department of Academic Investigation and Research, Department of Scientific Reasearch Guidance, Deng Xiaobao, Editor-in-Chief of ((Military Sciences of China)) Magazine, and Ma Guangwu, Chief Editor of Miltiary Sciences Press participated in the examining and approving works of this book, and they provided a lot of constructive opinions. Gao Tiejun, Fellow of Department of Strategic Research contributed hard work in examining and proof reading this book. There have never been changes as deep and rapid as current changes in the realms of war and strategy, not only the directions of future wars can not be grasped easily; it is also difficult to just understand the nature of the already emerged changes. To this day, there are still different views of key academic issues in the academic circle. Although the Project Group tried hard to be close to the essence subjectively, every individual’s knowledge, however, can not avoid being limited. Whether or not this book can provide readers with precise and appropriate views and comments, we have to let it be examined through practices, we also welcome generous comments from knowledgeable readers.

The Author

October 8, 2001

1. Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46, Part I, P475. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, P413. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. The War of Shennongshi against Fusui Clan is recorded in “Zhanguo Strategies, Strategy of Qin”, “History of Road, Afterward III”, and “Art of War of Sunbin”. Shennongshi lived in the northeast of today’s Henan, and Fusui Clan lived in Qufu, the southwest of Shandong. This war is the earliest war recorded in the ancient books of our country. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. The above statistics include different editions of the same books. Refer to “Understanding the Chinese Books of Art of War” by Baolin Xu, published by the Press of Liberation Army, 1988 edition. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. Refer to “History of Han” Volume 30, Chapter 10 of Art and Culture, China Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. “The Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union” Volume 1, published by Soldier Press, 1982 Edition, P. 344. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. (The United States) John Collins: “Great Strategy”, published by Military Science Academy, 1978 Edition, P 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. “Selected Military Works by Lenin”, published by Soldier Press, 1981 Edition, P 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. “Overview of Art of War”, published by the Publishing House of the People’s Liberation Army, 1988 edition, P 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. Lider Hart: “On Strategy”, published by Soldier Press, 1981 edition, PP448-449. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. “Selected Works of Mao Zedong”, Volume 1, published by People’s Press, 1991 edition, P175. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. (The Soviet Union) Wah Da Soklovesky: “Military Strategy”, published by Soldier Press, 1980 edition, P25. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
13. “Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union”, Volume 1, published by Soldier Press, 1982 edition, P342. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
14. “Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union”, Volume 1, published by Soldier Press, 1982 edition, P342. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
15. Refer to (the United States) Larselle F. Whigley: “The History of Military Strategy and Policy of the United States of America” published by the Press of the People’s Liberation Army, 1986 edition, P 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
16. “The Military Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union”, Volume 1, published by Soldier Press, 1982 edition, P 332. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
17. Socroffsky: “Military Strategy”, published by the People’s Liberation Army Press, 1984 edition, P 528. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
18. (France) Andrea Boffer: “Introduction to Strategy”, published by Military Science Press, 1989 edition, PP 16 to 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
19. Crosewitz: “On War”, volume 1, P43. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
20. “Military Works of Mao Zedong”, volume 2, P308. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
21. Li Jijun: “Military Theory and War Practice”, published by Military Science Press, 1994 edition, P7. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
22. “Wuzi. The Priority of Ruling a Country”. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
23. Croseweitz: “On War”, Volume 3, first edition of the Chinese edition, the Publishing House of the People’s Liberation Army, 1985 edition, P 1220. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
24. “Selected Works by Deng Xiaoping”, Volume 3, P 330. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
25. “Selected Works by Deng Xiaoping”, Volume 3, P 347. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
26. “Selected Works by Deng Xiaoping”, Volume 3, P 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
27. “On War”, 1964 edition, P 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
28. Ditto, P 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
29. “Complete Works of Lenin”, Volume 30, P 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
30. “The Military Works of Mao Zedong”, Volume 1, P 702. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
31. “The Complete Works of Lenin”, Volume 30, P 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
32. “The Military Works of Mao Zedong”, Volume 1, P 702. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
33. “Selected Works of Mao Zedong”, one-volume edition, P 458. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
34. (The United States) Starvolianorth: “The World History”, Volume II, published by Shanghai Social Science Press, 1992 edition, P121. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
35. “Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping”, Volume 3, People’s Press, 1993 edition, P294. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
36. “Sorting Out the Disordered World—Evaluation of the Global Strategy over the Century of the United States”, edited by the National Strategic Institute of Defense University of the United States, published by Defense University Press, 2000 edition, P13. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
37. “Sorting Out the Disordered World—Evaluation of the Global Strategy over the Century of the United States”, edited by the National Strategic Institute of Defense University of the United States, published by Defense University Press, 2000 edition, P15. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
38. Marx and Engels Selected Work, Vol. 2, page 122

    2. Di Wang Shi Ji

    3. Shi Ji, Wu Di Ben Ji [↑](#footnote-ref-37)